



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


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GYMNASIUM

SIVE

SYMBOLA CRITICA.

INTENDED TO ASSIST

THE CLASSICAL STUDENT

IN HIS ENDEAVOURS TO ATTAIN A CORRECT

LATIN PROSE STYLE.

BY THE REV. ALEXANDER CROMBIE,

LL.D., F.R.S., AND M.R.S.L.

“Audieram etiam quæ de orationis ipsius ornamentis traderentur, in quæ præcipitur primum, ut pure et Latine loquamur; deinde, ut plane et dilucide, tum, ut ornate; post, ad rerum dignitatem apte, et quasi decore; singularumque rerum præcepta cognoveram.”
Cic.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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GYMNASIUM,

SIVE

SYMBOLA CRITICA.

OBSERVATIONS.

SAL.

DICACITAS.

FACETIÆ.

CAPPERONERIUS observes, that there are seven words in the Latin language employed to denote "that which excites laughter," namely *Urbanitas*, *Venustum*, *Salsum*, *Facetum*, *Jocus*, *Dicacitas*, *Ridiculum*. To the English words *Wit* and *Humour*, there are none of these terms precisely equivalent. Some critics have been of opinion, that the former may, in all cases, be rendered by *Dicacitas*, and the latter by *Facetiæ*. Others are inclined to think, that *Sal*, or *Sales*, approaches nearest to our term *Wit*, and that *Facetiæ* corresponds nearly to the word *Humour*.—"Sale, et facetiis Cæsar vicit omnes." *Cic.* "Erat salsus, et facetus." *Id.* There is, indeed, no small difficulty in ascertaining the precise meaning of these terms; and the explanation here given is submitted to the learned reader, rather as a matter of probability, than of certainty.

Sal, agreeably to its primitive import, and according to Quintilian, denotes “whatever seasons discourse, or gives zest to sentiment;” and this celebrated critic censures that usage, by which the term *Salsum* was confined to “that which excites laughter.” “*Salsum*,” says he, “in consuetudine pro ridiculo tantum accipimus; natura non utique hoc est (quanquam et ridicula oporteat esse salsa) nam et Cicero omne, quod salsum sit, ait esse Atticorum, non quia sunt maxime ad risum compositi; et Catullus cum dicit, *Nulla in tam magno est corpore mica salis*, non hoc dicit, nihil in corpore ejus esse ridiculum. *Salsum* igitur erit, quod non erit *insulsum*, velut quoddam simplex orationis condimentum, quod sentitur latente judicio, et velut palatum excitat, quod et a tædio defendit orationem.” *Inst.* vi. 3. We have the authority of Quintilian, therefore, for asserting, that *sales* should not be confined to the *Tò ridiculum*, or what excites laughter; though, in his time, it was frequently so used; but that it denotes, whatever by its smartness, vivacity, or sprightliness, gives zest to discourse. Of the three terms in question, it would appear, therefore, that this is the most generic. Cicero, accordingly, in the following passage, makes it comprehend *Facetiæ* and *Dicacitas*. “Huic generi orationis aspergentur etiam *sales*, qui in dicendo mirum quantum valent, quorum duo sunt genera, unum facetiarum, alterum dicacitatis; utetur utroque, sed altero in narrando aliquid venuste, altero in jaciendo mittendoque ridiculo.” *Cic. de Orat.*

As *Sal* has a much more extensive signification, than “That which excites laughter,” so *Facetus*, according to Quintilian, is not confined to things laughable, but is rather a term significant of grace and elegance. In evidence of this, he quotes the following passage from Horace, “Molle atque facetum Virgilio annuerunt gaudentes rure Camœnæ.” *Hor. Sat. i. 10. 44.* and likewise the words of Brutus, as related by Cicero, “Næ illi sunt pedes faceti, ac deliciis ingredienti molles.” In these two passages it is evident, there is no allusion to wit or humour; and that the idea conveyed is that of grace, or elegance. In the following example also, it seems to have the same meaning, “Qui (malum) bella aut faceta es, quæ ames hominem istius modi.” *Plaut. Truc. v. 38.* It appears likely, therefore, that the primary idea implied in *Facetus*, is that of “gracefulness:” and Hill is of opinion, that the purer writers always ascribe a certain degree of politeness to the wit implied in *Facetus*. Whether the following passage ever occurred to the learned writer, as furnishing an objection to this opinion, we know not; but the common interpretation of it is at utter variance with this explanation;—“Est qui Inguen ad obscœnum subductis usque facetus.” *Hor. Sat. i. 2. 26.*

Here the word is, by all translators and critics, as far as we know, understood to mean something contemptible and ridiculous. This interpretation, however, is not only irreconcilable with the sense, in which Horace always employs the term *Facetus*;

but is also repugnant to the universal usage of classic writers. As far as our researches extend, there is not a single example to justify the meaning here generally assigned to it, as denoting something indecent, or ridiculous: It is probable, therefore, that Horace employs the term ironically, and, if this interpretation be admitted, the keenness of the satire is thereby greatly increased.

The primary idea then implied in *Facetus* is conceived to be “elegance,” or “grace,” and this idea seems essential to it, whatever variety of signification it may admit.

The term implying with this idea, that of “Wit,” or “Humour,” Cicero considers it as divisible into two kinds, *Cavillatio* and *Dicacitas*. “Duo sunt genera facetiarum; alterum æquabiliter in omni sermone fusum, alterum peracutum et breve; illa a veteribus superior cavillatio, hæc altera dicacitas nominata est.” *Cic. de Orat.* lib. ii. *Cavillatio* is defined by Cicero, “Genus facetiæ, quod *fit* mentiundo,” “A species of humourous raillery,” consisting of charges chiefly false, and distinguished from *calumnia* by this circumstance, that in the former is not implied a desire that they should be believed; whereas the latter denotes, that they are advanced as truths. *Dicacitas* will be considered afterwards.

Now there appears some difficulty in reconciling this division with that, which has been already quoted from Cicero. For if *Sal* comprises *Facetiæ* and *Dicacitas*; why does he afterwards divide *Facetiæ*

into *Cavillatio* and *Dicacitas*? for, if *Facetiæ* includes *Dicacitas*, it would be as absurd to say, that *Sal* is divided into *Facetiæ* and *Dicacitas*, as to say, that *Being*, as a *genus*, is divided into *Animal* and *Man*. This would almost tempt us to suspect that Cicero himself did not, in this instance, attend to his own distinctions. But let us inquire into the meaning of the word *Facetiæ*, as explained by himself, in another passage, and also by Quintilian, two critics of unquestionable authority.

Under *Facetiæ*, as implying *Tò ridiculum*, Cicero seems to comprehend almost all, that we commonly denote by the terms *Wit* and *Humour*, the former consisting in a new and incongruous association of images, or some smart expression, intended to excite laughter; the latter in a ludicrous exhibition of the faults, foibles, or defects of others. Its meaning, however, when it is opposed to *sal*, seems to be confined to the latter of the two, as distinguished also by taste and elegance. “*Sale et facetiis Cæsar vicit omnes.*” *Cic.* “*Esse quamvis facetum et salsum non nimis est per se invidendum.*” *Cic. de Or. lib. ii.*

Facetiæ, as has been observed, is divided by Cicero into two kinds: “*Duo sunt genera facetiarum; alterum re tractatur, alterum dicto. Re, siquando quid tanquam aliqua fabella narratur. Est autem hæc hujus generis virtus, ut facta demonstrentur, ut mores ejus, de quo narres, ut sermo, ut vultus omnes exprimantur, ut iis, qui audiunt, tum geri illa fierique videantur. In re inest item ridiculum, quod ex qua-*

dam depravata imitatione sumi solet." *Cic. de Orat.* lib. ii. Here is included "A faithful description of a laughable subject," and also, that species of exaggeration, by which the singularities of character are overcharged, and which we term caricature, whether by description, picture, or mimicry. "In dicto autem ridiculum est id, quod verbi aut sententiæ quodam acumine movetur." This species is denoted by *Dicacitas*, and consists in the satirical smartness of the expression; for confining which within proper bounds Cicero observes, "Ut in illo superiore genere vel narrationis vel imitationis, vitanda est mimorum ethologorum similitudo, sic in hoc scurrilis dicacitas oratori magnopere fugienda est." This error he thus illustrates:—"Hæc, quæ cadere possunt in quos nolis, quamvis sint bella, sunt tamen ipso genere scurrilia, ut iste, qui se vult dicacem, et mehercule est Appius, sed nonnunquam in hoc vitium scurrile delabitur. Cænabo, inquit, apud te huic lusco familiari meo C. Sextio, uni enim locum esse video. Est hoc scurrile, quod et sine causa lacesivit, et tamen id dixit, quod in omnes luscus conveniret." *Ib.*

Facetus, according to Quintilian, and as is evident from the examples already adduced, does not always imply, what excites laughter. "*Facetum* quoque non tantum circa ridicula opinor consistere," lib. vi. 3. It means "Graceful," or "Gracefully humorous." It includes, indeed, grace, beauty, and politeness. "Homo facetus inducit sermonem urbanum, et venustum." *Cic. Dicacitas*, he says, de-

rived from *Dico*, and implying uniformly something said, denotes a "Witticism," or sharp remark, exciting laughter, at the expense of another. "*Proprie significat sermonem cum risu aliquos incessentem.*" *Inst.* vi. 3. This is a species of the *Tò ridiculum*, in which, he says, Demosthenes never indulged, and Cicero affected too much: hence he was called by his enemies, "*Scurra Consularis.*" *Dicacitas*, therefore, seems to imply, all *jeux de mots*, as puns, quips, cranks, gibes, repartee, and the numerous tribe of that species of wit, termed "play on words," to excite laughter at the expense of another.

From the explanation here given of the words *Sal*, *Facetiæ*, and *Dicacitas*, it must be evident, that *Sal* has a very comprehensive meaning, including whatever serves to give zest to discourse, and prevent weariness or languor in the hearer; and, therefore, comprises *Facetiæ*, and *Dicacitas*, but does not necessarily imply an excitement to laughter.

Facetiæ denotes "Gracefulness in general," or that elegance of wit and humour, which indicates a correct and delicate taste. Hence we sometimes find it employed to denote taste and judgment, or what is denominated "critical taste." Thus, in the following sentence, it is opposed to *Fastidium*.—"Illis fastidium pro facetiis procedit," *Aul. Gell.* xv. 8, "Their fastidious delicacy passes for a refined and delicate taste." It agrees with *Sal*, in not necessarily implying an excitement to laughter. *Dicacitas* differs from both these—as it uniformly implies that

laughter is the object of it. It differs also from *facetiae* in this respect, that the wit or humour of *facetiae* consists in a series of humourous representations, and refers either to the matter or the manner; that of *Dicacitas* has no reference to the gesture or manner, and implies, chiefly, a smart witticism, calculated to excite laughter. It is considered by Capperonierus as synonymous with the French *Bons mots*. Cicero, indeed, says, “Hæc *scilicet* bona dicta, quæ salsa sint.” *De Orat.* lib. ii.—*Sal* and *Dicacitas*, considered as synonymes, refer solely to what is wittily, or humourously said—*facetus*, to what is said or done. *Urbanitas* properly means, as Quintilian informs us, that politeness of expression, which is acquired in the metropolis, and by conversing with learned men. “Urbanitas dicitur, quæ quidem significari video sermonem præ se ferentem in verbis, et sono, et usu, proprium quendam gustum urbis, et sumptam ex conversatione doctorum tacitam eruditionem.” It is, therefore, opposed to *Rusticitas*.—When it is applied to wit or humour, it means that which is distinguished by its politeness, and obtains in polished and fashionable society. *Venustus* alludes entirely to the *beauty* of the sentiment, and the expression.

The primary idea implied in *Lepos**, and *Lepi-*

* The etymology of *Lepos* is doubtful. Some, among whom is Donatus, believe it to be derived from λεπίς, *Lamina*, *Squama*, *Cortex*; others, that it is a contraction from λεῖον ἔπος, *Dictum politum ac suave*. From the former we should infer, that it relates to something external, and also from the latter, that it

dus is, according to Hill, "Elegance," chiefly in regard to expression. Agreeably to this explanation, it is included in *Facetus*, and is distinguished from it by this circumstance; that, while *Facetus* refers to matter or manner, *Lepidus* refers to the expression only. I am rather inclined to think, that the primary idea implied in *Lepos* and *Lepidus*, is "sweetness," or "softness," opposed to what is harsh, or rough.— Thus, "O mi lepos," *Plaut. Cas. ii. 3*, I consider as nearly synonymous with "O meum suavius," an expression, which occurs frequently in dramatic writers. "In lepidio loco, in lecto lepidio strato." *Plaut. Poen. iii. 3. 84*. Here the chief idea is softness. In the following passage, conformably to this idea, it is considered with *Sal* as a sort of *Condimentum*, or "Seasoning," rendering a thing palatable, or agreeable, by its sweetness. "Nec potis quicquam commemorari, quod plus salis, plusque leporis hodie habeat; coquos equidem nimis demiror, qui tot utuntur condimentis, eos eo condimento uno non uti." Stalino is here speaking of love, which, he says, as a seasoning to human life, includes *Sal* and *Lepos*; by the latter of which, he evidently means sweetness; for, he adds, "Neque salsum, neque suave esse potest quicquam, ubi amor non admiscetur." *Plaut. Cas. ii. 3. 2*. "Medio de fonte leporum Surgit amari

relates, as it very generally does, to words only, which may be regarded as the garb of sentiment. Some grammarians consider it as synonymous with, καλλιπέπεια.

aliquid, quod in ipsis floribus angat." *Luc.* lib. iv. 112.

Here also it denotes "Sweetness." In the same sense as applied to words, it is used in the following passage. "In libris ejus hominis melle dulciorem leporem fatebatur habitare, inque animis eorum, qui illum audierant, quasi aculeos quosdam relinqui prædicabat." *Val. Max.* viii. 9. 2. *Ext.* Here is signified that sweetness, or delicacy of wit and humour, which was at once sharp and grateful. "*Lepos* nativus," (*Nepos*) "A natural sweetness of speech." That the term is confined to the words, not extending to the matter, is evident, from Cicero's explanation of the difference between it and *facetus*. "Quod, quibuscunque verbis dixeris facetum tamen est, re continetur; quod mutatis verbis salem amittit, in verbis habet *leporem* omnem." *De Orat.* lib. ii.

It is conjectured then, that the primary idea implied in *lepos*, is "sweetness," or "softness," and that the term is confined to the mode of expression; whereas *facetia* is applicable to the sentiment, as well as the diction or gesture, designating the character of the mind, as possessed of taste and judgment.

TIME.

A point of time is expressed in the ablative; a space of time generally in the accusative:—thus, "He came at three o'clock," *Venit horâ tertiâ.*—"He staid a few days," *Mansit paucos dies.* In the

former case, there is an ellipsis of the preposition *In* ; and in the latter of *Per*. It must be observed, however, that the point of time must be contemporary with the tense of the verb, with which it is connected, otherwise the rule does not hold good ; and it is the more necessary to attend to this, as the young scholar is apt to be misled by the idiom of our language. “ He invited me to dine with him next day in the gardens,” *Secum in hortis die postero ut pranderem, invitavit*. Here *Die postero* and *Pranderem* are contemporary circumstances. But, if we turn the verb *Pranderem* into a noun, the state of the words expressive both of time and place must be changed—thus, “ *Ad prandium me in hortos invitavit in posterum diem*,” where *In hortos* and *In posterum diem* are connected with *Invitavit*—thus, “ He invited me to dinner into the gardens, for, or against, next day.” *Postero die* would imply, that the invitation took place next day.

Desum is elegantly used for *careo*, thus, *Careo libro*, elegantly *Deest mihi liber*.

In the following Exercise, though the expression, *action* and *inaction*, would pretty nearly suit the paronomasia, *otiandi* and *negotiandi*, I have preferred retaining the words of Canius, as they are given in the original.

EXERCISE.

Caius Canius, a Roman knight, a man who wanted neither humour nor learning, having gone to Syracuse, *haud*

negotiandi, sed otiandi causâ, as he was wont to express himself, gave out, that he wished to purchase some gardens, whither he might invite his friends, and enjoy himself without interruption. This circumstance being made public, one Pythius, a banker at Syracuse, told him, that he had gardens, which he did not intend to sell; but that Canius was welcome to use them as his own. He likewise invited him to sup with him in the gardens the next day. Canius accepted the invitation. Pythius, being a man of great influence with all ranks of people, in Syracuse, had persuaded a number of fishermen to fish that day in the front of his gardens.

OBSERVATIONS.

OPIPARUS.

LAUTUS.

Opiparus, quasi *Opibus paratus*, denotes “Costly,” “Magnificent.” It particularly refers to the money expended on the object; hence “sumptuous,” and frequently, “elegant.” *Opiparus* was used only by the earlier writers; *Opipare* was current in the Augustan, and posterior ages. *Lautus* a *Lavere*, “To wash.”—“*Epularum magnificentia*,” says Festus, “a *Lavatione* dicta; quia apud antiquos hæ elegantia, quæ nunc sunt, non erant, et raro aliquis lavabat.”—“From the costliness of baths,” says Hill, “which were once so rare, *Lautus* would, in all probability, come to denote magnificence,” or “Expensive elegance in general;” and, he observes, that the entertainer is called by Horace, *Eum, qui præbet aquam*. The former, therefore, strictly refers to the cost, and the

latter to the elegance of the articles, as evincing wealth and opulence.

CUNCTARI. GRAVARI. TERGIVERSARI.

MORARI.

“*Cunctari*,” says Faber, “proprie est quærere de aliqua re, quam agitamus ; quod cum fit, suspendimus negotium, de quo deliberatio est, donec statui de eo possit.” “It denotes,” says Dumesnil, “to balance in one’s mind, as he does, who asks questions.” *Gravari* is “To scruple,” or “be loth to do any thing.” “Quid, si quæ voce gravares, mente dares.” *Virg.* “Si ad consulem gravarentur mittere, sibi saltem darent populi consilium.” *Liv.* xxiv. 37. “*Tergiversari*,” says Stephens, “proprie est eorum, qui terga vertentes adhuc tamen pugnant, nec sese victos fateri volunt.” It properly denotes, “To turn one’s back,” hence it signifies, simply, “To shew dislike,” “To refuse,” as “*Tergiversari nolui.*” *Cic. Ep. ad Terent.* “I was unwilling to refuse.”—Hence also it signifies, “To seek subterfuges,” or “means of escape,” like a soldier in battle, who, though he has turned his back, and is sensible of his inferiority, yet still makes a shew of resistance. It almost always, therefore, implies insincerity on the part of the person spoken of, or an attempt to dissemble, what he thinks or feels, with the view of escaping from some dilemma. “Quid dissimulem ? quid tergiverser ?” *Cic.* “Why should I dissemble ? Why should I shuffle ?” or look for subterfuges to get off ? “*Fannium invitum, et huc*

atque illuc tergiversantem, testimonium contra se dicere cogo," (*Cic. pro Ros. Com.*) "Resorting to this and that subterfuge."—"Non incallide tergiversantur." *Cic.* "They shuffle with no little address." It is distinguished from *Cunctari* by this circumstance, that while *Cunctari* implies that hesitation, and those inquiries in the agent, which shall enable him to judge correctly, and act with success, *Tergiversari* denotes, that the agent resorts to subterfuges, in order to escape with safety from some difficulty or danger. The former implies circumspection, and cautious delay; the latter, disingenuity and cunning. The one is opposed to haste and precipitation; the other to ingenuous promptitude. "An cuncter? An tergiverser?" *Cic. Att. vii. 12.* "Shall I delay? Shall I play fast and loose?"

But the delay implied by *Cunctari* may be unseasonable, or it may be excessive. Cicero, therefore, says, "Sed assequar omnia si propero; si cunctor, amitto." *Ep. Att.* In this passage, observes Hill, "*properare* means hurrying through the business, in any way." The learned author, it is apprehended, mistakes the import of the verb *properare*, the signification of which is "to haste," not "to hurry." Cicero, it is conceived, intends to say, that hesitation and delay would be fatal to his success, while dispatch, or haste, not *hurry*, would attain the object*.

* "Aliud est properare," says M. Cato, "aliud festinare; qui unum quid maturè transigit, is properat; qui multa simul incipit, neque perficit, is festinat." *A. Gell. xiv. 16.* This dis-

Morari is distinguished from *Cunctari* by its denoting, not, like it, that delay, which proceeds from caution and inquiry, but delay in general, without any reference to its cause; and marking, as Hill observes, simply the interval between the possible, and the actual occurrence of an event. It may, therefore, be applied to that delay, which proceeds from folly, or inconsideration; *Cunctari* cannot be so employed.—As an active verb, it signifies “To retard,” or “Impede.”

It has been a subject of controversy, whether *nomina facere* means “to give credit on security,” or “to give an obligation to pay;” that is, whether it be applicable to the seller, or the buyer, to the lender or the borrower, and one of these only, or to both creditor and debtor. That it was applied to the latter we have one evidence in Pomponius (see Dig. lib. xv. tit. 1. cap. 4.); there is also, if the reading be correct, an example in the third book of “Cicero’s Offices,” from which treatise the following exercise is taken; but the accuracy of the lection has been disputed. It is certain, that in the common use of the phrase by Cicero, and other writers of distinction, even those *argenteæ ætatis*, it refers to the creditor. “Accepi Aviani literas, in quibus hoc erat liberalissimum, nomina se facturum, quum venisset, qua ego vellem die.” *Cic. Ep. Fam.* vii. 23. “That he would tinction is not, indeed, uniformly observed; but one thing is certain, that *festinare*, and not *properare*, is used to express great haste, and that *properare* never signifies “to hurry.”

accept my obligation to pay, on whatever day, I pleased," "Nunquam magis nomina facio, quam cum dono." *Sen. de Vit. Beat. cap. 24.* "I give credit." It would be easy to adduce more examples to shew that *nomina facere* refers to the creditor. Adams has quoted a passage from Seneca, as an evidence of its application to the debtor. "Nomina facturi diligenter in patri-monium et vasa debitoris inquirimus." *De Ben. i. 1.* To me it is evident, that the phrase refers to creditors, or lenders. I have therefore considered this to be its meaning; but do not commit myself to the opinion of some critics, that Cicero expressly noted Pythius as the subject; or that the common lection is erroneous, though not reconcileable with the general practice of the author. See *Pearce's note on the text.*

EXERCISE.

Canis came at the time appointed. There was a sumptuous banquet prepared; a great many boats were in view; and the fishermen brought what fish they took, and laid them at the feet of Pythius. "Pray," said Canis, "what means this, Pythius?"—"Have you such a quantity of fish? such a number of boats?"—"Certainly," answered he; "all the fish at Syracuse are from this place; here it is supplied with water; the Syracusans cannot do without this villa of mine." Canis, very desirous to have the gardens, requested him to sell them. Pythius at first seemed loth to do it, but at last consented; and Canis bought them at as great a price as Pythius chose to ask; and bought them too with all their appurtenances. Pythius accepts the proffered security for payment, and completes the trans-

action. Next day Canius invited his friends into the garden; and he himself came early. Not a boat, not a fisherman was to be seen.

OBSERVATIONS.

The infinitive mood is frequently used for the preterimperfect tense indicative, by an ellipsis, as is conjectured, of the verb *cœpit* or *cœperunt*. “*Invidere omnes mihi.*” *Ter. Eun.* iii. 1. 20. “*At Romani, domi militiæque intenti, festinare, parare, alius alium hortari.*” *Sall. B. C. cap.* 5. for *festinabant, parabant, &c.*

STOMACHARI.

IRASCI.

SUCCENSERE.

Stomachari (derived from *Stomachus*) “the weasand,” or “gullet,” and in medical language, “the stomach,” *Ciborum receptaculum*, (see *Juv.* v. 69,) signifying also “anger,” or “indignation,” denotes “to fume,” “to storm,” “to be in violent anger,” expressing it in words, or gestures. It is construed either absolutely, as “*Cur stomacher, nescio,*” *Cic.* or with an accusative, as “*Stomachor omnia,*” *Cic.* and sometimes with *cum*, as “*Cum stomacharetur cum C. Metello, dixisse dicitur.*” *Cic.*

Irasci signifies “to be angry,” but does not imply violence of emotion, nor the outward expression of it. We may say, *Iratus est*, when there is no vehemence of passion, no external sign of anger.—This distinguishes it from *stomachari*. “*Sæpius videbam cum iridentem, tum irascentem, etiam stomachantem Philippum,*” *Cic.* “angry and storming.”

Succensere, a *succensus*, denotes "to be grievously and justly angry." It differs from *stomachari* in not implying the expression of anger, and from *irasci*, in always implying, that there is just reason for being angry, and that the emotion is strong and serious. "*Irascimur*," says Noltenius, "ob levia et inania; *succensemur*, non nisi justis de causis."—"Irasci et succensere," *Cic. not, Succensere et irasci.*

DIES FESTI. PROFESTI. INTERCISI.

Days among the Romans were distinguished into three general divisions, the "*Dies Festi*," "*Dies Profesti*," and, "*Dies Intercisi*." The *Dies Festi*, "Holy days," were consecrated to religious purposes; the *Dies Profesti* were given to the common business of life; and the *Dies Intercisi*, were "Half-holidays," divided between sacred and ordinary occupations. The *Dies Festi* were set apart for the celebration of these four solemnities, "*Sacrificia*," "*Epulæ*," "*Ludi*," and "*Feriæ*."—The three first were sacrifices, banquets, and games, in honour of the Gods. *Feriæ* were either public or private. The public were of four kinds, "*Stativæ*," "*Conceptivæ*," "*Imperativæ*," "*Nundinæ*."

Feriæ Stativæ were stated festivals appointed by the calendar. *Conceptivæ* were named by the magistrates or priests, and were annually observed. *Imperativæ* were appointed by the consuls, or chief magistrates, on any extraordinary occasion. *Nundinæ*, because kept every ninth day, (*quasi Novendinæ*) correspond to our fairs, or great market days, when the

people from the country brought their commodities into the city, and exposed them to sale.—Though they were at first in the number of the *Feriæ*, they were afterwards, for the accommodation of the country people, declared to be *Dies Fasti*, on which law suits were determined.

Feriæ Privatæ were holidays, observed by particular persons, or families, as birth-days, and the like.

The *Profesti* were “Fasti,” “Comitiales,” “Comperendini,” “Stati,” and “Præliares.”

The *Dies Fasti* were so called, because on them it was lawful (*fas*) for the Prætor to sit in judgment, and to say “Do, Dico, Addico,” “I give the writ, and the judges declare right, adjudge redress.” For it is to be observed, that it was the business of the prætor, *Dare actionem et judices*, “To give the writ, and to name the judges, or jury.” *Dicere jus*, “To pronounce sentence,” and *Addicere bona*, “To adjudge compensation, or redress,” by assigning, for example, the goods of the debtor to the creditor. *Judicare*, that is, “to absolve,” or “to condemn,” was the province of the judges, or jury. For this purpose, they were furnished, each with two *tabellæ*, one inscribed with the letter A, for *absolvo*, and the other, with the letter C, for *condemno*. *Jus dicare*, therefore, is to be distinguished from *judicare*. (See *Manut. de legibus*.) All other days were called *Nefasti*, or “Non-court days.” *Comitiales* were for holding the *Comitia*, or public assemblies. *Comperendini*, for giving bail. *Stati*, for deciding causes between a Roman and a

foreigner.—*Præliares*, for attacking an enemy, it being deemed unlawful to do this, during the continuance of some particular feasts.

EXERCISE.

Canius inquired of his next neighbour, if it was a holiday among the fishermen, as he saw none of them there. “No holiday,” said he, “as far as I know; fishermen do not usually fish here; and I was much surprised, indeed, at what took place yesterday.” Canius was in a great passion; but what could he do? There was no legal redress to be had; for, as Cicero says, “Aquillius had not yet published his *formulae* on *dolus malus*; in regard to which,” says the orator, “when I asked him what was implied by *dolus malus*, he answered, Pretending one thing, and doing another”—an explanation this, truly perspicuous, as coming from a person skilled in definition. Pythius, therefore, observes Cicero, and all those, who pretend one thing and do another, are perfidious and wicked.

OBSERVATIONS.

It is given as a rule by Scheller, and other grammarians, that after a comparative, the latter of the two subjects compared, should, if *Quam* be employed, be put in the same case with the former subject of comparison. (See *Scheller Præc.* p. 150.) This rule, though generally, is not universally correct. It is true, I apprehend in those cases only, in which the predicate is applicable to both subjects; and in these instances, both nouns are dependent on the same verb expressed, or understood. For example, we cannot say, *Utor Cicerone doctiore, quam Sallustio*, to denote, “I am intimate with Cicero, a more learned

man than Sallust;" but *Quam est Sallustius*. The reason is, Cicero and Sallust are not the subjects of one and the same predicate, the person speaking not being intimate with Sallust, though he is with Cicero. In like manner, if we say, "I gave the book to Titius, a wiser man than Sempronius," we cannot render it, *Titio sapientiori quam Sempronio librum dedi*; but *Quam Sempronius est*, "the book being given to Titius only."*

When the two subjects belong to one and the same predicate, they are put in the same case; not, however, because *Quam* couples like cases, but because the same thing being predicated of each subject, the substantives depend on one and the same word. Thus, "Ego hominem callidiorem vidi neminem, quam Phormionem." *Ter. Phor.* iv. 2. 1.—Here the subjects compared belong to one and the same predicate. "Ego vidi neminem callidiorem, quam vidi Phormionem," "I have seen no man more cunning, than I have seen Phormio to be."—In the following examples, they are not the subjects of the same predicate, and therefore they may, or may not, be in the same case, according to the structure of the sentence. "Meliozem quam ego sum, suppono tibi." *Plaut. Curc.* ii. 2. 6. "Si vicinus tuus meliozem equum

* The doctrine of conjunctions is explained by Mr. Grant, with his usual correctness and precision, in "The Institutes of Latin Grammar." This valuable work, evincing the ability of its author, we would earnestly recommend to the attention of the classical student. It contains a clear and complete digest of the rules and principles of Latin Grammar, illustrated by copious and apposite examples.

habet, quam tuus est." *Cic. de Inv.* lib. 1. "Ut gloriari possis multo fortiozem, quam ipse es, virum abs te occisum." *Val. Max.* iii. 2. Quam ipsum would imply that both were slain, i. e. *Meliorẽ virum occisum, quam teipsum occisum esse*. The same observation is applicable to *ac* or any copulative conjunction. "Destinavisse eam Rubellium Plautum, per maternam originem, pari, *ac* Nero, gradu, a divo Augusto, ad res novas extollere." *Tac. Ann.* xiii. 19. i. e. "pari gradu, *ac* Nero erat." Nero is not the subject of *extollere*, but the nominative to *erat* understood.

Sanctius has given an example, in which the sentiment appears fully expressed by the repetition of the predicate before the second subject of comparison. "Lepidiorem uxorem nemo, quam ego habeo hanc, habet." *Plaut. Cas.* v. 4. 29. But the reading is erroneous. It should be, *St.* "Lepidiorem uxorem nemo quisquam, quam ego habeo."—*Ch.* "Hanc habe."—See *Sanct. Min.* lib. ii. cap. 10. It is to be observed then, that *Quam* does not couple like cases; and that the two subjects of comparison are not put in the same case, unless what is predicated of the one is also predicated of the other, in which instance, as has been remarked, the substantives depend on one and the same word. In fact, all conjunctions couple, not nouns, but verbs or sentences; except those which denote addition, concomitancy, or conjunction, as *Et*, *Ac*, *Atque*, "And," "Add," or "Join," and these connect sentences, nouns, and verbs. If there be two subjects, and two predicates, they connect sentences—as

Aristippus docuit, et Marcus audivit. If there be two subjects, or two objects, with only one predicate, and that predicate belonging to each, they couple the predicate expressed with the same predicate understood, as *Ego et Tullia valemus, i. e. Ego valeo, et Tullia valet.* Here there are two subjects, and one predicate.—*Amat patriam et parentes, i. e. Amat patriam, et amat parentes:*—Here also there is but one predicate, and two objects of the affection, which it denotes. *Constitit asse, et plusis; i. e. Constitit asse, et constitit plusis.* If the predicate belong to the subjects, not singly, but collectively, the conjunctions couple the nouns—as, *Sunt par nobile gladiatorum Æserninus et Placideianus.* Here the two persons, not individually, but together, form the *par nobile*. We cannot say, *Æserninus est par, et Placideianus est par.*

The reader must be careful also not to be misled by the rule, that conjunctions always couple like moods. The sense often requires a diversity of mood. “*Est difficile, et difficilius fuisset, nisi hoc cavisses.*” “It is difficult, and would have been more difficult.” “*Ingemuisse etiam Alexandrum morti, et non parcius flevisse, quam ipse lacrimaretur.*” *Curt.* “*Prædicavit . . . non minus libenter sese recusaturum populi Romani amicitiam, quam adpetierit.*” *Cæs.* The latter verb in each of the two last sentences might have been in the infinitive mood, being coupled by *quam* with the verb preceding; or, more properly speaking, each of the latter verbs being under the government of the leading verb. The authors, how-

ever, in equal consistency with usage, employed the subjunctive.

It may be observed in passing, 1st. That *quam* is sometimes understood, “Religionum usque quaque contemptor, præter unius Deæ Syriæ.” *Suet. in Ner. cap. lvi.*, for *præter quam*. “Plus viginti millia cæsa sunt,” for *plus quam*. 2dly. That where ambiguity would be produced by the use of an ablative after a comparative, *quam* should be employed. “The plebeians were more hostile to the tribunes, than were the patricians.” We must not say, *Plebs erat tribunis infestior patribus*; but *quam patres*. 3dly. When the latter of the two subjects is expressed by the relative, the conjunction should be omitted. Thus we say, *Vidit fratrem meum, quo duobus annis sum junior*, not *quam qui*. This is an observation of Despauter, which we believe to be correct. 4thly. When the ablative is a negative, *quam* should not be used, and the negative should introduce the sentence. Thus, we should not say, *Tu es fortior quam nemo*, or *nemine*; but *nemine tu es fortior*. This is an observation of the same learned grammarian.

The expressions, “Too heavy for,” “Too great for,” and such like, are rendered, in Latin, by the comparative, and *Quam*, “Heavier than,” “Greater than,” and sometimes by “Greater than that, which,” “Heavier than that, which.” For example, “My punishment is too heavy for me to bear,” *Supplicium gravius est, quam quod ferre possim*, “than that, which I am able to bear,” or “than what I am able to bear,” or *Quam, ut ferre possim*, “than that I

can bear it." "Suscepi plus, quam quantum præstare possim." *Cic.* The particle, or relative, is sometimes omitted, "Hoc majus est quoddam, quam ab iis postulandum sit," *Cic.* i. e. *quam ut*, or *quod*.—"The burden is too great for your strength," *Onus viribus tuis est majus*. "The burden is greater than your strength." "Accessit cohortatio gravior, quam aures Ser. Sulpicii ferre didicissent." *Cic. Phil.* ix. cap. 4. "He is too young to have such a load imposed upon him," *Junior est, quam cui tantum oneris imponatur*

The comparative is sometimes followed by *Quam pro*, as "He wears a garment too large for his body," *Majorem gerit vestem, quam pro habitu corporis*. Such expressions as the following should be carefully avoided, *Nimis juvenis est ad tantum oneris imponendum*. *Nimis magnam vestem pro corpore suo*. The latter is inelegant; and the former wholly unclassical.

It has been asserted, by some critics, (See *Voss.* and *Vavass. de vi et usu verb.*) that *Alta vox*, and *Alte loqui*, are improperly used for *Elata vox*, and *Elate loqui*, the best ancient writers never having employed the former phraseologies.—In opposition to this opinion, Vorstius adduces the authority of Catullus, who uses the expression, *Altiore voce*—and of Quintilian, who says, (lib. ii. cap. 3,) *Vocem altius attolli*—and also of Cicero, who says, *Vox attollitur altius*. The example from Catullus goes expressly to the question, and, we may add, *Valeat quantum valere potest*. The two others, from Quintilian and Cicero, can be adduced only as an analogical justifi-

cation of the phraseology in question ; and in all cases, especially where the language is metaphorical, it is not always safe to trust to analogy. Identity of expression is our only sure authority.—Thus much is certain, that Cicero's general and favourite expressions are, *Clara voce, Elata voce, Clare—Clarius.*

EXERCISE.

Fulvius Flaccus had determined to punish capitally the chiefs of the Campanian state, on account of their perfidy ; and several had already suffered death. In consequence, however, of a letter from the senate, he was forced to desist from the infliction of punishment. On this occasion, Jubellius Taurea voluntarily presented himself, and said, “ Since, Fulvius, you are possessed with so strong a desire to shed our blood, why do you delay to prepare the bloody axe against me, that you may be able to boast, that a braver man than yourself was slain by you ? ” On his answering, that he would willingly do so, were he not prevented by the senate, “ Behold me then,” said the other, “ voluntarily exhibiting an act acceptable, indeed, to your eyes, but too great for your soul.” He then fell on his sword, and died.

OBSERVATIONS.

PRIMUS.

PRIMUS QUI.

It is no uncommon thing to find, in modern Latin, such expressions as the following, *Primus erat, qui hanc viam invenerit*, “ He was the first, that invented this way.”—“ Principes Varro dictos vult, quod primi essent, qui gladiis pugnarent.” *Pitisc. Lex. Antiq. Rom.* “ Because they were the first, that fought with swords.” This phraseology should be carefully avoided ; for, though in some cases it be

sufficiently perspicuous, it may in others create ambiguity. If we mean to say, "He was the first, that invented," that is, "the first to invent this way," we must render it, "*Ille primus hanc viam invenit.*" *Ter. Eun.* ii. 2. 16. I am the first to feel our misfortunes, the first to know them all," "*Primus sentio mala nostra; primus rescisco omnia.*" *Ter. Ad.* iv. 2. 7. "They were the first, that taught the use of oil," "*Primi olei usum docuere.*" *Just.* ii. 6. "He was the first that was condemned," "*Primus est condemnatus.*" *Cic. Brut.*

In like manner are construed *Prior*, *Posterior*, *Uterior*, *Proximus*, *Supremus*, *Ultimus*, and, indeed, all comparatives and superlatives, when the relative, in English, though grammatically referring to the antecedent singly, refers to all the subjects, with which the antecedent is compared. In other words, when the relative clause, in English, expresses the action, state, or attribute, not of the antecedent subject of comparison singly, but of those also, with which it is compared, this form of expression is employed. Thus, "He was the last that went away," that is, "He was the last to go away," or "the last of those, that went away." *Ultimus abiit ille.* "Ucalegon is the next that burns," *i. e.* "The next to burn," or, "of those that burn."—"Proximus ardet Ucalegon." *Virg. Æn.* ii. 311. "He will be the last that hears of the disgrace of his own house," *i. e.* "the last of those, who hear." "*Dedecus ille domus sciet ultimus.*" *Juv.* x. 342. "He was the highest, that

stood on the bank." "Altissimus stetit ille in ripa." In all these examples, the relative clause in English, though grammatically it refers to the antecedent only, comprehends those subjects also, with which the antecedent subject is compared.

But, when the relative clause marks the character of the subject singly, and is not applicable to the other subjects, with which that subject is compared, the relative *Qui* should be employed. Thus, if we mean to say, "He was the highest, who stood on the bank," meaning, "He, who stood on the bank, was the highest," we must render it, *Altissimus erat, qui in ripa stetit*. When Cicero says, "Primam posuit eam, quæ orta esset ex præsensioe rerum futurarum." *Cic. Nat. Deor. lib. 2,** he means, "He laid that down, as the first cause, namely, that which arose." But had he intended to say, "He laid that down, as the first that arose," or, "the first to arise," he would have said, *Quæ prima orta esset*. In like manner, when he says, "Ex æde Liberi parvum illud caput pulcherimum, quod visere solebamus num dubitasti tollere?" he means, "that most beautiful," or "very beautiful head, which we were wont to visit." Had he intended to say, "The most beautiful head, *that* we were wont to visit," that is, "Of all, that we were wont to

* It may be useful to remind the reader of the rule by which the relative is here joined with the subjunctive mood. Had the relative clause been the observation of Cicero, the verb would have been *Oritur*. But the meaning is, "Cleanthes laid that down as the first cause, which (he said) arose."

visit," he would have said, *Quod pulcherrimum*, or *Omnium, quæ visere solebamus, pulcherrimum*. Speaking of the rapacity of Verres, he says, "Mittit rogatum vasa ea, quæ pulcherrima apud illum viderat." *Cic. in Verr. ii. 4. 27*. When Cicero says, "In Isara, flumine maximo, quod in finibus est Allobrogum, ponte facto, exercitum traduxi." *Cic. Ep. Fam. x. 15*, he does not mean, "the largest river, that is," but "a very large river, which is." The former observation would be expressed by *In Isara, quod maximum est flumen*.—"On the last night that he spent on earth," "Nocte, quam in terris ultimam egit." *Val. Max. i. 7*. If we say, *Nocte ultima, quam in terris egit*, a very different idea is conveyed—for this does not imply, "that of all the nights he spent on earth, this was the last," but "on the last of all his nights, which night he spent on earth." To express, however, the former sentiment, as distinguished from the latter, we find, in modern Latin, the relative joined with the subjunctive mood, thus, *Nocte ultima, quam in terris egerit*, instead of, *Nocte, quam ultimam in terris egit*, as the author has it. That such phraseology is not to be found in classic writers, we do not affirm; but it occurs very rarely. "At quem virum? quem ego viderim in vita optimum," *Ter. Ph. ii. 2. 19*, "The best man, that I ever saw." In such cases, the common phraseology is either that, which has been just now exemplified, or, "Omnium, quos vidi, optimum." Thus, "Occisissimus omnium, qui vivunt."

Plaut. Cas. iii. 5. 53. "Sceleratissimus omnium, quos terra sustinet." *Sall. B. J.* cap. 14. Again; "Quem vero extet, et de quo sit memoriæ proditum, eloquentem fuisse, et ita esse habitum, primus est M. Corn. Cethegus." *Cic. Brut.* "In quibus hoc primum est, in quo miror." *Cic. de Fin.* lib. 1. In the last of these examples, Lambinus gives the following reading; and it is presumed, much more correctly; for the indicative mood is totally inadmissible. "In quibus hoc primum est, quod demirer." But, as the subjunctive mood is required with the relative, when the clause is oblique, even this form of expression must frequently be ambiguous, and should, therefore, be uniformly avoided. I am inclined indeed, to think, that, when it does occur, the verb is not under the government of *qui*, but is used potentially, to denote some degree of contingency. Thus, Cicero writes, "Præcidi caput jussit . . . M. Antonii, omnium eloquentissimi, quos ego *audierim*." This may signify, "the most eloquent of all, that I have chanced to hear."

Before quitting the subject, it may not be improper to remark, that it would be subservient to perspicuity, if, in English, we employed the word *That* after the superlative, when the expression is elliptical, that is, when the predicate denotes a superiority over those expressed in the relative clause, and the word *Who*, or *Which*, when the second subject of comparison is not involved in the relative clause. When this distinction is not marked by diversity of

arrangement, a diversity of pronoun would prevent ambiguity. Thus, if we mean to say, "He was the best of those, who went away," it might be expressed, "He was the best, *that* went away." But, if we intended to signify, that "He who went away, was the best," that is, comparatively to others, the previous subjects of discourse, the distinction might be marked by saying, "He was the best, *who* went away."

It is to be observed also, that though there are two different forms of expression in English, there is only one generally adopted in Latin. Thus, we say in our language, "He wounded the first man, that he saw," or "He wounded the man, that first he saw:" but, in Latin, we must say, *Homini, quem primum conspexit, vulnus intulit*; and not *Homini primo, quem conspexit*, or *consplexerit*. With the indicative mood the expression is totally inadmissible, and with the subjunctive it seldom, if ever, occurs*.

* Since the preceding observations were written, a pamphlet has appeared, entitled, "A reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review against Oxford." In this pamphlet the anonymous author condemns, as barbarous, such expressions, as *Primus fuit, qui habuit*. If this expression be intended to denote, "He was the first, that had," or "the first to have," his judgment is correct; for the expression signifies, "He, who had, was the first." But it is to be observed, that this is not analogous to the phraseology of the Reviewer; for he has joined the relative with the subjunctive mood. The passage is *Nonne vult Pausanias Melanthum Andropompi filium e Nelei progenie primum fuisse, qui in Attica sedem habuisset?* But even this mode of construction will not justify such phraseology.

The Reviewer, in his defence, produces some examples to prove, that *Primus est, qui* is good Latin, in the same sense, in

“To act the conqueror,” or “the part of a conqueror,” is rendered by *Agere victorem*.

which he has employed the expression. It is obvious, however, from the examples, which he has produced, that he did not comprehend the objection of the critic, and has, therefore, entirely mistaken the question. He is chargeable with what logicians call *Ignoratio Elenchi*. For the Oxford Critic must evidently be understood to condemn *Primus est qui*, when employed to denote, “He was the first that,” or “He was the first to,” as *Primus erat, qui fecit*, “He was the first, that did it,” or “He was the first to do it;” but not, when used to express, “He, who did it, was the first man.”

The first example, which the Reviewer adduces in his justification, is, “Ex quo potest probabiliter confici, eum recte primum esse iudicio suo, qui omnium cæterorum iudicio sit secundus.” *Cic. Acad. Frag.* This passage evidently has no reference to the question. The meaning is not, “the first to be,” or “the first, that is,” but that “he, who is the second in the judgment of others, is the first in his own.” *Primum esse* forms singly the predicate; whereas it is only in those cases, in which *primus*, taken together with the relative clause, forms a complex predicate, that the phrase *Primus est qui* is condemned by the anonymous critic.

“Polemoni ea prima visa sunt, quæ paulo ante dixi,” is another example, which he adduces; but this also has no reference to the question. *Quæ paulo ante dixi*, form the subject: *prima visa sunt*, the predicate. “Est enim primum quod cernitur in universi generis humani societate.” *Cic. Off.* i. 16. This example is, for the same reason, wholly irrelevant. “Puerum primus Priamo qui foret post illa tempora natus.” *Cic. de Div.* lib. i. This example, likewise, is totally foreign to the question. For the rule of the anonymous critic does not regard the arrangement simply; but asserts, that *primus*, instead of agreeing with the subject in the antecedent clause, agrees with the relative in the subsequent clause. For example, he would not object to *Virum cano, qui primus*, or *primus qui*; but he would condemn

Agere denotes "to act the part of, in reality,"
ludere "to act in appearance." *Bonum civem agit*,

Virum primum, qui. The only incontestable example, which the Reviewer has produced in favour of his phraseology, is the one, which has been already quoted from Cicero, "*Quem vero extet, et de quo sit memoriæ proditum eloquentem fuisse, et ita esse habitum, primus est M. Corn. Cethegus.*" *Cic. Brut.* This example, we are inclined to think, must be regarded as one of those inadvertencies, which are ascribable to the occasional oscitancy of the human mind, and from which no author is entirely free. The anonymous critic observes, that Cicero, in his "*Brutus*," though he has frequent occasion to use *Primus est, qui*, employs it only on one single occasion, namely, in the passage now quoted; and that, in every other instance, he uses *primus* simply. The observation is perfectly correct; the Reviewer, however, denies the fact, and positively affirms, that there is but one opportunity of employing either phraseology, and that he there uses *Est primus qui*. This assertion alone furnishes a strong presumption, that he did not comprehend the doctrine of the critic; for to ascribe it to a wilful desire to misrepresent, would, we are persuaded, be an act of extreme injustice to the writer. That he errs, the following examples will sufficiently evince, "*Hic primus infixit*," not *Primus erat, qui inflixerit*. "*Xantippi filius primus adhibuit doctrinam.*"—"Hæc igitur ætas prima oratorem perfectum tulit."—"Hic primus damnatus est." And in no example, but the one adduced by the Reviewer, does he use the other phraseology.—See *Cic. Brut.*

But though we entirely concur with the Oxford critic, in rejecting the phraseology of the Reviewer, in the sense in which he has employed it, it is necessary to correct an error, with which his own doctrine on this subject is chargeable. He observes, that Cicero uniformly employs, instead of *Primus est, qui*, either *primus* singly, *Qui primus*, or *Primo*. Here the critic errs egregiously. The adverb is wholly inadmissible. The distinc-

“He acts the part of a good citizen.” “Bonum civem ludit.” *Cic. Ep. Fam.* viii. 9. “He plays the

tion between “Hannibal *primus* transiit Alpes,” and “Hannibal *primo*,” is so obvious, and so generally known, that the critic’s unacquaintance with it cannot fail to excite surprise. “*Primus* intravi navem, quia ante me nemo; *primum* intravi, quia ego nunquam ante.”—See *Despaut. Comm.*

The following observations on the subject before us, have been partly anticipated; but they may serve to render the point in question still more clear to the junior reader.

In several of the modern languages, there is an elliptical form of expression in the use of superlatives, and ordinal numerals, which is wholly unknown in the Latin language. We say, for example, “He was the first, that came,” meaning, “He was the first of those, who came.”—“He was the bravest man, that Thebes produced,” that is, “the bravest of those, whom Thebes produced.”—“Socrates was the wisest man, that lived in Greece,” for “the wisest of those, who lived in Greece.” But in Latin, we cannot say *Primus erat, qui venit. Fortissimus fuit, quem Thebæ genuerunt. “Socrates erat sapientissimus, qui in Græcia vixit.”*—These phraseologies are rejected on account of their ambiguity; for *Primus erat, qui venit*, might denote “He, who came, was the first man.” *Fortissimus fuit, quem Thebæ genuerunt.* “He, whom Thebes produced, was the bravest man.”

It is usual, I am aware, with modern Latin writers, as is the case also in the very few examples, which occur in the Latin classics, to distinguish the former meaning from the latter, by joining *qui* with the subjunctive mood. But it deserves the reader’s particular attention, that this difference of construction will not always preclude ambiguity; because, when the clause is oblique, *qui* in the latter sense, would be necessarily joined with the subjunctive mood. The phraseology, therefore, is very properly rejected by classic writers. To adduce, in its justification, one or two examples, in opposition to the great mass of

patriot," or "affects to act the patriot." I remark this use of the verb *ludere*, because, I believe, it has not been noticed by any lexicographer.

EXERCISE.

Cyrus having arrived at the age of manhood, Harpagus wrote to him a letter, advising him to make war on his grandfather, Astyages, who had banished him into Persia, and to seize the crown. Cyrus, after he had read the letter, had a dream, in which he was desired to attempt the same thing; and was also advised to take, as an associate in the undertaking, the first man, that he should meet next day. Cyrus did so; and, perceiving that the people were favourable to his design, he raised an army, and marched against Astyages. A battle took place; in which the king was taken prisoner. Cyrus, however, acted towards him the part of a grandson, more than of a conqueror; for he took nothing from him but his crown; and conferred upon him the government of Hyrcania.

opponent authorities, is (if we may be pardoned the similitude) to weigh a turkey's feather against an ingot of gold. Besides, it is to be observed, that not even the authority of Cicero himself can justify ambiguity. It may be true, that in the passage, in which he has employed this form of expression, no ambiguity, or obscurity, is involved. But this, though it may furnish some apology for the writer, cannot, consistently with the principles of sound criticism, be pleaded in justification of a phraseology, which, though in some cases easily intelligible, may, in others, perplex, or mislead the reader. The simple question is, "Whether is this form of expression, in any case, liable to misconstruction?" If it is, it ought to be in all cases rejected.

OBSERVATIONS.

INDOLES.

INGENIUM.

Indoles, says Dumesnil, means "Natural disposition," and relates to the qualities of the soul. *Ingenium*, "Judgment," "Sagacity," "Penetration." "They agree," says Hill, "in denoting an innate quality of mind ; but differ, as the former regards the dispositions of the heart, as susceptible of improvement, or of corruption ; and the latter, the powers of the understanding, as they exist."

Neither of these explanations appears to be quite correct. Both critics seem to err in confining the term *Ingenium* to the powers of the understanding. *Ingenium* from *Ingenitus*, denotes the native qualities and properties of the whole soul, and not merely those of the intellect. That it is applied to the powers of the understanding, is universally admitted ; that it also denotes the moral qualities of the soul, the following examples will sufficiently prove. When Salust is delineating the character of Catiline, he says, "Magna vi et animi et corporis, sed ingenio malo pravoque." It cannot be doubted, but *Ingenium* here refers to the moral disposition chiefly, if not entirely. When Gnatho says, "Novi ingenium mulierum," *Ter. Eun.* iv. 7. 42. he clearly alludes to the natural temper, and not the understanding, of women. When Thais says, "Non adeo inhumano ingenio sum," *Ter. Eun.* v. 2. 41, she evidently alludes to the qualities

of the heart. To these may be added the following passages, “*Ingenia ferocia efferaverat.*” *Curt.* viii. 2. 16. “*Mansuetissimum ingenium suum sæviore uti severitate coegit,*” *Val. Max.* lib. ii. cap. 7. “*Ingenium vetus.*” *Mart.* lib. xi. cap. 8. “*Si mansueferi posset ferum ejus ingenium.*” *Suet. in Vit. Calig.* cap. 27. I am, therefore, inclined to think, that *Ingenium* denotes “*Quicquid est ingenitum.*”—“*Natura ingenita,*” and is applied to the native qualities of the whole soul, those of the heart, as well as of the head; but, as Hill correctly observes, without any reference to their corruption, or improvement; their probable increase or diminution.

Indoles, from *Inolescere* (per epenthesis literæ *d*) “*To grow in,*” is defined by Servius, *Futuræ virtutis imago*; and by another eminent critic, *Significatio quædam in pueris et adolescentibus futuræ probitatis*. It denotes the moral propensity of the soul, as indicated by certain characters, and unfolding itself with advancing years. “*Attingam nunc,*” says Valerius Maximus, “*quasi cunabula quædam et elementa virtutis animique procedente tempore ad summum gloriæ cumulum perventuri, certo cum indolis experimento.*” *Val. Max.* iii. 1. 1. “*Cum hac indole virtutum et vitiorum sub Asdrubale meruit,*” *Liv.* xxi. 4, “*With this natural disposition to virtue and vice.*” “*Majore mihi ingenio videtur esse, quam ut cum orationibus Lysiæ comparetur; præterea ad virtutem major indoles.*” *Cic. de Or.* Here *Ingenium* refers to the powers of the mind, and may be rendered,

though not quite comprehensively enough, by the word "Genius:" and by *Indoles ad virtutem*, is signified, "A disposition to virtue." It seems to denote, sometimes, simply, the diagnostic character by which either the present, or future qualities of the subject are known, or anticipated. "Novi indolem ingenii nostri; cito erit parata navis." *Plaut. Mil. iii. 3. 46.* "I know the natural *capability*, or the natural powers, of our ingenuity."—Here there is no reference to the moral character. "Summa in filio spes, summa ingenii indoles, summa virtus," *Cic. Orat. Philip. II.* "The greatest indications of intellect or genius." Hill is of opinion, that "in advanced life, it suggests the existence of such qualities, (that is, moral qualities) not yet called forth," and quotes, in support of this opinion, "Omnes, in quibus est virtutis indoles, commoventur." *Cic. Off. lib. 3.* Stephens, on the contrary, says, that in persons arrived at maturity, it is an indication of present virtue, and quotes, "Fac enim fuisse in isto C. Lælio, M. Catonis materiem atque indolem." *Cic. in Verr.* In the latter opinion, we are inclined to concur. When Livy says, "Tanta indoles in Lavinia erat," lib. i. cap. 3, he surely alludes to qualities called forth into actual exercise.

It would appear then, that *Ingenium* denotes "The innate moral and intellectual qualities," without any reference to their increase, or diminution, and that *Indoles* denotes "the seeds, or embryo of moral nature," "the native propensity to virtue or

vice," manifested by certain signs, and unfolding itself with years. It corresponds to our word, *Character*, denoting, not only when confined to moral qualities, the mark, or sign, of moral distinction, but also the qualities, which that mark, or sign betokens. "Indoles futuræ imperatoriæ virtutis apparuit." *Just.* ii. 9. 15, "The indications, or signs, of his future excellence, as a general."

Ingenium and *Indoles* are each applied also to things inanimate, as, "Soli ingenium," *Plin.* xiv. 1, "The nature of the soil." "Lactis ingenia." *Aul. Gell.* xii. 1. "In arboribus etiam et frugibus major plerumque vis et potestas est ad earum indolem, vel detrectandam, vel augendam, aquarum atque terrarum quæ alunt." *Aul. Gell.* lib. xii. cap. 1.

PERCONTARI. INTERROGARE. SCISCITARI.

Percontari, means "To sift to the bottom, by search or inquiry," "To pry." *Interrogare*, simply "To ask." "The former," says Dumesnil, "has a relation to public news; the latter refers to the sentiment, or opinion, of the speaker." Hill observes, that "in the case of the first verb, the person either gratifies his curiosity, by prying into matters, with which he is but little, if at all, concerned; or he presents inquiries, the purpose of which is hidden from the person required to answer them." These explanations approach near the truth. *Percontari* (quasi

per contum exquirere) means, "To sift," "To examine to the bottom," "To ask inquisitively, either for the sake of curiosity, or for the purpose of getting useful information." *Sciscitari*, a frequentative, from *Sciscere*, which is an inceptive from *Scire*, denotes "to inquire, with a desire to know something interesting and important." The former expresses a sifting and inquisitive manner of asking; the latter, the eager desire of knowledge, prompting to inquiry. The one often refers to matters of idle and impertinent curiosity, the other always to matters of importance. Here the reader will perceive, that we have ventured to extend the import of the verb *Percontari*, beyond that assigned to it by Dr. Hill. Of the many examples, which might be produced, to shew, that *Percontari* is not confined to matters of idle curiosity, or to queries, the purpose of which is hidden from the person required to answer them, the few following will suffice.—"Tum potissimum amicorum vocat, primumque rei frumentariæ præfectum Turranium, post Lusium Getam prætorianis impositum percontatur." *Tacit. Ann.* xi. 31. "Accitosque pontifices, percontatus est." *Tacit. Ann.* iv. 17. A reference to these two passages will satisfy the reader, that the use of *Percontari* is not so much limited as the learned author supposes, the queries here alluded to, not being those of idle curiosity, nor those of which the purpose was hidden from the person asked. See *Curt. lib. vi. cap. 7.*—*Val. Max. iii. 7. 1.*—*Id. viii.*

14. 4. *Ext.* Nay, the passage quoted by the ingenious critic, from Horace, appears to me to be utterly irreconcilable with his definition of the term.

“Inter cuncta leges, et percontabere doctos,
Qua ratione queas traducere leniter ævum.”

Hor. Ep. xviii. 96.

The supposition, that Lælius, in the opinion of the poet, might not be sufficiently aware of the importance of the question, is wholly inadmissible.

Sciscitari implies, that the information wanted is interesting to the inquirer, and that the query is put with an eager desire to know.—“De uno quoque nostrum, et maxime qui hoc loco sententias dicimus, sciscitantur omnes; avent audire, quid quisque senserit.” *Cic. Phil. 11.* “Sciscitari pergit, cum quibus tantæ rei societatem inisset; plurimum referre, quales viri tam memorabili operi admoturi manus essent.” *Curt. lib. vi. cap. 14.* The eagerness to know in the former case, and the interest of the inquirer in the latter, are here expressly mentioned, as prompting to the inquiry.

The difference between *Interrogare* and *Percontari*, is explained by Quintilian. “Quid enim tam commune, quam interrogare vel percontari? Nam utroque utimur indifferenter, cum alterum noscendi, alterum arguendi gratiâ, videatur adhiberi,” *lib. ix. cap. 2.* Popma has objected to this distinction, and Dumesnil pronounces it groundless. But the meaning of Quintilian has evidently been misunder-

stood by these, and some other critics; for, as Buchnerus has shewn, and as may be evinced by numberless examples—the first *Alter* does not always refer to the former of the two particulars, but often to the latter. The passage, therefore, is to be understood, as if Quintilian had said, “Cum posterius noscendi, prius arguendi gratiâ, videatur adhiberi.” See *Capp. in Quint.* p. 548. *Interrogare* then may be the act of one, who puts a question, and answers it himself, which was called *subjectio*, (see Auct. ad Heren. lib. 4. cap. 23.) a mode of arguing adopted by orators; or it may express a question, which requires no answer; whereas *percontari* always signifies, that a reply is desired. Another distinction has also been suggested between these two verbs, the same as exists between ἐρωταεῖν and πυνθάνεσθαι—namely, that *Interrogare*, like the former, is used in questions, where the answer may be simply *Yes*, or *No*; and that *Percontari* always requires a detailed reply. See *Alexander Numenius de Figuris*, tom i. p. 580.

Ubi vinum, intemperantius haustum, capiti detrimentum affert, est *crapula*. See *Steph. Thes.* and *Martin. Lexicon Philologicum*.

EXERCISE.

Pyrrhus, king of Epire, was a man distinguished for the meekness of his disposition. Having heard, that some Tarentines had spoken of him, at a feast, in disrespectful terms, he sent for those, who, he was told, had been present, and asked them, if they had really said the things, which had

come to his ears. One of them ingenuously replied, "If wine had not failed us, the things, which have been reported to you, would have been mere play and joke, compared with those, which we were going to say." This apology on the score of inebriety, and so honest a confession of the truth, turned the anger of the king into laughter. The effect of this clemency and moderation of mind was, that the Tarentines ever afterwards, when sober, returned him thanks, and when intoxicated, prayed for his prosperity.

OBSERVATIONS.

SUI. SUUS. IPSE. IS. ILLE. ISTE.

In no case, perhaps, is the young translator more liable to err, than in the use of the reciprocal pronouns. His attention, therefore, it is hoped, may be profitably given to the following observations.

One of the greatest defects in the English language is, the want of a sufficient number of pronouns of the third person. It is from this defect, that ambiguities so frequently occur, when we have occasion to speak of two or more persons in the same sentence. If we say, for example, "Lisias promised to his father, never to abandon his friends," it is impossible for the hearer, or reader, to ascertain, whether he here meant the friends of Lisias, or those of his father. The Latin language possesses a decided and important superiority in this respect.—The Romans had three distinct pronouns of the third person, one for noting the principal subject, one for that which is subordinate, and one for marking the latter emphatically, so as to

distinguish it from the former, or from any other subject, which may have been previously mentioned. The three pronouns are *sui*, *ipse*, and *is*, *ille*, or *iste**, the proper use of which we shall now endeavour to explain.

First, then, in order to enable the reader to discriminate between the first and the three last, we would propose the following simple, and general rule. —When the subject is of the third person, and no transition from one subject to another is to be noted, *sui* and *suus* must be employed; but when a change of subject is to be signified, we must then use *is*, *ille*, or *iste*. This rule is essential to perspicuity. Its application may be illustrated by the few following examples. “Lycurgus was the greatest ornament of Lacedæmon. Apollo said, that *he* knew not, whether he should rank *him* among men, or among Gods.” The pronoun *he* refers to Apollo, the nominative to the verb; here, therefore, there is no change of subject, and the pronoun is accordingly rendered by *sui*. The pronoun *him* refers to Lycurgus, a subject different from that, which the nominative to the verb expresses; in order, therefore, to mark the transition, it is rendered by *ille*. In Latin, the sentence would proceed thus: “Apollo dixit, *se* nescire, utrum *illum* hominum, an Deorum, numero aggregaret.” *Val. Max.* v. 3. 2. *Ext.* “Cato said, that he was a hap-

* The difference in respect to meaning, between *is*, *ille*, and *iste*, it is foreign to our present purpose to consider. They are here regarded as equivalent words, and opposed to *sui* and *ipse*.

pier man, than Cæsar." If *he* refers to Cato, no change of subject being implied, it must be rendered by *sui*; thus, "Cato dixit, *se* Cæsare esse feliciores." If *he* refer to some other person, the change of subject must be noted, and for this purpose, we must employ *ille*, saying, "*illum* Cæsare esse feliciores."—"Titius vendidit suas ædes," means, "Titius sold his (Titius's) house." "Vendidit ejus ædes," means "He sold the house of another person." If we say, "John loves James and his brother," the sentence is somewhat ambiguous. If the pronoun refer to *John*, the principal subject, it should be rendered, *Joannes diligit Jacobum, et fratrem suum*. If it refer to *James*, it should be rendered, *fratrem ejus*. "Tradito sibi puero, vir dicendi peritus ingenium ejus perspiciat." *Quint. lib. i. cap. 3*. Here *sibi* refers to the nominative to the verb. *Sui* and *suus*, therefore, are to be employed as referring to the principal subject of discourse, if it be of the third person; and this subject is very generally the nominative to the principal verb in the sentence. When these are used, no change of subject is implied.

Ipse is distinguished from *sui* and *ille* by its applicability to any of the three persons. Thus, we say, *Ego ipse, Tu ipse, Nos ipsi*. "Ego ipse vindex æris alieni." *Cic.* "Tute ipse his rebus finem præscripsisti." *Ter. And. i. 1. 124*. "Nosmet ipsos vindicamus in libertatem." *Sall. B. G.* Its general office is to individuate with more precision, or to designate the subject with greater emphasis, answering to the

English words, “very,” “self,” “own.” When applied to the third person, it is distinguished from *sui* and *ille* by this difference—*Sui* relates to the principal subject, generally the nominative to the verb; *ipse* refers to the subordinate subject, but emphatically marks it, as distinguished from the principal, or any other subject previously mentioned. “The senate apologized, and said, that it had happened, not through their fault, but by his own sudden and secret arrival,” “*Senatus excusatione usus est, et dixit, non suâ (senatûs) negligentîâ, sed ipsius subito, et clandestino adventu, factum.*” *Val. Max.* v. 1. 1. Here *sua* refers, according to its proper character, to *senatus*; and *ipsius* points to Ptolemy, referring to him emphatically, as opposed to any other person, as being the cause of their apparent negligence. “Alexander a Leusippo impetravit, ut eorum equitum, qui apud Granicum ceciderunt, faceret statuas, et ipsius quoque iis interponeret.” *Vell. Pater.* Here *ipsius* is properly used, as referring to Leusippus. Had the author used *suam*, it would have strictly referred to Alexander. “The senate ordered, that all expenses should be liberally furnished both to himself, and his whole suite,” “*Ut impensæ liberaliter cum ipsi, tum toti comitatu, præstarentur.*” See *Val. Max.* v. 1. 1. Here *sibi* would strictly refer to the senate.

To the general rule here delivered for the use of *ille*, *ipse*, and *sui*, we subjoin the following observations.

1st. When the subject, whether principal, or sub-

ordinate, is expressed by *Quisque*, or *Unusquisque*, the reciprocal pronoun is used. We say, for example, “*Quisque sui memor.*” *Cic.* “*Pro se quisque acriter animum intendat.*” *Liv. Præf.* “*Suus cuique mos.*” *Ter. Ph. ii. 3. 14.* “*Suo quisque tempore usus est.*” *Ter. Ad. Prol.*

2dly. When no ambiguity is to be apprehended, *is* and *ille* are sometimes used for *sui*. “*Persuadent Rauracis, uti eodem usi consilio, una cum iis proficiscantur.*” *Cæs. B. G. i. 5.* Here *una cum iis* is used for *una secum*. “*Non petit, ut illum miserum putetis,*” *Quint.* for *se miserum*.

3dly. When the nominative to the verb is in the first or second person, *suus* is frequently used for *ipse*. This phraseology is admitted, as being attended with no ambiguity, *suus*, and *sui*, being incapable of referring to the first, or second person. Thus, we may say, *Cepi columbam in nido suo*, for *nido ipsius*; but we cannot say, *Puer cepit columbam in nido suo*, but *nido ipsius*, because *suus* might, and, indeed, strictly would, refer to *puer*. “*Eloquere quicquid est suo nomine,*” *Plaut. Aul. vi. 4,* “*Speak out, whatever it is, by its own name.*” Here, also, there is no ambiguity. *Suus* cannot refer to *tu*. “*Mittam hodie huic suo natali die malam rem.*” *Plaut. Pseud. i. 3. 5.* “*Expugnaui filio aurum ab suo patre.*” *Plaut. Bacch. iv. 9. 7.*

4thly. Though the principal subject of discourse is generally the nominative to the verb, it is sometimes, by the structure of the sentence, expressed in

an oblique case. As the principal subject however, it may be, and frequently is, noted by the reciprocal pronoun. “ Ab Antonio admonitus sum, ut mane sibi adessem.” Though the principal subject be here expressed by an ablative case, it is properly represented by the pronoun *sibi*. “ Est libido homini suo animo obsequi.” *Plant. Bacch.* iii. 3. 12. Here *id*, or more properly *obsequi*, is the nominative to the verb ; but *homini* is, notwithstanding, the principal subject.—It must be observed, at the same time, that, agreeably to the general rule, by which *sui* and *suus* should refer to the nominative to the verb, *ipsius* is here admissible. The same observation may be applied to the following sentence, *Pythagoram venerabantur discipuli sui*—that is, *ipsius discipuli*. But, though *ipse* be admissible in such cases, care must be taken, that ambiguity be excluded ; for it is to be observed, that the genitive of this pronoun having no variety of termination, the subject cannot, in all instances, be so precisely ascertained, by the use of *ipse*, as by employing *suus*. If we say, “ Ciceronis suum filium piget,” the meaning is clear ; but, if we say, “ Ciceronis ipsius filium piget,” the pronoun may be conceived to agree with *Ciceronis*, instead of being the regimen of *filium*. When Virgil says,

“ Tum breviter Barcen nutricem affata Sichæi,
Namque suam patria antiqua cinis ater habebat.”

Æn. iv. 632.

the pronoun *suam*, by its termination, clearly indicates its subject ; *ipsius* would leave it in obscurity. “ He

received this name, by reason of his avarice," *Propter avaritiam suam, hoc nomen inditum est*; or, according to the general rule, *Propter avaritiam ipsius*. The latter is the expression of Plautus, (see Cap. ii. 2. 37.) In the following sentence, perspicuity requires the use of the reciprocal pronoun. "Consulem C. Marium, levi vulnere a Telesino perstrictum, servus suus gladio interemit." *Val. Max.* vi. 8. 2. Here *servus* is the nominative to the verb; but Marius is the principal subject, and neither *ipse* nor *is* would so clearly point to Marius, as the reciprocal pronoun. *Ipse* might refer to Telesinus, and *is* to some other individual, if any such had been previously mentioned.

The preceding observations will enable the reader to perceive the following errors, "Intrantes domum, invenerunt puerum cum Maria matre ejus," for *sua*. "Vidi spiritum Dei descendentem, sicut columbam, super se," for *super eum*. *Se* properly refers to *columbam*. "Quos præscivit, et prædestinavit conformes fieri imaginis filii ejus," for *sui*.—Despauter censures "Reddidit filium patri ejus;" a passage which occurs in the same translation of the gospels, from which some of the preceding examples are taken. We apprehend, however, that both *suo* and *ejus* would be here redundant. If *his* refer to the nominative to the verb, it ought to be *suo*; if it refer to the son, the pronoun is unnecessary; but if it be employed, *ipsius*, perhaps, is the preferable word; if it refer to some third person, it should be *ejus*. When Chry-

salus says, "Expugnaui filio aurum ab suo patre," *Plaut. Bacch.* iv. 9. 7, there is a peculiar force and archness in the addition of the reciprocal pronoun. While it marks the singularity of the circumstance, it indicates the difficulty of the act, and the ingenuity of the agent. It is to be observed also, that the nominative to the verb being of the first person, there can be no uncertainty of reference, and, therefore, no ambiguity. But when *suo* is added to *patri*, in the passage, "Filiu reddidit," &c., it either refers the relation to an improper object, namely, *ille* (Jesus), this being strictly the reference, or it marks an antithesis, where no contrast is intended. In either case, it expresses a conception either primary, or secondary, which did not belong to the speaker. Where there is the least danger of ambiguity, *suus* should never be applied to the subordinate subject. When Chrysalus says "Quid suo reddidit patri?" *Plaut. Bacch.* iv. 4. 14, the reciprocal pronoun refers, agreeably to its proper character, to *ille* (*Mnesilochus*), the nominative to the verb. By the same rule, in the expression, "Filiu reddidit suo patri," the pronoun should refer to *ille*, whereas it is intended to refer to *filium*. Where ambiguity is not to be apprehended, *suus* and *sui* may be used as referring to the subordinate subject.— "Nunc adeo hoc factum est, ut nomine quamque appellem suo." *Plaut. Pseud.* i. 2. 52. "Intelligis me ita paratum in iudiciu venire, ut non modo in auribus vestris, sed in oculis omnium sua furta, atque flagitia defixurus sim." *Cic. in Verr.* In neither of

these examples can there be any ambiguity, the principal nominative being, in the former, of the first, and in the latter, of the second person. In the following sentence, *sui* refers at once to the principal, and the subordinate subject. “Ad Laïdem Demosthenes clanculum adit, et ut sibi *sui* copiam faceret, petit.” *Aul. Gel.* i. 8. Here also, there can be no misconception, though *sui* be used for the subordinate subject. Terence, in a passage precisely similar, employs, agreeably to the general rule, the pronoun *is*,

“Postridie ad anum recta pergit; obsecrat,
Ut sibi ejus faciat copiam.” *Ter. Ph.* i. 2. 62.

“Alexander Diogenem gradu suo divitiis pelleret tentat.” *Curt.* iv. 3. Here *suo* should strictly refer to Alexander; but the reader almost intuitively perceives, that this reference would involve an absurdity. The following expression we should probably misapprehend, were we to read it, disjoined from the context. “Alexander urbem destitutam a suis intrat.” *Curt.* iii. 1. 6. Here we should naturally refer the reciprocal pronoun to Alexander; the context, however, clearly shews, that it refers to the inhabitants; for it is added, “Arcem, in quam confugerant, oppugnare adortus.” Expressions, however, which are in the least degree liable to misconstruction, should carefully be avoided. Every sentence should be so framed, as to exhibit the intended meaning with clearness and precision; nor should the reader be reduced to the necessity of referring, for illustration, to what

precedes, or what follows ; much less should he have misconceptions created by the inaccuracy of the writer, even though afterwards corrected. The rule of Quintilian cannot be too frequently, or too forcibly inculcated. “ Non ut intelligere possit, sed ne omnino possit non intelligere, curandum,” lib. viii. cap. 3 *. We would recommend it, therefore, to the reader, not to employ the reciprocal pronouns, as referring to a subordinate subject, unless in cases where there is no possibility of misconception.

It may be farther remarked, that when two subjects are mentioned, *iste* denotes the nearer or the latter ; thus, “ Quærebam igitur, utrum panderem vela orationis statim, an eam ante paululum dialecticorum remis propellerem.” *Aud.* Isto modo vero. *Cic. Tus. Q.* iv. 5. “ In the latter way.”

It has been already observed, that the proper office of *ipse*, as opposed to *is* and *sui*, is emphatically to note the subordinate, as distinguished from the primary, or any other subject. “ The king loved Parmenio, and at his own request gave him the government of the province,” *Rex Parmenionem dilexit, et ipsius rogatu ei provinciam administrandam dedit.* “ The emperor shewed him the will, written

* “ Id ipsum in consilio est habendum, non semper tam esse acrem judicis intentionem, ut obscuritatem apud se ipse discutiat, et tenebris orationis inferat quoddam intelligentiæ suæ lumen, sed multis eum frequenter cogitationibus avocari, nisi tam clara fuerint, quæ dicemus, ut in animum ejus oratio, ut sol in oculos, etiamsi in eam non intendatur, incurrat.” *Quint.* viii. 2. *ad fin.*

with his (not the emperor's) own hand," *Testamentum ipsius manu scriptum Imperator ostendit*. The same observation is exemplified in the following exercise.

Invidia, like many other nouns, has both an active and passive meaning. In order to avoid the ambiguity, Cicero employed a new term, *invidentia*, to denote our envy of others; but his example was not followed. *Vid. Tusc. Q. iv. 7.*

EXERCISE.

Alcibiades having learned, that some of the Lacedæmonians, whose envy he had excited, were laying snares for his life, fled to Tissaphernes, prefect of Lydia, into whose favour he soon contrived to insinuate himself, by his elegant manners and consummate address. When he found, that he had acquired very considerable influence over the mind of Tissaphernes, he took the liberty to dissuade him from furnishing the Lacedæmonians with a fleet, or with warlike supplies. He apprised him, that, while the Grecian states were at variance with one another, Darius would necessarily become the arbiter of peace and war; assuring him, at the same time, that the king would subdue, by their own arms, those, whom he was incapable of conquering by his own power. This counsel was not only favourably received, but strictly followed by Tissaphernes.

OBSERVATIONS.

EFFUGERE.

EVADERE.

The former is to escape from danger by fleeing, implying in the person a consciousness of the danger,

and an effort to escape. “Barbari suppliciorum ultimum effugere tentabant.” *Curt.* vi. 6.

“Effugere in thermis et circa balnea non est,
Menogenen, omni tu licet arte velis.”

Mart. Ep. xii. 84.

Evadere is to get out of danger, or difficulty, whether by our own endeavours, or those of others, or even by accident. It does not necessarily imply a consciousness of the danger, or an attempt to escape. “Rex, quum tanti periculi, quod evaserat, imago oculis oberraret,” *Curt.* viii. 6. The king had escaped from the danger alluded to, not by his own endeavours, for he was not aware of it, but by the interposition of others.

Evadere, when used for *Fieri*, is often, in modern Latin, improperly followed by the preposition *In*—thus, “Non dubitans, quin in virum magnum evasurus esset Marcianus.” *Grotius in Vers. Procop.* Cicero, and the best writers, always construe it, when it signifies “To become,” as a substantive verb—thus, “Perfectus Epicureus evaserat,” *Cic. de Clar. Or.* “He had become a perfect Epicurean.” “Non patiebatur eos, quos judicabat non posse oratores evadere, operam apud se perdere.” *Cic. de Orat.* lib. i. Such expressions, therefore, as *Evadet in virum doctum*, for *Evadet vir doctus*, “He will become a learned man,” should be avoided.

DESISTERE.

DESINERE.

Desinere, in the opinion of Faber, is, “To dis-

continue only for a time ;” “ Cessare ab aliqua re, cum tempore iteranda.” *Desistere* he defines to be, “ Desinere, ac ita quidem, ut habeat quandam mutatæ mentis et consilii significationem.” The learned critic, however, admits, that the former verb often denotes a permanent relinquishment of any action or pursuit. This, indeed, is evident from the two following passages ; and others also might be produced. “ Quod si tam facilem populum haberem, quam Æsopus habuit, libenter mehercle artem desinerem, tecumque, et similibus nostri, viverem.” *Cic. Ep. Fam. vii. 1.* “ Noster Æsopus ejusmodi fuit, ut ei desinere per omnes homines liceret.” *Cic.* In both these passages the verb expresses a permanent retirement of each from his occupation. *Desistere*, according to the same lexicographer, implies some change of mind, or some alteration of opinion, whence it may be inferred, that he would confine *Desinere* to the outward act. Facciolati concurs with him in his explanation of *Desistere*; and, in confirmation of this opinion, it has been remarked, that though we may say, *Desinere vel Desistere a re aliqua*, we cannot say, *Desinere mente—consilio, sententiâ*, but *Desistere*. The latter certainly are the classical expressions. And, though that change of mind, which is implied, in the discontinuance of any emotion, or affection, may be expressed by *Desinere*, as “ Desinit iræ,” *Sil. It.* “ Desine vereri,” *Ov. Trist.* yet the relinquishment of any volition, purpose, or action, from a new view of circumstances, and a consequent change of mind,

is, we believe, expressed by *Desistere*, and not *Desinere*.

The verbs agree in denoting the discontinuance of any action, or procedure, whether that discontinuance be temporary or permanent; and when this conception simply is implied, they may be used indiscriminately. “*Haud desinam, donec perfecero.*” *Ter. Ph.* ii. 3. 73. Here *Desistere* might have been employed, “*Non, hodie si exclusus fuero, desistam.*” *Hor. Sat.* i. 9. 57. Here again, the verb *Desinere* would have expressed the same determination. They are each applied to persons and things, but we are inclined to think, with this difference, that *Desistere* is not applied to things, unless when motion is denoted, either in space, or of time. “*Destitit in dubio fluctu jactarier intus.*” *Lucret.* vi. 554. “*Autumno desistente.*” *Varr. R. R.* ii. 3. *Desistere* is *finem facere*; *Desinere* is also *finem habere*, or *terminari*. “*Triclinium desinit, incipit portus.*” *Plin. Ep.* v. 6. *Vox desinit*, “The word ends.” Here *Desistere* would be inadmissible. *Desistere* refers to action only; *desinere* to action or passion. “*Ut auctor desinat inquiri.*” *Ov. Met.* i. 615. *Desistat* would be here, we apprehend, inapplicable.

In short, we are inclined to state, as the radical and chief distinction between these two verbs, that *Desistere* is properly the act of a voluntary agent, and is seldom applied to inanimate things, and then only, when motion, the power of which strictly belongs to animated being, is either literally or figuratively de-

noted ; whereas *desinere* is not only used, to express an action proceeding from volition, but also facts and events, whence volition is excluded. Hence we say, *destitit timere, amare, odisse*; but not *timor, amor, odium, destitit*, but *desiit*. When Ovid says, “Ægre desinet esse miser,” *Rem. Am.* 658, *desistet*, as if the effect depended on the lover, would be inadmissible. And, when he says, in another passage, “Somnus Credibilis tardâ desinit esse morâ,” *Ov. Her.* xxi. 22, the verb expresses merely the termination of a sentiment, in which the will has no concern.

OBSERVATIONS.

In the following exercise occurs the phrase “at full speed,” that is, “as fast as they could.” In all expressions, in which *possum* is involved, the learner should always be careful to attend to its proper, or literal, signification. Thus, “I can,” is equivalent to “I am able,” “I could,” to “I was able,” and sometimes to, “I should be able.” With this precaution, he will be in no danger of mistaking the proper mood or tense, in which the verb should be put: thus, “I would cry out, *with all my might*,” or, “as loudly, as I could;” *Clamarem, quantum possem*, or, “as much, as I should be able.”—“I cried out, *with all my might*,” or, “as loudly, as I could;” *Clamavi, quantum potui*, or, “as much, as I was able.” “I follow, as fast as I can;” *Sequor, quantum possum*, “as fast as I am able.”—“I will follow as fast, as I

can ;” *Sequar, quantum possim*, or “*potero*,” “as fast, as I may, or shall, be able.”

EXERCISE.

Brutus, being defeated by Antony and Octavius, near Philippi, betook himself to flight, to prevent his falling into the hands of the enemy. One Lucinus, observing a few horsemen pursuing him at full speed, threw himself in their way, in order to save the life of his general, and told them, that he was Brutus. The horsemen, overjoyed at this circumstance, gave over the pursuit, and despatched messengers, to tell Antony, that Brutus was taken. Antony, when he received the intelligence, was at a loss how to treat the illustrious captive. But he was soon delivered from his uneasiness, for Lucinus, shortly afterwards came up, and confessed, who he was. In the mean time, Brutus made his escape.

OBSERVATIONS.

AMICITIA.

HOSPITIUM.

The former means “Friendship in general,” in whatever principle it may be founded. *Hospitium* is strictly that friendship, which originates in hospitality; for it literally means, “A house to which a traveller repairs for lodging and entertainment.” In the earliest ages, before inns were erected for the accommodation of travellers, they used to be entertained in any house, to which choice or necessity might direct them; and to turn a stranger away was reprobated as a crime of the most odious character. “I opened my doors,” says Job, “to the traveller.” See also *Gen.* ch. xviii. Friendships were thus contracted, and tokens of

regard (*Tesseræ dimidiatæ*) passed between the landlord and his guest, as memorials of this friendship; and these pledges were carefully transmitted from father to son. This sort of friendship was most religiously cultivated by the ancients; for a belief was early instilled into them, that the *Deus Hospitalis*, as Plautus calls him, or *Jupiter Hospitalis*, according to Cicero, would not suffer the rights of hospitality to be violated with impunity. In what veneration, indeed, these bonds of attachment were held, may be learned from the story of Glaucus and Diomedes, in the sixth book of the *Iliad*; for we are told, that these two warriors, though they met as foes, and were preparing for combat, having by mutual inquiries, not unusual in such cases, learned each other's parentage, not only abstained from every act of hostility, but renewed their obligations to hospitality and friendship, when they knew that their grandfathers had been mutual guests. The same sacred regard to the ties of hospitality, is illustrated by the story of Bellerophon, recorded by Homer in the same book.

AMBULARE.

INCEDERE.

Ambulare signifies "to walk," generally for exercise and amusement. It has no reference to the manner. "*Ambulare* est spatiis factis in eadem vestigia sæpius reflectere, idque ad voluptatem vel sanitatem." *Nolt. Lex. Ant.* It does not, however, necessarily

imply, that the person walks backwards and forwards in the same place, as Noltenius here supposes, but merely, that the person walks for amusement, or health. We sometimes find it applied "to walking journeys," as "Eo modo ambulat Cæsar, et his diariis militum celeritatem incitat, ut timeam, ne citius ad Brundisium, quam opus sit, accesserit." *Cic. ad Att.* 8. 14. Schorus, therefore, is more correct than Noltenius, when he says, "Non solum ii dicuntur ambulare, qui spatia faciunt, aut animi causa eunt, sed etiam qui proficiscuntur aliquo." *Schor.* 33. *Verw. Thes.*

Incedere is "to walk with measured steps," "to march," "to walk with a portly and courageous gait." "*Incedere* est ingredi composito, vel cum gravitate et pompa." (*Popma.*) Both occur in the following passage, "Tenero ac molli passu suspendimus gradum, nec ambulamus, sed incedimus," (*Seneca.*) that is, "We do not walk, but step; or we walk with measured pace." "Incedunt per ora vestra," *Sall. B. C.* "They walk in a stately, or pompous manner." Thus *Incedere* always denotes a measured step. So also *Incessus*—thus, "Modo citus, modo tardus incessus," *Sall. B. C.* "His gait was sometimes quick, at other times slow." *Incedere* is sometimes applied to travelling on horseback; "Servi pedibus, liberi non nisi equis incedunt." *Justin.* xii. 8.

"To walk," as contradistinguished from "to creep," is rendered by *gradi*. "Namque alias bestias nan tes,

aquarum incolas esse voluit ; alias volucres, cælo frui libero ; serpentes quasdam, quasdam esse gradientes." *Cic. Tus. Quæst.* v. 13.

"A countryman," when it means "One of the same nation, or people," is rendered by *Civis*, or *Popularis* ; when it signifies "A person living in the country, as opposed to one residing in the city," it is rendered by *Rusticus*. *Civis* is opposed to *Hostis*, or *Exterus*, "A foreigner." *Rusticus* to *Urbanus*, and *Agrestis* to *Oppidanus* and *Urbanus*.

Ferre is frequently construed with the accusative of the thing carried, and two datives—thus, "To carry a book as a present to any one," *Ferre librum dono alicui*.

The scholar, perhaps, may require to be reminded, that a practice or habit is frequently expressed, in English, by *Would*, and in Latin, by the preter-imperfect tense—thus, *Aiebat*, "He would say," or "Used to say," or "Was in the habit of saying." *Jubebat*, "He would bid." *Insumebat*, "He would spend." See *Hor. De Art. Poët.* 439.

As implying comparison or likeness, is rendered by *ut, uti, sicut, sicuti* ; implying a cause, or reason, by *quod, quia, quoniam, as, or since*—thus, "He did, as I desired." *Fecit, ut jussi*. "As you think so, I will forbear." *Quoniam ita censes, abstinebo*. In the latter sense, it is also rendered elegantly and forcibly by *quippe qui*, with the subjunctive mood generally—thus, *Quippe quæ in lege non scripta sit*. *Cic.* "As, or, forasmuch as, this is not written in the law."

In the following exercise similitude, or comparison, is implied, rather than cause or reason ; therefore, *uti* or *quemadmodum* is the more appropriate word, though *quoniam* may be allowed.

Vesci is, by writers of the Augustan age, joined to an ablative ; but by others, sometimes to an accusative.

EXERCISE.

When Louis, the eleventh, king of France, was sojourning among the people of Burgundy, his affairs being disturbed at home, he contracted an intimacy with one Conon, a plain honest countryman. After walking, or hunting, the king would frequently turn aside to Conon's house, and as princes are sometimes pleased with plebeian things, he would eat turnips with him and his wife, with the highest satisfaction. Louis being soon reinstated on his throne, Conon's wife advised him to wait on the king and remind him of their old friendship, and also to take with him some large turnips, as a present to his majesty. Conon was extremely reluctant, saying, that he should lose his labour, for that kings did not remember such good offices.

OBSERVATIONS.

The scholar should be careful to mark, by the pronoun, the transition from one subject to another, where it is not otherwise signified ; thus, " He entered, and she exclaimed," *Ingressus est, et illa exclamavit*. If *Illa* were omitted, both verbs would refer to *He*, as " He entered, and exclaimed." Tacitus, through inattention to this rule, has, in several

instances, puzzled, if not misled his reader. “*Addidit tentatam cohortem, quæ Ostiæ ageret, nec ullis tantorum criminum probationibus in pœnitentiam versus post scelus quærebat.*” *Hist.* ii. 63. Here *addidit* refers to P. Varus, and *quærebat* to Dola-bella; whereas, by the grammatical construction of the sentence, both verbs should refer to Varus.

The *Toga* among the Romans, and the *Pallium* of the Greeks, were long outer garments, reaching down to the feet. The *Toga* was of a white colour, either natural or artificial. In the former case, it was called *Toga alba*, and in the latter, *Candidata*.—This, at least, is the opinion of Lipsius, and, though liable to objection, appears, on the whole, highly probable. This garment being inconvenient for labour, it was usual to tuck it up, when they were going either to work, or travel. Hence originated the phrase, *Accingere se operi*, “To gird one’s self up,” or “Prepare one’s self for work.” Hence also, we have in scriptural language, “Gird up your loins,” or “Be prepared for working, or travelling.”

It has been remarked by some critics, that the conjunction *ac* is not used before the letters *c* and *q*, at the beginning of a sentence, nor before a vowel. Heusinger, indeed, disapproves the collocation of *ac* before *c* and *q*, in any part of a sentence. Examples of a contrary usage are quoted; but in much the majority of these *et* and *atque* are found in the best manuscripts. The scholar cannot err in avoiding, whatever seems to be of doubtful authority. It is also

observed by Drakenborch, in his annotations on Livy, (lib. 3. 16; 10. 36; and *Epit.* lib. 104,) that this elegant historian seems to have avoided *ac* before a word beginning with a vowel. In other classics, though very rarely in Cicero, we find this position occasionally admitted. General usage, however, is decidedly opposed to it.

EXERCISE.

Conon's wife, however, prevailed; and he accordingly picks out some large turnips, and prepares himself for the journey. But being hungry by the way, he ate all of them, except one, which was remarkably large.—When he had stolen into the hall, through which the king was to pass, he was immediately recognized by his majesty, and invited to an interview. With great alacrity he produced the turnip; and the king accepted it with still greater, charging one of his ministers to lay it up amongst those things, which he held most dear. He ordered also a thousand crowns to be paid to Conon for the turnip. The fame of this circumstance being soon spread, one of the courtiers presented the king with an elegant horse.

OBSERVATIONS.

LIBERALITAS.

MUNIFICENTIA.

The former is the generic term, and is opposed to *avaritia* and *prodigalitas*. It is defined by Cicero to be "*virtus in recte dando consistens.*" *Off.* i. 7. *Munificentia*, as its composition imports, is strictly, *liberalitas in muniis faciendis, sive in muneribus ludorum edendis.* *Liberalitas*, says Noltenius, ut plurimum privatorum est; *munificentia* principum.

ARGUMENTARI.

RATIOCINARI.

“*Argumentari*,” say Stephens and Faber, is “*Argumentis ad aliquid probandum uti*.”—“*Ratiocinari*, aliquid ratione colligere, vel deprendere.” The former is to bring forward arguments, whence-soever derived, for the purpose of proving any position; the latter to deduce, by logical reasoning, what is true, or what is false, what is right, or what is wrong; for as it is observed by several eminent critics, *Syllogismus*, in Greek, is termed by the Latins *Ratiocinatio*. See *Quint.* lib. vii. cap. 8. In consistency with this idea, it denotes money reckonings, or the collection of two or more numbers into one sum, as a conclusion or result.

Of these, *Argumentari* is the more generic term, the latter being confined to syllogistic reasoning.—When Cicero, in his defence of Milo, had endeavoured, from the temper of each, the consequences, as they would affect both, the time when the act was committed, and from other circumstances, to shew, that Clodius was the aggressor, he breaks off, and says, “*Sed quid ego argumentor ?*” Now, in this passage, *Ratiocinari* would be inadmissible; being totally inapplicable to this species of argument. It is to be observed then, that *Argumentari* is the generic term, including the adduction of argument of any species whatsoever. “*Omnis argumentatio*,” says Cicero, “*aut per inductionem tractanda est, aut per ratiocinationem*.” By *Inductio*, he means that sort of argu-

ment, by which a person is made to confess any fact, or assent to any position, by our previously proposing to him another, precisely similar, to which he cannot withhold his assent. It much resembles the argument from analogy. "*Ratiocinatio*," he defines to be, "*oratio ex ipsa re aliquid probabile eliciens, quod expositum, et per se cognitum, sua se vi et ratione confirmet.*" *Cic. de Inv. lib. 1.* He then tells us, that *Ratiocinatio* is divided into three parts, the *Major*, the *Minor*, and the concluding propositions; or, if the premises be accompanied with a proof of each, it is divisible into five parts. Hence it seems evident, that *Ratiocinari* is to reason with the formality of a logician.

Most nouns of the fifth declension want the plural number; but *Spes* has the nominative and accusative plural.

The measure of any thing, whether expressed in inches, feet, miles, &c., or indefinitely, is put in the accusative, and sometimes in the ablative; the measure of excess always in the ablative; thus, "A wall twelve feet high," *Murus, duodenos pedes altus.*—"They are six miles off," *Sex millibus*, or *Sex millia passuum absunt.*—"Much better," *Multo melior*, i. e. "better by much."—"Five feet higher," *Quinque pedibus altior*. Mr. Ruddiman has unnecessarily given two rules (Nos. 18 and 62) on this subject, one for distance, and another for measure.

Lactare aliquem spe, the phrase used by Erasmus, has been considered to be of suspicious character.

It has, however, the authority of Plautus, Terence, and Varro. The phrases, *In spem adducere*, *spe complere*, *spem offerre*, proposed in its stead, do not express the idea correctly. *Spem alere* approaches nearer to the sentiment. Noltenius quotes only the authority of Terence, in favour of *lactare*, and questions its validity; but we conceive, that it would be fastidious indeed to reject a word, sanctioned by Plautus, Terence, and Varro.

“To occur to any one” is rendered by *alicui in mentem venire*. “Ea res tibi tam belle in mentem venire non potuisset.” *Cic. pro Quinct.* “Hæc mihi fere in mentem veniebant.” *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* In the use of this phrase, there is an idiomatic expression, frequent with Cicero, which deserves attention. “Cum illius temporis mihi venit in mentem,” *Cic. in Verr.*, for “illud tempus.” “Venit enim mihi sane loci, religionis, illius in mentem.” *Cic.* There is here, doubtless, an ellipsis, but what the governing word is, we may conjecture, but cannot ascertain. Hadrianus Cardinalis pronounces the analogical expression to be rude and vulgar. When he delivered this opinion, he surely could not be aware, that Cicero often employs it.

EXERCISE.

The king, knowing the courtier had been tempted by the liberality, which he had shewn to Conon, and was aiming at gain, accepted the present with wonderful cheerfulness; and having summoned his nobles, began to consult, what

recompense he should make for so elegant a horse. In the mean time, the courtier conceived the highest expectations, reasoning thus with himself, "If the king repaid so liberally a turnip given by a countryman, how much more liberally will he repay a horse, presented by a courtier?" After the nobles had severally delivered their opinions, and the courtier had been long amused with vain hope, his majesty at last said, "a thing occurs to me, which I will give him;" and having called one of his nobles, whispered to him to bring, what he would find in a certain place, carefully wrapped up in a piece of silk.

OBSERVATIONS.

INVENIRE.

REPERIRE.

Whether there be any difference between these two verbs, and what is that difference, have been subjects of great controversy among lexicographers and critics. Valla is decidedly of opinion, that they are precisely synonymous. This opinion is impugned by Alexander ab Alexandro, who maintains a distinction, but does not explain, in what the difference consists. Fr. Fl. Sabinus defends the doctrine of Valla at considerable length, affirming the verbs to be strictly synonymous.

Fronto distinguishes them thus, "*Reperimus nostra ; invenimus aliena.*" This distinction is incorrect, as the examples, which will be adduced in the course of our inquiry, will sufficiently evince. Some critics have asserted, that *Invenire* is "To find by searching," and *Reperire*, "To find by accident."

(See *Verw. Thes. in Vavass.*) In evidence of this, they adduce the following expression in Ovid, “ Tu non inventa reperta es.” *Ov. Met.* i. 654, in which they contend, that the poet clearly indicates the difference between the two verbs, implying that, though not found by search, she was found by accident. The argument would be conclusive, if the lection were correct. But we have irrefragable evidence, that this reading is false, and that the passage should run thus,—“ Tu non inventa reperta Luctus eras levior.” Here we have no decisive evidence of the distinction supposed. In the following example from Plautus, the idea of “ search” is clearly excluded. “ Mercatum jussit ire ; ibi hoc malum inveni.” *Merc.* ii. 3. 23. i. e. *in hoc malum incidi.*

Others have contended, that the distinction is the reverse of that, which these critics have endeavoured to establish, and that *Invenire* is “ To find by accident,” and *Reperire* “ To find by search.” (See *Nolt. Lex. Ant. Gruter.* vol. i. 1045.) Dumesnil delivers it as his opinion, that *Invenire* signifies “ To find,” whether by accident or design, and that *Reperire* is “ To find by search,” and is said, “ of things unknown, or things sought after.” Hill adopts the same distinction, but adds, as another discriminating circumstance, that *Reperire* denotes, that the object searched for is known to exist, and that *Invenire* does not imply any knowledge of its existence. As far as my own enquiries have extended, neither of these explanations, though they approach nearer the truth, than

any of the preceding, appear to be correct. That *Reperire* does not always denote "finding by search," innumerable examples may be produced to prove. The few following will suffice; "Nimium negotii reperi." *Plaut. Merc.* iv. 3. 58. "Ni grato ingratus repertus est." *Id. Pers.* v. 2. 59. "Qui invident omnes inimicos mihi istoc facto reperi." *Ib. Ep.* i. 2. 6. In this last example it must be obvious, that Stratippocles did not intend to say, that he found enemies by searching for them. "Propter paupertatem hoc nomen reperi." *Id. Stich.* i. 3. 22. Here also no desire to find the name of Gelasimus by searching can be implied by the speaker.

It is equally clear, that *Reperire* does not always imply, that the object sought is known to exist. The examples already adduced make this sufficiently evident, but the few following may be added: "Aliquam reperitis rimam." *Plaut. Curc.* iv. 2. 24. The flaw was not known to exist previously to examination. When Cæsar says, "In castris Helvetiorum tabulæ repertæ sunt," *B. G.* i. 29, does he mean to convey the idea, that the register was known to exist? The discovery was, most probably, quite accidental and unexpected.—"Quærit quoque (namque reperta Fistula nuper erat) qua sit ratione reperta." *Ov. Met.* i. 687. Here also, a knowledge of the previous existence of the pipe cannot be supposed. When Hill quotes from Quintilian the following passage, "Hoc reperire difficilius, quam cum inveneris, argumentis adjuvare," lib. v. cap. 10, he observes, that the former

verb “suggests the labour of investigation, when the object is known to exist; the latter the apparent easiness of the discovery, which had been the fruit of exertion, and not presented by chance.” This observation, I frankly own, appears to me somewhat enigmatical. Does the learned author mean to represent the thing found out (*hoc*) to be at once easy, and difficult to be investigated; that the one verb suggests the idea of labour, and the other of facility in discovering the same thing, and by the same process? It seems to me, as to Burmann, that the verbs here convey precisely the same idea, and that the sentiment is simply this, “It is more difficult to find this out by investigation, than, after you have found it out, to aid or support it by argument or proof.”

That both these verbs then agree in signifying “to find out,” whether by search or by accident, and are each applicable, whether the object be or be not known to the enquirer as existing, is abundantly evident. It is evident also from the examples quoted, and might be still further evinced by the adduction of others, that these two verbs signify each, *deprehendere*, *investigare*, *nancisci*, *excogitare* vel *comminisci*. Hence it has been confidently affirmed, that the verbs are precisely synonymous, and may in every instance be used indiscriminately. To this conclusion, however, we cannot assent, persuaded that in no language are to be found any two words precisely of the same import, and of the same exact character. What then, it may be asked, is the difference? On a sub-

ject which has eluded the research, and baffled the ingenuity of the most eminent and acute philologists, it becomes us to offer an opinion, to whatever it may amount, with great diffidence. In no question of verbal distinction has the author of this work experienced so great difficulty as in this enquiry; and as we are prone to estimate a discovery not by its real value, but by the labour, which it costs us, and the number of failures, he has been led to attach more importance to his success in this investigation (if he has been successful) than it obviously merits. The difference then between these two verbs we apprehend to be simply this, that, while *invenire* is used to signify “to find out,” in a transitive sense, and also “to invent,” in the abstract, *reperire* always refers to some specific object expressed or implied. Wherever the latter occurs, the thing found, whether sought for or not, is, we believe, universally specified. This is not necessary in the case of *invenire*. “Fingebat hæc Homerus, et humana ad Deos transferebat; divina mallet ad nos. Quæ autem divina? Vigere, sapere, *invenire*, meminisse.” *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.* lib. iii. *Reperire*, as we apprehend, would be here inadmissible. We do not recollect, nor have we been able to discover, any example, in which it is used in this abstract sense; and we conceive, that *reperire* would here be equally improper, as it would be to translate the verb in English thus, “To be strong, to be wise, *to find*, to remember.”

The distinction here offered receives some con-

firmation from this well-known fact, that, while we have the abstract noun *inventio* from *invenire*, we have no correspondent abstract noun from *reperire*. It would be difficult to account for this, unless on the supposition, that the distinction here offered is correct. We find also the word *inventor*, expressing the agent, with no object specified, and applied in a general and abstract sense. It is employed, for example, as an epithet of Jupiter, "Jupiter Inventor."—*Repertor* here would be inapplicable: for wherever it is used the object must be expressed or implied, as "pallæ repertor." *Hor.* "Repertores legum." *Quintil.* "Repertor medicinæ." *Virg.* The distinction then may perhaps be thus briefly expressed, that *invenire* is used not only in a relative, or transitive, but also in an absolute and abstract sense, while *reperire* is confined to the former; *invenire* expressing the power or faculty, as well as the act, *reperire* expressing the latter only.

PRIMORES.

PROCERES.

OPTIMATES.

"*Magnates*," says Noltenius, "apud neminem, quod constat, proborum scriptorum reperitur, nisi quod extat in antiqua quadam inscriptione a Dempstero allata. Cicero, Livius, Justinus aliique, dicunt pro eo *optimates*, Livius et alii *proceres*, idem Livius, Virgilius et Horatius *primores*, Plautus *summates*, Seneca, Tacitus, Suetonius *megistanes*." To the list of those, who use *Primores*, he should have added, Tacitus, with whom, as Faber observes, it seems to

have been a favourite word. What distinction there is, if any exists, among these words, it is easier to conjecture, than to determine. *Primores* is never applied by Cicero, nor, I believe, by Plautus, to persons. *Plaut. Bacch.* iv. 4. 24. *Trin.* iv. 2. 65. Both these writers seem to have used it in the same sense. "Primoribus labris attigissent." *Cic. de Orat.* lib. i. "Digitulis duobus sumebas primoribus." *Plaut. Bacch.* iv. 4. 24. "Versabatur mihi in labris primoribus." *Id. Trin.* iv. 2. 65. When it is employed by other writers, and signifies persons, it appears to denote, "Men of the first rank," and refers to place, or order of station. *Proceres*, if distinguishable from this, refers to "Men eminent either by rank, or political authority." *Optimates* is confined by Erasmus, to "Persons of large fortune." Cicero seems to give it a more extensive meaning, than is assigned to either of the two other terms, when he includes in the number of *Optimates* the *Libertini*. He defines them thus, "Sunt principes publici consilii; sunt qui eorum sectam sequuntur." *Orat. pro Sext.* i. e. "The leading men in public deliberation, and those, who follow their party." Under this appellation, he afterwards includes all those, who wish for that, which is most desirable by all wise and good men, *Otium cum dignitate*. In this definition is evidently included, "Excellence of moral and intellectual character." He elsewhere seems to confine the term to the aristocracy of the country. "Respublica est res populi, cum bene ac juste geritur, sive ab uno rege, sive a paucis opti-

matibus, sive ab universo populo : cum vero injustus est rex, quem tyrannum voco, aut injusti optimates," &c. *Cic. Frag.* Here rank only, and not merit, is expressed by the term *Optimates*. In the following passage he uses it, agreeably to his own explanation of it, as signifying "favourable to the cause or interest of the nobles," as opposed to *Populares*, "Friends of the people," or "Men desirous of popular applause."—"Quod a me ita præcautum atque provisum est, non ut ego de optimati illa mea ratione decederem, sed ut ille esset melior, et aliquid de populari levitate deponeret." *Ep. ad Att.* lib. ii. 1. Here, by *Optimati ratione*, is meant, "His conduct in favour of the leading men." (See also his oration for Sextius, cap. 45.) From these passages it would appear, that by *Optimates* Cicero means, "Persons distinguished by rank, or political merit," and sometimes the former only.

Sub, compounded with an adjective, lessens the signification, and corresponds to the English termination *ish*; thus, *Albus*, "White," *Subalbus*, "Whitish." *Acidus*, "Sour," *Subacidus*, "Sourish," *Subacid*, or "Somewhat sour."

EXERCISE.

The turnip was accordingly brought; and the king, with his own hand, presented it to the courtier, carefully wrapped up, as it was, in the silk cloth. His majesty, at the same time, told him, that he indeed believed the horse to be very valuable; but that he was amply repaid by a thing, which had cost him a thousand gold crowns. The

courtier, overjoyed, not doubting, but something had been given him of no ordinary value, returned thanks to his majesty for his great liberality, and then took his leave. Eager to see what the silk cloth contained, he took it off, and found, to his great mortification, a turnip now somewhat dry. Thus the catcher, himself caught, became a subject of laughter to all the nobles.

OBSERVATIONS.

LIS.

JURGIUM.

RIXA.

These three words have been considered as synonymes, each implying "disagreement." *Jurgium* denotes merely "a chiding" or "slight difference between friends." *Lis* expresses "discord between adversaries, or opponents," "a ground of controversy, which may be removed judicially or otherwise." "Si *jurgant*, benevolorum concertatio est; *lis* inimicorum, non *jurgium* dicitur." *Cic. lib. 4, de repub.* *Lis* is frequently confined to law suits, and sometimes denotes, the damages given. "Lites severe æstimatæ." *Cic. pro Muræn.* "The damages were estimated with rigour." "Philosophi ætatem in litibus conterunt." *Cic. de Leg.* "In philosophical controversies." *Rixa* differs from these, as always implying "noisy contention, or brawling, and generally, blows." "*Jurgia* primum, mox *rixa*, inter Batavos, et legionarios."—*Tac. Hist. 1. 64.* *Contentio*, as denoting merely "a striving together," or "a strenuous exertion of faculties, corporeal or mental, on each side," has been already explained. We shall here

only remark, that it is sometimes used for *certamen*, and *controversia*, each of these words implying *contentio*, or “an exertion of conflicting powers.”

BIBERE.

POTARE.

The former of these verbs means, simply, “To drink,” the latter, “To be addicted to drinking,” or “To drink to excess.” “*Bibunt* sobrii ad naturæ necessitatem; *potant* ebriosi affluenter, et ad ebrietatem.” *Popma*. “Nunquam sitiens biberat, nec esuriens ederat.” *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.* “Ibi primum insuevit exercitus populi Romani amare, potare, signa, tabulas pictas, vasa cælata mirari.” *Sall. B. C. cap. 11.* In the latter example, *Bibere* would be inadmissible. Sallust means to say, that the Roman soldiers acquired the habit of drinking to excess.—In the following passage we have both verbs, “Aquam calefactam pueris bibendam dedit; qua potata, salutari quiete sopiti diutina vi morbi repente liberati sunt.” *Val. Max. lib. ii. cap. 4.* The verb *Potata* expresses here, says Torrenius, “frequency of drinking;” for that the draught was probably repeated several times, before it produced sleep. This certainly is not an improbable conjecture. It appears to me, however, to refer to the largeness of the draught, and the eagerness with which they took it.

The reader must remember, that when two persons, or classes, are spoken of, though the comparative or superlative are indifferently used in English,

the comparative must always be employed in Latin. "The two brothers met, and the elder was the first that spoke," *Senior prior locutus est*. *Primus* is here inadmissible. It is an impropriety, however, into which the idiom of our language is sometimes apt to seduce the young scholar. The improper use of the comparative with the superlative is an error, into which he is much less liable to fall. It occurs in the following passage, "Fides, spes, charitas, hæc tria, major horum charitas."—Here there are three things compared; the superlative, therefore, and not the comparative, should have been employed. "The greatest," not "The greater of these is charity." Despauter remarks, that the expression involves also a syntactical error. He delivers it as a rule, which, he believes, is observed by all classical writers, that the gender of the comparative should, in such examples, be the same with that of the substantive which it governs in the genitive plural. Here *major*, agreeing with *charitas*, is of the feminine gender, and *horum* is of the neuter. The learned grammarian, therefore, condemns the expression, and says, it should be *maxima harum*, or *maximum horum, est charitas*. Classic usage, however, justifies the agreement of the superlative in gender frequently with the principal subject, and not with that, which it governs in the genitive plural, thus "Indus, qui est fluminum maximus." *Cic. Nat. Deor.* ii. 52. "Hordeum omnium frugum mollissimum est." *Plin.* We perceive, then, no ground for rejecting *maxima horum est cha-*

ritas. Analogy, therefore, would lead to the conclusion that *major horum*, though otherwise objectionable, involves no syntactical error in respect to gender. Usage, I apprehend, does not forbid us to say “*Fides et charitas; horum major est charitas.*”

It is necessary also to distinguish between the adjectives, *Prior* and *Primus*, and the adverbs *Prius* and *Primum*. If we say *Primo*, or *Primum fecit hoc*, we mean, “He did this for the first time,” or “In the first place he did this.” If we say, *Primus fecit*, we mean, “He was the first man that did this.”—*Hannibal primum transiit Alpes*, denotes “Hannibal in the first place crossed the Alps;” which expression is naturally followed by *Tunc*, *Deinde*, or some consecutive adverb, as *Deinde Italiam vastavit*, and “Then ravaged Italy.” *Hannibal primus transiit*, implies, that Hannibal was the first person that crossed. This distinction is violated by Varro, when he says, speaking of the origin of the term *Hastati*, (See *Varr. de Ling. Lat.* iv. 16.) “*Hastati, quod primi hastis pugnabant.*” This strictly means, “They were the first persons that fought with spears.”* The ad-

* An anonymous critic, (See New Edinburgh Review, No. 6,) has ventured to affirm, that, if the distinction here laid down, is violated by Varro, it is violated also by Livy, and quotes in evidence the following passages. “*Hastati omnium primi pugnam inibant.*” *Liv.* viii. 8. “*Instruit deinde primos hastatos.*” xxx. 32. It will require but little penetration in the reader to perceive, that the Reviewer either did not understand the distinction, or that he misconstrued the words of Livy. Varro meant

verb *Primo* should have been here employed. When there is no danger of misconception, we find *Prius* used for *Prior*—thus, “*Uter prius populus res repetentes legatos aspernatus dimiserit.*” *Liv.* i. 22. This usage, however, should be cautiously adopted, as it may frequently create ambiguity and misconception.

A purpose, or intention, is expressed, as has been already observed, by *Ut* or *Qui*, with the potential mood, *Ad* or *Gratiâ* with the gerund, by the supine in *Um*, by the future participle, and in poetical writers, often by the infinitive. It deserves attention, however, that *Qui* is elegantly used, in those cases only, in which the subordinate agency of some person or thing, is implied, as “He sent messengers to inform the king,” *Nuncios misit, qui regem certiores facerent*, “Who might inform.” The relative clause expresses the subordinate agency of the messengers. “He called for a sword to kill himself.” *Gladium poposcit, quo seipsum interficeret*, “With which he might kill.” But where no subordinate agency is

to say, that the *hastati* at first fought with spears; instead of which he states, what he did not intend to state, and what was not the fact, that “they were the first, that ever used spears.” Livy on the contrary meant to say, what he does say, that “the *hastati* were the first to engage in battle,” and therefore, in strict conformity to the rule, uses the numeral adjective, and also that “they were the first, that were marshalled.” If the Reviewer supposes, that this was not the meaning of the historian, he labours under an egregious error. The two passages, instead of overturning, serve to establish the distinction.

signified, the relative should not be employed—thus, if we say, “He came to inform me,” it would be inelegant to render it, *Venit, qui me certioorem faceret*, we must say, *Ut me certioorem faceret*, or *Me certioorem facturum*—or we may employ the supine, as also the gerund, with *Ad* or *Gratiâ*. Mr. Ruddiman has noted the use of *Qui* as inelegant in such expressions, as, *Venit, qui opem oraret*. To prevent misconception, he should have informed his readers, that it is in such examples, and such only, where there is a definite subject, and no subordinate agency is signified, that the expression is exceptionable; for, in all other cases, there is a peculiar elegance in the use of the relative.

It deserves the notice of the reader, that Cicero almost uniformly uses *inimicitiae* instead of the singular number.

EXERCISE.

In time of summer, when animals are plagued with thirst, a lion and a wild boar came to a little spring, to drink. But a dispute having arisen, which of them should drink first, and a desperate fight ensuing, the affair seemed likely to end in murder. After they had fought a considerable time, stopping for a short space, in order to take breath, they spied some vultures waiting to devour the one, which should first fall. This circumstance induced them to dismiss their enmity, saying, “It is better for us to become friends, than to be a prey to vultures and crows.” The fable shews, that it is wiser to put an end to strifes and contentions, than to carry them to the length of involving all the parties in disgrace and ruin.

OBSERVATIONS.

CUTIS.

PELLIS.

Cutis is “the human skin, while on the body;” *Pellis*, “A skin of any kind stripped off.” “Corpore viva *cutis*, *pellis* detracta vocatur.” *Nolt.* *Corium* means, “Thick hide,” whether on the animal or not. Dumesnil confines it to “Leather,” or “Tanned hide.” That it is applied to the thick hide of live animals, the following example alone is sufficient to prove. “Quarum aliæ *coriis* tectæ sunt, aliæ villis vestitæ, aliæ spinis hirsutæ.” *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* Pliny applies it to fishes, (see lib. vi. cap. 24,) and Plautus humourously to the human body. “Periit meum *corium*, cum cistella.” *Cist.* iv. 2. 36. “Detegetur *corium* de tergo meo.” *Epid.* i. 1. 63. “*Corium* perdi.” *Ib.* i. 1. 84. “I have lost my skin, or my hide,” for the latter term is often humourously thus used, in English also. This word likewise signifies “Leather;” but is by no means confined, as Dumesnil supposes, to this signification.

Pellis, is “The skin or hide taken off,”—“Deformem pro cute pellem, Pendentesque genas, et tales aspice rugas.”—*Juv.* x. 192.

Juvenal here considers the *Cutis* in old men, as *mortua*, and therefore gives it the name of *Pellis*.

Aluta, from *Alumen*, “Alum,” with which it was dressed, signifies “A thin leather,” of which the Romans made shoes and purses; and, as Cæsar tells us, the Gauls made sails.

Must is expressed, as was formerly observed, by the gerund, and by *Necesse est*.

It has been already explained, when *Would* is to be considered as a sign of the potential mood, and, when it is to be rendered by *Volo*. “We will go,” *Ire volumus*.—“We will not go,” *Ire nolumus*.—“We would not go,” *Ire noluimus*.—“We would not go, if he should ask us,” *Non iremus*, or *Ire nolle-mus, si ille rogaret*. When the sense is absolute, or independent, the accessory circumstances of “will,” “ability,” “duty,” &c., must be expressed by the indicative mood of the verbs *volo, possum, debeo, &c.*

The construction of the ablative absolute, has been already, oftener than once, explained. After, therefore, referring the reader to vol. i. p. 333, I shall here only remark, that the junior reader should be careful to observe, whether the noun connected with the participle in English be, or be not, the nominative to the verb, before he proceeds to translate the sentence. Inattention here may lead him into an egregious error. The following example will serve to illustrate the propriety of this admonition: “The king having promised him the spoils, the general took his leave.” *The king*, though in what is termed the absolute case, which in English is the nominative, is not the nominative to the verb. *Rege spolia pollicito, dux abiit*. Here the verb is deponent, and the two participles correspond precisely in signification. This form of expression but rarely occurs. Take the passive verb, and the English, in

order to agree with the meaning of the Latin participle, must be turned into *Being*—*Spoliis a rege promissis, dux abiit*, that is, “The spoils being promised by the king.”

Such expressions as “we may see,” “we may read,” “we may hear,” used in the way of remark, were generally rendered by classic writers, *videre licet*, *legere licet*, *audire licet*. But several examples occur, even in authors *ætatis aureæ*, in which *est* is used for *licet*, thus, “Scire est liberum ingenium,” *Ter. Ad. v. 3. 42*, “We may know.” “Verbo negare sit,” *Liv. xlii. 41*, “I may deny.” In writers of a posterior period, the expression is more common, “Est videre apud illos argentea vasa.” *Tac. Ger. cap. 5*.

EXERCISE.

A certain man had a horse and an ass. While they were on a journey, the ass said to the horse, “Take part of my burden, if you wish me to live;” but the other would not do it. The ass, at last falling down with fatigue, died. The owner then having put the ass’s load, and also his hide, on the horse’s back, the horse exclaimed, “Ah, wretch that I am! I would not carry part of his burden, and now I must carry the whole, and his hide over and above.” Hence we may learn, that those, who are placed in exalted stations, act wisely, in sharing the burdens of their inferiors; for that in this way, and this only, can the preservation of both be effected.

OBSERVATIONS.

SIGNUM.

STATUA.

Aldus Manutius, in a letter to J. Michaelis,—(See *Grut.* vol. iv. p. 301,) says, that *Signum* and *Statua* are each made of the same materials, and that each of them is applied either to a whole figure, or to a bust—thus differing neither in matter, nor in form. The distinction, he says, is threefold:—1st. *Signum* is “The likeness of a god, of a man, or of a brute being.” *Statua*, “The representation of a god, or of a man.”—2dly. If the figure be erected in the forum, or any public place, it is called *Statua*; if in a private house, *Signum*: so that the same figure, if removed from a public into a private place, or conversely, would change its name.—3dly. That *Signum* may apply to a figure sculptured or imprinted on the surface of the materials, as an impression, for example, on wax—whereas *Statua* applies only to a figure cut out, and disjoined from the mass, or matter, from which it is formed. That the first and third of these distinctions are well founded, there can be no doubt; the second, however, appears extremely questionable. (See *Plin.* lib. xxxiii. cap. 3.) See also *Cic. Ep. ad Att.* lib. i. 3. 6, 7.

The Greek *Drachma* has been generally considered as the same with the Roman *Denarius*.—This opinion is sufficiently correct for common purposes. Such as are desirous of ascertaining the precise rela-

tion of the *Drachma* to the *Denarius*, may consult “M. de Romé De L’Isle’s Treatise on Metrology,” and “Arbuthnot’s Tables.” Money computations among the Romans were made by *Æs*, *As*, *Sestertius*, or *Nummus*, *Denarius*, *Solidus*, or *Aureus*, *Pondo*, or *Libra*. The *Æs*, which signifies money in general, has the same meaning also with the word *As*, and was, at first, a piece of copper or brass uncoined, *Æs rude*, weighing a pound, or twelve ounces *. It began to be

* The inferior coins of the Greeks, were, in the earliest ages, composed of a mixture of copper, zinc, and lead; and latterly of copper, lead, and tin. The Romans had two sorts of copper coins, one of which consisted of copper only, and the other of a mixture of copper and zinc. The latter was much the same as our brass.

The custom of mixing copper with zinc, may be traced back to the remotest periods. The oldest nations generally employed copper for their utensils, and even for sharp cutting instruments. But as copper, especially when cast, is not of itself sufficiently hard for that purpose, it may be readily conjectured, that experiments were made, in order to find out, how a greater degree of hardness could be communicated to this metal. A mixture of tin was found to answer the end proposed; and this mixture was by the Greeks, called *χυτόν*, and by the Romans *æs caldarium*, as at present, according to the different uses, to which it is applied, it is called with us, bronze, bell-metal, gun-metal. This mixture was extremely brittle, and the coins composed of it were, therefore, not struck, but cast. “Caldarium,” says Pliny, “funditur tantum; malleis fragile.” Lib. xxiv. cap. 20.

Among the mixtures of copper, mentioned by Pliny, there is one which he calls *æs tenerrimum*, consisting of 100 parts of copper, ten of lead (*plumbum nigrum*), and five of tin (*plumbum argentarium*). Under the term *plumbum nigrum* must be understood lead; the *plumbum argentarium*, *album*, *candidum*, being

stamped in the reign of Servius Tullius. The *Sestertius*, marked L.L.S. (Libra, Libra, Semis,) or H.S. was a silver coin, equivalent to two *asses* and a half. When used as a neuter noun (*Sestertium*) it denotes a thousand *sestertii*—thus, *decem sestertia* denotes ten thousand *sestertii*. And when the adverbial number is used, *centena millia* is understood; thus, *decies* H.S. is equal to 1,000,000 *sestertii*. *Mille sestertii*, or *nummi*, is equivalent to £8 1s. 5½d. It is to be observed, that *centena millia* is understood, as referring to the adverbial numeral only, and not to any preceding numeral, thus, “In ducentis et tricies

our tin. Pliny means by it, tin fused from washed ore. The word *stannum*, which occurs in Pliny, was not used by the Romans to denote our tin, but a mixture of silver and lead, that is, lead from which the silver contained with it in the ore has not been separated. The Roman coins consisted, as has been already observed, either of pure copper, or a mixture of copper and zinc, called by the Romans *aurichalcum*, answering to our brass, pinchbeck, similar, &c. Metallic zinc, as we now have it, was at that time unknown. The *aurichalcum* was composed of either copper and zinc, or of copper, tin, and lead, the former of a pale yellow, the latter of a darker colour, resembling gold. This mixture, by means of calamine (*Cadmia fossilis*) was rendered tough and malleable, whereas the old mixture of copper and tin, was extremely brittle. It is doubted by Klaproth, to whom I am indebted for these observations, whether *æs Corinthiacum* was, as is commonly supposed, produced from the fusion of gold, silver, and copper statues, when Corinth was taken. He seems to think, and adduces the authority of Pliny in his favour, that *æs Corinthiacum*, was a term of art, and applied to a metallic mixture in high estimation among the Romans, and though of a superior quality, nearly resembling *aurichalcum*.

sestertio." *Cic. pro Cluent. cap. 2*, the meaning is "thirty times a hundred thousand," (3.000.000) and two hundred thousand, *i. e.* 3.200.000. When the numbers are distributed into divisions by points, the right hand division denotes units, the second expresses thousands, and the third, hundreds of thousands, thus; III. XII. DC. HS. denotes, 300.000 and 12.000 and 600, or 312,600. The *Denarius* was the chief silver coin among the Romans, so named from its equivalence to ten *asses*, and taking the *as* as equal to $3\frac{1}{16}$ farthings, is equal, in our money, to seven-pence three-farthings. It was marked with the letter X or *. The *Quinarius* was equal to five *asses*, and marked with the letter V.

The *Aureus* was a gold coin, struck in the second Punic war, equal in value to twenty-five *Denarii*, or one hundred *Sestertii*. In latter ages it was reduced in weight, and had the name of *Solidus*.

Pondo is supposed by some writers to have been equal to 100 *Denarii*, and therefore different from *Libra*, which consisted of 84 *Denarii*, or 96 *Drachms*, taking the difference of the *Denarius* and the *Drachma* to be, as some suppose, nearly as 8 to 9. The *Pondo* was equivalent, as some say, to £3 4s. 7d. and, according to others, £3 2s. 0d. The *Mina*, a Greek coin, was equal to 100 *Drachmæ*, or a Roman *Pondo*, or *Libra*, for we find these two latter terms sometimes used indiscriminately. *Argenti pondo bina et selibras*, equal to two pounds and a half of silver, or 250 *drachms*.

The *Talent* was equal to sixty *Minæ*.

The comparative value of the Roman coins may be seen from the following table :—

<i>Teruncius</i>					£0 : 0 : 0 : 0 $\frac{775}{1000}$	
2	<i>Sembella</i>				0 : 0 : 0 : 1 $\frac{55}{100}$	
4	2	<i>Libella</i> } <i>As</i> }			0 : 0 : 0 : 3 $\frac{1}{10}$	
10	5	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	<i>Sestertius</i>			0 : 0 : 1 : 3 $\frac{3}{4}$
20	10	5	2	<i>Quinarius</i> } <i>Victoratus</i> }		0 : 0 : 3 : 3 $\frac{1}{2}$
40	20	10	4	2	<i>Denarius</i> 0 : 0 : 7 : 3	

The following observations, which are extracted from Aldus Manutius' *Epistolæ de Quæsitis*, on the subject before us, deserve attention, being calculated to reconcile the discordant opinions respecting the value of the *Drachma* and the *Denarius*. He begins with observing, that there were two kinds of *Attic drachms*, one before the time of Solon, and the other introduced by that illustrious legislator. These drachms were of different weights; but, though Solon reduced the weight, so that ninety-six of the new weighed no more than seventy-two of the ancient drachms; yet the pound (*libra*) still continued to be divided into ninety-six drachms, just as it stood before the time of Solon. The pound, therefore, in one case, in regard to weight, bore much the same proportion

to that in the other, which a pound Avoirdupois (sixteen ounces) bears to a pound Troy, or twelve ounces. And whether the weight of the drachma was the greater, or the less, one hundred made up the *Mina*. And as the *Denarius*, or ancient *Drachm*, equally exceeded the *Drachm* of Solon, by a fourth part of the former, or a third of the latter; it is clear, he observes, that the ancient *Drachm* and the *Denarius* were of the same value, so that, in a Roman ounce, there were seven of each, and in an Attic ounce ten of each. But, as Solon diminished the weight of the *Drachma*, chiefly for the relief of debtors, no alteration took place in the weight of it, as employed in weighing drugs or medicines. It continued, therefore, in pharmacy, to be of the same weight, and equal to the *Denarius*. Accordingly, Pliny says, "*Drachma Attica denarii argentei habet pondus.*" lib. ii. cap. ult. And as the *Drachma* was changed, so also was the *Mina*. The author then cautions the reader against supposing, that the *Mina*, whether the ancient, or the one introduced by Solon, was equal to the Roman *Libra*; for he observes, that in the *Mina* of Solon there were only seventy-two *Denarii*, but in the Roman *Libra* eighty-four. Now, if the ancient *Drachm* was equal to the *Denarius* in point of weight, it follows, that, as there are ninety-six drachms in a *Mina*, there must be the same number of *Denarii*, that is, twelve more than in the *Libra*, so that the *Mina* exceeds the *Libra* in weight, by an eighth part of the former, or a seventh of the latter. The

Mina Euboica he considers as equal to the Roman *Libra*; and concludes with saying, that eight ancient *Attic drachms* are equal to eight *Denarii*, eight of the drachms of Solon to six *Denarii*, and eight *Eubœan* drachms to seven *Denarii*.

Before dismissing this subject, it is necessary to observe that the value of the *Denarius*, which was originally equivalent, as its name imports, to ten *asses*, underwent one or two changes. Pliny tells us, that, when Hannibal invaded Italy, the *As*, which had been, in the first Punic war, reduced to two ounces, was lowered to the weight of one ounce, and that the *Denarius* was made equivalent to sixteen ounces. It still, however, retained its name, and continued to be marked with the letter X. It was afterwards, it is said, made equivalent to twelve *asses*; and at this value it stood in the time of Augustus, and of a few of his immediate successors. Brotier, however, is of opinion, that in the reign of Augustus, it was equivalent to sixteen *asses*. Pitiscus considers this to be a mistake, and reasons thus. The monthly pay of a soldier was, he observes, an *Aureus*, or twenty-five *Denarii*. Now, if a *Denarius* had been equal to only ten *Asses*, twenty-five *Denarii*, or two hundred and fifty *Asses*, would not have given each man ten *Asses* a-day. If it had been equivalent to sixteen *Asses*, the soldier, at the rate of ten *Asses* a-day, would not have received an *Aureus*, or twenty-five *Denarii* per month. Pitiscus, therefore, makes it equivalent to twelve *Asses*, in which case, twenty-

five *Denarii*, or three hundred *Asses*, per month, are equal to ten *Asses* per day.—This opinion, however, is controverted by several very learned antiquaries ; and, indeed, without entering largely into the argument, it may be observed, that, according to this statement, the *Denarius* must always have been equivalent to twelve *Asses*, and twenty-five *Denarii* to an *Aureus*, otherwise the soldier could not have received ten *Asses per diem*. That this, however, was not the original value of the *Denarius*, we have undoubted authority for asserting.

Those, who are desirous of seeing the subject fully discussed, may consult *Lips. in Tac. Ann.—Excurs. F. Electr. i. 2.*; and on the other side *Cont. de Mil. Rom. Stip. Thes. Ant. Rom. Græv. x. 1519. F. et Putcan. de Stip. Mil.* But whether the *Denarius*, in the time of Augustus, was equivalent to twelve, or to sixteen *Asses*, the testimony of Pliny is express, that the *Denarius*, in the second Punic war, was made equivalent to sixteen *Asses* ; and this furnishes no small presumption, that, in the time of Augustus, it was of this value at least. “Hannibale urgente Q. Fabio Maximo Dictatore, *Asses unciales facti* ; placuitque *denarium sedecim assibus permutari*. In militari tamen stipendio semper *denarius pro decem assibus datus*.” *Plin. xxxiii. 3.* This passage clearly establishes the distinction, after the second Punic war, between *Denarius* and *Decem Asses*, and fixes the former at that period as equivalent to sixteen *Asses*. But, if the *Denarius* was paid to the Roman soldier

instead of ten *Asses*, we should be induced to infer, that some change took place afterwards respecting the pay of the army; for we find them, in the first year of Nero, complaining that they received only ten *Asses* a-day, and demanding a *Denarius*. “Enimvero militiam ipsam gravem, infructuosam, denis in diem assibus, animam et corpus æstimari; nec aliud levamentum, quam, si certis sub legibus militia iniretur, ut singulos denarios mererent.” *Tac. Ann. lib. i. cap. 17.* From this passage it is evident, that their daily pay was not a *Denarius* each, but *Decem Asses*. It seems difficult to reconcile this fact with the words of Pliny, who expressly asserts, that, though the *Denarius* was made equivalent to sixteen *Asses*, each soldier received a *Denarius* for ten.

We conclude with remarking, that *æs* was frequently suppressed; thus we have *balnearium* for “bath-money,” *Juv. ii. 52.* *Calcearium* for “shoe-money.” *Suet. Vesp. 8.* *Columnarium Cic. Att. 13. 6.* “Tax for every pillar supporting a house.”

The price, or value, of any thing, is put in the ablative; but these genitives, *tanti, quanti, pluris, minoris, magni, parvi, nihili, teruncii, flocci, pili, hujus, maximi, minimi, assis*, (taken indefinitely,) *nihili, nauci, pensi*, are excepted.

EXERCISE.

Mercury, desirous to know, in what estimation he was held by mankind, went in a human form, into the workshop of a statuary, as if intending to purchase something.

Seeing the statue of Jupiter, he asked, at what price it might be bought? The man answering, "For a drachm," he smiled, and asked, "At what might this one of Juno be purchased?" The statuary answered, "For more money." Seeing his own statue, and thinking, that, as he was the messenger of the gods, and his name invoked by all mortals, desirous of gain, it would be highly valued, he enquired the price. "If you will," said the statuary, "buy the other two, I will give you this one to boot."

The fable shews, that the opinion, which we entertain of our own importance, differs often from the estimate, which others form of our character.

OBSERVATIONS.

CUPIDITAS.

AVIDITAS.

AMBITIO.

The two former agree in denoting "desire in general," but with this difference, that the latter seems to denote a greater degree of eagerness. *Cupiditas pecuniæ* is "avarice;" *cupiditas imperii* is "ambition." The former, however, is sometimes expressed by the simple term, *cupiditas*; and "ambition," though less frequently, is also thus signified. Curtius, in detailing the speech of the Scythian ambassadors, uses *aviditas* to denote "ambition." The term *ambitio*, is distinguished from both, by being confined to the desire of domestic honour, or power—"the love of rank, office, or civil distinction." "Miserrima est omnino ambitio, honorumque contentio." *Cic. Off. lib. i.* The latter clause is explanatory. "Me ambitio quædam ad honorum studium duxit." *Cic. Att. i. 16.* Sallust says "Imbecilla ætas ambitione

corrupta tenebatur." *Sall. B. C. cap. 3.* "Sed a quo incepto studioque me ambitio mala detinuerat." *Ib. cap. 4.*, alluding to his desire of civil and political distinction.

ANIMA.

ANIMUS.

MENS.

Anima is the principle of life, common to all animals, and even vegetables. "Id est, quo vivimus et sentimus." (*Grangæus.*) *Animus* is "The soul," the percipient and intellectual principle peculiar to man, including the faculties of the mind, with the affections of the heart—

—— "Mundi

Principio indulsit communis conditor illis,

Tantum animas, nobis animum quoque."

Juv. Sat. xv. 147.

Here the *Anima*, or "Life," is represented as belonging to inferior animals, and *Animus* as peculiar to man. Noltenius remarks, that this distinction is not regarded by Sallust, when he says, "Sed multi mortales dediti ventri atque somno, indocti incultique, vitam sicuti peregrinantes transiere, quibus profecto contra naturam corpus voluptati, anima oneri fuit." *B. C. cap. 2.* But, as Hill observes, there is no inaccuracy here; for as *Anima*, in the human species, implies the existence of *Animus*, the former may be safely substituted for the latter. Accordingly, we find this frequently to be the case. The converse, however, does not occur.

Mens implies merely the intellect, or rational faculty, under the government of which are the affections, passions, appetites, and sentiments of *Animus*. When opposed to each other, *Animus* refers to the sentiments and passions; *Mens* to the reason. “Mala mens, malus animus,” “A perverted reason makes a corrupt heart.” In the following passage they all occur, and are clearly defined—“Animam morte sopitam esse neminem latet; animum somno, et in furiosis mentem extingui, non animam.” *Plin.*

But, if *Mens* denote the “understanding,” or “the rational faculty, as opposed to the passions and appetites,” how shall this signification be reconciled with the following passage in Horace?—“Qui non moderabitur iræ, Infectum volet esse, dolor quod suaserit et mens.” —*Ep. i. 2. 60.* It would be a most unwarrantable impeachment of the sagacity of the poet, to suppose him capable of asserting, that Reason can prompt to any criminal indulgence, or stimulate to an action, of which we may have reason to repent. *Mens*, therefore, has, in this example, been uniformly rendered “Passion.” By this interpretation, the sentiment accords with the acknowledged principles of philosophy, and the clear intention of the poet; but how is this translation to be reconciled with the invariable usage of classic writers? for in no instance is the word *Mens* found to denote either passion, or appetite. On the contrary, it signifies the “intellect,” or that power of the human mind, whose province it is to controul the passions and appetites. The translation, therefore, is di-

rectly contrary to classic authority. But the lection is erroneous, and ought to proceed thus,—“ Qui non moderabitur iræ, Infectum volet esse, dolor quod suaserit *amens*.”

This reading is not only recommended by its own intrinsic propriety, but is sanctioned also by the authority of a very ancient manuscript in the Vatican, in which *amens* is most legibly written.—(See *M. Ant. Muret. ad Hippol.* xviii. cap. 3.*)

The scholar will perceive, by a little attention, that the clauses, in the following exercise in which the word *Would* occurs, are not absolute, but conditional. He should also attend to the following phraseologies.—“ You were slow in coming,” *Tarde venisti*.—“ It is long in growing,” *Diu crescit*.

It may be here remarked, that, when one subject is either, in some degree, involved in the other, or naturally implied with it, the enclitic *que*, in connecting them, is more generally used than *et*, and also in concluding an enumeration of particulars. In the conclusion of sentences, however, the enclitic is generally rejected. Tursellinus remarks, that it ex-

* It has been asserted by an anonymous critic, that, if this opinion be correct, it will follow, that *mens* can never be joined with an adjective denoting depravity. (*New Edinburgh Review*, No. 6.) The author, we presume, would not object to the common expressions “perverted reason,” and “depraved judgment,” and yet, at the same time, he must acknowledge, that reason cannot justify inordinate desire, nor prompt to the gratification of any malignant passion.

presses the Greek *Τε*. “*Qui solis et lunæ, reliquorumque siderum ortus, obitus, motusque cognoscerent.*” *Cic.* “*Portoria, reliquaque omnia vectigalia.*” *Cæs.* “*Vitæ necisque potestatem habet.*” *Cæs.* “*Jus potestatemque habere.*” “*Sub imperium ditionemque subjungere.*” *Cic.* “*Jus ratumque esto.*” *Cic.* In such cases, *ac* and *atque* are sometimes used, *et* very rarely.

EXERCISE.

The Scythian ambassadors, being introduced into the royal tent, are reported to have addressed Alexander in the following terms:—“If the Gods had given you size of body, equal to your ambition of mind, the whole world would not contain you. With one hand, you would reach the east, and with the other the west: nay, not content with this, you would desire to know where the refulgent sun hides his beams. From Europe you go into Asia; and from Asia you pass into Europe. After conquering the whole human race, you are now going to wage war with woods, and rivers, and snows, and wild beasts. What! know you not, that large trees are long in growing, but are extirpated in a single hour?”

OBSERVATIONS.

APEX.	CULMEN.	FASTIGIUM.
CACUMEN.	VERTEX.	

Apex is “the top,” or “tuft of a cap,” such as was worn by the priests of Mars. *Culmen* is “The

roof," or "covering," (*e culmo*,) the ancients, in the ruder ages, having covered their houses with straw. *Fastigium* is "The ridge of a house," "the pinnacle," or "highest part." "Evado ad summi fastigia culminis." *Virg. Æn.* ii. 458. "The top of the roof." It also denotes "the lowest part," or "the depth," thus, "Forsitan et scrobibus quæ sint fastigia, quæras." *Virg. Geo.* ii. 288.

Cacumen is "The top of any thing," as "Cacumina arborum,"—"Cacumina montium." It is never, like *Fastigium*, applied to "the bottom," or "depth." *Vertex* is "The crown of the head."—Though these be the strict significations of the several terms, they are metaphorically employed to denote the top of any thing.

INTEGER.

TOTUS.

OMNIS.

Integer means "the whole without division." *Totus* "the whole without subtraction." These two refer to quantity. *Omnis* means "all," or "the whole," when number is implied, or, as logicians term it, *quantitas discreta*, as opposed to *quantitas continua*, to which the two first are confined. *Omnis*, however, is sometimes used for *totus*, as "Omne cælum, totamque terram mente complexus." *Cic. de Fin.* ii. 34.

The distinction between *totus* and *omnes* is well illustrated by Quintilian, the former meaning the "whole collectively," the latter, "the details," or "the particulars." "Qui dicit, expugnatam esse civitatem, complectitur omnia At si aperias hæc, quæ

verbo uno inclusa erant, apparebunt, et fusæ per domos ac templa flammæ, et ruentium tectorum fragor infantium et feminarum ploratus, &c. Licet hæc omnia, ut dixi, complectatur *eversio*, minus est tamen *totum* dicere, quam *omnia*." *Lib. 8. cap. 3.*

Servire, "To serve," or "be a slave," is opposed to *Imperare*, "To command," or "rule."

FATUUS.

STULTUS.

STOLIDUS.

The English term "fool" is used, sometimes to denote "an idiot," "a changeling"—*mente omnino carens*, and sometimes "one deficient in understanding, but not an idiot." *Fatuus*, according to the general opinion of critics, properly denotes the former character, and *stultus* the latter. "*Fatuus et stultus differunt, quia stultus est obtusis sensibus, fatuus nullis.*" *Facciol.* Isidorus quotes, as is supposed from Afranius, "Ego meipsum *stultum* etiam existimo, *fatuum* esse non opinor," as an evidence of this distinction. The three words seem well explained by Popma. "*Fatuus*, qui ingenio et memoria valet quodammodo, sed sine ullo judicio; *stultus*, qui judicandi facultate, quam habet, non utitur vel abutitur; *stolidus*, qui nec ingenio, nec memoria, nec judicio valet."—*Stolidus*, according to another eminent critic, "est, qui proxime accedit ad naturam brutorum—*Stultus* est, qui imprudenter et inepte, vel agit, vel loquitur."

After a negative, "But" is rendered by *Quin*, or

Qui, -æ, -od non, when it means, "That not." The use of this conjunction is thus explained by Aul. Gellius.—"*Quin* particula, quam grammatici conjunctionem appellant, variis modis sentiisque connectere orationem videtur. Aliter enim dici putatur, quum quasi increpantes, vel interrogantes, vel exhortantes, dicimus, *Quin venis, quin legis, quin fugis* : aliter quum ita confirmamus, *Non dubium est, quin M. Tullius omnium sit eloquentissimus* ; aliter autem quum sic componimus, quod quasi priori videtur contrarium, *Non idcirco causas Isocrates non defendit, quin id utile esse, et honestum existimarit*."—In the first of these examples, *Quin* is nearly synonymous with *Quid non*. The difference will be explained hereafter. In the other two, it is equivalent to *Quod non*. In the following exercise, it is put for the relative and the negative, as in this example—"Nemo est, quin existimet," *Cic.*—that is, "Qui non existimet," "There is no man, but thinks, or who does not think."

The junior reader is desired to observe, that, in English, we conjugate some intransitive verbs, either with the verb *to be*, or with the verb *to have*, in one and the same sense. Thus we say either "summer is come," or "summer has come." "Fallen is Babylon," or "Babylon has fallen." "The king was come," or "the king had come." "Winter will be gone" or "winter will have gone." In using intransitive verbs, it is the latter phraseology only, which accords with the Latin idiom.

EXERCISE.

"He is a fool, who looks at their fruit, without measuring their height. Take care, lest, while you strive to reach the top, you fall with the very branches, of which you have laid hold. A lion has sometimes become the food of the smallest birds; and rust consumes iron. Nothing is so strong, but it may be in danger from what is weak. What have we to do with you? We never set foot in your country. We will neither be slaves to any man, nor do we desire to rule. The gifts, presented to us by the Gods, are a yoke of oxen, a plough, a goblet, and arrows. These we use, both with our friends and against our enemies. You, who boast, that you are come to punish robbers, are yourself the greatest of all robbers."

OBSERVATIONS.

CUPERE. VELLE. DESIDERARE.

The former is "to desire earnestly," as "*Cupio omnia reipublicæ causa.*" *Cic. Ep. Fam. x. 19.* When it governs the dative, it signifies "to favour," as "*Ego Fundanio non cupio? Non amicus sum?*" *Ep. ad Quint. Frat. 1. 2.* *Velle* also means "to wish" or "desire," but implies less ardor: hence the complimentary expression "*Cupio omnia, quæ vis.*" *Hor. Sat. i. 9. 5.* "*Omnia, quæ tu vis, ego cupio.*" *Plaut. Pers. v. 1. 14.* "What you wish to have, I most earnestly wish, that you may have." *Desiderare* differs from these two as denoting, when applied to a person, the desire of something felt to be requisite to one's happiness, and regret at its absence, and generally at its loss." *Sextilem totum mendax desideror.*" *Hor.* "I am longed for, and my absence

regretted." "Neque nunc vires desidero adolescentis, non plusquam adolescens tauri vires desiderabam." *Cic. de Sen.* "I do not desire, not feeling the want." "Nostri non amplius viginti omnibus sunt præliis desiderati." *Cæs. B. C. iii. 53.* "Were missing." Here regret is implied at having lost a good, once possessed. It is transferred to things inanimate, still however, implying the necessity or utility of the object. "Fimi desiderat aliquantum." *Plin. xvii. 8.* "Requires some manure." "Longiorem desiderat orationem," *Cic. Att. v. 16.* "Requires a long address." "Desideramus," says Popma, "vel quod diligimus, vel quod amisimus."

OPUS.

USUS.

Opus and *Usus* are joined to the ablative, as *Quid opus est verbis?* "What need is there of words?" *Duce nobis opus est,* "We have need of a general." In these examples, the thing needed is expressed in the ablative, by an ellipsis of *in* or *de*, which are sometimes introduced; as "*Opus est mihi de libro.*" *Cic.* We sometimes find it in the nominative, as *Dux nobis opus est,* "A general is needful to us." In the last example, *Opus* may be considered as an indeclinable adjective. Plautus has indulged in almost every mode of construction, putting the thing needed sometimes in the ablative, sometimes in the genitive, and sometimes in the accusative; but in this he is not to be imitated. It is to be observed, however, that though *Opus* and *Usus* are construed with either

the nominative, or the ablative, of the thing wanted, perspicuity sometimes requires the one phraseology in exclusion of the other. Thus, we ought to say, *Quod opus mihi fuit id tibi opus non est*, and not, *Quo opus mihi fuit, eo tibi opus non est*; because *Quo* and *Eo* may be understood to be masculines.

It is joined with the perfect participle, as also with the infinitive, which supplies the nominative to the verb; thus “*Priusquam incipias consulto, et ubi consulueris, mature facto opus est.*” *Sall. B. C.* “*Ne dici quidem opus est.*” *Cic. Orat. 3. in Cat.* “It needs not be told.”

“*Opus*,” says Vavassor, “*idem esse arbitror atque refert, expedit, utile est; non idem esse atque necessarium aut oportet.*”—“*Illud etiamsi opus est, tamen est minus necessarium.*” *Cic. de Orat.*

Cave, when followed by the subjunctive mood, was used by the Latins in the same sense with *Vide ne*—thus, “*Cave facias*, inquit; nam ista lex perferetur,” *Cic.* that is, “Beware of doing it,” “Take care, you do not do it.”—*Ne* is here elegantly understood.

It has been already observed, that the measure of excess is expressed in the ablative. In conformity to this rule, the definite article before a comparative is rendered by *eo*, and correlatively by *quo* and *eo*; thus, “Better,” *Melior*. “The better,” *Eo Melior*, i. e. “Better by that.” “The wiser the better,” *Quo sapientior, eo melior*, i. e. “By what the wiser, by that the better.”

It may be observed in passing, that in expressing measure the governing word is sometimes omitted, as, “Nos in ea castra properabamus, quibus aberant bidui,” *i. e. itinere* or *via*, “two days’ journey.”

Or when it introduces an alternative question, is expressed by *an*, the correlative words being “Utrum, an,” “Num, an; or *ne* enclitic,” followed by *an*—thus, “Whether did *he* do it, or *you*?” “*Num* ille fecit, *an* tu?”—“Will you go, or stay?” “Visne ire, *an* manere.” The same observation is applicable to the interrogative *An*, taken indefinitely—thus, “I know not whether he will go, or stay,” “Nescio *num* iturus sit, *an* mansurus.”

EXERCISE.

“What need have you of riches? The more you have, the more you desire. If you are a God, you ought to bestow favours on mortals, not take them away. But, if you are a man, think always what you are. It is folly to remember those things, for the sake of which you forget yourself. Those, on whom you have not made war, you may enjoy as friends; for the firmest friendship subsists among equals; and they are equals, who have never tried each other’s strength. Beware of believing, that those are friends, whom you have conquered; there is no friendship between a slave and his master. You have no occasion for a friend, of whose friendship you may be doubtful. Adjacent as we are to your empire on both sides, you will have in us the guards both of Europe and of Asia. Consider well then, whether you should wish us to be friends, or to be enemies. The Scythians will never become slaves.

OBSERVATIONS.

POLLICERI. PROMITTERE. RECIPERE.

Some critics have distinguished these verbs thus, “*Pollicemur sponte, vel ex pactione; promittimus autem rogati.*” The inaccuracy of this distinction might be evinced by numberless examples.

Polliceri and *Promittere* agree in denoting “To promise:” but have been understood, by some critics, to differ in this, that *Polliceri* expresses a stronger, and *Promittere* a weaker, affirmation. (See Facciolati in *Promitto.*) This seems to have been the opinion of Donatus, who remarks on the following passage, “Negabon’ velle me, modo qui sum pollicitus ducere?” *Ter. And.* iii. 5. 6. “*Melius pollicitus sum dixit, quam si promisi diceret.*” In this distinction Hill nearly concurs with the learned critic, delivering it as his opinion, that *Polliceri* signifies a stronger, and *Promittere* a weaker, obligation. He observes also, that *Promittere* supposes the existence of certain contingencies, upon which the engagement is understood to cease; and he accuses Suetonius of “using the verb impurely,” when he applies it to the fulfilment of what physicians undertake. Citing the following passage from Horace, “*Quod medicorum est, promittunt medici,*” *Ep.* ii. 1. 115, he observes, “that physicians tacitly encourage the expectations of their patients, but give no security;” intimating, that unforeseen contingencies may frustrate their en-

deavours. On this ground, he censures Suetonius for saying, “*Medicamenta hoc pollicentur.*” But we find the term employed by Pliny also, in a similar sense. “*Medici quidem secunda nobis pollicentur.*” *Ep. i. 22.* This passage can be reconciled with the truth of the author’s observation, in no other way, than by supposing, that, though physicians generally give, as he says, “no security that they will effect a cure,” they deviated from their usual caution in the case of T. Ariston. In confirmation of his opinion, he subjoins the two following passages from Cicero. “*Neque, mehercle, minus ei prolixè de tua voluntate promisi, quam eram solitus de mea polliceri.*” *Fam. Ep. vii. 5.* “*Nihil tibi ego tum de meis opibus pollicebar, sed de horum erga me benevolentia promittebam.*” *Or. pro Plan.* That the distinction, supposed by the learned critic, was intended here by Cicero, appears to be highly probable; but that it was not universally, if generally observed, numberless examples might be adduced to prove.

That *Promittere*, in its primitive import, meant nothing more, than “To hold out,” seems to be unquestionable. Hence it came naturally to signify, “The act of exciting expectation to receive,” and hence, “To promise.” Accordingly we find it, in its proper and etymological signification, denoting, “To give hopes or expectations, merely by the evidence of facts, or tokens, where no promise was made, or implied.” “*Haterius, qui et promisit oratorem, et præstitit.*” *Sen. Contr. iv. 29.* (See *Facciolati.*) “In-

terrogabo, per quæ se parricidam scelera promiserit." *Quintil. Decl.* i. 6. *Polliceri* would convey a very different conception. As denoting "To promise," we believe the term to be generic, signifying any engagement or obligation, whether express or implied, whether exciting hope or fear, whether by weak or strong affirmation. Accordingly we find Cicero employing the term *Promissum*, to denote every species of promise, while *pollicitum*, we believe, he never once uses. *Polliceri*, generally perhaps significant of express and certain engagements, and those made by stronger affirmations, is employed only in a good sense, as exciting hope, whereas *Promittere* holds forth either good or evil, awakening hope or fear; the distinction being similar to that between the English verbs, "to hope," and "to expect." We hope for good; we expect good, or evil. This we conceive to be the only precise and uniform distinction. "Promisi ultorem, et verbis odia aspera movi." *Virg. Æn.* ii. 96. Here *Promisi* means "I threatened." There is no good reason whatever for referring, as some critics have suggested, the verb *Promisi* to Palamedes, and rendering it, "I promised." "Surrepturum pallam promisit tibi," *Plaut. Asin.* v. 2. 80, "He intimated, or threatened, that he would steal your robe." In neither of these examples would *Polliceri* express the meaning.

Recipere implies more than *Polliceri* and *Promittere*, denoting, that the person guarantees the result, or becomes answerable for his engagement.

It is *eventum et periculum in se suscipere*. “De æstate polliceris, vel potius recipis.” *Cic. Att. xiii. 1.*

We have already observed, that, when of two future events, one is represented as to be perfected before the other take place, the former is generally expressed by the future perfect, or the future subjunctive, as it is improperly called, and the other by the future imperfect, or future indicative—as, *Si unquam, ita fecerit, non impune feret*, “If he do (shall have done) so again, he shall not escape with impunity.” This rule takes place, when the idea of past time is not involved in the sentence, or expressed by the principal verb. We now observe, that, when of two future events, one is to be completed before the other takes place, and when the latter is expressed either by a future infinitive governed by a preterite tense, or when the principal verb is in the preterite tense, the pluperfect potential is elegantly used.—This rule may be illustrated by the following examples:—“I will do, whatsoever you order me,” *Quodcunque jusseris, ego faciam*, that is, “I will do, whatsoever you shall have ordered.” Here the command and the execution of it are both future; but, as the former must be finished, before the latter can take place, the former is expressed by the future perfect, and the latter by the future imperfect.—In this sentence, future time only is involved, “Be assured, that I will do whatever you shall order,” *Quodcunque jusseris, me facturum esse, pro certo scias*. Here the principal verb, *scias*, implies present time. “I told him, that I would do,

whatever he should order," *Quodcumque jussisset, me facturum esse dixi*.—Here the principal verb, *Dixi*, is in the preterite tense, and the order, which must precede the execution, is expressed in the pluperfect potential, not in the future perfect, the clause implying, "he should have ordered."

Though this is the strict and proper office of the pluperfect tense, to express an action as perfected, before another action, also finished, was completed, it is necessary, in order to prevent misconception on this subject, to make a remark, for the suggestion of which I am indebted to the acute and learned critic, to whose ingenious and philosophical little work on the construction of the Relative, I have already had occasion to refer. It is observed by the learned author, "that, whenever the future perfect indicative would be resorted to, if the statement were direct, the pluperfect subjunctive *is requisite*, if the same sentence be thrown into that form, which has been described by the term oblique." And he adds, "This observation, so far at least as oblique sentences are concerned, holds good, *whatever be the tense of the introductory verb*." (See *Dr. Carson's Rules for the construction of the Relative*, p. 113, 2d Ed.) In confirmation of this opinion, the learned author offers the following example. *In magno periculo erit, siquid adversi acciderit*. This sentence, he observes, when thrown into an oblique form, in the words of Nepos, runs thus; "Docet eum magno fore periculo, siquid adversi accidisset." The example here adduced, (and

others might be offered,) suffices to prove, that the pluperfect subjunctive may follow a present tense. If the learned author then, had confined his doctrine to the mere *compatibility* of the two tenses, as by an expression afterwards he seems inclined to do, and not extended it to the *necessity* of their combination, we should entirely concur with him. We cannot, however, agree with him in thinking, that the pluperfect, in such oblique forms, "is requisite," whatever be the tense of the "introductory verb." If the leading verb be in the present tense, the preterite, and not the pluperfect subjunctive, is frequently used, and certainly with greater conformity to the established relations, by which these tenses are connected. "Accepta oratione eorum, Cæsar obsides imperat, eosque ad certam diem adduci jubet; nisi ita fecerint, sese bello civitatem persecuturum demonstrat." *Cæsar, B. G. v. 1.* This threat, expressed in the direct form, would be thus signified; *Nisi ita feceritis, bello civitatem persequar.* Yet in the oblique form the future perfect is retained, the introductory verb being, at the same time, in the present tense. This example, among many others which might be offered, will suffice to shew, that the pluperfect subjunctive is not "requisite," though I concur with the ingenious critic in acknowledging its admissibility, which, in the two first editions of this work, I might justly be considered, as indirectly questioning.

EXERCISE.

It is a rule, taught by Cicero, that those promises are not to be kept, which are not useful to the persons, to whom you have given them. Sol promised to his son Phaëton, that he would do, whatsoever he should wish. The youth desired to be taken up into his father's chariot; he was taken up, and was burnt to atoms. How much better would it have been, if the father's promise had not been kept. Agamemnon vowed to Diana the most beautiful thing, that should be produced in his kingdom, in that year, and he sacrificed his daughter Iphigenia. The promise ought not to have been performed, rather than so horrible a crime should have been committed. Thus, says Cicero, to perform promises, to abide by agreements, and to restore deposits, things, which seem in themselves honourable, cease to be honourable on certain occasions.

OBSERVATIONS.

CAUSA.

RATIO.

Causa is that, which produces an effect, physical or intellectual; *ratio* is “a moral or intellectual cause”—“a motive for acting, or a reason for thinking.” “*Ratio est causa; quæ demonstrat, verum esse id, quod intendimus.*”—*Auct. ad Heren.* “Num parva causa, aut parva ratio est?”—*Ter. Eun.* iii. 5. 27. The former term appears to refer to the external object, as alluring; and the latter, to the internal motive, as having reason in it. “Minari denique divisoribus, ratio non erat.” *Cic. in Verr. ad init.* “There was no good reason, or rational motive,

for threatening." "To threaten was not a rational proceeding."

AMARE.

DILIGERE.

Almost all critics are agreed, in saying, that *Amare* implies more than *Diligere*. "*Amare plus est quam diligere*," says Gifanius. These are also the words of Doletus—who adduces the following examples, L. Clodius valde nos diligit, aut (ut ἐμφατικότερον, dicam) valde nos amat." *Cic. ad Brut.* "Sic igitur facies, et me aut amabis, aut quo contentus sum, diliges." *Id.* "Sed tamen, ut scires eum non a me diligi solum, verum etiam amari, eam ob rem tibi hæc scribo." *Id. Fam. Ep. lib. xiii.* "Tantum tamen accessit, ut mihi nunc denique amare videar, antea dilexisse." *Id. Fam. Ep. lib. ix.* *Amare*, says Dumesnil, is "To love cordially."—*Diligere* expresses "a love founded in, and created by, virtue and esteem." The former, says Hill, implies "that the object itself is amiable, and raises in the observer a sentiment proportioned to the degree of the quality that attracts it;" the latter implies, "that the object is possessed of a comparative excellence, and selected from a number, among which it is held to be the most deserving." He illustrates the distinction by observing, that, were there a single pair of the human species upon a desert island, the sentiment expressed by *Amare* might be gratified by each in respect to the other; but that expressed by *Diligere* could not. According to this explanation, *Amare* denotes the emotion of love abso-

lutely, as excited by an object in itself amiable ; *Diligere*, that which is founded in comparison, or the preference of one object to another, on account of its superior merit.

We agree with Hill, in opinion, that the verb *Diligere* expresses selection, or preference, implying superior excellence in the object. Choice, or discrimination, is clearly denoted by the etymology of the verb. Cicero says, “ Quocirca quum judicaris diligere oportet, non quum dilexeris judicare.” *Cic. de Amic.* And Auctor ad Herennium has the following observation, shewing this to be the distinctive meaning of the verb ; “ *Deligere* oportet, quem velis *diligere*.” *Lib. iv.* *Amare* denotes the warm and affectionate emotion of love. It expresses a feeling of the heart ; the former implies more a sentiment of the understanding. *Amare* denotes the affection, whether instinctive, as that of parents to their offspring, or excited by a rational conviction of the amiableness of the object ; *Diligere*, “ love towards an object, as being preferable to others.” The same idea of preference is implied in the expressions, “ Feræ partus suos diligunt.” *Cic. Or. ii. 40.* “ Omne animal seipsum diligit.” *Cic. Fin. v. 9.* Had Scheller clearly understood the import of the verb *Diligere*, he would have perceived, that these, and similar expressions, are not deviations from general usage, but strictly consistent with the distinctive meaning of the term.

It sometimes also appears to denote the expression of this partiality and love, by acts of kindness.

“Eum, quem necesse erat *diligere*, qualiscunque esset, talem habemus, ut libenter quoque *diligamus*.” *Cic. Ep. Fam.* xii. 16. Here Trebonius informs Cicero, that such was the superior merit of his son Marcus, that his friends at Athens voluntarily shewed him those marks of kindness, which necessity would have prescribed towards him, as the son of Cicero. They are each sometimes used by Cicero, as equivalent to our colloquial expression, “to be obliged.” “Vectenum diligo.” *Cic. Att.* 10. “I am obliged to Vectenus.” “I am gratified with his conduct.”

BRACHIUM.

LACERTUS.

Concerning the distinction between these words critics are much divided. *Brachium* is considered by some to be “the arm, from the shoulder to the elbow;” and *Lacertus*, “from the elbow to the wrist.” This is the opinion of Ainsworth, Stephens, Doletus, Junius, Dumesnil, and several other eminent critics and lexicographers. They tell us, that *Brachium*, *Lacertus*, and *Manus*, correspond respectively to *Femur*, *Tibia*, and *Pes*.—General as this opinion may be, I am inclined to think it erroneous. Popma, Holyoke, Faber, and one or two others, give a different, and, in my apprehension, a more correct definition of the words in question; and it is somewhat surprising, that the two examples, which Dumesnil quotes in support of his opinion, militate directly against it. They are taken from the two following passages in

Ovid, “ Est vidisse satis ; laudat digitosque manusque, Brachiaque, et nudos media plus parte lacertos.”—*Met.* lib. i. 500.—Here the parts are evidently mentioned in order, from the fingers to the shoulder. We have first the *Digiti*, then the *Manus*, then the *Brachia*, and then the *Lacerti*. And, as Faber observes, the whole of the *Brachia* are naked, but only the half of the *Lacerti*. The other passage is from the same author,—“ Redeunt humeri ; subjecta lacertis Brachia sunt.”—*Met.* lib. xiv. 304.—Here it is evident, that the *Brachia* are lower than the *Lacerti*. Yet these are two passages, which Dumesnil quotes in favour of his distinction. And when Ovid says, “ Pars humeri tamen ima tui, pars summa lacerti Nuda sit.”—*Art. Am.* iii. 307, it is very evident that *Lacertus* can mean nothing but the arm from the elbow to the shoulder. I observe, at the same time, that, though *Brachium* strictly means the arm from the wrist to the elbow, and *Lacertus* from the elbow to the shoulder, they are each frequently employed to denote the whole arm. It may be remarked also, in confirmation of the distinction here stated, that the most muscular part of the arm is, from the elbow to the top of the shoulder, and hence *Lacertus* is frequently employed to denote “ Strength,” thus, “ Tullit æstus in arma Cæsaris Augusti non responsura lacertis.”—*Hor. Ep.* ii. 2. 47.

The word *had*, used as the preterite of the verb *to have*, is to be carefully distinguished from the word *had*, employed as an auxiliary verb, and the sign of

the pluperfect tense. Thus, if we say, "Lucretia had concealed a poniard under her clothes," it is rendered, "Lucretia cultrum *abdiderat*." But, if we say, "Lucretia had a poniard concealed," it must be rendered, "Cultrum abditum habebat."—(See *Liv.* lib. i. cap. 58.) "Complures annos portoria reliquaque omnia Æduorum vectigalia, parvo pretio redempta habere." *Cæs. B. G.* lib. i. cap. 15. *Redemisse*, "had farmed," would not imply, what is here expressed, namely, that Dumnorix was at that time the farmer of the taxes.

The junior reader must be reminded, that, when a change of subject is signified, it is necessary to mark that change by the use of the pronoun, in its appropriate gender and number. Thus, if we say, "he returned, and she said," it must not be rendered, *Rediit, et dixit*, for this would denote, either, "He returned and said," or "She returned and said," according to the subject preceding, but *Rediit, et illa dixit*, where the pronoun marks the change of subject.

EXERCISE.

Clitus was one of Alexander's dearest friends, and had served long under his father Philip. In a certain battle, when Alexander was fighting, bareheaded, and when Rosaces had his arm raised to strike him behind, Clitus protected the king with his shield, and cut off the barbarian's head. Hellenice, his sister, had nursed Alexander; and he loved her with as great tenderness, as if she had been his mother. From these considerations, Alexander had a great attachment to Clitus, and entrusted him with the govern-

ment of a very extensive province. The night before he set out to take upon him the government of this province, Alexander invited him to a banquet.

OBSERVATIONS.

FACTA. ACTA. GESTA. RES GESTÆ.

Facta is a generic term, denoting actions of any kind. *Gesta*, says Noltenius, refers to matters of importance to the state, whether of peace, or war.—*Acta* denotes things of inferior moment, which were done in the city, and reduced to writing, as *Acta senatus*. In these were inserted whatever was said, or done, in the senate, as the *Acta populi* contained affairs relative to the people, elections, public trials, marriages, divorces. *Gesta*, he observes, are always public, and remarkable; *Acta* may also be private. “*Gesta apostolorum*,” an expression used by Erasmus, he deems extremely objectionable, and expresses his surprise, that the learned writer should have condemned the more common phraseology, “*Acta apostolorum*.” In the supplement, he vindicates the phrase, “*Actus apostolorum*.”

Res gestæ means “Exploits in war.” Gifanius observes, that Sallust uses *Acta* for *Res Gestæ*. “*Milites alius alium læti appellant, acta edocent, atque audiunt sua quisque facta ad cœlum ferri.*” *B. C.*—and that Ovid has imitated him—thus, “*Exitus acta probat.*” *Ep. ii. 85.* He might have added, as an anonymous critic has observed, that Livy employs the word *acta* in the same sense. *Liv. xiii. 19.* “*Acta*,” says Facciolati, “*sæpissime dicuntur de*

magnorum virorum præclare gestis,—de rebus publicis gestis a senatu, a magistratibus, ab imperatoribus, et significant tum leges, decreta et jussa, tum ea omnia, quæ ad rempublicam pertinentia, quocunque modo, ab iis aguntur.”

ADULARI. ASSENTARI.

In a former edition of this work, the etymology of *Adulari*, proposed by Valla, Scaliger, and Dumesnil, who considered it, as compounded of *a intens.* and *δοῦλος*, was too hastily adopted. To determine its derivation is a matter of difficulty, and several conjectures have been offered on the subject by Scaliger, Perottus, Festus, and other critics, some deriving it from the Greek verb ἡδυλίζω, *suavicule loquor*, and others from οὐρά, *cauda*.—Martin, in his *Lexicon Philologicum*, derives it from *Aula*. “Malim,” says he, “ab *aula* significante *ollam*, ut *adulor* sit, quasi *sector aulam*, id est, *ollam*, more canum iis blandientium, a quibus catillones esse sinuntur.” Vossius seems inclined to adopt the conjecture of some critics, who suppose, that the verb *Olare*, synonymous nearly with *Colere*, was used in the earliest ages; and in support of this conjecture, the verbal *Adolabilis* is quoted from Ennius. But, whatever may be the etymology of this verb, I concur with the learned and ingenious Mr. Barker, in thinking, that it certainly has a reference to the fawning of dogs, denoting servile flattery. (See his Observations on this work, in Vol. 10th of the Classical Journal.) “*Adulatio* est blandimentum proprie canum.” *Nonius*. “Canum vero tam fida

custodia, tamque amans dominorum adulatio." *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* lib. ii.

Assentari denotes that species of flattery, which consists in yielding implicit assent to the opinions, the wishes, or the assertions, of others.

"Quicquid dicunt, laudo; id rursum si negant, laudo id quoque;

Negat quis? nego; ait? aio: postremo imperavi egomet mihi

Omnia assentari."

Ter. Eun. ii. 2. 20.

The adjective pronouns are sometimes used for the substantive, the noun, to which the pronoun refers, being at the same time construed, as if the substantive pronoun were employed; thus, "Tuum hominis simplicis pectus vidimus." *Cic. Phil.* ii. 43. i. e. *pectus tui hominis simplicis*. "Solius meum peccatum corrigi potest." *Cic. ad Att.* xii. 15. i. e. *peccatum mei solius*—"Noster duorum adventus." *Liv.* i. e. *adventus nostri duorum*.

EXERCISE.

There the king began to boast of his own achievements, and to vilify those of his father, Philip; many of his nobles, at the same time, flattering him by their assent. He said, that the noble victory at Chæronea was his alone, and that the glory of it had been taken from him by the malignity and envy of his father. He asserted also, that Philip, in an insurrection among the soldiers, had owed his safety to his son. These, and things like these, the young men were overjoyed to hear; to the elderly they were extremely unpleasant. In opposition to the commendations, which Alexander bestowed on himself, Clitus, not sufficiently sober,

began to recount the exploits of Philip, and said, that, in his judgment, they were much greater than the achievements of Alexander.

OBSERVATIONS.

FACINUS.

SCELUS.

FLAGITIUM.

Facinus, from *Facere*, denotes “a bold or daring action;” and, unless it be joined with a favourable epithet, or the action be previously described as commendable, the term is always to be understood in a vituperative sense. “Homines ad vim, ad facinus, cædemque delecti.” *Cic.* Here it signifies a criminal action. “Præclari facinoris, aut artis bonæ, famam quærit.” *Sall. B. C.* Here the epithet *Præclarus* marks the character of the action, as praiseworthy. “Se quisque hostem ferire, murum ascendere, conspici dum tale facinus faceret, properabat.” *Sall. B. C. cap. 7.* Here the previous description of the action fixes its character.

Scelus implies a higher degree of criminality. “Facinus est vinciri civem Romanum; scelus verberari; prope parricidium necari.” *Cic. in Ver. Flagitium*, according to Hill, implies a still higher degree of moral guilt, and “such as cannot be surpassed.” In this he appears to me to err. It is doubtless true, as has been remarked by him, and several other critics, that the Germans punished crimes, implied by *Scelera*, publicly and openly; and that those disgraceful vices and criminal acts, of the existence of which they wished the people to be ignorant, they punished secretly. “Diversitas supplicii illuc respicit,

tanquam scelera ostendi oporteat, dum puniuntur, flagitia abscondi." *Tac. Germ.* 12. An examination of their laws would, however, have convinced the learned critic, that the term *Scelera* comprehended some of the most atrocious crimes, of which men can be guilty; and that, in point of criminality, it rises higher than the term *Flagitia*. This, indeed, would be sufficiently clear, if all other evidence were wanting, from the following passage in Livy. "Minus tamen esset, si flagitiis tantum effeminati forent, (ipsorum magna ex parte dedecus erat,) et a facinoribus manus, mentem fraudibus abstinuissent." *Liv.* xxxix. 16. "However, their criminality (alluding to their lewd and disgusting practices) would have been less, if they had only indulged an effeminate lasciviousness, (for that would have brought dishonour only to themselves,) and had kept their hands from perpetrating horrid and treacherous villanies." That *Flagitium* implies a less degree of criminality than *Scelus*, and that it is even applied to faults of a venial nature, seems evident also from the following passage in Cicero. "Tantamne fuisse oblivionem, inquit, in scripto præsertim, ut ne legens quidem senserit, quantum flagitii admiserit?" *Cic. in Brut.* cap. 61. Here *Flagitium* means simply an "error," but shameful. "Nonne id flagitium est, te aliis consilium dare, foris sapere, tibi non posse te auxiliarier?" *Ter. Heaut.* v. 1. 49. "Is it not discreditable to you, as an inconsistency?" We find Cicero also applying the epithet *flagitiosus* to selfish grief, as manifesting a feeling degrading to character. "Quid autem flagitiosius et

indignius, quam eum, qui sic doleat, fateri oportere, quum tantopere alicujus morte crucietur, quod aliqua utilitate privatus sit, si nihil ex ejus vita beneficii, ac commodi, se consecuturum speravisset, nihil sibi omnino dolendum fuisse." *Cic. de Consol.* Hill has remarked, in corroboration of his opinion, that, when *Flagitium* appears in the same sentence with the two other terms, it naturally finishes the climax. If this were universally the fact, it would serve to confirm his explanation. But we find, that the inverse collocation is frequently adopted. "Flagitiis et facinoribus coopertus," *Sall. B. C.* 24; on which passage, Havercamp remarks, that *Flagitia*, consisting chiefly in libidinous excesses, are less criminal than *Facinora*, and therefore still less, according to Hill himself, than *Scelera*. We find an ignominious peace denominated *Flagitium*. *Sall. B. J.* xxxii. 2. The same author designates the flight of a soldier by the same term. *B. J.* cap. 58. I am inclined therefore, to think, that *Flagitium*, though generally referring to lustful excess, denotes any fault, error, or crime, which reflects more or less disgrace on the offender; and that it implies a less degree of moral guilt, than *Scelus*. "Inter *flagitium* et *facinus* hoc differt, quod *flagitium* est quicquid agit cupiditas indomita ad corrumpendum animum, et corpus suum; *facinus*, quod agit, ut alteri noceat." *Vide Facciolati in Facinus*.

It was remarked by an ancient critic, and we believe the remark to be correct, that Cicero never uses the word *pœnitentia* for "repentance." *Pœnitere* rarely occurs as a verb in a personal sense. Justin

however, has thus used it oftener than once ; and we find, in one of the fragments of Sallust, *pœniturus*, for *pœnititurus*,—in Cicero, Sallust, and Suetonius, *pœnitens*—in Plautus, Livy, Seneca, and V. Maximus, *pœnitendus*—and *pœnitendum* in Cicero and Sallust.

Consciùs sceleris means “conscious to one’s self of a crime;” or “of being the criminal,” *consciùs sceleri*, “privy to a crime,” or “having a knowledge of it.” “Huic facinori conscia.” *Cic. pro Cel. cap. 21.*

EXERCISE.

Alexander hearing his father preferred to himself, was fired to madness ; and seizing a dagger from the hand of one of his attendants, plunged it into the heart of Clitus. Exulting at first in the perpetration of this atrocious deed, he upbraided the dying man with his encomiums on Philip ; but, when he came to reflect, that he had rashly slain an innocent and aged friend, the brother too of her, who had nursed him in infancy, the anguish of remorse pierced his soul. Bursting into tears, he clasped the dead body in his arms ; and so violent was the feeling of repentance, that, seizing the weapon plucked from the wound, he would have thrust it into himself, had not his friends arrested his hand. Resolved not to survive him, he abstained from food during three days, when the entreaties of the whole army at last prevailed on him to abandon his determination. How forcibly does this story teach us the fatal effects of intemperate drinking, and unbridled passion !

OBSERVATIONS.

DESPICERE. SPERNERE. CONTEMNERE.

The etymological meaning of *despicere* is “to see an object, as below us, or beneath us,” and is op-

posed to that of *susplicere*, "to see an object, as superior to us, or above us." These imply mere perceptions; whence, however, in the one case arises the feeling or emotion, which we signify by *contemnere* or *spernere*, and in the other, that, which is denoted by *admirari* or *reuereri*. "Itaque eos viros *suspiciunt*, maximisque efferunt laudibus, in quibus existimant se excellentes quasdam et singulares virtutes perspicere; *despiciunt* autem eos, et contemnunt, in quibus nihil virtutis, nihil animi, nihil nervorum putant." *Cic. Off.* 2. 10.

Contemnere, says Popma, "est parvi ducere:"—*Despicere*, "infra se existimare:"—*Spernere*, "cum fastidio rejicere et segregare." "Ita contemnere plus est quam despicere, spernere plus quam utrumque horum." Noltenius prefers the distinction of the Scholiast. (See *Cic. in Verr.*) "*Despicimus* inferiores, *contemnimus* æquales, aut *despicimus* vultu, *contemnimus* animo: nam *Despicio* notat, aliquem tanquam se inferiorem intueri. At *Contemno* est aliquem licet æqualem, non curare seu negligere." He adds, "Quando igitur hæc duo verba conjunguntur, etiam atque etiam considerandum est, utrum de æquali aut superiore, an de inferiore dicantur. Nam inferior despiciendo plus committit, quam contemnendo," ut, "Itaque a populo Romano contemnimur, despici-mur," *Cic.* that is, "We, the senators." He observes, that, when on the contrary, the person despising is either equal, or superior to the person despised, *Contemnere* is a stronger term than *Despi-*

cere; thus Cicero, speaking of Verres, who had been already Prætor and Proprætor, says, “Non usque eo despiceret contemneretque ordinem senatus.” That there is no authority whatever for this observation, it would be temerity to affirm; but that it is sanctioned by general usage, may be confidently denied. Cicero himself, whose authority is here quoted in favour of the criticism, says, in the same speech against Verres, “Quemadmodum ille tenuissimum quemque *contemserit*, *despexerit*; liberum esse nunquam duxerit.” Here the person despising is evidently superior to the person despised; the phraseology, therefore, is directly contradictory to the learned author’s distinction. The explanation given by Popma, which Dumesnil and several other critics have adopted, comes much nearer the truth. “*Contemnere* est parvi ducere; *Despicere* infra se habere; *Spernere* cum fastidio rejicere et segregare.”—Here the two first verbs are correctly defined. But in regard to the third, it is to be observed, that though *Spernere*, very generally, denotes “to reject with disdain,” it frequently signifies merely, “to view with indifference or contempt.”—“Hostem belluasque spernebat.” *Curt.* ix. 2. “Ad spernendum periculum accensi.” *Id.* viii. 13. In the same author, if I mistake not, occurs the expression, “Spernere mortem.” In none of these examples and several others which might be adduced, can *Spernere* signify “to reject with disdain.”

From a careful collation of a great variety of passages, in which these verbs occur, the definition given

by Hill appears the most correct, and the most precise. *Contemnere*, he says, denotes the absolute vileness of the object, while *Spernere* and *Despicere* imply its relative inferiority. The two last, he observes, differ thus: "The correlative object to *Spretum* may be either the person, who slights, or any person whatever; whereas, the correlative object to *Despectum* is always the person, who looks down." That is, *Despicere* always implies, that the person despising thinks meanly of the person despised, as compared with himself,—thus, "*Despicio te*," is equivalent to "*Contemno te præ me*," "I think contemptuously of you, compared with myself;" whereas *Spernere* denotes, that the person, or thing, is thought meanly of, not only in comparison with the person despising, but also in comparison with some other person or thing. The only addition, which we should be inclined to make to this explanation is, that *Spernere* implies a greater degree of contempt than either of the two other verbs expresses, and conveys more nearly the idea of our English word, "Scorn." *Sperno*, "I scorn," and hence, frequently, "I spurn," or "I reject with scorn," a person or thing, that I think either inferior to another, or unworthy of myself, though it be not, perhaps, actually contemptible.—"*Quod petiit, spernit.*" *Hor. Ep. i. 1. 98.* "*Ob hæc facta abs te spernor.*" *Ter. Eun. i. 2. 90.*—"*Sperne voluptates.*" *Hor. Ep. i. 2. 55.*—"*Sum fragilis, sed tu, moneo, ne sperne sigillum.*" *Mart. Ep. xiv. 178.*

Before we dismiss the subject, we would advert to an error committed by the learned critic, which re-

quires correction. He remarks, that when "*Contemnere*," which denotes, he says, the absolute vileness of the object, is used where comparison is implied, the comparison is denoted by "Præ;" and that *Spernere* and *Despicere*, which signify relative inferiority, excluded the use of "Præ." In this opinion we cannot concur. The preposition is often found with *Spernere*, as well as with *Contemnere*; thus, "Præ illius forma, quasi spernas tuam." *Plaut. Mil.* iv. 4. 34. "Operæ pretium est audire, qui omnia præ divitiis humana spernunt." *Liv.* iii. 26.

One substantive governs another in the genitive when they signify different things. But, if the latter of the two has an adjective joined with it, specifying the general meaning of the substantive, or emphatically describing the property, which it expresses, it may be put in the genitive, or ablative, as "A man of consummate wisdom," *Vir summæ prudentiæ vel summa prudentia*. Sometimes the latter substantive is put in the accusative, by *Synecdoche*, and sometimes in the ablative, while the adjective agrees with the subject, and not with the property or quality—as *Vir præstans ingenio*, *Vir decorus faciem*, i. e. *secundum faciem*. The latter of these phraseologies obtains chiefly among the poets. It deserves, however, the attention of the scholar, that the genitive and ablative are not to be used indifferently. In some cases, which will be better understood by example than by explanation, the genitive only is used, and in others the ablative—thus, "A field of four acres," *Ager trium jugerum*. "A stone of a hundred pounds

weight," *Lapis centum librarum*. "Be of good cheer," *Bono animo es*. "If your mind is disengaged," *Si vacuo animo es*. *Cic.* "A woman far advanced in life," *Mulier magno natu*. *Liv.* iii. 71.

There is an idiom, which is connected with the subject, and may be here noticed, as occurring in classic writers. "Romanorum nemo id auctoritatis aderat, ut promissa ejus magni penderentur." *Tac. Ann.* xii. 18. for *nemo ejus auctoritatis*. "Hominibus id ætatis." *Cic. de Orat. lib.* i. "Men of that age."

EXERCISE.

It is, said a celebrated writer, worth their while, who despise all human things, in comparison with riches, and are of opinion, that there is no place either for honour, or for virtue, unless where wealth abounds, to read what we have related to us, concerning T. Quinctius Cincinnatus. This man, the sole hope of the Roman state, cultivated with his own hand, a farm of four Roman acres across the Tiber, which is called the Quinctian Meadows, opposite to that place, where the ship-docks now are. There was this great man found by the deputies of the senate, whether digging a ditch with a spade, or at plough, this at least is certain, busily employed in agricultural labour.—When the usual compliments were over, they begged him to put on his gown, and hear the Senate's message.

OBSERVATIONS.

COMITARI.

STIPARE.

Dumesnil's definition of these words, if not erroneous, is certainly defective. He says, *Comitari* is

generally said of an inferior accompanying a superior ; and that *Stipare* is “ to attend upon,” “ to be in the retinue of,” or “ to escort.” The distinction is simply this, that *Comitari* is applied to one attendant or to more ; whereas *Stipare* always implies a crowded retinue.

SATIN’ SALVÆ.

Hadrianus Cardinalis observes, that *Satin’ Salvæ* was a common form of question among the Romans, when they apprehended mischief, or danger. “ Hem quid est ? quid trepidas ? satin’ salvæ ?” *Ter. Eun.* v. 6. “ Quærentique viro, satine salvæ ? minime inquit.” *Liv.* i. 58. “ Cum frater satine salvæ res, interrogaret.” *Id.*

LICTORES.

The office of Lictor was instituted by Romulus, who borrowed it from the Tuscans. The name, as Lipsius informs us, was derived from an obsolete verb, *Ligo, ligui, lictum, ligere*, “ to bind,” it being the business of the Lictors to bind the hands and legs of criminals, before they suffered punishment. The Lictors were, at first, generally chosen from the lowest of the *Ingenui*, or common people ; (See *Liv.* ii. 55,) but, in later ages, they were taken from the *Liberti* and *Libertini*. Some magistrates, indeed, chose them from their own slaves. To prevent this, a law was made, as Dionysius informs us, in the time of the Triumvirate, that no slave should bear a rod (*Virga*).—

(See *Dionys. Hal.* lib. lvi.) Their office was four-fold,—1st. It was their duty to walk before the magistrates (*Præire*) one by one, in a regular line. The foremost was called “Lictor Primus;” and the hindmost, who immediately preceded the magistrate, was called “Lictor Proximus,” or “Postremus.”—2dly. It was their business to clear away the crowd (*Turbam submovere*), and make way for the magistrates. (See *Liv.* xlv. 29.—*Id.* viii. 33.) For this purpose, and also for knocking at a door, or gate, they carried a rod (*Virga*). “Forem, uti mos est, virga percussit.” *Liv.* vi. 34.

“Bis senos jubet en redire fasces,
Nato consule, nobilique virga,
Vatis Castaliam domum sonare.”

Mart. lib. viii. *Ep.* 66.

Thirdly. It was their duty to enforce that respect, which was due to the magistrates. This part of their office was named *Animadversio*, and was executed *Inclamando*, “by crying out.” The usual expressions of respect were, uncovering the head, rising up, dismounting from horseback, or from a chariot, and going out of the way. “Ut consul animadvertere proximum lictorem jussit, et is ut descenderet, ex equo inclamavit.” *Liv.* lib. xxiv. cap. 44. “Si consulem, inquit, videro aut prætorem, omnia, quibus honos haberi solet, faciam; equo desiliam, caput aperiam, semita cedam.” *Sen. Ep.* 30.

Fourthly. It was part of their office to inflict

punishment on criminals. “ I, lictor, colliga manus.”
 “ I caput obnube, arbori infelici suspende, verbera vel
 intra pomœrium, vel extra pomœrium.” *Liv.* i. 26.

Their *Insignia* were the *Fasces* and *Virgæ*. The *Fasces* were a bundle of rods, tied with a piece of leather. A hatchet, or axe, was, at first, stuck in the middle of the rods; but Val. Poplicola, after the banishment of the kings, removed the axe, lest the sentiment of liberty should be weakened by the terror of capital punishment. But when a Dictator was chosen, the axe was placed in the middle of the *Fasces*, as it was during the regal government. To the Dictator, to the kings also, and the Consuls, were assigned twelve lictors; the master of the horse had six; the Prætor had the same number; and every vestal virgin, when she appeared in public, was attended by one lictor. Adams, and several other writers, have assigned twenty-four lictors to the Dictator. In this they appear to have erred.—Plutarch, indeed, tells us, in his “ Life of Fabius,” that the Dictator was attended by twenty-four lictors; but, as Lipsius observes, this statement is contradicted by higher authority; for we are told in the epitome of the 89th book of Livy, that Sulla, in assuming to himself twenty-four lictors, had done a thing entirely unprecedented. “ Sulla dictator factus, quod nemo quidem unquam fecerat, cum fascibus viginti quatuor processit.”

Dictator.

The Dictator was a magistrate, created in time

of imminent public danger, and invested with absolute authority. He was chosen by one of the consuls, who, by order of the senate, named any person of consular authority, who seemed to him best qualified to execute the office. The nomination took place in the night time. “Nocte deinde silentio, ut mos est, Papirium Dictatorem dixit.” *Liv.* ix. 38. He was also called, “Magister populi,” and “Prætor Maximus.” His authority, which was absolute, not only over the people, but over the consuls and other magistrates, was limited by the existence of the danger, or emergency, which required his creation, and could not in any event be prolonged beyond the space of six months. Some have supposed, that his power was not altogether absolute, and that from his decree there lay an appeal to the people. It is true, that a law was made, first by the Consuls Horatius and Valerius, (A. U. 304,) and then by M. Valerius, (A. U. 453,) by which it was enacted, that no magistrate should be created, from whom there was no appeal. “Nequis ullum magistratum sine provocatione crearet.” *Liv.* iii. 55. But though this law might be considered as restrictive of the power of the Dictator, it seems sufficiently evident, that Dictators did not comply with it, and that the people themselves seemed uncertain of its applicability to the Dictatorial authority. For we find, in the dispute with Papirius the Dictator, that, though Fabius claims, in explicit terms, the right of appeal, saying, “Tribunos plebis appello, et provoco ad populum,” yet he immediately

afterwards expresses himself, as if the Dictator had it in his power either to grant, or to refuse, his claim. And we find that the younger Fabius was pardoned, not by a sentence of the people, in virtue of the law of appeal, but by their earnest entreaties addressed to the Dictator. (See *Liv.* viii. 33.)

TOGA. PALLIUM. PEPLUM. STOLA.
PALUDAMENTUM.

The *Toga* was a loose woollen robe of a semi-circular form, without sleeves, close at the bottom, but open at the top as far as the girdle, so that the right arm was at liberty, while the left supported a lappet, (*Lacinia*,) which was thrown over the left shoulder, and formed a *Sinus*, or fold on the breast. When the left arm was drawn under the gown, the *Sinus*, or lappet, hung about the wearer's feet. Cæsar, we are told, had this slovenly practice; and, it is said, that Sulla, alluding to this, advised the nobles, "Ut puerum male cinctum caverent." The colour of the *Toga*, as has been already mentioned, was white (*Toga alba*); and when a person stood candidate for an office, it was usual to have his gown whitened, probably with a fine white chalk, whence Persius uses the phrase, "Cretata ambitio." *Sat.* v. 177. The gown, thus whitened, was named *Candida*, and the wearer *Candidatus*. It was usual also, on holidays, to have the gown cleaned, or washed, by the fuller, in which case, the wearer was called *Alba-*

tus—thus,—“ Ille repotia, natales, aliosve dierum, Festos albatus celebret.”—*Hor. Sat. ii. 2. 60.*

The *Toga* was distinguished by the following varieties, the *Prætexta*, the *Pura*, or *Virilis*, the *Picta*, the *Pulla*, the *Rasa*, and the *Undulata*. These, at least, are the principal varieties. The *Toga prætexta*, so called, from its having a purple border all round it, (*Cui limbus purpureus adtextus esset*), was worn by boys and girls, the children of *Ingenui*, or of free-born citizens; by the former, till they put on the *Toga virilis*, and by the latter, till they were married. It was also worn by magistrates, not only in Rome, but in the colonies and free towns; by the masters of colleges, by the senators, during the celebration of public games, and by the priests and augurs in the capital; but not, as some suppose, by those in the country. Over the gown was worn a *Bulla aurea*, or hollow golden ball, suspended by a string, which went round the neck. The sons of freed men were not, at first, allowed to wear the *Prætexta*; (See *Macrob. i. 6.*) they, in time, however, obtained this privilege, but with this distinction, that their *Bulla* was made of leather,—“*Etruscum puero si contigit aurum, Vel nodus tantum, et signum de paupere loro.*”—*Juv. Sat. v. 164.*

The *Toga pura* was so called, because it was all of one colour, or purely white. It was also called *Virilis*, because the *Prætexta* (*Vestis puerilis*) was laid aside, and the *Virilis* assumed, when they arrived at the age of puberty, that is, entered on the period of

manhood. It was likewise named *Libera*, the *Prætexta* being the badge of pupillage, and the *Toga pura* the garment of liberty.

At what precise period it was usual to assume the *Toga virilis*, is a subject involved in some degree of obscurity. This arises from the incorrect manner in which the period has been defined by classic writers, who have not, in this instance, been sufficiently attentive to the obvious distinction between time past, and time passing. Antiquaries and critics are, accordingly, divided respecting the age, at which the *Toga virilis* was assumed; and, in delivering their opinions, most of them are chargeable with the very error, whence the obscurity of the ancients arises. Nay, however extraordinary it may appear, it is no uncommon thing to find the same author now fixing one period, and then another.—Merouville, for example, tells us, in one passage, that the *Prætexta* was worn to the seventeenth year of age, and in another, to the fifteenth. Some have affirmed, that the *Toga virilis* was taken, when the youth had completed his fourteenth year. This opinion may be pronounced to be entirely erroneous; for though Macrobius fixes the age of puberty at fourteen, we have no where, as far as I can learn, sufficient authority for saying, that boys were permitted to assume the *Toga virilis*, and to become their own masters, at this age. Aldus Manutius, Dacier, and several other critics, among whom is Kennett, the author of the “Antiquities,” contend, that the *Toga virilis* was assumed, when the youth had

completed his sixteenth year, that is, was sixteen years of age, and had entered into his seventeenth. Donatus says, that the *Toga prætexta* was worn to the seventeenth year, "Ad annum decimum septimum," which would clearly imply, that the *Toga virilis* was taken, on entering into the seventeenth year ; and he tells us, afterwards, that those who were accounted not to be of the military age, or fit for serving in the army, were under seventeen years of age, hence that the military age was the seventeenth year. From this, the natural inference would be, that the *Toga virilis* was taken in the beginning of the seventeenth year of age, or when the youth was sixteen years old. For this opinion, he adduces the authority of Pliny. He quotes also the authority of Aul. Gellius ; but, I apprehend, without perceiving that the latter authority is not consistent with itself. For Aul. Gellius tells us, that those were accounted boys, and, consequently, wore the *Prætexta*, who were under seventeen years of age, in other words who had not entered into their eighteenth year, and yet, in their seventeenth year, that is, when they were sixteen years of age, they were accounted fit for the army, and wore, therefore, the *Toga virilis*. This, and similar inconsistencies of expression, have occasioned a diversity of opinion among critics and antiquaries on this subject. Ainsworth says, the *Toga virilis* was taken when the youth was seventeen years of age ; Adams is of the same opinion. Holyoke, and several other lexicographers, agree with Ald. Manutius, Da-

cier, and others, maintaining it was assumed when the youth was sixteen years of age.

On examining this controversy, it appears to me, that, in the later period of the republic, and during the reign of Augustus and Nero, the Roman youths assumed the *Toga virilis*, when they had completed their fifteenth year. This is the opinion of Pitiscus, and it seems to be supported by irrefragable evidence. Cicero, in a letter to Atticus, (i. 2,) acquaints him, that a son was born to him in the 690th year of the city, in the consulship of Julius Cæsar and M. Figulus. He gave this son the *Toga virilis*, in the 705th year of the city, in the consulate of Corn. Lentulus and Claudius Marcellinus. The youth had then completed his fifteenth year. Cicero himself was born (*Cic. in Brut.* and also *ad Att.* vii. 5,) on the 3d of January, in the year of the city 648, and assumed the *Toga virilis* in the year 663. (See *Cic. de Orat.* iii. 1. and *Cic. in Brut.*) In the earlier ages of the Roman state, it seems evident, that the *Toga virilis* was not assumed till the seventeenth year was completed, at which period, every youth, by a law of Servius Tullius, was compelled to serve as a soldier. It was at this period also, that a youth was either allowed to impeach, or stand forward, as a public accuser. “M. Cotta, eo ipso die, quo togam sumpsit virilem, protinus ut e capitolio descendit, Cn. Carbonem, a quo pater damnatus fuerat, postulavit.” *Val. Max.* v. 4. 4. *Ext.* These two circumstances, therefore, namely, the law of Servius, and the privilege of

impeachment attached to the completion of the seventeenth year, render it almost certain, that, in the earlier ages of the state, the *Toga virilis* was assumed at this period. This opinion is farther corroborated by the testimony of Livy. He says, (lib. ii. cap. 57,) “Delectu edicto, juniores ab annis septemdecim, et quosdam prætextatos scribunt,” “They enlist all the youths above seventeen years of age, and some, who had not yet quitted the *Toga prætexta*.” Now, unless we are to affirm, what is extremely improbable, that an interval of two years is here signified, we must conclude, that those, who were sixteen years of age, were still wearing the *Prætexta*, and were not yet accounted to be of the military age.

The *Toga picta* was an Etrurian garment, of a purple colour, embroidered with gold, and worn by kings, consuls, or generals, when they were honoured with a triumph.

The *Toga purpurea* was distinguished from the *Picta* by this circumstance, that it was not figured or embroidered. This was the only difference.—(See *Ald. Manut. de Quæst. lib. i.*) Among the *Togæ* may be reckoned the *Trabea*. Of this, says the same author, there were three kinds, the one belonging to the Gods, and of purple only; another belonging to the priests and augurs, of purple and scarlet; and the third worn by kings and consuls, of white fringed with purple. Kennett is of opinion, that the *Picta*, *Purpurea*, the *Palmata*, the consular *Trabea*, and the *Paludamentum*, were the same, this being

the only difference, that the last is often given to military officers in general, and is sometimes used for the common soldier's coat; and, he adds, that the words are employed indiscriminately, denoting the robes of state proper to the kings, consuls, emperors, and generals, during a triumph. This opinion, however, is somewhat questionable. According to Pitiscus, the *paludamentum* was an open, and the *trabea* a close, garment. Others maintain, that the former was all of one colour, generally purple, and sometimes white; and that the *trabea* was white, with stripes of purple or scarlet. "Trabea virgas quasdam trabium instar habuit intextas." *Valtrin. de Re Milit.* See *Pitisc. Lex. Ant. Rom. Ald. Manut. de Quæsit.*

It has been already remarked, that the common *Toga* was white; and as long as it continued to be the general dress, there was no difference in respect to the colour of the garment, except that, in the richer class of people, it was cleaner and of a better colour. The *Toga sordida*, however, which may be considered as the dress of the common people, was assumed by the rich and noble, when they had to defend themselves before a public tribunal, against any accusation. They were then called *Sordidati*. This was the case in the earlier periods of the Roman state. In later ages, the *Toga*, which was formerly universally worn, gave place, unless in the highest ranks, to the *Pænula*, the *Lacerna*, or the *Tunique* only, and these of a dark or black colour.—Hence *Pullati*, that is, *Pulla induti*, denoted the poorest and lowest class of the people.

After the time of Augustus, the *Toga* gradually fell into disuse; and, in the reign of Hadrian, it was relinquished by almost all the senators and knights.

The *Pallium*, or cloak, was the exterior robe, or upper garment, of the Greeks, as the *Toga* was of the Romans.

It would appear, however, that the *Pallium* was not entirely confined to the Greeks, and that a few individuals among the Romans themselves adopted this part of the Grecian dress. It was objected to Rabirius, “Quod homo consularis soccos habuerit, et pallium.” *Cic. pro Rab.* And Suetonius informs us, that Augustus attempted to introduce the *pallium* as the common garb. “Sed et cæteros continuos dies, inter varia munuscula, togas insuper, et pallia distribuit, lege proposita, ut Romani Græco, Græci Romano habitu uterentur.” *Suet. Cæs. Aug.*

In the earlier ages of the Roman state, the *Toga* is supposed by most antiquaries to have been the common dress of men and women. “Propterea quod in lecto togas ante habebant; ante enim olim fuit commune vestimentum, et diurnum, et nocturnum, et muliebre, et virile.” *Nonius. Varro de Vit. Pop. Rom.* In later ages, the *Stola* became the appropriate dress of the Roman matrons. This was a sort of purple *Tunique* with sleeves, (*manicata*—see *Pitisc.*) having many folds, reaching to the feet, and ornamented with a border of gold. “Rugosiorum cum gerat stola frontem.” *Mart. iii. 93. 4.* It appears also to have covered the head. “Stola matronale operimentum;

quod cooperto capite, et scapula a dextro latere, in lævum humerum mittitur." *Isid.* i. 25. See also *Pitisc. Lex. Ant.*

Female slaves, women convicted of adultery, and courtesans, were not permitted to wear the *Stola*. Hence they were called *Togatæ*.

" Est mœcha Fabulla ;
Damnetur, si vis ; etiam Carfinia ; talem
Non sumet damnata togam." *Juv.* ii. 68.

" Quis Floralia vestit, et stolatum
Permittit meretricibus pudorem."
Mart. i. 36. 8.

EXERCISE.

Much surprised, he inquired if all was well ; and desired his wife, Racilia, quickly to fetch his gown from the cottage. Then, having wiped off the dust and sweat, with which he was besmeared, he put on his gown, and came forward to the deputies, who saluted him Dictator. When they had explained to him the perilous situation of the army, they requested him, without delay, to repair to the city. Having crossed the river in a barge, which was prepared for that purpose, he was received by his three sons, who came forward to meet him, and also by the majority of the senators. Attended by this train, and preceded by the lictors, he was conducted to his house. The commons also, to whom his authority was not so acceptable, crowded around him, eager to see him. On the day following he marched against the *Æqui*, and having gained a signal victory over them, rescued his country from the most imminent danger.

OBSERVATIONS.

TEMPERANTIA.

MODERATIO.

Of these, *Temperantia* is the special term, denoting the due government of the passions and appetites of our nature. Cicero, in one place, defines it to be “*Moderatrix omnium commotionum.*” *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.* lib. v. And in another place, “*Quæ moderandis cupiditatibus, regendisque animi motibus laudatur, ejus est munus in agendo, cui temperantiæ nomen est.*” *Cic. Or. Part.* cap. 22. The English word “*Temperance*” regards chiefly the regulation of two of our appetites, hunger and thirst. *Moderatio* is a generic term, applicable to the government, or regulation, of any thing whatever. “*Mundi divina in homines moderatio.*” *Cic.* Its meaning, therefore, is much more extensive, than the English derivative.

COMPELLARE.

ALLOQUI.

The essential distinction between these two words seems to be, that the former denotes, “*To call the attention of any person, for the purpose of being heard ;*” and hence, by inference, “*To accost*” or “*address him.*” It seems also to imply some set purpose, and therefore some degree of earnestness, and formality, whether the person addressed be a superior, an equal, or an inferior. *Alloqui* means simply, “*To speak to,*” with, or without, any ceremony, or set purpose. “*Quare da te in sermonem, et perseca, et con-*

fice ; excita, compella, loquere, ut te cum illo Scæva loqui putes." *Cic. ad Att.* xiii. 23.

JUSTITIA.

ÆQUITAS.

The latter is the generic term, including what we owe to God and man. Cicero considers it in its principle, or foundation, as *Tripartita*, divisible into three parts. "Una pars legitima est," "what is founded in law ;"—"altera æquitati conveniens," "what is consonant with equity, or founded in our natural perceptions of right and wrong ;"—"tertia moris vetustate confirmata," "what is founded in long and established usage." In respect to its objects, it is also three-fold. "Æquitas tripartita esse dicitur ; una ad superos deos ; altera ad manes ; tertia ad homines pertinere. Prima *pietas* ; secunda *sanctitas* ; tertia *justitia et æquitas* nominatur." It is therefore the generic term, and is also used specially, as applied to men. *Justitia* is used only in the latter sense, and is considered by Cicero as denoting a conformity, not to written law absolutely, (for a conformity to an absurd or tyrannical law, he says, would not be *justice*,) but to this law, as consonant with our clear perceptions of right and wrong. "Etiamne, si quæ sint tyrannorum leges, si triginta illi Athenis leges imponere voluissent ; aut si omnes Athenienses delectarentur tyrannicis legibus, num idcirco hæ leges justæ haberentur ?" *Cic. de Leg.* lib. i. He considers therefore *Justitia* as founded not in statute or written law, but in nature. "Ejus initium est a natura profectum : deinde, quædam in con-

suetudinem ex utilitatis ratione venerunt; postea res et a natura profectas, et a consuetudine probatas, legum metus et religio sanxit." *Cic. de Invent.* lib. ii. Cicero, therefore, it is evident, comprehends, in the term *Justitia*, whatever is in itself right, as prescribed by reason and experience, whether agreeable, or not, to statute law, including what we express by "justice and equity." In English, *Justice*, as opposed to *Equity*, means a conformity to the statute and common law, whether consonant, or repugnant, to what is right and equitable.

It has been observed, that such expressions as "He was on the point of," "He was not far from," are rendered by *Pæne in eo erat*, *Parum abfuit quin*. "So far from" is, in like manner, rendered by *Tantum abest*, *Tantum abfuit, ut*; thus, "We are so far from being unwilling, that persons should write against us, that we very much wish it." "*Tantum abest, ut scribi contra nos nolimus, ut id etiam maxime optemus.*" *Cic.* It may be here further remarked, that the verb *abesse* is, in such expressions, not always used impersonally, though this is certainly the general phraseology. "*Milites nostri tantum abfuerunt, ut perturbarentur.*" *Hirt. de B. A.* cap. 22, "were so far from being thrown into confusion." It is to be likewise observed, that the second *ut* is sometimes omitted, and the clause thrown into a different form, thus, "*Tantum abfuit, ut inflammares animos nostros; somnum isto loco vix tenebamus.*" *Cic. in Brut.*

“Tantum porro aberat, ut binos scriberent, vix singulos confecerunt.” *Cic. Att. xiii. 21.*

It is also elegantly rendered by *Adeo non, ut*, as “He was so far from offering violence to them himself, that he took the greatest care.” “*Adeo ipse non violavit, ut summam adhiberet curam.*” *Curt.*

EXERCISE.

After the defeat of Darius, Alëxander was so far from abusing his victory, that he would not suffer the least outrage to be offered to the vanquished. By his clemency and moderation, he gained to himself universal admiration and praise. When Sysigambis, the mother of Darius, was introduced into his presence, she thus addressed him; “You deserve, that we should offer the same prayers in your behalf, which we have been wont to offer for Darius. Of this you are worthy, who surpass the king, not only in good fortune, but also in equity. You call me mother, you call me queen; but I own myself your servant. I have already reached the summit of that fortune, which is past; and can bear the yoke, of that, which now is. It is in your power to exercise clemency, or cruelty.” “Fear not,” said Alexander; “be of good cheer.” He then took the son of Darius in his arms; and the boy, nowise frightened at the sight of Alexander, though he had never seen him before, clasped his neck with his little hands. The king, struck with the composure of the child, said to Hephæstion, “O how earnestly do I wish, that his father had imbibed a little of his son’s disposition.”

OBSERVATIONS.

INTER.

APUD.

Inter means "Among," or "In the number of," as *Inter Amicos*, "Among," or "In the number of, my friends." *Apud*, "At," "Among," "With," "In the writings of," "In the minds of," or "In the opinion of," "In the customs of," as *Apud Ciceronem*, "with Cicero," or "In the opinion of Cicero." *Apud Homerum invenio*, "I find in the writings of Homer." *Apud Romanos mos erat*, "With the Romans," or "Among the Romans, it was a custom." "Ego quoque . . . constitui apud te auctoritatem augurii et divinationis meæ." *Cic. Ep. Fam. vi. 6.* "I have established in your mind."

OBEDIRE.

PARERE.

Critics are not perfectly agreed concerning the precise meaning of these verbs. *Obedire*, says Dumesnil, is "To Obey," literally as slaves do; *Obtemperare*, as a son does a father; and *Parere* is "To Submit," or "Yield to." Others say, that *Obedire* implies voluntary obedience; and that *Parere* is the correlate of *Imperare*, signifying "To Obey from necessity." Hill says, *Obedire* is "to comply with the request, from feeling the claim of the petitioner, whether enforced or otherwise," and that the expression "*heard*," (*auditum*,) may be either the admonition of a friend, or the command of a superior.

Parere, he says, implies a higher degree of submission, and suggests resignation, where force or complaint could have little effect. *Obtemperare* denotes the spirit of obedience, even though the will of the superior has never been heard.

These explanations are neither completely at variance, nor do they perfectly agree with one another. *Obedire*, *Obediens*, and *Obedientia*, I conceive to be generic terms, expressing obedience from whatever motive, whether choice or necessity, and that *Parere* denotes an obedience to necessity, or some authoritative command, as that of a parent or master. The latter implies superiority in the person commanding—the former expresses obedience to an equal, a superior, or an inferior. The former (*Obedire*, “dicto audiens esse,”) is “to do what one is desired to do;” the latter, *Parere*, is “to submit one’s self to the will of another, whose superiority is acknowledged,” and is, therefore, nearly related to *Servire*. “Cui *servire* ipsi non potuimus, ejus libellis *paremus*.” *Cic.* “Has (injurias) ægre tulerant, jam domiti ut *pareant*, nondum ut *serviant*.” *Tac. Agr.* 13. The former of the two verbs denotes compulsory subjection, the latter, servile submission; in this they differ; but they agree in expressing subjection to a superior. “*Parebo* auctoritati tuæ.” *Cic. Fam. Ep.* ix. 15.

In the following passage, *parere* denotes a state of inferiority and submission—“Quibus visis, indignatus tali feminæ ferrum et arma portantes *parere*.” *Just.* lib. i. cap. 3. In one of the epistles of Horace,

(i. 2. 62.) we find it opposed to *Imperare*. “Animum rege, qui, nisi *paret, imperat*,” “which, unless it be the servant, becomes the master.” *Obedire* being the generic term, is, in the following passage, in like manner opposed to *Imperator*, “Egomet sum mihi *imperator*, idem egomet mihi *obedio*.” *Plaut. Merc. v. 2. 12* *. “Modeste qui *paret*, videtur qui aliquando imperet dignus esse : itaque oportet et eum, qui *paret*, sperare se aliquo tempore imperaturum, et illum, qui *imperat*, cogitare, brevi tempore sibi esse parendum.” In all these examples, *Parere* conveys the idea of submission to superior authority or power. Figuratively in the same sense, it is used in the following passages—“Quæ homines arant, navigant, ædificant, virtuti omnia *parent*.” *Sall. B. C.*—“Virtus, fama, decus, divina, humanaque pulchris, Divitiis *paret*.”—*Hor. Sat. ii. 3. 94*.

Obedire does not necessarily imply subjection or inferiority. The obedience expressed by it, may be either voluntary or compulsory, it may be practised to a superior, an inferior, or an equal.

It has been already observed, that, when a state of suffering is not perfected, the simple tenses in the

* Hill observes, that *Audire* and *Obtemperare* may throw their power upon the agent, which *Obedire* cannot. He quotes from Cicero, “Te audi, tibi obtempera,” and remarks, that the expression “Tibi obedi” could not be used. The passage, now cited from Plautus, would seem to evince the inaccuracy of this opinion. When we say, “Egomet mihi *obedio*,” the action or power is clearly thrown upon the agent

passive voice are employed ; and that, when the state is completed, the perfect participle must be used.

It is now to be observed, that when a general practice is to be expressed, or when we have to signify, that any action or state is continued, the perfect participle passive must not be employed. Thus, we say, "Robbers are punished with death," *Latrones morte mulctantur*. *Mulctati sunt* would either imply, that the punishment, once practised, is now discontinued, or it would express an individual act of punishment, past or completed. "Liber tuus et lectus est, et legitur a me diligenter." *Cic. Ep. Fam. vi. 5*. "Has been read, and still is read by me."

EXERCISE.

Among the Parthians, the signal is given by the drum, and not by the trumpet. They cannot fight long ; and, indeed, if their perseverance were equal to their fury, they would be irresistible. They have a plurality of wives ; nor is there any crime, which they punish more severely, than adultery. They eat no meat, but what is acquired by hunting. They are particularly fond of riding, and this is the chief distinction between freemen and slaves, that the latter travel on foot, and the former on horseback. Except in their armour they make no use of gold and silver. When engaged in battle, they often put on the appearance of flight, in order to throw the enemy in pursuit off their guard. By nature taciturn, they are more ready to act than to speak. There is no credit to be given to their promises, if the observance of them be not conducive to their interest. They obey their princes through fear, and not through reverence.

OBSERVATIONS.

SUPERBIA.

FASTIDIUM.

ARROGANTIA.

Superbia is that affection of mind, by which a man thinks highly of himself. The good opinion may be merited, and may also be inoffensive. “Sume superbiam quæsitam meritis.” *Hor. Car.* iii. 30. 14.

The term, however, is very generally used in an unfavourable sense, and denotes an inordinate self esteem, accompanied with a low opinion, and insolent contempt, of others. “Silentium ipsius non civile, sed in superbiam accipiebatur.” *Tac. Ann.* vi. 13. “Ingratam Veneri pone superbiam.” *Hor. Car.* iii. 10. 9.

Fastidium is properly “a daintiness of stomach,” “a loathing of certain aliments.” Hence, when used metaphorically, it does not, like *superbia*, denote an extravagant self esteem, so much, as a scornful feeling, and repulsive manner towards others. It is nearly synonymous with the English word “disdain” from *dedaigner*, or *dedignari*, “to think unworthy of notice.” “Utque superba pati fastidia.” *Vir. Ec.* ii. 15. “Quorum, si essent arrogantes, non possem ferre fastidium.” *Cic.*

Arrogantia is the assertion of undue and exorbitant claims. “Illa, quæ Græci scriptores arrogantia causa, sibi assumserunt, reliquimus.” *Auct. ad Heren.* cap. i. The primary conception implied in it, is expressed by the verb, whence it is derived, in Ho-

race's admonition to the dramatist, speaking of Achilles, "Nihil non arroget armis." *De Art. Poët.* 122. "Let him claim every thing by arms." "*Superbus*," says Facciolati, "turgescit iis bonis, quæ revera habet, *arrogans* temere et impudenter bona sibi vindicat, quæ non habet."

FUGERE.

VITARE.

These verbs agree in signifying the avoidance of evil or of danger. The former denoting "to flee from," implies a greater degree of celerity than the latter, which signifies "to shun." Dumesnil defines the former, *s'eloigner avec vitesse*. It is "to run from evil," *vitare*, "not to come within its reach," or "to pass by it." The one indicates speed, the other attention and caution. Horace says, "Metaque fervidis *evitata* rotis;" were the verb *fugere* to be substituted, it would convey the conception of fleeing from the goal, a conception very different from that intended by the poet, his design being to express approximation, but not contact.

FACIES.

VULTUS.

Facies, according to Popma, is "naturalis oris species, quæ eadem semper manet. *Vultus* habitus faciei adscititius, qui pro motu animi et voluntatis mutatur." By the face, which is unchangeable, we distinguish one person from another; by the countenance, which is changeable, we learn the passions and emotions of the mind. "Recordamini faciem, atque illos ejus fictos simulatosque vultus." *Cic. pro Cluent.*

“Vultus, qui sensus animi plerumque indicant.” *Cic.*
 “Imago animi vultus est.” *Cic. de Orat. lib. 3.* It
 is necessary however to observe, that *facies* is some-
 times used by metonymy to denote the whole form,
 and that *vultus* sometimes signifies “the face.”
 “Ætate integra, feroci ingenio, facie procera virûm.”
A. Gell. 13. 29.

SUPERARE.

VINCERE.

These verbs agree in expressing the notion of mastery, or superiority. The former means primitively “to surmount,” or “to rise above.” “Commodum radiosus ecce sol superabat ex mari.” *Plaut. Stich. ii. 2. 41.* “The sun was rising above the earth.” “Superant montes, et flumina tranant.” *Virg. Geo. iii. 270.* “They pass over the hills.” From its signifying the possession, or the attainment, of local superiority, it naturally came to denote “to surpass in any way,” and hence “to conquer,” “to subdue.”

Vincere is considered by Papias and Isodorus to be derived from *vis*, and to mean *vi superare*. Vossius, though he does not reject this derivation as inadmissible, thinks it more probable, that the verb came from *νικαω, νικαῖω* by *metathesis*, *winco, vinco*. Its original meaning was probably that, which it continued generally to retain, namely, “to conquer in battle,” “to subdue active resistance by valour and physical force.” This conception is not implied in the primitive meaning of *superare*, which, according

to Dumesnil, signifies, "to gain a superiority by strength and patience." And, as the latter, from denoting a local, came to signify the attainment of a moral and intellectual, superiority; so *vincere*, by a transition equally natural, from expressing superiority over active opposition, came to denote with *superare*, "to surmount," and "to surpass," physically or intellectually. "Summi fastigia tecti ascensu supero." *Virg. Æn.* ii. 302. "Ascensu vincere montes." *Claud.* "Omnes Athenienses splendore ac dignitate vitæ *superasse*." *Nep. in Alcib.* "Ut parsimonia victus atque cultus omnes Lacedæmonios *vinceret*." *Ib.* In these examples the two verbs are used as mutually equivalent. To express also "conquering in battle," they seem used indiscriminately. "Quos omnes gravi prælio *vicit*." *Nep. in Agis.* "Prælio navali *superati*." *Cæs. B. C.* ii. 22. Dumesnil's distinction therefore, if generally, is not universally observed, that *vincere* implies a battle, *superare* the overcoming of an obstacle; that the former is effected by courage and valour; the latter by strength and patience. What, if any distinction, exists between the two verbs, as synonymes, signifying "to conquer," is not clearly ascertained. It deserves, however, the reader's attention, that *superare* is used in the sense of *superesse*, "to be over and above," and also "to survive." "In quo et deesse aliquam partem, et *superare*, mendosum est." *Cic. de Orat.* lib. ii. "Captæ *superavimus* urbi." *Virg. Æn.* ii. 643. "We have survived the taken city." *Vincere* would

here be inadmissible. It should also be observed, that *vincere* is employed to signify, “to prove,” “to evince.” “Vincon’ argumentis te non esse Sosiam.” *Plaut. Amph.* i. 1. 277. “Vince deinde, bonum verum fuisse Oppianicum.” *Cic. pro Cluent.* “Prove that Oppianicus was a good man.” *Superare* would not express this conception.

To, signifying “agreeably to,” or “according to,” is rendered generally by *secundum*, *ex*, *pro*, and also by *ad*, which is with peculiar propriety used after a verb of motion.

EXERCISE.

When we are in a state of prosperity, and when the current of life flows on to our heart’s wish, we should be careful to avoid pride, disdain, and arrogance. To be immoderately affected with either prosperity or adversity, is the characteristic of a light and feeble mind; as, on the other hand, an evenness of temper in the whole conduct of life, with a steady uniformity in the countenance and the brow, bespeak a wise, firm, and good man. Such is the character we have received of Socrates, and also of Lælius. I see Philip of Macedon, surpassed by his son in achievements and military glory, but superior to him in condescension and mildness of temper. The father was accordingly always great, the son often base in the extreme. Rightly, therefore, do they appear to counsel, who admonish us to observe a behaviour humble in proportion to the elevation of our rank.

OBSERVATIONS.

NOXA.

NOXIA.

“*Noxa*,” says Fronto, “*pœna est ; noxia culpa*.” To the same purpose, is the opinion of Servius,—“*Noxia damnum est ; at noxa peccatum*.” Gifanius considers them as synonymous ; and it is certain that Livy, and some of the purest classics, use them indiscriminately, to denote either the fault, or its punishment.

PAGUS.

VICUS.

OPPIDUM.

URBS.

These verbs are thus correctly distinguished by Aldus Manutius. “*Pagus constare videtur e pluribus vicis ; vicus e pluribus casis. Vicus duplex, extra urbem, et in urbe. Si extra urbem, constat e pluribus casis ; vicus in urbe ædium est continuata series, non ipsa via, quæ suo nomine appellatur*.”—“*Omnibus vicis statuæ factæ sunt*.” *Cic. Off. lib. iii.* “*Quia non in media via, sed prope ædes ponuntur statuæ. Oppidum proprie infra urbem est. Interdum tamen oppidi nomen pro urbe usurpatur : itaque Athenas urbem nobilem oppidum vocat Cicero*.” *Ep. ad Att. iii.* “*Urbs nobilius quiddam ac plenius quam oppidum*.” *Ald. Man. de Quæ. lib. i. 7.* Valla remarks, that all cities and towns came to be denominated *oppitla*, except Rome, which was peculiarly dignified with the appellation of *urbs*. This distinction, while it accorded with the vanity of its inhabitants, clearly shews, that *urbs* conveyed the idea of

superior rank and importance to that of *oppidum*. We find, however, that their historians and poets did not uniformly regard this distinction ; and that, the terms *urbs* and *oppidum*, though not synonymous, were sometimes used indiscriminately, like the English nouns, *city* and *town*.

NUM.

AN.

The correlative words, “ Whether,” “ Or,” are usually rendered by *Utrum, An ; Num, An ; Ne*, inclitic, *An ;* and, sometimes, by *An* singly, in the *apodosis*. Cellarius observes, that in dubitative sentences, scarcely any writer in the golden age of the Latin language used *An* in the *protasis*, or antecedent alternative ; but that writers in the silver age employed it frequently. This opinion appears to be well founded. “ Multum interest *utrum* laus minuat, *an* salus deseratur.” *Cic.* “ Id *utrum* more Romano locutus sit, *an* quomodo Stoici dicunt, postea videro.” *Cic.* The interrogative, or suspensive word is sometimes omitted in the *protasis*—thus, “ Paullum interesse censes, ex animo omnia, ut fert natura, facias, *an* de industria.” *Ter. And.* iii. 5. 56.—that is, “ *Utrum*, or *Num* facias.”—If the question consist of three members, *An* is employed in all but the first—thus, “ Quæro abs te *iine*, qui postulabant indigni erant, qui impetrarent ; *an* iste non commovebat, pro quo postulabant : *an* res ipsa tibi iniqua videbatur ?” *Cic. Rose. Am.* cap. 41. In writers of the silver age, we find *An* often used in the *protasis*—thus,

——“ *Deliberat an petat urbem*
A Cannis, an post nimbos et fulmina cautus,
Circumagat.” *Juv. Sat. 7.*

“ In commune consultant, *an* intra tecta subsistant, *an* in aperto vagentur.” *Plin. Ep. vi. 6.*

Though “ Whether,” “ Or,” be generally rendered by *Utrum, An; Ne* (inclitic) or *An*, it is to be observed, that this is not always the case. For, if there be no contrariety, or opposition, implied by the two members of the interrogation, *Aut*, and not *An*, is to be employed in the latter. Thus, when Chærea says, “ Num parva causa, aut parva ratio est?” *Ter. Eun. iii. 5. 27*, “ Is this a slight motive, or slight reason?” he does not mean to oppose the two subjects to each other, as if either contrary, or materially different, *motive* and *reason* being, in this case, nearly synonymous; and, therefore, he employs the conjunction *Aut*. But, if the subjects had been essentially different, or contrary, or if the two questions were understood to express the only possible alternatives, *An* must have been used to introduce the latter. Thus, in a passage immediately preceding, Chærea says, “ Quid mihi quæram, sanus sim, anne insaniam?” *Ter. Eun. iii. 5. 8.*

Again—“ Whether,” “ Or,” are frequently expressed by *Seu, Sive*, or *Sive, Sive*. To enable the scholar to distinguish, when he is to use *Seu, Sive*, and when *Utrum, An*, the following observations may be worthy of his attention.

When the two members of the interrogation are

the subject of a predicate, and that predicate is either expressed or implied, *utrum*, or *num*, *an* must be used. They are generally accompanied with such expressions, as *Scio*, *Intelligo*, *Quæro*, *Dubito*, *Incertum est*, these being the predicates, of which they are the subjects,—thus, “*Utrum illi sentiant, an vero simulent, tu intelliges.*” *Cic.* “You will learn.” *Intelliges*—here is the predicate; the subjects follow, “*Utrum sentiant, an vero simulent,*” “Whether they think so, or only pretend it.”—“*Taceamne, an prædicem, nescio,*” “I know not, whether I shall be silent, or publish it.” The predicate is sometimes understood, as well as the *protasis*, thus “*Titus Flavius Petronius, municeps Reatinus bello civili Pompeianarum partium, centurio, an evocatus, profugit.*” *Suet. in Vesp. cap. i.* The full expression would be “*num centurio, an evocatus incertum est, profugit.*” *Seu, Sive*, are not necessarily, and are, indeed, but rarely preceded by any predicate; and when they are so, the suspensive members do not express the subjects of that predicate—thus, “*Unda enaviganda, sive reges, sive inopes erimus coloni,*” *Hor. Car. ii. 14. 12.*—“The river, to be crossed by all of us, whether we are kings, or poor husbandmen.” “*Sive ista uxor, sive amica est, gravida e Pamphilo est,*” *Ter. Ad. i. 3, 11,* “Whether she be his wife, or his mistress, she is pregnant.” “*Seu, recte, seu perperam facere coeperunt, ita in utroque excellunt,*” *Cic. pro Quint.* “Whether they begin to act rightly, or wrongly, they so excel in each.” In these

examples, it is manifest, that the suspensive clauses are not the subjects of any predicate, and are unconnected with the verb, or noun, preceding.

It may further assist the junior scholar to distinguish *Seu*, *Sive*, from *Utrum*, *An*, if we observe, that, when "Whether, Or," can be turned into "Either, Or," and when they can be expressed by "be," or "be it that," *Seu*, *Sive*, must be employed—thus, *Sive uxor, sive amica*, "Be she his wife, or his mistress."—" *Sive reges erimus, sive coloni*," "Be it, that we are kings, or husbandmen." *Sive me amas, sive me odisti, non magni facio*, "Be it, that you love me, be it that you hate me, I do not value it much." "Whether by courage, or by stratagem, he gained the victory," *Seu virtute, seu dolo, victoriam peperit*, nearly, though not precisely, equivalent to "Either by courage, or by stratagem." "Pœnasque luit, seu imperati parricidii, seu sacrilegii perpetrati." *Just. lib. i. cap. 9.* "Seu preces coloniarum, seu difficultas operum, sive superstitio valuit, ut in sententiam Pisonis concederetur, qui nihil mutandum censuerat," *Tac. An. lib. i. cap. 79.* This passage cannot be rendered literally, unless by *either, or*, though these words do not exactly convey the idea, *seu, sive*, being of a dubitative import, *either, or*, assertive and positive.

From these observations, it is hoped, that the scholar will be able to distinguish when he should employ *Utrum*, *An*, and when he should use *Seu*, *Sive*. It is necessary, at the same time, to observe,

that though the distinction here offered is very generally, it is not universally, observed by classic writers. This, indeed, might naturally be expected, when it is considered, that the Latin *An*, and the Greek *ἀν*, or *Si*, were, in fact, the same word. Hence we frequently find, in colloquial language, *Si* used for *An*, or *Ne*,—thus, “Ibo, visam, si domi est.” *Ter. Eun.* iii. 4. 7*. We find also, *Seu* or *Sive* employed for *An*, as,—“Erravitne via, seu lassa resedit, incertum.” —*Virg. Æn.* ii. 738.

It has been already observed, that, according to Cellarius, the best classic writers never employ *An* in the *protasis*, or antecedent alternative : and this opinion, we are inclined to think, with the following exception, is supported by the universal usage of the golden age. The exception, to which we allude, is when *An* is used, as some lexicographers conjecture, for *Aut*—thus, “Quam orationem in *origines* suas retulit paucis antequam mortuus est, an diebus, an mensibus?” *Cic. in Brut.* In this, and similar passages, it appears an error to conceive, that *An* is to be considered as synonymous with *Aut*, the expression being of a more dubitative nature, than is implied

* This passage is commonly quoted as furnishing an example of *si* for *an*. Mr. Greenlaw questions this substitution, and translates it, “I will go, and if he is at home, I will pay him a visit.” In favour of this interpretation, Mr. Greenlaw might have quoted “Demiphonem, si domi est, visam.” *Ter. Ph.* v. 8. 5. This passage seems to countenance the learned author’s construction. That *si* is, however, sometimes used for *an*, may be proved by a variety of unquestionable examples.

by the adversative conjunction, though the difference between them is not very considerable. The expression seems to be elliptical ; and to be the same, as if we said, in English, “ A few, shall I say, days, or months, before he died.” This form of expression is evidently more dubitative than if we said, “ A few days, or months, before he died.”

FIDEM DARE. FIDEM FACERE. FIDEM HABERE.

The first of these phrases denotes “ to give a pledge, an assurance, or solemn promise,”—thus, “ Do fidem ita futurum,” *Ter. Eun.* v. 9. 30, “ I give you my honour,” “ I pledge my troth, that it shall be so.” “ Accipe, daque fidem,” *Virg. Æn.* viii. 150, “ Receive, and give me, the pledge of honour.” “ Data acceptaque fide perpulit.” *Curt.* viii. 6.—*Dare fidem alicui* means, therefore, “ to pledge one’s word,” or “ to give a solemn promise (*sancte promittere*) to any one.” This phrase is, in one or two examples, and these totally unworthy of imitation, employed for *Fidem afferre*, or “ to add credibility to a circumstance ;” thus, Ovid says,—“ Nunc quoque dant verbo plurima signa fidem.”—*Fast.* lib. ii. 20. No good prose writer, as far as we know, ever used this phraseology ; it should, therefore, be carefully avoided.

Noltenius observes, that *Fidem dare* is often very improperly used by the Germans for “ to give credit,” *Fidem habere*, or *Credere*, “ to believe.” As the meaning of the terms, in English, taken in-

dividually, may be apt to mislead the junior scholar, it may be necessary to impress on his attention, that the classical meaning of *Fidem dare* is “to give a solemn promise,” or “to pledge one’s honour,” and in no case should be employed for “To give credit to a person,” or even for “To give credibility to a thing.”

Habere fidem, for which, in the decline of the Latin language, *Adhibere fidem* was sometimes used, means “to give credit,” or “to believe,” as “*Prope-modum habeo jam tibi fidem.*” *Cic. in Verr.* “*Ait, si fidem habeat, se iri præpositum tibi apud me.*” *Ter. Eun. i. 2. 59.* “If he could believe.” *Facere fidem* means “to make a person, or thing, be believed.” “*Alexandro vix fecerunt fidem,*” “It was with difficulty they made Alexander believe,” that is, “*Alexandro vix persuaserunt.*”—“*Argumentum est probabile inventum ad faciendam fidem.*” *Cic. Part. Orat.* that is, *ad persuadendum*. The verb is construed, sometimes with the dative of the thing, and sometimes with the genitive, as under the government of *Fides*—thus, *Fidem facere orationis, vel orationi suæ.*

Fidem solvere is considered by some critics, as denoting “to break a promise,” as *fædus solvere* means “to violate a treaty.” They quote the following passage from Terence, “*Fidem solvisti.*” *And. iv. i. 29.* “You have broken your promise.” Others understand this expression ironically, thus endeavouring to reconcile it with what they conceive to be the proper meaning of the phrase, namely, “to keep a promise.” In the latter opinion, I am inclined to

concur. It appears to me, that *solvere fidem* means generically "to untie an obligation," i. e. by discharging it, and hence specially, "to perform a promise." Plancus says, in one of his letters to Cicero, "suam fidem solutam esse." *Cic. Ep. Fam. x. 21.* The meaning here evidently is, "that he had fulfilled his engagements." The phrase, which is clearly analogous to *rotumolvere*, is used by Florus in the same sense. "Ut et fidem solverent, et ulciscerentur." *Lib. i. cap. 1.* Cicero uses *fidem frangere*, *fidem violare*, for "to break an engagement," and *fidemolvere*, or *exsolvere*, for "to discharge an obligation," or "to perform a promise."

EXERCISE.

In the consulship of Cl. Marcellus and C. Valerius, there was a great mortality at Rome. Whether this was occasioned by the intemperature of the atmosphere, or by human treachery, was extremely uncertain. When the men of chief note in the city were dying of the same distemper, and almost all of them with nearly the same symptoms, a maid servant came to Q. Fabius Maximus, who was then Curule Ædile, and promised to disclose the cause of this mortality, upon an assurance being given her, that her information should not be prejudicial to herself. Fabius immediately communicated this to the consuls, who laid the affair before the senate; and by their consent the public faith was pledged to the informer. She then told them, that the republic was distressed by the treachery of women; that the mortality was owing to poisonous drugs, which were prepared by a society of females in the city; and that, if they would follow her directly, they might detect them in the fact.

OBSERVATIONS.

STATOR.

VIATOR.

ACCENSUS.

Stator, says Dumesnil, was a person who attended to execute the orders of his master,—and *Viator*, “A courier,” or “Runner.” “*Viatorum* erat munus accire, quos magistratus conventos volebant.” *Drakenborch*.—“*Viatores* dicebantur, qui, quoties senatus cogendus esset senatores ex agris vocabant.” *Pitisc. Lex. Ant. Rom.* In the early ages of the Roman state, the senators and chief men, as Columella informs us, lived in the country; and the *Viatores* were the officers who summoned them to Rome, to attend their duty in the senate. “*Illis temporibus proceres in agris morabantur, et quum consilium publicum desiderabant, a villis arcessebantur in senatum; ex quo, qui eos arcessebant, viatores nominati sunt.*” *Col. Præf. libri primi*. This was originally the office of the *Viatores*. They were afterwards attached to the *Tribunes* and the *Ædiles*. Le Clerc observes, that the *viatores* were officers attendant on the tribunes, and *lictores* on the consuls. “*Ardens ira tribunus viatorem mittit ad consulem, consul lictorem ad tribunum.*” *Liv. ii. 56*. That they were attached to the *Ædiles* also, is sufficiently evident.

“*Accensus* erat minister magistratuum præter lictores, qui illorum dicto ad imperium, nutumque præsto essent, et ad conciones Quirites advocabat.” *Pitisc. Lex. Ant. Rom.* “*Utatur accenso atque lictoribus.*” *Cic. de Leg. ii. 24*. They seem to have had their name from (*ab acciando*) summoning the

people to an assembly, or those who had law suits to court. It appears also, from a passage in Suetonius, that the [ancient practice was for the *Accensus* to walk before the consul during the month, in which he had not the *Fasces*, while the lictors followed behind. Speaking of Julius Cæsar, he says, “*Antiquum etiam retulit morem, ut quo mense fasces non haberet, accensus ante eum iret, lictores pone sequerentur.*” *Suet. in Vit. J. Cæs.* Varro likewise tells us, that before the invention of clocks, it was the business of the *Accensus* to call out to the prætor in court, when it was the third hour, or nine in the morning; when it was mid-day; and when three in the afternoon. (*Lat. Ling.* v. 9.) It appears also, that he was employed sometimes in the capacity of secretary. “*Non reprehendo, quod scripsit accensus; cur enim sibi hoc scribæ soli assumant?*” *Cic. Verr.*

It is universally agreed, that the *Accensi* and the *Viatores* had each the office of summoning; but it has been questioned, what was the precise distinction between them. Donatus says, that the *Viator* was distinguished from the *Accensus* by this circumstance, that the former had the right not only to summon, but likewise to bind, the latter only to summon. And it would appear, notwithstanding the contrary opinion of Sigonius, that Donatus had satisfactorily proved his assertion. “*Arreptus a viatore, provoco inquit.*” *Liv. lib. iii.* “*In vincula duci jussit. Arreptus a viatore.*” *Id. lib. vi.* “*Miserisne viatorem, qui M. Bibulum vi domo extraheret?*” *Cic. in Vat.*

Another distinction, as Donatus observes, consists in what has been already mentioned, that the *Accensus* called out the hour of the day, a duty, in which the *Viator* had no concern.

The *Stator* was an officer, or serjeant, who stood beside the magistrate, ready to execute his orders, chiefly, if not entirely, as a messenger. “*Literas tuas a te mihi stator tuus reddidit.*” *Cic. Fam. Ep. xi. 17.* “*Præsto mihi fuit stator ejus cum literis.*” *Id. x. 21.* In the reign of the emperors, the *Statores* guarded the back part of the *Prætorium*, or “general’s tent;” and they were called *Statores prætorii*.—In each camp there were two centuries of *Statores*, under the command of the *Evocati*.

SALUBER.

SALUTARIS.

“*Saluber* fere physice, *Salutaris* moraliter sumitur. *Saluber* de rebus sanitatem juvantibus; *salutaris* de rebus, quæ civiliter prosunt. Ita locus *saluber*, aqua *salubris*, consilia *salutaria*.” *Nolt. Lex. Antib.* This is the distinction between the two terms, in their strict acceptation. But though *Saluber* is very generally confined to denote, what is conducive to good health, we find it sometimes used for *Salutaris*—thus “*Consilia salubria.*” *Cic. ad Att. lib. viii.* “*Leges rem surdam inexorabilem esse, salubriorem inopi quam potenti.*” *Liv. ii. 3.* A few examples occur also of *salutaris* for *saluber*. Hill considers *saluber* as denoting what is, immediately, and *salutaris*, what is not, immediately, beneficial; but

the examples, which he adduces, are insufficient, unless by gratuitous assumption, to support the distinction. Though these adjectives, however, are sometimes used indiscriminately in one sense, it may be useful to remark one distinction, which is uniformly observed, namely, that *saluber*, like the term “healthy” in English, denotes not only *what conduces to health*, but also *what is in a healthy and vigorous state*. “Genus hominum salubri corpore.” *Sall. B. J. cap. 20. Salutaris* is always used in a transitive sense, denoting “conducive to health.”

EXERCISE.

Those, who accompanied her, found some of the women boiling the medicines; and with others they discovered the medicines carefully deposited. The drugs being brought into the forum, and the ladies to the number of twenty, with whom they were found, being summoned by a serjeant, two of them, Cornelia and Sergia, both of patrician family, insisting that the drugs were wholesome, were desired by the informer to drink them, and thus convict her of having fabricated a false charge. Having taken some time to confer with their accomplices, they, and the others, at last consented; and having drunk off the potion, they all died. The rest of their associates were afterwards apprehended, and seventy of them were condemned to death. Till that period, no trial for poisoning had ever taken place at Rome. The senate decreed to the informer, a reward of two thousand sesterces out of the public treasury.

OBSERVATIONS.

NEGLIGERE.

OMITTERE.

Both these verbs occur in the following Exer-

cise. "Negligens," says Festus, "dictus est non legens, neque dilectum habens, quid facere debeat, omissa ratione officii sui." That it very generally refers to duty is certain; but it is not confined to this conception. When Horace says, "Negligis immeritis nocituram Postmodo te natis fraudem committere forsân." *Car. i. 28*, the meaning is not, "you neglect the duty of committing an offence"; this would be an absurdity. The verb seems to be precisely of the same import with our expression "not to mind," having the same double, or ambiguous character. Thus we say in English, "you do not mind offending your friends," and "you do not mind your duty to others." In the former sense Cicero says, "Illo-
rum minas, quas ante horrebamus, negligere cœpi-
mus." *Orat. pro Quint. cap. 30*. The leading idea then in *negligere* is "indifference." This is not implied in the verb *omittere*, which denotes "to leave a thing undone or not said, knowingly and intentionally."

The supines of verbs are considered by grammarians to be verbal nouns, the one in the accusative case, under the government of *ad* understood; and the other in the ablative, with an ellipsis of the preposition *in*. The supine in *um* governs the same case, with that of the verb, to which it belongs. "Hic invictus patriam defensum revocatus." *Nep.* "Græcis servitum matribus ibo." *Virg. Æn. ii. 786*. It has an active, or transitive signification, unless its verb be neuter or neuter passive, and is put after a verb expressing motion, or tendency to motion.

“Nec ego vos ultum injurias hortor.” *Sall.* In the two following examples the verbs are neuter passive. “Nuptum virginem locavi huic adolescenti.” *Ter. Ph.* v. 1. 22. “Damnatus absens in Volscos exsulatum abiit.” *Liv.* ii. 35. “Into banishment,” or “to be banished.” When not followed by a verb of motion, the preposition is expressed, thus, “Præclaro ad aspectum.” *Cic. in Verr.* ii. 4. 52. It may be here considered as a substantive noun, but the example evinces the true character of the supine. The supine in *u* is used after an adjective noun, and is employed generally in a passive sense. It has been denied indeed by some grammarians, that it is ever used actively. Vossius however, and others, have produced evidence, sufficient to prove, that this opinion is founded in error. Cicero says, “Difficile dictu est, quantopere conciliet animos hominum comitas, affabilitasque sermonis.” *Cic. Att.* vii. 22.; and in the following Exercise, he says, “Difficile est judicare.”

We sometimes find the gerund used for the supine; thus, “Facillimus ad concoquendum.” *Cic. de Fin.* ii. 20. “Very easy to be digested.” This phraseology deserves attention; being the only neat form of expression, when the supine is wanting; thus, “Difficilis ad patiendum.” *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.* ii. 7. “Difficult to bear.”

The first supine with the verb *iri*, used impersonally, forms the future of the infinitive passive, as *amatum iri*. And as the supine is, in truth, a noun substantive, and not the perfect participle, for which

it has been mistaken, it cannot vary its termination either for gender, or for number. If a late distinguished critic had been aware of this, he would not, in the preface to his edition of a Latin poet, have written “*varias editiones excusas iri.*” The syntactical construction is this; *id iri* (ad) *excusum varias editiones.*

EXERCISE.

Scipio used to complain, that men were each more careful, in being able to tell the number of his sheep and of his goats, than in being able to count the number of his friends; that in purchasing the former they used due care, but shewed themselves heedless in choosing the latter; and that they had no signs, as it were, or marks, to enable them to judge, who were proper persons for this affectionate connection. In truth, to form a judgment in this case, is a matter of difficulty, until a trial has been made; and this trial must be made, while the parties are mutual friends. Thus friendship is contracted before the judgment is formed, and excludes the power of making a trial. If there be any persons, says Cicero, who think it an evidence of a sordid mind to prefer money to friendship, where shall we find those, who give the latter the preference to power, to honours, and authority,—to civil offices, and military commands? For human nature is too weak to resist the attractions of power; which, if men can attain, at the expense of friendship, they believe, that they shall escape uncensured, because it is not without a weighty reason, that they relinquish their friend. It is very difficult to find true friendship among those, who enjoy honours, and are engaged in political concerns. But, waiving these objects, how grievous, and how difficult to be borne, do partnerships

in calamity appear to most men. The man, therefore, who shews himself a steady and firm friend in adversity and in prosperity—him we ought to pronounce to be a very rare character, and approaching to a similitude with a divine being.

OBSERVATIONS.

MARE.

ÆQUOR.

PELAGUS.

FRETUM.

Mare has been defined “Congregatio aquarum salsi saporis,” and is opposed to *terra*. *Æquor*, from *æquus*, signifies “a smooth or level surface;” it is, therefore, applied to a field. “Præcipitemque Darren ardens agit æquore toto,” *Virg. Æn.* v. 456; and also to the sea. “Quid tam planum videtur quam mare? ex quo etiam æquor poetæ vocant.” *Cic.* While *mare* denotes the sea universally, *pelagus*, as contradistinguished from it, means “the depth,” or “the deep sea.” “Anchoris sublati pelagus remis petere cœperunt.” *Cæs. B. H. cap.* 4. *Fretum* denotes “a frith,” “strait,” or “narrow sea;” also “an arm of the sea.” “Æstus maritimi, fretorumque angustiae, ortu aut obitu lunæ commoveri.” *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* ii. 7.

PROCERITAS.

ALTITUDO.

Proceritas denotes extension horizontally, or vertically, signifying “length,” or “height.” “Cygni adjuvantur proceritate collorum.” *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* “The length of their necks.” “Proceritas corporis.” *Plin.* “The height of the body.” *Altitudo* denotes

extension upwards, or downwards—"height," or "depth." "*Altitudo ædium.*" *Cic.* "The height of the house." "*Altitudo fluminis.*" *Cæs.* "The depth of the river."

Versus "towards," like the preposition *tenus*, is put after its case. "*Cum Brundusium versus ires ad Cæsarem.*" *Cic. Ep. Fam. ii. 27.*

Testudo, literally "a tortoise," the hardness and shape of whose shell protects it from injury, was a general name among the Romans, for all their covered defensive engines, under the protection of which they approached and attacked the walls of an enemy. It was sometimes formed by the targets of the soldiers raised and closed above their heads, the first rank standing upright, and the rest gradually stooping, till the last rank kneeled down upon their knees, thus forming a sort of penthouse, so that stones thrown from the walls would roll down the declivity.

More generally it denoted a machine, or erection constructed of wood and hurdles, covered also with raw hides and other materials, not easy to be set on fire by any combustibles. It was moved on wheels, or as some more probably imagine, on rollers; and by this circumstance the *testudines* are distinguished from the *vineæ*. They were of different sizes and different shapes.

"The *vineæ*," says Kennett, "were composed of wicker hurdles laid for a roof on the top of posts, which the soldiers, who went under them for shelter, bore up with their hands."

The *turres* or moving towers were constructed of beams and strong planks, and were from thirty to forty feet square, somewhat resembling a house. They were sometimes surrounded with corridors, or galleries (*porticus*) at each story, to prevent them from being set on fire.

The *agger* was either a cavalier, or mount of earth, or a platform or terrace. The term was also sometimes used to denote a "trench."

The *Catapultæ* and *Balistæ* answered to our pieces of artillery, and were intended to discharge darts, arrows and stones. The *Catapulta* was smaller than the *Balista*.

EXERCISE.

For completing these works, Trebonius draws together from all parts of the province a great number of men, and beasts of burden; he orders also wood and osiers to be brought to Marseilles. But so well was the town provided with all requisites for war, that no mantles were sufficient to withstand their violence. For they had wooden bars, twelve feet in length, armed at the point with iron, and these, shot from the largest *balistæ*, pierced four rows of hurdles, and were fixed in the ground. Galleries, therefore, were covered with planks a foot thick joined together, and in this way materials for the terrace were carried forward. A *testudo* sixty feet long, went before, to level the ground, composed of the strongest planks, and covered with every thing necessary to defend it from fire and stones. But the greatness of the works, the height of the wall and towers, and the multitude of their machines greatly retarded all our operations. In the mean time L. Nasidius, sent by

Pompey to the assistance of Domitius and the Marseillians, with a fleet of sixteen ships, some of which were armed with beaks of brass, passes the strait of Sicily, without the knowledge or the expectation of Curio, landed at Messana, and raised so sudden a terror, that the senate, and principal inhabitants having fled, he carried off from their dock yards one of their galleys. Having joined this to his other ships, he steers his course to Marseilles, where he arrived; and by a boat, which he dispatched privately for that purpose, acquaints Domitius and the Marseillians with his arrival.

OBSERVATIONS.

SERVUS.

VERNA.

The former of these is a generic term, denoting a slave of whatever kind; the latter is applied to a slave born in the family. It is a just observation of Dr. Hill, that though the latter were more kindly treated, and allowed greater liberties, and hence became impudent and petulant, (*"Vernæ procaces," Hor.*) the former were more respected, as retaining certain liberal sentiments, which could exist only in minds originally free.—Of the *Servi* there were several denominations—as, *Usuarii, Fructuarii, Vicarii, Vicariorum Vicarii, Peculiares, Communes, Dotales, Receptitii, Hæreditarii, Castrenses, Ordinarii, Peculiati, Vulgares, and Publici*. These are the denominations mentioned by Pignorius. (See *Pign. de Serv.* p. 60.) For a full explanation of these terms, I must refer the reader to *Pitisc. Lex. Ant. Rom.* or to the author now quoted. I shall

only observe, that the *Fructuarii* were those, in whom the possessor had only a temporary interest, not being the owner of them; that the *Dotales* were those given to the husband, as the dower of his wife; *Receptitii*, those whom she retained as her own property; the *Ordinarii* were the chief servants of the family; the *Vicarii* their assistants, or under-servants; the *Peculiares* those servants, who were charged with the care of the young sons, or daughters, of the family, and were peculiarly assigned to them for that purpose.

We have already offered our reasons for doubting, that *famula* denotes, as Dumesnil supposes, "A maid-servant, but free."—It rather appears to us, that *famulus* and *famula* are generic terms, denoting any person, who serves another, whether in the character of a slave or a hireling, including, therefore, *servus*, *verna*, and *mercenarius*. This is the opinion of Popma, which Noltenius also seems to have adopted, "*Famulus* dicitur, quicumque in ministerio est, sive servus sit, sive liber; *servus* est qui alieno dominio subjicitur." *Popma. Noltenius.*

The adverbs *Cum*, *Dum*, *Postquam*, and others, are often elegantly omitted, the verb being turned into a participle.—Thus, "When he had spoken these words, he sat down," *Hæc verba locutus, consedit.* "While he was thus hastening, the lictor came up," *Illo ita festinante, lictor accessit.* "After he had drawn up his army, he renewed the battle," *Acie instructa, prælium redintegravit.*

This phraseology is not only more concise, but is also, in many cases, favourable to softness and perspicuity. *Cum Hannibal Alpes transisset, et in Italiam venisset*, is an expression offensive to the ear. When we say, *Cum Hannibal, Alpibus trajectis, in Italiam venisset*, the harshness is removed.

EXERCISE.

When Tarquin and his family were banished from Rome, Brutus and Collatinus were made consuls. As Brutus had been to the Romans the father of their liberty, so he was its most zealous guardian. There were at that time among the Roman youths some, whose licentiousness had known no controul, during the reign of Tarquin, and who had been accustomed to live in a princely manner. These, wishing for their old licentious mode of life, formed the wicked design of receiving the Tarquins privately into the city. Titus and Tiberius, the sons of Brutus, leagued themselves with the traitors. When the conspirators were deliberating privately, as they thought, concerning the scheme, which they had formed, one of the slaves overheard their conversation; and letters, which they had written to the Tarquins, being found in their possession, proved the affair. The traitors were immediately thrown into prison, and afterwards beheaded.

OBSERVATIONS.

IDEM QUI.

Idem denotes sometimes substantial, and sometimes modal, unity, or identity. “*Idem hoc luci me mittere potuit.*” *Plaut. Amph.* i. 1. 11. “The same man might have sent me hither in the day time,” that

is, "The same man personally, or substantially." "Idem es, ecastor, qui soles." *Plaut. Truc.* ii. 4. 17. Here modal identity, or sameness of character, not substantial identity, is implied. In the former sense it is opposed to *Alius* in its literal acceptation, signifying, "the same, and no other man;" in the latter to *Sibi dispar*, or *Mutatus*, "the same," or "not changed." "Eadem erit, verum alia esse assimilabitur." *Plaut. Mil.* ii. 1. 74. "Commutatur officium, et non semper est idem." *Cic. Off.* lib. i.

An anonymous critic*, who seems to be more extensively than correctly conversant in classic literature, affirms, that *Idem qui* is never used by Cicero "to identify a person with a fact or story," and that this expression "never refers to a person or substance, unless in a figurative sense, when by person is meant character, or quality." Before we proceed to examine the justness of this, and some other observations of the same writer, it may, for the sake of accuracy, be necessary to remark, that a person cannot possibly be identified with a fact. An agent, and an action, cannot be referred to one and the same predicament; much less can they be constituted one and the same subject. By identifying a person with a fact, the author must mean, "identifying a person with the doer of an action, or the efficient cause of a fact." Now, if the critic means to affirm, that *Idem qui* is never em-

* See "A Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review against the University of Oxford." The author is understood to be the Right Rev. Dr. Coplestone, now Bishop of Llandaff.

ployed to identify a person with the doer of an action, or the doer of one action with the doer of another, he labours under an error. To evince this, one or two examples will suffice. “Eadem illa (*voravit*) quæ meum marsupium (*voravit*).” *Plaut. Rud.* ii. 6. 63. Here the doer of one action is identified with the doer of another. By parity of construction, we find a person identified with the subject of an action. “Eandem puellam peperit, quam a me acceperat.” *Id. Cist.* i. 2. 21. “Eandem, quæ dudum constituta est.” *Id. Mil.* iii. 1. 213.—And in these examples, it is to be observed, that identity of person, and not of character, is implied. If the critic means, that *Idem est qui* is never employed, to identify a person with the doer of an action, he advances an opinion, in which we perfectly concur. Personal, or substantial, identity, is never denoted by *Idem est qui*, but by *Is est qui*, *Ille est qui*, *Hic est qui*, and when emphasis is intended, as when we say, in English, “The self same,” “the very same,” by *Ipsè qui*, *Ille ipse qui*, or *Qui idem*.

It may be asked, if it be allowable to say, *Is est, qui fecit*, why is it not permitted to say, *Idem est, qui fecit*? The anonymous critic conjectures, “Because *Is qui* identifies, as well as *Idem qui*,” and, he observes, that neither Vossius nor Tursellinus seem to have been aware of the principle. It is doubtless true, that these two critics have been silent concerning the principle; nay, as far as I recollect, they have not even mentioned the fact. But the critic’s own

conjecture leaves the principle in obscurity, or at least is totally inadmissible, as a satisfactory explanation of it. For, in the first place, *Is qui* does not identify with the same force and precision, as *Idem qui*, or *Ipsa qui*, the latter of which expressions we employ with the substantive verb, and the former in other cases. *Ipsa est, qui ita fecit*, is a stronger and more emphatic expression, than *Is est*; and if, instead of saying, “Eandem puellam peperit, quam a me acceperat,” *Plaut. Cist. i. 2. 21*, we say *Eam*, we enfeeble the expression, and less forcibly mark the falsity of the pretence.

But were it even granted, that the critic’s position is correct, and that *Is qui* identifies, as well as *Idem qui*, we must intuitively perceive, that this may be a sufficient reason for admitting both phraseologies, but furnishes no solid argument for rejecting either. The principle, however, is obvious, and may be very briefly explained; for this, like most other grammatical controversies, resolves itself into a question of mere perspicuity.

It can hardly be necessary to observe, that the subject of every proposition must be carefully distinguished from the predicate; and that, where this distinction is not clearly marked, ambiguity, or obscurity, is necessarily created. Now, if we say, *Idem est, qui te læsit*, to denote, “He is the same man, that injured you,” we employ an ambiguous expression; for it may also mean, “He who injured you, is the same man,” that is, “not changed in temper or disposition.” To

express, therefore, the former proposition, we say, *Is est, qui te læsit*. Here the antecedent pronoun *ille* understood is the subject, and *Is qui te læsit*, the predicate. To denote the latter, we say, *Idem est, qui te læsit*. Here *ille qui te læsit* is the subject, and *idem est* is the predicate. By this difference of expression, all ambiguity is precluded.

It may be supposed, perhaps, that by joining *qui* in the former sense, with the subjunctive mood, ambiguity might be prevented. A little reflection, however, will convince the reader, that the supposition is erroneous; for in oblique clauses, *qui* must, in the latter sense also, be joined with the subjunctive mood.

Are there then, it may be asked, no examples of *Idem est qui*, to identify a person with the doer or sufferer of an action? We believe not one; and the ambiguity of the expression furnishes a sufficient reason, why it ought not to be admitted. It should be observed, however, that, when the subject and predicate are clearly marked, or where they may be interchanged without any violation of sense, *Idem est qui* may be employed to identify the subject with an agent, or patient. In one of Cæsar's addresses to his soldiers, we have the following passage, "Hos esse eosdem Germanos, quibuscum sæpenumero Helvetii congressi, non solum in suis, sed etiam in illorum finibus, plerumque superarint." *B. G. i. 40*. Here it is of little moment, whether we say, "that the Germans, whom the Helvetii defeated, are these same persons," or

“that these are the same Germans, whom the Helvetii defeated.” At any rate, the meaning of the word *idem* cannot possibly be misconceived.

Marcellus, before he engaged with Hannibal, employs the following argument to rouse the courage of his troops, “Nempe iidem sunt hi hostes, quos vincendo, et victos sequendo, priorem æstatem absumsis-*tis*.” *Liv.* xxvii. 13. Here also all ambiguity is excluded. The subject is clearly *hi hostes*, and the remainder of the sentence constitutes the predicate. In both these passages, too, there may be some allusion to identity of character.

When we mean, therefore, to identify a person with the doer or sufferer of an action, *Is est qui*, *Hic est qui*, *Ille est qui*, should be employed, or *Qui idem*. The Reviewer, therefore, should have said, *illum fuisse, qui occiderit*, or, much preferably, *qui idem*, which latter expression, with peculiar propriety and precision, would have followed *qui primus*. If emphasis be intended, *ipse qui* may be properly employed—thus, *ipsum fuisse qui*. We concur, therefore, with the anonymous critic, in rejecting *Idem est qui*, as unwarranted by classic usage, if employed to identify a person with the doer of an action ; but we cannot admit his explanation of the principle, as either pertinent or satisfactory.

In assigning his reasons for rejecting the Reviewer’s expression, he advances a position, to which we cannot possibly assent. He says, “If the phrase is never used, as I believe it never is, of persons, but

in this figurative way, when by person is meant character, or quality; there cannot be a stronger proof, that it is improper in any other. For it should be observed, that absolute sameness, or identity, is then predicated: *which sameness is the proper antecedent to qui.*" In this position we cannot concur. It must, we presume, have escaped the recollection of the learned critic, that, in explaining his own doctrine on the subject, a few pages before, he observes, that *qui*, being a relative, refers properly to a person, or thing, or a quality in the abstract, but not to a quality *in concreto*. *Sameness* then, in such examples cannot possibly be the antecedent to *qui*. Neither sense, nor grammatical usage, nor even the author's own position, that *qui* refers to a person, or to a quality in the abstract, accords with the hypothesis of such a relation. The antecedent is a word going before the relative, and again understood to it; as, "He built the city, which (city) was called Rome." But, when we say, "He is the same man now, that he was before," can we, without egregiously violating the acknowledged principles of reason and speech, say, "He is the same man now, which sameness he was before"? The expression would be absurd and ridiculous. The plain and simple construction is evidently this, "He is the same man now, which man he was before."—*Idem est, qui fuit; vir*, "man," being the only proper antecedent. No adjective, unless a mere word, (*nuda vox*.) can, consistently with the clearest principles of all language, become an antecedent to the relative. The antecede-

dent must be a subject, and not a predicate. Unless it be a whole clause, which may be regarded as a subject, it must be a substantive noun either proper, or appellative. The quality expressed by the adjective, is not the subject, but modifies the subject; to it, therefore, the relative cannot possibly refer.

Respecting the construction of *Idem qui*, the critic offers another observation, which it will be necessary to examine with some degree of attention. The Reviewer had proposed the following expression as good Latin, “Nonne vult Pausanias, Melanthum Andropompi filium e Nelei progenie primum fuisse, qui in Attica sedem habuisset, atque ideo eundem qui Xanthum occidisset.” (*Ed. Rev.* Vol. xiv. p. 488.) This expression the critic condemns, maintaining, that *Idem* and *Qui* ought to be in the same case. A position so novel, so extraordinary, and so directly repugnant to all analogy, as well as to established usage, it is difficult to reconcile with that attention, which the author seems, from his “Reply,” to have devoted to classic literature.

The opinion of the critic, with his argument in support of it, appear to me so irreconcilable with one of the clearest principles in the Latin language, and so illogically defended, that it is impossible not to suspect, that I may have misconceived his meaning. In justice, therefore, to the author, I feel it my duty to exhibit his doctrine, and his argument also, in his own words.

“Another fault in the Reviewer’s phrase, *eundem qui*, is, that the relative is not in the same case with the

antecedent, which it ought to be, as, I hope, the following analysis will prove. The argument requires a little steady attention; and it seems to me deserving of it.

“ When *Idem* is in the nominative case with *Qui* following it, mere identity is predicated. *Idem est, qui fecit*, as we have already shewn, is barbarous; *idem est, qui fuit*, is Latin. The rules of grammar may, indeed, require an accusative case; but identity is the idea, that is expressed; nothing is predicated of the thing mentioned, but that it is the same.— Thus,

“ Apud bonos, iidem sumus, quos reliquisti. *Cic. Att. i. 13. Tursellin.*

“ Here *quos reliquisti* means no more than *qui fuimus cum nos reliquisti*. So,

“ Eosdem esse oratorios numeros, qui sunt poetici. *Cic. in Orat. c. 56.*

“ The variation of cases does not affect the meaning of the proposition; identity is all that is predicated. But when *Idem*, in any of its oblique cases, is followed by *Qui*, the meaning of the passage is, not that the thing which *Idem* denoted [*denotes*] is the same with any thing else, but that it bears the same relation to two other things. Now, the inflexions, or cases of nouns, are expressive of relation. The case of *Idem* denotes the relation it bears to one of the two things, and the case of *Qui*, denotes the relation it bears to the other. Hence the case of *Idem*, and the case of *Qui*, ought to be the same, otherwise, they

do not mark the same relation. And thus, I believe, it will be found, that the best writers invariably use the words. *Eadem ratione qua, eodem pacto quo, eandem potestatem quam, eodem loco quo*, are among the most ordinary phrases. The last phrase is from Livy, xiii. 37, where *loco* means *rank, estimation*, which is a quality, or abstract idea; if it had meant simply place, *ipso* probably, and not *eodem*, would have been the word; as in this passage of Cicero,

“Castra paucos dies habuimus, ea ipsa, quæ contra Darium habuerat apud Issum Alexander. *Ep. Att.* v. 20.

“There are various ways, indeed, of expressing the same relation, and sometimes this happens with *Idem qui*.—As ‘Vovit in eadem verba’ ‘Consul, quibus antea quinquennalia vota suscipi solita erant.’ *Liv.* xxxi. 9. Where the change of expression is easily accounted for, by the use of *suscipio*, instead of repeating the verb *voveo*; but the relation is not changed; and the rule, that sameness of relation is marked by sameness of case, is liable only to those exceptions, which we must expect to meet with, under every grammatical rule.

“A remarkable instance of the observance of it just occurs to me in *Livy*, xxvi. 33.

“‘Cæterorum omnium Campanorum eundem erga nos animum; quem Carthaginiensibus fuisse,’ not ‘*qui Carthaginiensibus.*’

“And thus, too, we may use all words denoting relation, although they include a person under them.

Eodem rege, quo; eodem duce, quo, &c. But to say *eodem duce, qui*, or, as this writer says, *eundem esse, qui occidisset*, is against the genius of the language, and argues an ignorance of the principle, which governs this phraseology."

That the opinion here offered is completely erroneous, may be confidently affirmed; and, perhaps, it is not too much to assert, that the argument, by which it is supported, involves as singular a combination of discernment and perplexity, truth and error, as ever occurred in philological discussion.

Before we proceed to examine the doctrine of the critic, we would premise the following observations.

Correlative words, as *Talis, qualis, Tantus, quantus, Tot, quot*, are all construed like the antecedent *Is*, and the relative *Qui*. They are all included under one and the same grammatical rule, being words precisely of the same character. Now, it can hardly be necessary to observe, that the case of the relative is totally independent on that of the antecedent. The pronoun *Is*, with the relative *Qui*, agree, each with the substantive, to which it belongs, either expressed or understood; and, as that substantive belongs to two different clauses, and may be in two different cases, so likewise may be the relative and its antecedent. The same observation may, therefore, be extended to all correlative words. "*Talis est ille, qualem eum esse scripseras.*" If we render it with *Is qui*, merely to illustrate the construction, it would proceed thus—" *Is est ille, quem esse scrip-*

seras." *Cic.* "Siquis est *talis*, *quales* omnes esse oportebat." *Cic.* "Ut ipsis *talis*, *qualem* se ipse optaret, videretur." *Cic.* "Dixi *tanta* concione, *quantum* forum est." *Cic.* "*Tanta* (ea) multitudo mihi obviam venit, *quantam* (quam) cepit urbs nostra." *Cic.*

To adduce more examples, would be to trespass on the patience of the reader. Now, without appealing to any authority, might it not be fairly presumed, that the correlative words *Idem qui* are construed like other correlative terms? If they be not, the exception must be deemed not merely extraordinary, but even wholly unaccountable: for, we believe, it will be universally found, that every exception from a general rule has been admitted, for the sake of perspicuity. This exception, however, could not possibly, in any instance whatever, conduce to perspicuity: its introduction, therefore, could be regarded in no other light, than as a capricious and wanton deviation from a general principle.

But let us consult usage, without whose authority, all abstract arguments in grammatical questions are wholly nugatory. To the examples, formerly offered, when we were examining the meaning and the use of *Idem qui*, the few following may be added. "Omni-bus amicis, quod mihi est, cupio esse *idem*." *Plaut. Trin.* i. 2. 16. "*Eosdem* esse oratorios numeros, *qui* sunt poetici." *Cic. Orat.* "Nunc hic disperii miser propter *eosdem*, *quorum* causa fui hac ætate exercitus." *Plaut. Trin.* iv. 3. 82. "Satin' eadem vigilantibus ex-

petunt, quæ in somnis visi memoras?" *Plaut. Mil.*
ii. 4. 40.

These few examples suffice to evince, that whatever species of identity *Idem qui* denotes, whether of substance or of mode, the terms are construed in the same manner, as all other correlative words, and that the case of the one is entirely independent on that of the other. We say, in Latin, *Criminis accusatus est, cujus erat, conscius. Patri pœnas dedit, cui erat obnoxius. Urbem diruit, quam majores condiderant. Ferro, quo uti solitus erat, eum occidit.* Now, let us ask, what opinion should we form of that critic's philological accuracy, who should maintain from these examples, that the relative and antecedent must agree in case,—that the case of the antecedent denotes the relation it bears to one of two things, and the case of *qui* denotes the relation it bears to the other—that hence the case of the antecedent, and the case of *qui*, ought to be the same, otherwise they do not mark the same relation, but that there are exceptions to this rule, such as the following, *Urbs, quam majores condiderant, diruta est.—Pater, cui erat obnoxius, pœnas sumsit.—Ferro, quod gestare solitus erat, eum occidit?* Should we not be pardoned, if we charged him with ignorance of a plain and simple rule, and with an attempt to perplex, by supposed exceptions, a principle from which there neither is, nor can be, any deviation? Should we not remind him, that the antecedent and relative are grammatically adjectives, each agreeing with its substantive,

expressed or understood, and that the case of the substantive depends entirely on the structure of its clause? But let us analyse the argument of the critic a little more minutely.

He begins with observing, that “When *Idem* is in the nominative case, with *qui* following it, mere identity is predicated.” What else, than mere identity, *Idem* can possibly predicate, we are quite at a loss to conceive. There may be an identity of substances, or an identity of modes, but whether the one or the other be predicated, it is still, we apprehend, mere identity. He adds, “The rules of grammar may, indeed, require an accusative case, but identity is the idea, that is expressed; nothing is predicated of the thing, but that it is the same.” His doctrine, therefore, amounts to this, that when “mere identity” is predicated, the word *Idem* may be either in the nominative, or the accusative case, “the variation of case,” as he afterwards adds, “not affecting the meaning of the proposition.” How far this observation can be deemed either precise or consistent with what follows, we shall presently have occasion to inquire. He proceeds—“But when *Idem*, in any of the oblique cases, is followed by *qui*, the meaning of the passage is, not that the thing, which *idem* denoted [denotes] is the same with any thing else, but that it bears the same relation to two other things.” Here, we apprehend, is a slight inaccuracy of expression. What does the critic mean by “the thing, which *idem* denotes”? The idea, which this term implies, is identity.

Does the critic, then, intend to say, that this identity is not the same with any thing else, but bears the same relation to two other things? If this be the sentiment intended, it appears to us quite unintelligible. We presume, however, that the critic meant to state, that, “when *idem* is in any of the oblique cases, the meaning is, not that the thing *of which identity is predicated*, is the same with any thing else, but bears the same relation to two other things.” Let us apply the observation to the following passage, —“*Eosdem esse oratorios numeros tradit, qui sunt poetici.*” *Cic.* Here we have *idem* in an oblique case, followed by *qui*. Are we then to understand, that the *numeri oratorii* are not the same with the *numeri poetici*, but bear the same relation to two other things? What then, it may be asked, is that relation? Is it that of identity, contrariety, contiguity, or what is it? And what are the two things, which bear the common relation to the *numeri oratorii*? Nothing, it is conceived, can be more evident, than that Cicero intended to predicate identity between two subjects, the *numeri oratorii* and the *numeri poetici*.

If it should be answered, that the critic admits that mere identity, as he terms it, may be predicated by the accusative case of *idem* followed by *qui*, we might refer to numberless examples, in which the same idea is predicated by *idem* in the genitive, dative, and ablative cases.—If we say, *Iisdem ducibus usus est, quos antea iter ad cognoscendum miserat*, is it, by this expression, intended to denote, that the

persons, who were guides, were not the same with any other persons, but that they bore the same relation to two other things ? The idea is too extravagant to be entertained for a moment. The sentence is evidently intended to predicate identity between two subjects ; namely, the persons employed as guides, and those previously sent to explore the road. If it should be alleged, that the critic's observation is confined to *idem est qui*, it may be answered, that the example adduced by himself, *Vovit in eadem verba consul, quibus antea quinquennalia vota suscipi solita erant*, precludes the supposition.

Let us now compare the author's two observations. In the former, he tells us that, when *idem* is in the nominative, or the accusative case, mere identity is predicated ; and in the latter he informs us, that when *idem* is in the accusative, or in any of the oblique cases, mere identity is not predicated. What distinction is to be here established, or what rule the reader is hence to learn, I must confess, without intending the least offence to the learned critic, it exceeds my powers of understanding to comprehend. Had he said, that, when *idem* is in the nominative case, mere identity is predicated, and when any of the oblique cases is used, something else than mere identity is implied, the rule, though false, would have been precise ; and if he had clearly explained, what he means by *mere identity*, the rule would have been intelligible. But to tell us, that the accusative of *idem* expresses mere identity, and that any oblique

case, and therefore the accusative, expresses something else, than mere identity, is to advance propositions, which, if not mutually inconsistent, are at least better calculated to perplex, than to instruct the reader.

The critic proceeds. "Now the inflexions, or cases of nouns, are expressive of relations. The case of *idem* denotes the relation it bears to one of the two things, and the case of *qui* denotes the relation it bears to the other. Hence the case of *idem*, and the case of *qui*, ought to be the same, otherwise they do not mark the same relation." Here two observations naturally present themselves.—1st. It is not always necessary to express identity of relation by identity of case. This is admitted by the critic himself; and the concession would entirely subvert his argument, even if classical authority did not demand the concession. Unless, therefore, he had shewn, what he has not even attempted:—1st. That the Reviewer intended to express identity of relation; and, 2dly. That the expression of this identity is one of those instances, in which it must necessarily be denoted by identity of case, his argument must be pronounced to be completely inapplicable.

But were it even true, that identity of relation must uniformly be expressed by identity of case, his argument would still be impertinent and inconclusive. It is founded in error—an error, indeed, so palpable, that it cannot fail to excite surprise, that it should have escaped the critic's observation. In the whole of his reasoning, he confounds two things quite dis-

tingent; I mean, *the relation of identity*, and *identity of relation*, the former of which may require to be expressed without the latter, and conversely. Now, if this be true, as we shall be able to evince, and were it even the fact, as cannot be proved, that identity of relation universally requires identity of case, we desire to know, by what axiom, what argument, or what authority, does the critic infer, that because identity of relation requires identity of case, the relation of identity must also require identity of case? Unless he prove this, his argument is a mere assumption; and, if he disclaim the assumption, his argument is wholly inapplicable. The distinction, which is here asserted, and which the critic seems not to have conceived, it may be necessary to illustrate by a few examples. Prolixity we are desirous to avoid; but we would rather incur this charge, than, in a work intended chiefly for the junior student, leave the subject imperfectly understood, or the error incompletely exposed. For this purpose, let us take the following example.—*Oppidum eadem ratione dirutum est, qua urbs vicina paucis ante annis eversa erat.* This sentence we shall proceed to analyse logically and grammatically.

First, then, we have the subject spoken of, namely, *oppidum*; then we have the predicate *dirutum est*; we have next this predicate modified by the word *ratione*, expressing the accident of mode, or manner, in which this destruction was accomplished. We have also identity predicated of this manner. This

is the first clause. Now, identity implies either the identity of two subjects, or of one subject with itself, that is to say, of one subject considered as existing at different periods, or as two distinct objects of contemplation. Identical then with what? The next clause answers the question, in which we have *urbs* the subject, *eversa erat* the predicate, *ratione* understood modifying the act, and *qua* referring that modification to the mode preceding, as identical with it. We have then two distinct subjects, two distinct predicates, and two modes of these predicates pronounced to be identical.

Let us now examine it grammatically. We have, first, the nominative and the verb, *oppidum dirutum est*. We have then the ablative, *ratione*, and *eadem* agreeing with it, this case being generally employed to express the manner absolutely, or, (to speak more correctly,) in this instance, to denote, by an ellipsis of the preposition, the relation we signify by the words "after," or "according to." In the relative clause we have *urbs* the nominative, and *eversa erat* the verb, with *ratione* understood, expressing the manner absolutely, and *qua* agreeing with it. Grammatically considered, *ratione* is independent; it bears no relation to any word in the sentence, though logically it modifies both the predicates. The relation of identity between the two modes is not expressed by the case of the accident, or manner, but by the correlative terms *eadem qua*. The manner, or the relation of "according to," is signified by the ablative,

as it would be, whether *idem qui* did, or did not, make part of the sentence. For it being a general rule, that the manner absolutely considered, or more properly the relation, “according to,” shall be put in the ablative, and *idem qui* being adjectives, not determining the case of any word, but being determined themselves by the case of their substantives, it is evident, that *idem* and *qui* are in the same case, not as agreeing with each other, but as agreeing each with *ratione*. The cause, the manner, the instrument, the time, the distance, and other *circumstances*, are expressed according to certain syntactical rules, which have no connection with *idem qui*, or with any other correlative terms. If the same circumstance, or accident, with the same modification, is to be expressed in the relative, as in the antecedent clause, the same rule of syntax must of course be applicable to both, and both may be put in the same case. But even this construction is often discretionary, as the same accident, with the same modification, is capable of more than one form of expression, and the cases of the two substantives, with which *idem* and *qui* agree, may be either identical, or different, according to the sense, or the structure of the clause, to which they belong. If the *cases* happen to be the same, as *Eodem tempore, quo.—Eadem via, qua.—Eisdem conditionibus, quibus*, it is because the same rule of syntax, which determines the case of the substantive in the antecedent clause, determines also the case of the substantive, understood in the relative clause, and

not because *idem* is in a certain case, is therefore *qui* in the same case.

It will not, we presume, be urged, that this is precisely the doctrine of the critic, who maintains, that identity of relation is expressed by identity of case; and, therefore, that *idem* and *qui* are, in these examples, in the same case. For, though we do not controvert the position, that identity of relation is generally expressed by identity of case, it may be pertinently asked, Is there no difference between asserting, that *idem* and *qui* must be in the same case, as if the syntax of the one determined that of the other, and affirming, what is the fact, that the correlative terms are, in regard to construction, respecting their cases, wholly unconnected with each other,—that they agree, each with its own substantive, and that the two substantives may, or may not, be of the same case, according to the structure of the clause, to which they belong? We say, *Die dicto, quo omnes convenirent*; but it does not hence follow, that we are to say, *Die dixerunt, quo omnes convenirent*, or *Diem dixerunt, quem omnes convenirent*.

But the most extraordinary circumstance is, that the critic appears either to abandon his position, or unwarily to adduce an example, which subverts it. He adds, “There are various ways of expressing the same relation, and sometimes this happens with *idem qui*—as, ‘Vovit in eadem verba consul, quibus antea quinquennalia vota suscipi solita erant,’ *Liv. xxx. 9*, where the change of expression is easily accounted

for, by the use of *suscipi*, instead of repeating the verb *voveo*, but the relation is not changed—and the rule, that sameness of relation is marked by sameness of case, is liable only to those exceptions, which we must expect to meet with under every grammatical rule.”

Can any example more demonstratively prove, than that, which is here adduced by the critic, that *idem* and *qui* may not be in the same case, and that the case of each depends on the structure of its clause? Though the example be completely subversive of his doctrine, he seems not to be aware of it, and accounts for the change of expression, by the use of *suscipi*, instead of *voveo*. But, will not a change of a verb, an adjective, or a preposition, in all instances, as well as this, produce a change of case? And can we require any further evidence to prove, that the case of *idem* and that of *qui* depend on the structure of the clauses? Still, however, adhering to his position, he affirms, by way of argument, that the “relation is not changed.” If, by “relation,” he means the relation of identity, it certainly continues unchanged—for as long as *idem qui* expressive of that relation, remains in the sentence, that relation must be denoted. If he means the relation expressed by case, it is completely changed. When Justin says, “*Eodem innati sunt solo, quod incolunt*,” lib. ii. cap. 6, we find *idem* in the dative case; but is the relative in the same case? By no means. The antecedent adjective agrees with *solo*, which is the regimen of *innati sunt*, and

the relative agrees with *solum* understood, which is the regimen of the active verb *incolunt*.—The sentence, with the words arranged syntactically, would proceed thus, “Innati sunt eidem solo, incolunt quod solum.” And in regard to the critic’s “remarkable instance” of the observance of his rule, in *Livy*, xxvi. 33, “Cæterorum omnium Campanorum *eundem* erga nos animum, *quem* Carthaginiensibus fuisse,” it is evident that there exists the same syntactical argument for *quem fuisse*, as for *eundem fuisse*, each of them being the subjects of *compertum est*, the verb preceding: or, according to a common ellipsis, subjects of the verb *dixit*—thus, “He said, that the mind of the Campanians was the same, which (he said) that of the Carthaginians was,” or “It was ascertained, that the mind of the Campanians was the same, which, it was ascertained, that the mind of the Carthaginians was.”

From the preceding observations and examples, it must be sufficiently evident, that the case of *idem* and that of *qui* have no mutual connection or dependence—that they agree, each with its own substantive, and that the cases of the substantives are determined either by the relation to be expressed, or the structure of the clause.

We now proceed to prove, what the intelligent reader, we presume, must have already perceived, that the great error of the critic consists in confounding two things totally different—we mean, 1st. That identity, which may exist between two subjects, whe-

ther these be substances, or modes; and, 2dly. An identity of accidents, or accessory circumstances, belonging to the substances, or the modes themselves. He seems not to have been, in the least degree, aware of this obvious fact, that there may be an identity of the former kind, where there is none of the latter, and conversely. This observation the following short example will illustrate. *Eadem via contendit, qua hostes discesserant.* Here there is a two-fold identity involved—1st. “The way, by which he marched;” and “The way, by which the enemy had departed,” are affirmed to be identical. This identity of subject is expressed by *idem qui*. 2dly. The accidents, or accessory circumstances belonging to the two subjects are identical, and this is expressed by one and the same preposition *by*, and in Latin by one and the same case, namely, the ablative. Here then we have an identity of accident expressed by an identity of case. Let us now alter the example, and say, *Eandem viam aperuit, qua hostes discesserant.* Here we have the same identity of ways, or roads, expressed by *idem qui*, as in the former example, but we have not the same identity of accident in the antecedent and relative clauses. For in the antecedent clause, the “way,” or “road,” is the thing acted upon—it is the subject of the operation, and the word *via*, therefore, receives the action of the verb *aperire*, and is put in the accusative case. In the relative clause, the word *via* understood to *qua*, is not the subject of any action—it modifies the verb *discesserant*, and has that

accident belonging to it, which is expressed, in English, by the preposition *by*, and in Latin by the ablative case. The same distinction might be illustrated by the following passage from Livy. “Necquicquam Vejente populo querente, *eandem, qua* Fidenæ deletæ sunt, imminere Vejis fortunam.” *Liv. iv. 25.*

The error of the critic, then, appears to consist in confounding the two identities, and supposing that the one necessarily implies the other. Now, nothing can be more evident, than that there may be an identity of subject, without an identity of mode—or an identity of mode without either an identity of subject, or any identity of accident belonging to that mode*. *Hostem eundem prælio cepit, qui patrem paulo ante occiderat.* Here is an identity of subject expressed by *eundem hostem qui* (*hostis*), but there is a diversity of mode, the one *action*, and the other *passion*. The subject *hostem*, which, in the antecedent clause, is suffering the action expressed by the verb, in the relative clause, exerts the energy which the verb denotes.

If we say, *Dedi hunc librum viro eidem, cui* (*viro*) *pater tuus Virgilium tribuerat*, we have the relation of identity between the two subjects, *viro* and *viro*; and we have also identity of relation, namely, *Acquisition*, expressed in both clauses by the dative. The former is denoted by *idem qui*; and the latter by identity of case. Again, if we say, *Scio te dedisse hunc*

* What is here termed the accident of a mode, is generally called by logicians the mode of a mode.

librum eidem viro, quem (virum) *pater tuus olim dilexerit*, we have the same relation of identity, as in the preceding example, between *viro* and *virum*; but have we the same identity of relation? Certainly not. *Acquisition* is implied in the one, and *passion* in the other. The relation of identity is denoted by *idem qui*; and the diversity of relation by diversity of case.

Were it, therefore, universally true, as it is not, that identity of relation is expressed by identity of case, by what principle does it hence follow, that the relation of identity requires identity of case?—Or how can the rule of the critic respecting identity of relation be applicable to a passage, in which it is not intended to express identity of relation, but the relation of identity? The latter is evidently all that the reviewer intended to signify; and this is effected by *idem qui*, in whatever case either, or both, of the words, may be expressed. When the critic, therefore, condemns the expression of the reviewer, because he has not put *idem* and *qui* in the same case, he evidently confounds identity of relation, which is generally signified by identity of case, with the relation of identity, which admits diversity of case.

There is one observation more, which we would take the liberty to recommend to the attention of the reader. The word *idem* is compounded of the pronoun *is*, and a syllabic adjection. Now we know that a *paragoge* renders the simple term more definite and more forcible, but does not affect, in the

smallest degree, the syntax, or construction of the word, to which it is suffixed. *Egomet, Tute, Hicce*, are construed precisely like the simple pronouns, *Ego, Tu, Hic*. We know also, that the case of the relative is nowise affected by the case of the antecedent. Have we not, therefore, reason to infer, that the case of the relative is totally independent on the case of *idem*, and that the same rule, which is applicable to *is qui*, is also applicable to *idem qui*?—If *idem qui* furnish an exception to the general rule, by which the construction of all correlative terms is governed, it is incumbent on the critic to prove the exception. Nay, the very rule, on which his argument is founded, that identity of relation requires identity of case, is equally applicable to *is qui*, as to *idem qui*. We would ask, then, whether the critic would say, *Eum fuisse, quem occiderit*, or *Is fuisse, qui occiderit*? It would be an insult to the critic to suppose him capable of employing either of these expressions to denote, “That he was the man, who slew.” Yet his argument leads to the adoption of one, or other, of these phraseologies. We contend, therefore, that *Eundem fuisse, qui occiderit*, involves no solecism whatever. There is an impropriety in thus using *idem qui*, but there is no syntactical error in the expression.

Having dwelt upon this subject much longer, it is apprehended, than the learned reader will forgive, though the observations, it is hoped, may be of some service to the junior student, we proceed to the examination of another question, respecting *Idem qui*,

which has given occasion to controversy among several learned critics and grammarians.

It has been much doubted, whether, agreeably to classic usage, the word *idem* can be followed by *cum*, as *Idem cum illo*, "The same with him," "The same as he." Scioppius, Cellarius, and several other eminent critics, condemn this phraseology.—Perizonius, Drakenborch, and some other writers of equal eminence, affirm, that it is sanctioned by indisputable authority, and, in evidence thereof, adduce the following example, "Hunc ego eodem mecum patre genitum in possessionem Armeniæ deduxi." *Tac. Ann.* xv. 2. "Non idem sentio cum Casellio." *Aul. Gell.* xv. 11. "Nabarzanes in eodem consilio erat cum Besso." *Curt.* v. 9. 1. "In eadem mecum Africa geniti." *Liv.* xxx. 12. Stephens contends, that in these examples, *cum* would be used, if *idem* were absent; and, therefore, they do not prove, that *idem* may be used with *cum*.

The question here involved admits a simple and easy solution; and it is somewhat surprising, that the principle, which seems to have regulated the practice of classic writers, in their use of *Idem qui*, and *Idem cum*, should have eluded the penetration of these very eminent critics. That *idem* cannot be joined with *cum* to express the identity of the two subjects, with one of which *idem* agrees, while the other is governed by *cum*, is unquestionably true.—We cannot say, *Idem est tecum*—*Eundem esse cum illo*. Such expressions are not sanctioned by any authority. So far,

it is conceived, the opinion of Scioppius and Cellarius is correct. Nay, I am inclined to think that those who contend for the use of *cum* with *idem* would not employ it in such cases.—*Idem cum*, employed to denote identity of character, appears to be equally devoid of authority. Noltenius applies the expression, *Idem est cum patre*, to the Son, as the second person in the Trinity; and observes, that we may say, *Idem est cum patre*, but not *Idem est, qui pater*. That the latter of these expressions is grammatically correct, but logically false, cannot be questioned; and on this ground we concur with Noltenius, in condemning it: but that the former, whatever theological sense it may be intended to convey, is contrary to classic usage, may be warrantably affirmed. It is sanctioned, we are persuaded, by no reputable authority. To this doctrine of Noltenius, we cannot, therefore, by any means assent. The rule, for the use of *Idem qui*, and *Idem cum*, may be briefly stated thus.—When identity of subject is implied, *Idem qui* must be used; when identity of adjunct is to be expressed, either *Idem qui*, or *Idem cum*, may be employed. Thus, *Eundem librum mihi dedit, quem tibi donavi*. Here the identity of subject excludes the use of *cum*. But when Cicero says to Catiline, “*Me nullo modo posse in iisdem parietibus tuto esse tecum*,” there is no identity in the subjects *me* and *te*, but there is an identity of adjunct, namely, *parietibus*.—In the following example likewise, “*Nabarzanes in eodem consilio erat cum Besso*,” there is no identity of subject,

Nabarxanes and *Bessus* being two different persons; but there is an identity of *consilium*. In these two last examples, therefore, either *cum*, or *qui*, may be used indifferently—thus, *Iisdem parietibus quibus*, and *Eodem consilio quo*.

This rule may, perhaps, be better understood by the junior reader, if he be informed, that *Idem cum* may be used, when the noun, with which *Idem* agrees, or the subject, of which identity is predicated, is not represented as the same with that, which is the regimen of the preposition *cum*, or the same with either of the other subjects. Thus *In eadem Africa mecum geniti sunt*. *Africa*, with which *eadem* agrees, is not identical with either *Me* or *Them*, the two subjects of comparison, nor is there any sameness of person, *I* and *They* being different; but there is an identity of adjunct, the same country being the birth-place of both.

We now dismiss the subject with observing, that *Idem* is, by a Græcism, sometimes, joined with the dative case—thus,—“*Invitum qui servat, idem facit occidenti.*”—*Hor. de Art. Poët.* 467.

The Roman army was distributed into three general divisions, the *Hastati*, the *Principes*, and the *Triarii*. The *Hastati*, so called, because they were at first armed with spears, though they afterwards carried swords and javelins, were the first rank of the Roman army. The *Principes*, who, according to

some, had this name, because they were originally the first line of the Roman army, but, according to Varro, because they were the first, that fought with spears, formed the second line. The *Triarii*, who were veteran and approved soldiers, formed the third line. The *Velites* made no part of the main army; but were light-armed troops, consisting of archers and slingers, who skirmished irregularly before the front.

In the reign of Romulus, the legion consisted of three thousand men, one thousand being chosen out of each of the three tribes, into which Rome was divided. Hence a soldier was called *Miles*, one of a thousand, *unus ex mille*; and the commander of the tribe was called *Tribunus*. (See *Varr. de Ling. Lat.*) The legion was divided into ten cohorts, each cohort into three maniples (*manipuli*), and each manipule into two centuries. This relative proportion was observed, whatever might be the number, of which the legion was composed. When the Roman legion consisted of six thousand, then a century consisted of one hundred; two centuries of any of the three lines formed a *manipulus*, so called from a handful of hay stuck on a pole, which they carried as a standard; and three *manipuli*, one from each of the three lines, formed a cohort, which consisted, therefore, of six hundred. Ten cohorts, or six thousand, made up the legion, if each century was complete. This, however, was but rarely the case, and the legion generally fell short of this number. To each legion was attached a body of horse, divided into ten *Turmæ*, or troops; and

each *Turma* into three *Decuriæ*, or companies of ten men. In battle the *Hastati* engaged first. If they were defeated they fell back, and joined the *Principes*. If both these were worsted, they retreated to the *Triarii*, and then all the three formed one line.—Hence arose the phrase, *Jam ad Triarios ventum est*, “It has now come to the last push.”

Two negatives in Latin, as in English, make an affirmative; in Greek, and in French, they strengthen the negation. Thus, *non nihil*, “not nothing,” means “something.” Hence “I cannot, but” (*but*, or *be out* having a negative import) is an expression equivalent to “I must,” and is often rendered by *Non possum non*; *non potest esse*, or *fieri*, *quin*; *non possum quin*, i. e. *quod non*. “Non possum non amare,” “Haud possum, quin amem.” It is to be observed, however, that, when the negatives are not in juxta position, or closely connected, so that the one emphatically destroys the other, a negative meaning is sometimes expressed. “*Non*, medius fidius, præ lacrimis, possum reliqua *nec* cogitare, *nec* scribere.” *Cic. ad Att.* *Aut* might have been here substituted for *nec*.

EXERCISE.

“I thank the Gods,” said Marcellus, “that the victorious enemy did not attack us in our camp, when you fled to the works with so great consternation. If he had done so, I cannot but believe, that you would have abandoned your camp with the same terror, as you quitted the field.

Have you forgotten, who you are, and with whom you are fighting? These enemies are the same, you so often defeated and pursued, last summer:—the same, whom you fatigued with skirmishes, and suffered not either to march, or to pitch their camp. And are *your* troops now diminished, or are *theirs* increased? Methinks, indeed, I talk not to my own army, or to Roman soldiers; their bodies only and their arms remain the same. If you had possessed the same courageous hearts, would the enemy have seen you turn your backs? Would they have taken the ensigns of a single company, or a single cohort? Hitherto they boasted of having cut Roman legions to pieces; to-day, for the first time, you have given them the glory of putting an army of ours to flight.” Next day he led them into the field, and they gained a glorious victory.

OBSERVATIONS.

Neuter and intransitive verbs sometimes govern an accusative of their own, or a kindred signification; thus, “*Modeste vitam vivere.*” *Plaut. Pers.* iii. 1. 18. “*Quorum majorum nemo servitutem servivit.*” *Cic. Top. cap.* 6.

“The Sardonian laugh” was a phrase among the Romans, denoting “an affected or pretended laugh,” *risus fictus* or *simulatus*. It is said, that there was a sea-weed, found on the shores of Sardinia, which was of a poisonous quality, and occasioned death to those, who tasted it, producing a spasmodic, or hysteric affection, resembling laughter. Hence the expression *risus Sardonius*.

“Hands off the tablet,” or “down with the

pencil," was a phrase, supposed by Victorius to have taken its rise from the schools of the painters, where the young pupils, in the absence of the master, used to amuse themselves with drawing their pencils over the piece, on which he was at work ; and when they spied him returning, they used to call out, " Hands off the tablet," or " lay aside your pencils." Gallus, to whom this letter is addressed, had written a panegyric on Cato, which had given offence either to Cæsar, or to Tigellius, (for it is not quite clear, to which of the two allusion is made,) and by the phrase, to which we refer, dissuades him from continuing his encomiums on Cato.

Digitus latus, or *digitus transversus* denoted the " sixteenth part of a foot," " a finger's breadth," and was used to express indefinitely a very short measure, or very small distance.

The future perfect is elegantly used for the future imperfect, when it is intended to denote, that the action, or the event, will be effectually completed.

The Romans, when they did not employ paper or parchment, used to write, or rather engrave on a tablet, with an iron pen, called *Stilus*, sharp pointed at one end, and at the other, flat, for the purpose of erasing, and afterwards smoothing, when they wished to make any corrections. Hence the expression, *stylum vertere*, " to turn the pen," or " to make alterations." The tablet was covered with a smooth coat of wax.

EXERCISE.

Cicero greets Gallus. As to any painful feeling of yours, about the letter's being torn up, I tell you to dismiss your uneasiness. The letter is safe at my house ; and you shall fetch it hence, whenever you please. Your admonitions are extremely obliging, and I beseech you to continue them. It would appear, you are afraid, that, if we get that man (Cæsar) for our master, we may have the Sardonic laugh. But, hark ye, my friend, "lay aside the pencil." The master is come, sooner than we had supposed. I am afraid, he may send the friends of Cato to join Cato in the shades below. Let nothing persuade you to think, that any thing can be better expressed, than that part of your letter, which begins with "The rest are falling." I whisper this in your ear ; keep the secret to yourself ; let not even your freed man Apella know it. We are the only two, that use this language ; how far we do well, or ill in this practice, I shall see ; but be it what it may, it belongs to us. Persevere, therefore, with all your energies, and never let your pen be an inch from your hand ; for the pen is the parent of eloquence. To this occupation, indeed, I even now devote a portion of the night. Farewell.

OBSERVATIONS.

CIRCUMDARE.

Circumdare, ex *circum* et *dare*, means "To put round ;" and in this sense it governs the thing put round in the accusative, and the thing inclosed in the dative—as, "*Exercitum omnem circumdat hostium castris*," *Liv.* iii. 28. "He surrounds the camp of the enemy with his whole army," literally, "He puts

his whole army round the camp." "*Cum fossam latam cubiculari lecto circumdedisset.*" *Cic. Tusc. Quæst. lib. v.* "When he had put a ditch round his bed." In this acceptation of the verb, the sense, but not the syntax, requires, that the verb and preposition be taken separately.

Circumdare signifies also, "To surround," and in this sense governs the accusative of the thing inclosed, and the ablative of that, which is put round, or with which it is encompassed—thus, "*Quorum cognita sententia, Octavius binis castris oppidum circumdedit.*" *Cæs. B. C. iii. 9.* "Surrounded the town with two different camps." "*Exiguïs finibus oratoris munus circumdedisti.*" *Cic. de Orat. lib. i.* "You have circumscribed the duty of an orator within narrow limits."

Hence *circumdari* is frequently ambiguous, admitting two meanings directly contrary. If we say, "*Murus ignibus circumdatus est,*" it may signify either, "The wall was encompassed with fires;" or "A wall was put round the fires," that is, "The fires were surrounded with a wall." "*Aurum argento circumdatum est,*" means either, "The gold was encircled with silver," or, "The silver was encircled with gold." And when Cicero says, "*Invenit auri aliquantum, idque circumdatum argento,*" *De Div. lib. ii.,* it is the judgment of the reader, more than the clearness of the expression, by which the meaning is to be ascertained.

The relative *qui*, instead of agreeing with the antecedent, frequently agrees with the noun following, both nouns referring to one and the same subject. “Animal, *quem* vocamus *hominem*.” *Cic.* “His animus datus est ex illis sempiternis ignibus, *quæ sidera* et *stellas* vocatis.” *Cic.* This mode of construction is by some grammarians deemed an elegance; and, where the latter substantive is a proper name, it is generally adopted.. “Ea omnia in pratis Flaminii acta, *quem* nunc *Circum* Flaminium appellant.” *Liv.* iii. 54. Here the relative agrees with the subsequent word, both in gender, and in number. “Est locus in carcere, quod *Tullianum* appellatur.” *Sall. B. C.* cap. 58.—Here *quod* agrees with *Tullianum*. Jones, in his grammar, by some strange inadvertence, refers *quod* to *carcer*, as if *carcer* were a noun neuter, and not masculine. A more remarkable instance occurs in the following example, in which the relative, though referring to persons, is put in the neuter gender and singular number. ‘Poppæo et Tigellino coram, quod erat principi intimum consiliorum, interrogat.” *Tac. Ann.* xv. 61. “who were in the intimate counsels of the prince,” or “formed his cabinet council.”

It may be here observed, in passing, that the relative sometimes agrees with a substantive, whose meaning is included in some preceding word, to which the relative refers. “Sed antea item conjuraverunt pauci contra rempublicam, de *qua* quam ve-

rissime potero, absolvam." *Sall. B. C. i. e. de qua conjuratione*. It sometimes also agrees, by the figure *synesis*, with the subject, and not its name. "Illa furia muliebrium religionum, *qui non pluris fecerat Bonam Deam*." *Cic. Ep. Fam. i. 9*. Here *furia* refers to Clodius.

I may here remark also, that, by the same figure, the adjective grammatically is sometimes found to disagree with its substantive, the sense and not the gender of the noun being regarded. "Scelus ludificatus est." *Ter*. "The villain abused." "Deum esse indignam credidi." *Plaut*. Here *Deus*, the masculine, is joined with a feminine adjective, a goddess being implied, and *Deus* denoting "a Deity," whether male, or female.

Necessity is, in English, expressed by the verb *must*; *duty* by the verb *ought*; and both of them, sometimes, by the verb "to have." In Latin, the former is denoted by *Necesse est*, the latter by *Debeo*, and *Oportet*, and both of them by the gerund, or gerundive. These forms of expression have been already briefly exemplified; but for the direction of the junior reader, we propose the following examples:

"I must read," "I have to read," "I am under the necessity of reading." *Necesse est mihi legere, vel Mihi legendum est*.

"I must have read," "I had to read," "I was under the necessity of reading." *Necesse erat mihi legere, Mihi legendum erat*.

"If I should be under the necessity of reading,"
 "If I should have to read." *Si mihi legere necesse esset*, vel *Si mihi legendum esset*.

"If I should have had to read," "If I should have been under the necessity of reading." *Si mihi legere necesse fuisset**, vel *Si mihi legendum fuisset*.

"I ought to write," or "It is my duty to write." *Scribere debeo. Mihi scribendum est. Me scribere oportet*.

"I ought to have written," or "It was my duty to write." *Scribere debui. Mihi scribendum erat. Me scribere oportuit*.

"It will be my duty to write." *Scribere debebo. Mihi scribendum erit. Me scribere oportebit*.

"The letters must be written by me." *Epistolæ sunt mihi scribendæ*.

"I know, that the letters ought to be written." *Scio epistolas esse scribendas; or Oportere epistolas scribi*.

It is a general rule, that, when a gerund, or the participle in *dus* is used, the person, on whom the necessity lies, must be put in the dative case; but, when this form of expression is likely to create ambiguity, the preposition *a* or *ab* must be employed; thus, "Nominatim *a me* magistratibus statui gratias esse agendas." *Cic. Or. post Red. cap. 12*.

* *Necesse est* is often joined with the subjunctive mood, with or without *ut*, as "You must go," *Eas necesse est*. "Pro hoc mihi patronus sim necesse est." *Plaut. Pæn. v. 4. 74*.

EXERCISE.

The third day, he was informed, that Ariovistus was advancing with all his forces, to take possession of Vesontio, which is the capital of the Sequani, and that he had already got three days' march, beyond his own territories. Cæsar now judged it essentially necessary to use every possible precaution, in order to prevent the town from falling into his hands; for it was not only full of all sorts of warlike stores, but likewise strongly fortified by nature, so as to furnish the greatest facilities for prolonging the war. For the river Dubis, as if drawn round it with a pair of compasses, nearly incloses the whole town: and the intervening space is occupied by a mountain of great height, so that the bottom of it reaches to the banks of the river. A wall, surrounding this mountain, gives it the strength of a citadel, and joins it to the town. Hither Cæsar marched, without intermission, day and night; and having possessed himself of the place, stationed there a strong garrison.

OBSERVATIONS.

ACIES.

EXERCITUS.

AGMEN.

Acies, according to Dumesnil, is the "front of the army." *Exercitus*, "A band of soldiers trained" (*Exerciti*) "by exercise." *Agmen*, "A body," or "army, on march." "*Exercitum* dicimus non unam cohortem, neque unam alam, sed numeros multos militum." *Ulp.* *Acies*, according to Vegetius, is *exercitus instructus*. Noltenius, to nearly the same purpose, defines it to be "*Exercitus stans*."

Acies, as Dumesnil observes, taking the strict

sense of the word into consideration, may, originally, have alluded to the front of the army, as resembling the edge of a sharp instrument; but, in classic writers, it is used for the whole army, in battle order, of which there were three forms, namely, *acies quadrata*, *acies cuneata*, and *acies ad Rhombi speciem*; or for any line of the army, whether the front, centre, or rear. Accordingly, we have *prima acies*, *secunda acies*, *tertia acies*.

The three words may be thus distinguished—*Exercitus* answers, precisely to our English word, “army,” and means, as Ulpian observes, not one troop, or one cohort, but a considerable number, trained by exercise. It is the generic term, being equally applicable whether the army be at rest, or in motion, whether drawn up in battle order, or promiscuous, and loose. *Acies* is applied to an army in martial array; *Agmen ab agere* (ἀγειν) to an army, or band of men in action, or in motion. “Agmina magis quam acies pugnabant; superior tamen, ut in tumultuaria pugna, Romanus erat.” *Liv.* “Magis agmina, quam acies, in via concurrerunt.” *Liv.* xxi. 57.

DUX.

IMPERATOR.

Imperator means, “the commander in chief.”—*Dux* the highest of the inferior officers, having himself an important command, “Præstate eandem nobis ducibus virtutem, quam sæpenumero imperatori præstitistis.” *Cæs. B. G.* vi. 8. In most cases, as in

the following exercise, they may be used indiscriminately, it being necessary to mark the distinction in those cases only, where the chief in command is to be discriminated from the generals immediately under him.

When an oration, or address, is detailed, not in the precise language of the speaker, but in the words of the historian, that is, when the speech is given as a narration, and not in the form of an address, it is often necessary to distinguish between what is delivered as the sentiment of the speaker, and what may incidentally be introduced as an observation of the writer. This distinction, which, in our language, is not always very obvious, unless by the typographical expedient of inverted commas, or Italic characters, is perspicuously marked, in Latin, by a difference of mood.

This is the principle which we endeavoured to illustrate, when treating of the relative; a principle, which, at that time, we had not seen notified by any critic or grammarian.

We find, however, in a pamphlet published since our observations on this subject were written, a doctrine somewhat similar proposed by the anonymous author whose critical observations on *Idem qui* we had lately occasion to examine. The principle, however, is more extensive, than he seems to apprehend. It extends not only to an ellipsis of the word *dixit*, but to an ellipsis of any predicate whatever, of which the verb in the subjunctive mood is the subject. This

position has been already proved by a variety of examples. (See Vol. I. p. 364.) It extends also to the conjunctions *quia*, *quam*, *cum*, *quod*, *quando*, *atque*, and other such connective words. This constitutes a rule, which particularly merits the attention of the critic. We shall give a few examples—

“Docet, longe alia ratione esse bellum gerendum, atque antea *sit gestum*,” *Cæs. B. G.* vii. 14. i. e. *atque gestum esse docet*. “Id unum consilium esse, ut se ipsa plebs, *quando* aliud nihil auxilii *habeat*, defendat,” *Liv.* ii. 55. “The common people said, that their only plan now was, to defend themselves, since (they said) they had no other aid.”—“Filiam *quia* non ultra pudica victura *fuert*, miseram, sed honestam mortem occubuisse.” *Liv.* v. 30. “Virginus said, that his daughter had died a lamentable, but honourable death, since (he said) she was no longer to live in a state of chastity.” “Multitudini exponunt, omnes equites Æduorum interfectos, *quod* collocuti, cum Arvernus *dicerentur*,” *Cæs. B. G.* vii. 38. “They explain to the multitude that the horsemen of the Ædui had been put to death, because they were reported, *they said*, to have conversed with the Arverni.” “Roma est ad id potissimum visa, in novo populo, *ubi* omnis repentina atque ex virtute nobilitas *sit*, futurum locum forti ac strenuo viro.” *Liv.* i. 34. The sentiment expressed in the relative clause, beginning with *ubi*, is not Livy’s, but *Tanaquil’s*: the relative term is therefore joined with the subjunctive mood. “Sin Cæsarem respiciant, atque ejus gratiam

sequantur, *ut superioribus fecerint* temporibus, se sibi consilium capturum." *Cæs. B. C.* "As he said, they did."—"Hoc scribere, sibi certum esse Romæ manere, causamque eam ascribere, quæ erat in epistola nostra, ne se absente leges suæ negligenterentur, *sicuti esset* neglecta sumptuaria." *Cic. Att. xiii. 7.* "As he said, his sumptuarian law had been neglected." The reader will observe, that the relative clause expressing no sentiment of Cæsar's, but of the writer's (Cicero), the verb is in the indicative. Attention to this observation will remove much of that obscurity, in which the rules, for the governing power of some conjunctions and adverbs, are involved.

EXERCISE.

It is said, that Scipio, in a conversation with Hannibal, asked him, whom he thought the greatest general; and that he answered, "Alexander of Macedon, because he had defeated the most numerous armies with a small number of men, and had traversed the most remote countries, which it had surpassed the hopes of man to visit."—"Whom do you place in the second rank?" said Scipio. "Pyrrhus," answered the other; "for he first taught how to form a camp, and had such an art of conciliating men, that the Italian nations chose rather to be subject to him, though a foreigner, than to the Roman people."—"Whom do you reckon third?" said Scipio. "Myself," replied the Carthaginian. Scipio, at this answer, burst into a laugh, and asked next, "What would you say, had you conquered me?"—"Then, indeed," said Hannibal, "I should have placed myself before Alexander and Pyrrhus, and all other generals."

OBSERVATIONS.

DEPOPULARI.

VASTARE.

The former, as the etymology imports, denotes strictly to destroy the people; and the latter to waste, or ravage, the country, in any way. *Vastare*, therefore, has the more extensive signification.—“*Decurſionibus, per equites, quos habet multos, vaſtat ea loca, quæ incurrit.*” *Cic. Brut. Fam. Ep.* 11. “*Ipe hoſtili modo Cordubeniſium agros vaſtat, ædificia incendit.*” *Cæs. de B. C.* lib. iv. But though *depopulâri*, in its ſtrict acceptation, regards ſolely the deſtruction of the people, it is ſeldom confined to this ſignification, but often denotes the plundering of a country, and the deſtruction both of the inhabitants, and their property—but not to the ſame extent with *vaſtare*, which is properly to “deſolate, or render waſte.” Doletus defines *vaſtare*,—“*Exinaniendo vaſtum reddere.*” In the following paſſage, they are uſed nearly in the ſame ſenſe.—“*Siciliam C. Verres per triennium depopulatus eſſe, Siculorum civitates vaſtaſſe, domos exinaniſſe, fana ſpoliaſſe dicitur.*” *Cic. in Verr.*

RUS.

REGIO.

PATRIA.

Rus means “the country,” as oppoſed to “the city.” “*Urbis amatorem Fuſcum ſalvere jubemus, Ruris amatores.*” *Hor. Ep.* i. 10.

Regio means, “a large tract of country,” “a

region," including fields, and cities. *Patria*, with *regio* understood, denotes "a native country." *Patria* (*sciz.* *regio*), "the country of one's forefathers," or "of one's birth."

The word *that*, as introductory to any thing said, or affirmed, is often omitted in English. Thus, "They were dismissed by the greater part with the inquiry, whether they had opened an asylum for women also; for thus only could they be provided with suitable matches," "A plerisque rogitantibus dimissi, ecquod feminis quoque asylum aperuissent, id enim demum compar connubium fore." *Liv.* i. 9. The word *that* marking the declaration, or thing said, is omitted before *thus*. This ellipsis is common, and requires some attention from the junior scholar, otherwise he will be apt to use the indicative, or subjunctive, instead of the infinitive, mood.

It may be necessary, also, to admonish him not to join *potens*, which is an adjective, and not a participle, with the infinitive mood. *Being able* is expressed by the particle *cum* and *possum*, as, "Not being able to break the bow," *Cum arcum frangere non posset*. When the expression refers chiefly to knowledge, and not physical ability, the verb *Scio*, or *Nescio*, is elegantly and appositely used. Thus, "I can speak Latin," *Scio Latine*, *sciz. loqui*, "Not being able to find his way out," *Cum exire nesciret*, or *Exire nesciens*.

EXERCISE.

Androgeos being treacherously slain in Attica, Minos, king of Crete, inflicted on the Athenians all the evils of war, and divine vengeance wasted the country. They were visited at once by famine and pestilence; and their rivers were dried up. In these circumstances, Apollo advised them to appease Minos; whereupon the anger of the gods would cease, and their calamities come to an end. Accordingly, having sent mediators, and requested reconciliation, they entered into an agreement, to send, every ninth year, seven young men under the age of puberty, and as many virgins, as a tribute to Minos. When these were carried to Crete, the fabulous account says, that they were either destroyed by the Minotaur in the Labyrinth; or that, wandering up and down, and not being able to find an outlet, they perished with hunger.

OBSERVATIONS.

POPULUS. PLEBS. GENS. NATIO.

Populus means, “the whole of the people, high and low.” *Plebs*, “the common people,” opposed to *proceres*, or *optimates*, “the nobles.”—“*Gens et populus a natione ita fere differunt, ut gens et populus latius, natio angustius quid sit. Ita Germanorum gens est seu populus; Saxonum natio.*” (*Nolt.*)—Dumesnil gives nearly the same distinction. *Gens* is the root, or stock, containing many families, (*familiaë*), or even nations (*nationes*). It is the generic term in respect to *natio* and *familia*. Thus, “*Gens Cornelia*” is the whole of the Cornelian race, including Corn. Scipio, Corn. Lentulus, Corn. Rufinus, &c. Each of

these formed a family. "Ex gente Domitia duæ familiæ claruerunt, Calvinorum et Ahenobardorum." *Suet. in Cl. Ner. cap. i.* *Gens*, in respect likewise to *Natio*, is generical, implying the whole race. Thus, the Germans may be called *gens*, the Saxons *natio*; or, if we rise higher, the Europeans may be called *gens*, the Germans *natio*. *Gens* is even, sometimes, applied to the whole human race—As, "Gens hominum est huic belluæ adversa." *Plin. viii. 25.*

"People," or "*Persons*," is rendered by *Homines*. "A people," or "A nation," by *Populus*,—thus, "Many people," *Multi homines*. "A great people," *Magnus populus*.

EXERCISE.

When the period of the third tribute came, and it behoved those parents, who had sons not arrived at full maturity, to resign them to the lot, complaints and murmurs rose again among the people, who were grieved and offended, that he, who was the cause of all, bore no part in the punishment. These murmurs of the nation reached the ears of Theseus, and galled him exceedingly. He determined, therefore, to take his share in the fortune of the citizens, and, accordingly, delivered himself up without lot. The whole nation admired and applauded his magnanimity. Ægeus, having in vain conjured him to relinquish his purpose, and seeing him resolute, gave out the lots to the others. When the lots were cast, Theseus took with him all those, on whom the lots fell, and set sail for Crete.

OBSERVATIONS.

ACCEDERE.

APPROPINQUARE.

The former signifies to advance towards any place, whatever may be our distance from it. “*Appropinquare, est prope, propius, vel proxime accedere,*” (*Dolet. Etym.*) denoting that the person advancing is but a short distance from the place. “Cum inde Romam proficiscens ad Aquinum accederet, obviam ei processit magna multitudo.” *Cic. Phil. ii.* “Sed gesta res exspectatur; quam quidem aut jam esse aliquam, aut appropinquare confido.” *Cic. Ep. Fam. 11.*

Accedere, “To approach,” is commonly construed with *ad*, or *in*. Livy sometimes uses the dative. When it signifies to agree with a person, it is almost uniformly joined to the dative, as “Accedam in plerisque Ciceroni.” *Quint. lib. ix. cap. 4.*—When it signifies “To agree to any thing,” it is followed by the dative, or by *ad*—thus, “Condemnari malebant, quam ad ejus conditionem pactionesque accedere.” *Cic. in Verr.* Tacitus says, *Sententiæ accedere*. *Accedere*, when it signifies to be added, is construed in the same manner, but more frequently with *ad*, and is, accordingly, in this sense, always followed by an adverb of motion to a place, and never by one denoting motion or rest in a place. “Cum ante paulum jam roboris accessisset ætati.” *Cic. pro Cæel. Huc accedebat*, “To this was added.”—“Eo ac-

cedebat, quod judices e lege Rupilia dati non erant." *Cic. in Verr.* "Volo enim ad id, quod mea causa fecisti, hoc etiam accedere," *Cic. Ep. Fam.* 13, "This also to be added." In English, we have a similar use of the derivatives. From *accedere*, "To approach, or come," we have "accession," or "coming," as "The king's accession to the throne." From *accedere* "To be added," we have the same noun, denoting *addition*, as "They gained fresh accessions of strength." And from this verb, signifying "To agree to," we have the verb "To accede," as "I accede to your opinion."

Potiri, "to become master of," or "to get into one's power," governs the genitive, or ablative. It has been remarked, however, by some critics, that Cicero, when he employs the verb *potiri*, to express the acquisition of sovereignty or political power, uniformly joins it with a genitive case, as *potiri rerum*, *potiri regni*, *potiri civitatis*. This remark we believe to be correct. "Quod ii, qui potiuntur rerum, præstaturi videntur." *Cic. Ep. Fam.* i. 8. The two examples, in which he is represented, as imitating an earlier usage, by joining it with an accusative, are questionable, and not to be imitated.

This verb has either an active, or passive, signification; thus, "Atheniensium potiti sunt Spartiatæ." *Auct. ad Her.*—"Hostium potitus est." "He got the enemy into his power." In the following passages it denotes, "To come into the power of," "Nam postquam meus rex potitus est hostium," *Plaut. cap.*

i. 1. 24, "After he came into the power of the enemy."

—"Nec dissentit eum mortis letique potitum,
Jampridem quem mens vivum se cernere credit."

Lucr. iv. 770.

CANDIDUS.

ALBUS.

Popma and Servius define these words thus,—
"Illud (*candidum*) cura, hoc (*album*) natura fit."—
They admit, at the same time, that this distinction is very frequently violated—and the truth of the concession may be evinced by numberless quotations. That *candidus* is often used to denote natural, and not artificial, whiteness, the following examples, which the reader may consult at his leisure, are sufficient to prove.—*Hor. Car.* iii. 15. 5.—*Hor. Ep.* ii. 2. 4.—*Virg. Ecl.* ii. 16.—*Virg. Geo.* iii. 387.—*Ovid.* xx. *Ep.* 140.—*Or. Met.* ix. 388.—*Met.* xii. 247.

According to Hill, "they agree in denoting one colour, but differ, as the latter, *candidus*, expresses the brightest white possible, as well as certain shades of it, and is applicable to subjects of nature and art; while the other expresses but a shade, and is applicable to subjects of nature alone." He adds, "*Candidus* expresses not only the brightest white possible, but also the highest degree of it." To this explanation it may be objected, that, if *candidus* imply the greatest degree of whiteness, it ought to be opposed to *ater*, whereas it is almost always opposed to *niger*, and to *ater* is opposed *albus*. "*Albo* opponitur

atrum, candido nigrum," says Festus; and this opinion rests on very general authority.—"*Album, an atrum vinum putas?*" *Plaut. Men.* v. 5. 17. "*Albus, an ater sis nescio.*" *Cic. Phil.* In Martial also, in whose epigrams we naturally look for strongly marked antithesis, we find *candidus* almost uniformly opposed to *niger*.—See iv. 62—viii. 77—xii. 34. This is certainly the general usage; though we sometimes find *albus* and *niger* opposed to each other.

It may be answered, that *candidus* may be opposed to *niger*, as it implies the different shades of white. But this appears to me to involve another difficulty. Whatever may be the quality denoted by *candidus*, it clearly admits intension and remission; for we find *candidus* compared. Now, if *candidus* denote the highest degree of whiteness, as Dr. Hill affirms, how can the adjective admit comparison? As the learned author remarks of *ater*, that it cannot be compared, because any intension of the deepest black is impossible, and a remission would reduce it to some of those shades, that are expressed by another term; so we may remark of *candidus*, that any intension of the greatest white is impossible, and a remission would reduce it to the signification of *albus*, or some other attributive. In short, if we say, it expresses the greatest degree, it cannot admit comparison; and if it does not denote the greatest degree, the definition is erroneous. If we say, that *candidus* expresses the highest degree of whiteness, and also all the shades, in other words, the highest and the lowest, we intro-

duce confusion by rendering the term vague and indefinite. What idea are we to annex to *Candida colla*, *Candida brachia*, and other similar expressions? Is *candidus* to be interpreted as meaning the highest, or as denoting the lowest degree of whiteness?

The author, indeed, says, that *candidus* implies resplendence, of which there are various degrees.—This is admitted; but degrees of whiteness and degrees of resplendence are not identical; and it is the quality of whiteness, as expressed by *candidus*, with which we are at present concerned. Whatever may be the degrees of resplendence, therefore, which *candidus* is capable of expressing, we cannot concur with Hill in saying, that it expresses the highest degree of whiteness, and also all its various shades. That an adjective, in the positive form, should express the greatest degree of the quality, and yet be capable of comparison, involves an absurdity.

The learned author remarks, that Virgil has employed *album* in an uncommon sense, in the following passage,—“Strymoniamque gruem, aut album dejecit olorem.”—*Æn.* xi. 580.

The whiteness of the swan, he says, is one of the brightest of natural substances, and of course is properly, and almost always, expressed by *candidus*. *Albus*, he says, has here no definite meaning, and serves only to eke out the line, into which a more proper word could not conveniently be introduced. Virgil, however, is not singular in this usage.—Ovid says, —“Ad vada Mæandri concinit albus olor.”—*Her.*

Ep. vii. 2.—and also,—“ *Ut non cygnorum, sic albis proxima cygnis.*”—*Ov. Met.* xii. 509.

From the collation of a vast variety of passages, it appears to me, that though these terms, as Popma and Servius observe, are often indifferently used, there is, notwithstanding, a difference between them, and that the distinction is strictly this: *Albus* is applied to the whiteness of nature only; *candidus* to natural and artificial whiteness. So far we concur with the two learned authors, whom we have now mentioned. *Albus* means a pale, or what we call a dead white, that is, without gloss, and also the greatest degree of it. The latter circumstance may, it is conceived, be fairly inferred, from its not admitting comparison. For though Varro has given us *albius*, and *albissimum*, I know of no other good authority, by which this comparison is supported*. *Candidus* denotes not a pale and dead, but a pure, beautiful, and shining whiteness, whether that of nature, or of art. Admitting comparison, it expresses this quality in greater or less de-

* In no instance, perhaps, are errors against metaphysical propriety more likely to be committed, in any language, than in assigning degrees of quality to adjectives, whose signification does not admit intension or remission. Thus we read in English, in authors too, from whom greater accuracy might be expected, “chiefest,” “more universal,” “most extreme,” though the simple terms *chief*, *universal*, *extreme*, denote the highest possible degree. In like manner we find in Latin *maxime gravissimus*. *Liv.* xli. 23. See *Drakenborck's Annotation*. *Maxime humanissimus*. *A. Gellius*, xxiii. 16. *Maxime liberalissimus* is imputed to Cicero; but, we apprehend, unjustly.

grees ; but in the positive state it expresses the quality simply, or absolutely. As *ater* generally, and, in truth, strictly denotes that great degree of blackness, which is unpleasant to sense, and sometimes excites emotions of fear, so *albus* frequently denotes a sickly and unpleasant whiteness. *Candidus*, on the contrary, always conveys a pleasurable idea—uniformly denoting resplendence, with purity and beauty. Hence it is frequently used to express beauty—thus,—“Sed alius ardor, aut puellæ candidæ.”—*Hor. Ep.* xi. 27.

Hence also it is often opposed to *sordidus*.—Cicero, metaphorically using the term, defines “*Candidum dicendi genus*” to be “*Quod non est sordidum, et intellectu facile.*”—*Candidus* is employed, metaphorically, to denote also “pure,” “candid,” “sincere,” “benevolent.”—See *Ov.* iv. *de Pont.* xiv. 43.—*Hor. Ep.* i. 4. 1.—*Id. Ep.* i. 6. 68.—*Id. Ep.* xi. 16.

In the following line from Horace, we have *candere* applied to a colour not white, and merely denoting *splendor*.—“*Rubro ubi cocco Tincta super lectos canderet vestis eburnos.*”—*Sat.* ii. 6. 102.

The difference then between *Albus* and *Candidus* may be correctly stated thus—*Albus* means, a pale, dead white—*Candidus*, a lively shining white. *Albus* expresses the greatest degree of the quality—*Candidus* the quality simply and absolutely, the former excluding, and the latter admitting comparison. *Albus* conveys an idea either unpleasant, or indifferent.

(See *Pers. Sat.* iii.—*Hor. Carm.* ii. 2. 15.—*Hor. Ep.* vii. 15.) *Candidus* always denotes a pleasurable feeling, implying purity and beauty. *Albus* is applied to natural whiteness—*candidus* to natural and artificial whiteness. *Albus* is confined to material things, *candidus* extends to things material and intellectual. *Albus* is restricted to one colour, *candidus* extends to whatever is brilliant.—See *Thyles. de Coloribus*.

Oblivisci is construed with an infinitive in two different senses. “Quod si scribere oblitus es.” *Cic. Ep. Fam.* vii. 14. “If you have forgotten how to write.” “Ne obliviscar vigilare.” *Cic. Att.* vi. 1. “That I may not forget to watch,” or “neglect to watch.”

EXERCISE.

When he arrived there, most historians tell us, that Ariadne, having fallen in love with him, gave him a clue of thread; and that, being instructed by her, how, by means of this, he might extricate himself from the windings of the labyrinth, he killed the Minotaur. When he was returning home with Ariadne, and the young men, upon their approaching the coast of Attica, he forgot to hoist the white sail, which was to signify to Ægeus, that they were safe. Ægeus, therefore, in despair, threw himself from the rock, on which he sat, and was dashed to pieces. Theseus obtained the government; but a few years afterwards, being dethroned by his adversaries, he fled to Lycomedes, king of the Syrians, who, in order to oblige Menestheus, put Theseus to death.

OBSERVATIONS.

ANIMADVERTERE.

OBSERVARE.

“Notamus *rem*,” says Dumesnil, “*ut memoriæ hæreat*; observamus, *ut judicium feramus*.” The purposes of the two acts, denoted by the verbs *notare* and *observare*, are here correctly distinguished.

Animadvertere, it has been already observed, signifies sometimes, “To notice without intention,” and sometimes, “Purposely to direct the attention to any object.” *Observare* means, “To observe narrowly,” or “To watch,” implying always a conscious effort. Thus we may say, *Eum animadverti, et observari*, “I noticed, and watched him.”—“Observes filium, quid agat.” *Ter. And. i. 1. 142.* “Ego te in consulatu observâram.” *Cic. 7 Fam. Epist. 27.*

Note; That *animadvertere in aliquem*, by an *ellipsis* of *supplicio*, signifies to “punish any one.”

MOS.

CONSUETUDO.

Varro is quoted by Macrobius, as giving the following explanation of *mos*. “Varro de moribus, *morem esse dicit in judicio animi, quem sequi debeat consuetudo*;” Festus says, “*Mos est institutum patrium, sive ad sacra pertineat, sive ad alia quælibet, cujus usus, seu cultus perseverans, consuetudinem facit*.” Quare *mos præcedit, ut causa*; *consuetudo sequitur*. Macrobius, quoting the following passage from Virgil, —“*Mos erat Hesperio in Latio, quem protinus urbes,*

Albanæ coluere sacrum." *Æn.* vii. 501,—observes, that the addition of the epithet *sacrum*, shews that the poet and Festus entertained the same opinion respecting the signification of the word *Mos*, and the words which follow,—“Nunc maxima rerum Roma colit”—express the steadiness and perseverance signified by *Consuetudo*. He adds, “*Mos* ergo præcessit, et cultus moris secutus est, quod est consuetudo.” *Mac. Sat.* lib. iii. cap. 8. According to this explanation, *Mos* answers very nearly to our words, “custom,” and “usage.”—*Consuetudo* to the word “habit.” In lib. vii. cap. 9, he calls *Consuetudo* “*secunda natura*,” “a second nature.”

Consuetudo, says Noltenius, “Est jus quoddam non scriptum, tacito consensu populi, et voluntate utentium introductum: *mos* autem est ipse actus, et usus inveteratus, ex quo consuetudo induci solet.” The meaning here assigned to *Consuetudo*, is its technical signification, as it is used by writers in jurisprudence, though it is by them very often confounded with *Mos*.

The proper signification of *Quisque* has been already explained. It is here to be observed, that *Quisque* is distinguished from *Omnis* and *Cunctus*, by its junction with the superlative, and rarely with an adjective, in the positive, or comparative, degree.—“Si quodque antiquissimum tempus spectari oporteret.” *Cæs. B. G.* i. 45. “Optimus quisque facere quam dicere malebat.” *Sall. B. C.* cap. 8. “Ii primo cœpere pessimum quemque necare.” *Id.* cap. 51.

“Summi cujusque bonitas commune perfugium est omnium.” *Cic. Off.* ii. 18. The superlative is not only used with *quisque*, when it modifies the subject itself, but also, when it qualifies some accident, property, or quality belonging to it. Thus, “Optimo quisque et splendidissimo ingenio longe illam vitam huic anteponit.” *Cic. Off.* lib. iii. 5.—When it is joined with a superlative, and with it expresses the subject, the predicate is elegantly put in the superlative degree—thus, “Every good man is a zealous assertor of liberty,” “Optimus quisque libertatis acerrimus est vindex,” *Cic.* literally, “Every best man is the most zealous assertor of liberty.”—The idiom of our language does not admit a close or literal interpretation of such expressions, and as they are frequently rendered by the English positive, it is the more necessary to attend to the difference of idiom.

While we say, that one quality simply, one property, one state, &c., implies the existence of another, the Latins, when they used *Quisque*, expressed, that the least or greatest degree of the one implied, or involved, the least or greatest degree of the other. Thus, “Prudentissimus quisque negotiosus maxime erat.” *Sall. B. C.* 8. “Colendum esse quemque maxime, ut quisque maxime his virtutibus lenioribus erit ornatus.” *Cic. Off.* i. 15. “Ut quisque erit conjunctissimus, ita in eum benignitatis plurimum conferetur.” *Ib.* i. 16. “Ut quisque maxime per-

spicit,—is prudentissimus et sapientissimus rite haberi solet." *Ib.* i. 5.

Quisque may be elegantly joined with a comparative, if accompanied with any general term of excess—as *quo, eo*—thus, "Quo quisque est solertior, et ingeniosior, hoc docet iracundius, et laboriosius." *Cic.* In all other cases, a writer studious of elegance should avoid joining it with a comparative; and with a positive, we believe, it is seldom or never found, unless in authors of inferior note. Cicero, Cæsar, Livy, and Sallust, never, we believe, employ it with a positive.

In regard to the place of *Quisque*, it is to be observed, that, when it occurs in a clause with *suus*, it is to be placed immediately after the pronoun, and before the substantive, with which the pronoun agrees. Thus, "Suus cuique mos." *Ter. Ph.* ii. 3. 14. "Suam cuique mores plerumque conciliare fortunam." *Nep. Att.* "Pro sua quisque potentia certabant." *Sall. B. C.* 39. "Suum quisque noscat ingenium." *Cic. Off.* i. 31. It is also placed after superlatives, and ordinal numerals; thus *maximus quisque, primus quisque*, not *quisque maximus*, or *quisque primus*. With a superlative, or an ordinal numeral, *omnis* or *quisque* is rarely, if ever, used. We say *Tertio quoque anno*, not *omni*; *fortissimus quisque*, not *omnis*.

The junior reader should be careful to distinguish between *nemo non*, denoting *quisque*; and *non nemo*,

signifying *aliquis*, or *aliqui*. *Nemo non odit*. "All men hate." *Non nemo odit*. "Some men hate."

EXERCISE.

Zeno, born at Elea, is reported to have left his native country, in which he might have enjoyed freedom in security, and to have gone to Agrigentum, then sunk into a state of the most wretched slavery, hoping that he should be able to correct the savage temper of the tyrant Phalaris. But, when he observed, that the habit of domineering had more influence with him, than the wholesomeness of his counsels, he inflamed every youth of rank in the city with a desire to assert the liberty of his country.—The tyrant heard this, and having summoned the people into the forum, began to inflict severe tortures on Zeno, asking, every now and then, who were his accomplices. Zeno named every person that was friendly to the tyrant, and upbraiding the Agrigentines with their timidity, he so roused them, that, moved by a sudden impulse, they stoned Phalaris to death. Every good man hates oppression, and the fortune of Zeno changed the condition of a whole city.

OBSERVATIONS.

QUOD AD.

QUOAD.

QUOD.

It has been disputed, whether *quoad* can be joined with an accusative case. Those who maintain the negative, affirm, that *quoad* is never joined to any case but the genitive, and that *quoad hoc*, "As to this," *Quoad corpus*, "As to the body," and such phraseologies, though common in modern Latin, are

not sanctioned by classical authority.—Borrichius attempts to defend them; and quotes two passages, one from Livy, and another from Varro, in which *quoad* is joined to an accusative case. The passage from Livy he quotes thus—"Quod stipendium serius quoad diem præstaret." *Liv.* xlii. 6. The meaning intended to be expressed is, "Because he paid the tribute later than the day appointed." That the reading, as here given is incorrect, we may warrantably presume, for the following reasons :

1st. No such expression is to be found in any other part of Livy. Considering the frequency with which the idea expressed by "as to," "in regard to," occurs in this author, we should naturally expect, that the phraseology in question would have repeatedly occurred, if Livy had approved it. In an author so voluminous as the Roman historian, its absence every where, unless in this solitary passage, furnishes a strong presumption, that the reading is false.

2dly. "Quoad diem," "As to the day," unless we are to regard the speaker as a contemptible quibbler, is an expression, which conveys no rational meaning. For it is to be observed, that *quoad*, if used for *quod attinet ad*, has a discriminative, or antithetic effect. Denoting "in relation to," or "in regard to," it implies, that the subject to which it points is either directly, or indirectly, opposed to something else, or particularised as distinct from it.—*Quod ad me attinet*, is contradistinguished to *Quod ad alios attinet*.—*Quod ad humeros attinet, amictus*, to *Quod ad reli-*

quum corpus attinet.—*Quod ad culturam attinet mediocris*, to *Quod ad cætera attinet*. He surely then did not mean to say, that he was too late as to the day, but not as to the month, or the year.

3dly. Not only is *quoad*, joined to an accusative, found no where else in Livy, but *quoad* preceded by a comparative, is found in no classic author whatever. We may, therefore, it is presumed, fairly conclude, that the reading is erroneous. Gronovius conjectures, that *quoad* has inadvertently been written for *Quam ad*; and in this conjecture, which reconciles the expression with Livy's usual phraseology, we readily concur. In the passage which Borrichius quotes from Varro*, and also in the following, which the critic overlooked, "Sic magna trium discrimina terræ, quod refert, utrum sit macra, an pinguis, an mediocris quoad culturam, pinguis fæcundior ad multa, macra contra," *Varro de Re Rust.* lib. ix.—in both these passages, unless we are to admit a phraseology totally repugnant to analogy, and the authority of every other writer, we must presume, that here also *quoad* has, through ignorance or inadvertence, been received for *quod ad*.

Is then, it may be asked, *quod ad* a proper, and correctly classical expression? We presume it is not; but this phraseology, whether it be, or be not, consistent with the best classical usage, is at least recon-

* "Hæc sigillatim triplicia esse debent, quoad sexum, multitudinem, casum." *Varro de Re Rust.*

cibleable with syntactical analogy. We consider *quod ad* to be an expression not justified by good authority; but as we find *quantum ad*, a phraseology precisely analogous, used by Tacitus, it is not improbable that *quod ad* may have been used by Varro in a similar manner, for which *quoad* has been erroneously substituted. "Ipse quidem, quanquam medio in spatio integræ ætatis ereptus, *quantum ad gloriam*, longissimum ævum peregit." *Vit. Agr.* cap. 44. Thus much is certain, that neither Cicero nor Cæsar, nor Livy, nor any of those, whom we esteem the best models of composition, ever employed this form of expression, but always *quod attinet*, or *quod spectat*. Thus, *Quod ad vos attinet*, "As to you." "Præcipuum metum, quod ad te attinebat, habui, nequod hic tumultus dignitati tuæ periculum afferret," *Cic. Fam. Ep.* viii. 10, "As to you, my chief fear was, lest this tumult should in any way endanger your dignity." Noltinius has, indeed, given a passage from an Epistle of Cælius to Cicero, in which *quod ad* occurs without *attinet* or *spectat*. But that the expression is not warranted by Cicero, we may safely affirm; for it is utterly repugnant to his uniform phraseology. Lambinus, whose erudition will not be questioned, reads, "Quod ad Cæsarem attinet, crebri, et non belli, de eo rumores." *Cic. Fam. Ep.* lib. viii. *Ep.* 1.

Before dismissing this part of the subject, we would remark, that through the ignorance or inattention of copyists, *quoad* has, in numberless instances, been inserted for *quod ad*, and, in many of these, in

utter violation both of sense and analogy. Of this fact, the following example from Cicero will serve, at least, as one evidence. “*Quoad quemque pervenit, pervenerit ex præda.*” *De Leg. Agr.* It is thus given by Stephens.—From what edition he has taken this reading, we know not; but it requires no great share of penetration to perceive, that not only the syntax, but the meaning also, demand *quod ad*; and in this manner Lambinus reads the passage.

The next question is, whether *quoad* governs the genitive. The argument from analogy is equally hostile to an affirmative answer, as to the assertion, that *quoad* governs the accusative. Nay, it would seem, that *quoad ejus* is less reconcileable with analogy, than *quoad hoc*—for that *quoad* may have been originally two separate words, and that the noun following was under the government of *ad*, is at least a possible supposition. But by what analysis we are to account for *quoad* governing the genitive, or by what hypothesis we are to reconcile it with the established rules of syntax, I confess myself utterly at a loss to conceive. Will it be said, as Perizonius supposes, that *quoad* is compounded of the adverb *quo*, and the preposition, as *adeo* is compounded of *ad* and the adverb *eo*, and that *quo*, as an adverb of place, governs the genitive? That *quo* is joined to the genitive, is true; but it is in those cases only, where progress or tendency to any point is implied, either literally, or figuratively. *Eo* as an adverb of motion governs the genitive; but does *adeo* also govern the same case?

If we suppose *quoad*, in this sense, to be compounded of *quod* and *ad*, we meet with objections equally insurmountable. What syntactical explanation can be given of *quod ad ejus fieri potest*? Can *ejus* be under the government of *ad*? This will not be maintained. And if we suppose the genitive to be governed by *quod*, we admit an inversion contrary to the uniform practice of prose writers.

The solution of Scioppius is still more absurd. In the expressions, "*Quoad ejus fieri potest.*" *Cic. Fam. Ep. v. 8.* "*Quoad ejus facere poteris.*" *Fam. Ep. iii. 2.* he supposes that *ejus* is under the government of *fieri* and *facere*, used here like substantive nouns, and equivalent to *factum*. But, as Perizonius observes, what sort of expression would be "*Quoad ejus factum poteris*"?—Such a solution is too absurd to require refutation. The conjecture of Perizonius is certainly more probable; who supposes *ejus* to be under the government of *aliquid* understood. But can Perizonius produce a single example to justify this conjecture? Can he adduce a single instance in which the governing word in similar expressions is understood? We find, *Quicquid hujus*, *Nihil hujus*, *Nihil istius*, *Quid ejus*, but not one example can be produced, in which the governing word *Nihil*, *Quicquid*, *Aliquid*, is suppressed. The expression is clearly repugnant to analogy; and to these forced and whimsical explanations are those critics compelled, who attempt to defend it.

It may, perhaps, be replied, that neither repug-

nance to analogy, nor any other grammatical objection, will subvert a positive fact. This is granted; but it requires no common evidence to establish a fact, either irreconcilable with experience, or contrary to analogy. But what is the fact? It is said, that *quoad* is actually found joined with the genitive—so is *quoad* with the accusative; but do the advocates for *quoad ejus*, who likewise reject *quoad hoc*, admit this argument? They do not; but, on the contrary, maintain that *quoad*, with an accusative, is an erroneous reading for *quod ad*. Let them admit both, and they will judge consistently; but to reject the one because contrary to analogy, though found in several passages, and to admit the other, equally repugnant to analogy, because it is found in a few examples, is palpable inconsistency. Both phraseologies are, in our opinion, equally objectionable; and both should be rejected. That *quoad ejus* has been erroneously substituted for *quod ejus*, we are inclined to believe, for the following reasons.—1st. The terms *quod* and *quoad* are so nearly alike, that a careless, or ignorant, copyist might easily mistake the one for the other. 2dly. We find numberless undisputed passages, in which *quod* is used in this sense. “Quod tuo commodo fieri possit.” *Cic.* “Quod sine molestia tua facere poteris.” *Cic.* “Quod commodo tuo facere poteris.” *Cic.* “Quod poteris ab ea pellito,” *Ter. Eun.* ii. 1. 9, “As far as you shall be able.” 3dly. By rejecting *quoad*, and adopting *quod*, we remove every syntactical difficulty, and reconcile the phrase to the rules of analogy. The

expression is then precisely similar to the following, of the accuracy of which there can be no question.—“*Quicquid hujus feci.*” *Ter. Eun.* i. 2. 122. “*Nihil istius me facturum.*” *Ter. Heaut.* iii. 3. 10. “*Siquid ejus esset.*” *Plaut. Cas.* iii. 2. 26. 4thly. *Quod ejus* is approved by editors of the greatest erudition, and is sanctioned by the authority of reputable manuscripts. This, at least, is the case, in several instances—“*Id ut eos prohiberet, quod ejus sine bello posset.*” *Liv.* xxxix. 45. This is the reading given by Drakenborch, and is approved by J. Fr. Gronovius, Duker, Le Clerc, Hearn, Crevier, and several other eminent critics. Gronovius was the first, that restored the *quod*, for which he had the authority of several manuscripts. These arguments incline us to reject the *quoad*, and adopt *quod*. Of two readings, the one repugnant to every principle of analogy, and the other perfectly accordant with established rules, the latter surely is to be adopted, even though the majority of manuscripts, or editions, should not favour that reading*.

* The author of a learned critique, in the “Monthly Review,” on the “Monstrophics of Huntingford,” (late Bishop of Hereford,) disapproves the expression *Quoad metrum*, and recommends *Quoad metri*. His words are these, “We should have been better pleased with *metri*, as *Cic. ad Att.* ix. 12. Other examples of the genitive occur in Cicero and Livy, while ancient authorities for the accusative after *quoad*, are very rare.” The learned author of “Monstrophics” admits, in his “Apology,” that *Quoad metri* would have been the preferable expression. The learned Reviewer, in his critique on this Apology, now rises in his tone of censure, and pronounces, (*ni fallitur*,) *Quoad me-*

It may be observed in passing, that as *quoad* means not only "as long as," but also "to the time when," and the termination of an antecedent, being the same with the commencement of a period, immediately consequent, the conjunction may be joined to verbs of contrary signification, the clauses yet express-

trum as wrong, and *Quoad metri* as right. To a doctrine proposed and admitted by authorities so respectable, it would be more gratifying to yield, than to withhold, one's assent. But the doctrine appears to be erroneous; and the ground, on which it is defended, utterly untenable. If the arguments, which have been here adduced to prove, that *quoad* is uniformly an adverb, that it is incapable of government, and that, when it appears with an accusative, it is a corruption for *quod ad*, when with a genitive, it is a corruption for *quod*; if these arguments are valid, the opinion of the learned critics falls to the ground. But as they proceed on the presumption, that *quoad ejus* is a correct lection, we shall, for the sake of argument, admit the accuracy of this reading. Will this justify the expression *Quoad metri*, for "As to the measure"? We apprehend, it will not. For, it may be asked, can a single example be produced analogous to *quoad metri*? Can a single example be produced, in which *quoad* is joined to a genitive, in an absolute sense? a single example, in which *quoad* with a genitive occurs without a finite verb in the same clause? Not one, we venture to affirm. Of the few, that do occur of *quoad* with a genitive, (admitting the common lection,) the clause, in all of them, contains a finite verb. Thus, *Quoad ejus fieri possit*, *Quoad ejus facere poteris*, *Quoad ejus fieri potest*. We contend, therefore, that the examples adduced are in no respect analogous to *quoad metri*, absolutely construed; and that, whether the *quoad*, in these examples from Cicero, be, or be not, a corruption for *quod*, the expression *quoad metri* is not justified by them.

The Reviewer observes, without any note of dissent, that

ing one and the same thing. Thus *quoad vivet*, and *quoad morietur*, "as long as he shall live," and "until he die," denote the same period, the termination of one state, being the commencement of its contrary.

An adverb expressive of quantity, sometimes becomes the nominative to a verb, and is considered to be of the neuter gender, and generally of the singular number. "Satis de hoc dictum est." *Cic. Partim*

Perizonius conjectures, that the genitive with *quoad* depends on *aliquid* understood. This opinion of Perizonius appears to be inadmissible, and we have assigned our reasons for rejecting it. But, if the suppression of *aliquid* could be admitted as probable, the construction would be rendered complete, and the syntax preserved inviolate. If we say, *Quoad* (*aliquid*) *ejus fieri potest*, *Quoad* (*aliquid*) *ejus facere poteris*, the pronoun *aliquid* is, in the one instance, the nominative to the verb, and in the other, it is the regimen of the verb *facere*. But when we say, absolutely, *Quoad metri*, "As to the measure," and attempt to solve this singular phrase, by saying, that *aliquid* is understood, it may be pertinently asked, in what case is *aliquid* to be considered? It is neither the nominative to a verb, nor is it governed by any verb. The learned Reviewer will not affirm, that it is governed by *quoad*; for he denies that *quoad* can govern an accusative. In what case, then, it may be asked, is *aliquid* to be considered? And why is it in that case? If it be the nominative, to what verb is it the nominative? If the accusative, by what is it governed? To these questions, we conceive, no answer can be given, consistent with the doctrine of the Reviewer, or the acknowledged principles of syntax. The expression, therefore, *quoad metri*, we humbly conceive to be repugnant to analogy, unauthorized by a single example, and utterly incapable of any solution, which can be reconciled with the established rules of syntax.

used, as an adverb of number, for *aliqui*, or when repeated, for *alii*, has the power of a collective noun, and is joined with a plural verb. “Sed eorum partim in pompa, partim in acie, illustres esse volucrunt.” *Cic. de Orat.*

EXERCISE.

When the Consul perceived these murmurings of the soldiers, he assembled them, and thus addressed them. “You have heard, soldiers, in what manner our affairs have been conducted in Algidum : the army there was such, as it became that of a free people to be. For my part, the measures, which I shall adopt, and the spirit, with which I shall be actuated, will be dictated by your conduct. The war may be protracted to advantage, or it may be speedily terminated. If it must be prolonged, I will augment your valour and your hopes by the same discipline, as I adopted at first. If you have already spirit enough, and are determined to fight, raise here such a shout, as you will raise in the field, as a token of your inclination and your courage.” When the shout was raised, he informed them, that he would lead them to battle next day. They conquered, and the senate decreed a thanksgiving.

OBSERVATIONS.

A verb is frequently, with great elegance, changed into a participle—thus, “Antony was defeated, and fled,” *Antonius victus in fugam se contulit*—that is, “Antony being defeated fled.” “They subdued the enemy, and led them in triumph,” *Hostes domitos in triumphum duxerunt*—that is, “They led the enemy,

being subdued." "He conquered the Samnites, and returned to Rome," *Samnitibus victis, Romam regressus est.*

Nunciare Romæ, and *Nunciare Romam, in urbe*, and *in urbem, Carthagine* and *Carthaginem*, are two modes of expression sanctioned by good authority. The former is the more common with Livy, and is very frequently used by Cicero. Were we to reason from analogy, attending to the difference between *Convenire in urbe*, and *in urbem*.—*Abdere se in silvas*, and *in silvis*, we should naturally infer, that *Nunciatum est Romam*, means, that "News was brought to Rome," and *Nunciatum est Romæ*, "It was told at Rome," implying, that the news originated there.

This distinction, however, though subservient to precision and perspicuity, is not uniformly observed, the genitive and the ablative with *in* sometimes denoting either of the two conceptions. But, when *in* with the accusative is used, motion to the place is universally implied. "*Pompeio in hortos nunciavit.*" *Cic. pro Mil.* can have only one meaning. "He came into the gardens and told Pompey," or, "He brought the news to Pompey, into the gardens."

It has been already observed, but it may be useful to remind the scholar, that the idiom of the Latin language requires, according to the practice of the purest writers, that, whatever is in the accusative case after the active verb, become the nominative to it in the passive voice; and that, when the verb governs

two accusatives, the person become the nominative to the passive verb. Hence, as we say, in the active voice, *Persuadeo hoc tibi*, "I persuade you to this," or "I convince you of this," we should say, *Hoc tibi persuadetur*, not *Tu persuaderis*. This rule is uniformly observed by Cicero, Livy, Cæsar, and Sallust. It is sometimes violated by inferior writers, and in modern Latin it is but rarely observed—thus, "*Capuam fallacibus Annibalis promissis Italiæ regnum nefaria defectione pacisci persuasam, armis occupaverat.*" *Val. Max.* iii. 8. 4.

An inversion of the clause, by placing the nominative after the verb, is frequently conducive to strength, to perspicuity, and to elegance. This inverted order should be employed, when any particular stress is to be laid on the nominative. The first, and the last words of a sentence are the most conspicuous. The first word calls the attention of the hearer, and on the last it rests. Quintilian, speaking of the close of a sentence, says, "*Hæc est sedes orationis; hoc auditor exspectat: hic laus omnis declamat.*" He adds, "*Proximam clausulis diligentiam postulant initia, nam et ad hoc intentus auditor est.*" *Quint.* ix. 4. Till a period is closed, the curiosity of the hearer is suspended. Now, when the idea expressed by the verb, or predicate, is to be assigned the preeminence, the verb follows the nominative, and concludes the period. But when it is intended, that the subject, rather than the predicate, shall appear the more prominent, the nominative follows the verb, and

closes the sentence. Thus, "Carus fuit Africano superiori noster Ennius." *Cic.* "Dixit hoc comes item P. Clodii, C. Clodius." *Cic. pro Mil.* "Eodem mentis proposito usus est Scipio." *Val. Max.* iii. 2. 13. "Valeant, valeant cives mei." *Cic. pro Mil.* Reverse the order in these sentences, and not only is the expression enfeebled, but likewise the primary object on which the attention here rests, receives comparatively only cursory notice.

"Apud Helvetios longe nobilissimus ac ditissimus fuit Orgetorix." *Cæs. B. G.* "By far the noblest and richest man among the Helvetii was Orgetorix." It is impossible to alter this arrangement, without violating the sentiment. It is the intention of Cæsar to fix the reader's attention on the subject of discourse—*Orgetorix*, therefore, concludes the sentence.

In conformity to the same principle, the nominative, in English, frequently follows the verb. The cases, in which this arrangement is proper, are specified in most of our English grammars. We shall here only mention one particular instance, in which, in order to call the notice of the reader, the sentence is introduced with the word *there*, while his attention is allowed to dwell on the principal subject, placed for that purpose at the close of the sentence; thus, "There flourished in our state, characters of the highest renown, Tib. and C. Gracchus," "Viguit in nostra civitate, Tib. et C. Gracchorum summa nobilitas." *Val. Max.* vi. 3. "Erant in ea legione duo fortis-

simi viri centuriones." *Cæs. B. G.* v. 44. "There were in that legion two very brave men."

2dly. This arrangement, while it imparts to the subject a greater degree of prominence, sometimes enables the writer to preserve an uninterrupted connection between dependent words, and clauses.—"Adjungitur enim accusationis cogitatio, non parva res, sed nimirum omnium maxima." *Cic. pro Mur.* "Premebat reum, præter vulgatam invidiam, crimen unum, quod M. Valerius, qui ante aliquot annos tribunus plebis fuerat, testis extiterat." *Liv. iii. 13.* "Jacent suis testibus ii, qui Clodium negant eo die Romam reditum fuisse," *Cic. Pro. Mil.* To introduce the last of these sentences with the nominative, would not only destroy the emphasis here laid on the subject (*ii*), but also give an impression of meanness to the clause. With peculiar beauty and force does Cicero, therefore, introduce the sentence with the predicate; then he expresses the cause, and by noting the subject last, he allows the reader's attention to rest upon it, while the antecedent and relative are thus closely connected. "Urbem Romam sicut ego accepi, condidere atque habuere initio Trojani, qui, Ænea duce, profugi, sedibus incertis vagabantur; cumque his Aborigines, genus hominum agreste, sine legibus, sine imperio, liberum atque solutum." *Sall. B. C.* cap. 5. Here it would be impossible to alter the collocation without injuring the sentence. As it stands, the first and the last words of the introductory clause express the principal subjects; and of these the superior in rank,

which is the subject also of the relative clause, occupies very properly the last place, and is thus closely connected with the relative pronoun. Had the author concluded the period with the two principal verbs, the beauty of the sentence would have been impaired, its force weakened, its harmony broken, and the principal subject thrown partly into the shade. “Hoc loco apte referantur, Polystratus et Hippoclides philosophi, eodem die nati, ejusdem præceptoris Epicuri sectam secuti, patrimonii etiam possidendi, alendæque scholæ communione conjuncti, eodem momento temporis ultima senectute extincti.” *Val. Max.* i. 8. Here the verb is very properly followed by the nominatives, and to these is subjoined, in close connection, a description of their common pursuits and circumstances. Had *referantur* followed *philosophi*, the connection would have been somewhat interrupted; and had it been placed at the end of the sentence, it would have given it a stiff and formal appearance. For this reason, we dislike the following arrangement, “Hic cernere licet omnium versuum genera, quibus Horatius Lyricorum Romanorum princeps usus est.” Preferably, we think, “Quibus usus est Horatius, Lyricorum Romanorum princeps.”

By placing the verb before the nominative, the connection between sentences is more strongly marked. “Horum virtuti nihil cedit Q. Cotius, qui propter fortitudinem Achilles cognominatus est.” *Val. Max.* iii. 2. The sentence is, with great propriety, introduced with *horum*—thus continuing the connection

between it and the sentence preceding, the pronoun referring closely to the persons previously mentioned. *Cotius*, the principal subject, concludes the clause, and is placed in close connection with the relative pronoun. Had the author said, *Q. Cotius horum virtuti nihil cedit, qui propter fortitudinem Achilles denominatus est*, it is easy to see, that the structure of the sentence would have been materially injured.

3dly. The inverted arrangement is adopted for the sake of variety—thus, “Cum alterum Italiæ latus Annibal laceraret, alterum invasisset Asdrubal.” *Val. Max.* viii. 4. “Mecum erat hic, ille ne advocatus quidem venit.” *Cic. pro. Cæl.* In the two following exercises this arrangement is exemplified.

It has been already observed, that what is called the future subjunctive, is in fact, an indicative tense, and ought to be named the future perfect; implying that an action now future and imperfect, will be finished at some future time, or before the completion of some other action likewise future. Sometimes both the future actions are expressed as perfected and contemporary, as “*Gratissimum igitur mihi feceris, si ad eum ultro veneris*,” that is, “If you shall (have) come, you will do (have done) me a very great favour.” *Cic. Ep. lib. vii. 22.*

Sometimes the future action, which, in order of time, must be antecedent to the other, is expressed indefinitely by the future indicative, no regard being had to its completion, while the other action or event, which, in order of time, must be subsequent, is ex-

pressed in the future perfect—thus, “*Pergratum mihi feceris, si disputabis.*” *Cic.* When the two actions, or states, are to be represented as contemporaneous, the future of the indicative is used to denote both. “*Si egebis, tibi dolebit.*” *Cic. pro Cæl.*

EXERCISE.

M. Cicero greets D. Brutus. In one day I received three letters from you, one of them short, which you had given to Volumnius; two at greater length, one of which was brought to me by the letter-carrier of Vibius; the other Lupus sent to me. From your letters, and from the speech of Græceius, it would appear, that the war is so far from being extinguished, that it is even inflamed. I doubt not but you clearly see, that, if Antony shall gain strength, all your meritorious efforts for the state will issue in nothing. Word has been brought to Rome, and, indeed, every one is convinced, that the spirits of Antony are broken, and that he has fled. Some complain that you have not pursued him; and think, that he might have been crushed, if sufficient dispatch had been employed. The man, who shall crush Antony, will finish the war. Farewell.

OBSERVATIONS.

To the observations introductory to the preceding exercise, we shall subjoin the few following:—The nominative is frequently put after the verb for the sake of euphony—Thus, “*Quousque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra? Quamdiu etiam iste furor tuus nos eludet? Quem ad finem sese effrænata jactabit audacia?*” Place *jactabit* last, and the cadence

of the sentence will be injured, while the coition of the vowels will offend the ear. In respect to euphony in general, it may, indeed, be observed, that the concurrence of vowel sounds should be avoided. “Qui (vocalium concursus) cum accidit, hiat, et intersistit, et quasi laborat oratio.” *Quint.* ix. 4. To this rule, however, Cicero himself does not appear to have been very scrupulously attentive. He confesses that the violation of the rule argues some degree of negligence; but maintains, at the same time, that the softness produced by the concurrence of vowels is pleasant to the ear. “Habet ille tanquam hiatus, et concursus vocalium molle quiddam, et quod indicet non ingratham negligentiam de re hominis magis quam de verbis laborantis.” (See “Preliminary Observations.”) The concurrence of harsh consonants should also be avoided. The ear will here be a sufficient guide.

Though, as Quintilian observes, we must necessarily speak in long and short syllables, of which the various metrical feet are composed, we should be careful to avoid, at the close of a sentence, any poetical modulation, particularly two spondees, the last feet of a spondaic hexameter, and also a dactyle, followed by a spondee, unless they are composed of three words, “Duo spondei non fere conjungi patiuntur, quæ in versu quoque notabilis clausula est, nisi cum id fieri potest ex tribus quasi membris, ut *Cur de perfugis nostris copias comparat is contra nos*, una syllaba, duabus, una.” On this principle Quintilian censures the first clause of Sallust’s “Jugurthine War.” “Non

minore autem cura vitandum est quicquid ἐρρηθμὸν, quale est apud Sallustium; *Falso queritur de natura sua.* Quamvis enim vineta sit, tamen soluta videri debet oratio." *Quint.* lib. ix. cap. 4. Turnebus pronounces this clause an excellent Iambic verse. One thing is evident, it is constructed with more of poetical rhythm, than is consistent with the principles of prose composition.

If the sentence conclude with a spondee, Quintilian observes, that a cretic -υ- may with great advantage to euphony be placed before it—as, "Criminis causa." This advantage will be increased, if the two feet form only one word—as, "Archipiratæ." A Tribrach before a spondee, he thinks, is still preferable, as *facilitates*. A spondee should not be preceded by a Pyrrhic υυ, and still less by a Pæon Primus -υυυ.

In respect to cadences, we find the critics of antiquity by no means agreed. The subject is, in a great measure, a matter of taste; unity of opinion, therefore is not to be expected. The most eligible closes are considered to be Epitrit. Primus υ--- Epitrit. Tert. --υ- Epitr. Quart. ---υ A Choriambus -υυ- A Bacchic and Iambus υ--υ- A Tribrach and Spondee υυυ-- A Spondee and Anapæst. --υυ- Epitr. Secundus -υ-- occurs likewise very frequently. The close of the following sentence is also approved by Cicero, "Patris dictum sapiens temeritas filii comprobavit." With this cadence, we are told by Cicero and Quintilian, the Asiatics were wonderfully delighted.

A number of short syllables should be avoided at the end of a sentence, and the members should swell towards the close. “Augeri enim debent sententiæ, et insurgere.” *Quint.* ix. 4. Of this, the following passage from Cicero furnishes a short, but beautiful example, “Habet honorem quem petimus; habet spem, quam propositam nobis habemus; habet existimationem, multo sudore, labore, vigiliisque collectam.” *Cic. de Orat.*

But though considerable attention ought to be paid to the cadence of sentences, there can be no doubt, as Quintilian observes, that an excessive attention to this nicety savours too much of affectation and labour, and that a rough and harsh composition is preferable to that which is effeminate and nerveless. It is justly observed, also, by a modern writer, that a cadence uniformly smooth resembles the murmurings of a stream, which, not varying in the fall, causes, at first attention, at last drowsiness.

It may be remarked also, that, though classic writers were generally careful to avoid poetical numbers, in their prose compositions, we find these occurring, even in authors of the highest name. “DisplICEO mihi, nec sine summo scribo dolore.” *Cic. ad Att.* lib. ii. 18. Here we have a complete hexameter line. “Quum sint dicta, in conspectu consedimus omnes.” *Acad. Quæst.* lib. iv. In the following sentence we have an *Iambicus Trimeter*, “Senatus hæc intelligit, consul videt.” *Cic. Orat. in Cat.* 1. “Bellum scripturus sum, quod populus Romanus.” *Sall.*

B. J. cap. 1. These clauses form a spondaic hexameter.—“*Successit tibi Lucius Metellus.*” *Cic.* Here we have a Phalæcian verse. The avoidance of all poetical numbers in prose composition it would be vain to attempt; and, were it even practicable, would, in some cases, be improper.

It is observed by Noltenius, that *natus* is generally used without a preposition, if the family, or stock, be expressed, and with a preposition, if the parent be signified either by noun or pronoun—as, *Ex me natus est. Nobili genere natus.* With the generic terms *stirps, genus, locus*, we believe the preposition is very rarely employed; but it is also very frequently omitted, when the parent is signified. “*Eodem patre nata.*” *Nepos.* “*Patre certo natus.*” *Cic.* “*Creusa matre natus.*” *Liv. i. 3.*

EXERCISE.

L. Petronius, a person of low origin, had, through the kindness of P. Cælius, arrived at the rank of knighthood. Placentia, of which Cælius had been appointed governor by Octavius, having been taken by Cinna’s army, Cælius, now an old man, to prevent his falling into the power of the enemy, fled for assistance to the hand of Petronius. The latter endeavoured to divert him from his purpose, but he did not succeed; he determined, however, not to survive him, and they fell together.

To Petronius should be joined Sex. Terentius, though he had not the good fortune to die for his friend. Brutus fleeing from Mutina, when he knew, that Anthony had dispatched horsemen to murder him, was on the very point of being taken, when Terentius threw himself in their way, and

pretended that he was Brutus. Aided by the darkness of the night, the stratagem succeeded to his wish. He was soon, however, recognized by Furius; but before that time Brutus had escaped.

OBSERVATIONS.

CINGERE.

CIRCUMDARE.

These verbs agree in signifying “to surround;” but the former implies a closer encircling than the latter, and is used for “to gird,” or “to bind tight around.” “Cinxerat et Graias barbara vitta comas.” *Ov. Trist.* iv. 4. 78. “Regio cincta mari, circumdata insulis.” *Cic. pro Flac.*

Saltus is commonly defined to be “*silva non facile pervia*,” but it signifies also *campi spatium*, “a lawn,” or “open space between woods.” Dumesnil gives it the meaning of “defile,” in contradistinction to *silva*, *nemus*, *lucus*, “un defilè, un lieu, où il faut sauter, pour s’en tirer.” “Tuus exercitus vix unum saltum tueri potest.” *Cic. Ep. Fam.* viii. 5. “Scarcely defend one defile.” In this sense it seems to have been used by Cæsar, in the narrative, whence the following exercise is taken, denoting simply “a narrow passage.” We find Livy employing it in a similar acceptation, and as synonymous with *angustia*. “Sed antequam venias ad eum, intrandæ primæ angustię sunt; et aut eâdem, quâ te insinuaveras, retro via repetenda; aut, si ire porro pergas, per alium saltum artio rem (*al.* altio rem) impeditio remque evadendum.”

Liv. ix. 2. Duncan, in his translation of Cæsar, has rendered it by the word “avenue,” but not, we apprehend, with sufficient precision.

The Roman foot contained four *palmi compressi* or “hand-breadths,” equal to sixteen *digiti transversi*, “finger-breadths;” and like the *as* was divided into twelve *unciae* or *inches*. The *passus* consisted of five of these feet.

TUMULUS. COLLIS. MONS. JUGUM.

Tumulus, *i. e. colliculus*, “a hillock,” *collis* (monticulus) “a little hill,” *mons* “a hill or mountain;” *jugum* specially understood “the top,” or “summit,” but sometimes denoting the hill itself.

DAMNUM.

DETRIMENTUM.

Damnum est amissio bonorum, “damage from the loss of a good once possessed,” *detrimentum*, quod fit usu et consumptione, *a deterere*, is, literally, “injury from use or wear.” The former expresses deprivation; the latter deterioration. Thus also *deterior* is *minus bonum a bono*; *pejor* is *e malo magis malum*. The English word *worse*, though with some impropriety, is used in both senses; but in strictness of speech, it is inapplicable to a thing, which is not even bad, or which is not chargeable with the attribute in any degree.

EXERCISE.

The little hill upon which the enemy were posted, rose from the bottom with an easy ascent. It was almost wholly surrounded by a morass, difficult and obstructive. To this spot the Gauls, confiding in the nature of the ground, and having demolished the bridges, confined their station. They at the same time, by stout detachments guarded the fords and narrow passes of the morass, courageously prepared, if the Romans should attempt to force their way through, to assail them from the higher ground, while entangled in the mud ; so that one, who considered only the nearness of the armies, would have supposed, that the enemy were ready to fight on almost equal terms ; but that a person, looking at the inequality of the position, would have discovered all this to be empty pretence, and mere ostentation. Cæsar's soldiers being indignant, that the enemy could stand the sight of them at so short a distance, and calling for battle, Cæsar explains how great loss, and how many brave lives the victory must cost ; and assuring them that their safety was dearer to him, than his own fame, he led his army back into the camp.

OBSERVATIONS.

ATER.

NIGER.

“ *Ater*,” says Dumesnil, “ denotes a coal black colour.”—“ *Tam excoctam reddam atque atram, quam carbo est.*” *Ter. Ad. v. 3. 63.* *Niger* means simply, “ Black.” “ *Spectandum nigris oculis, nigroque capillo.*” *Hor. De Art. Poët. 37.* The former implies the greatest degree of blackness, and is, therefore as Hill observes, not found in a state of

comparison, except in Plautus, in whom we find the comparative degree of this adjective. *Niger* admits comparison, as it denotes all the various shades of black, and is, therefore, capable of intension and remission. *Niger* being the generic term*, every thing

* Hill says, that *Ater* is "the generic term, as it signifies the deepest black in nature." This is, truly, a singular error—an error, which every reader, conversant in the dialectic art, cannot fail to detect. But as we have had frequent occasion to use the term *generic*, and shall still have to employ the word, it may be of some service to the young reader, if we occupy a few minutes in attempting to explain and illustrate its meaning.

Language is composed of general terms. To create a distinct name for every individual object, would be a labour at once impracticable and useless. Of these names, some are more, and others are less general; and that, which may be a generic name, in relation to one term, may be a special name, as contrasted with another. The term *generic*, therefore, as will presently appear, admits degrees, and is, in its import, relative. But the highest generic name can never become a special one, nor the lowest special become a generic term.

In looking around us, we cannot fail to remark, that many of the objects we perceive, resemble one another in their most obvious qualities and properties. Those, then, which have the same leading character, we refer to one class, and, instead of assigning a name to each individual, we assign a general name to the whole class. Thus, we give the name *Man* to the whole human species; and this name is applicable not only to the species, as a whole, but also to every individual of that species. Finding that man, and other living creatures, resemble one another in the common property of life, we ascend a step higher, and reduce them all under one general class, to which we give the name of *Animal*; a name applicable at once to the whole, and also to every individual living creature. *Animal*,

coal black may be called *Niger*, but every thing black cannot be called *Ater*. It is to be observed also, that *Ater* generally conveys the idea of something gloomy and horrible, hence it is applied to the Furies, as "*Erinnyes atræ*." *Ov.* Unlucky days, among the Romans, were named *Dies atri*. *Niger*, on the contrary, is frequently applied to things beautiful and pleasant, and never conveys the idea of "frightful," "horrific," or "unpleasant to sight." *Ater* is supposed by one writer, to denote a blackness not natural. In this he errs. We have "*Ater capillus*." *Ov. Am.* xiv. 9. "*Atra bilis*." *Cic.* "*Ater filius*." *Ov.*

therefore, in relation to *Man*, is a generic term, and *Man*, in reference to it is special. Finding that all things around us have the common property of existence, we ascend still higher, and include all under one common class, to which we give the still more general name of *Being*. In relation to *Being*, *Animal* now becomes a special term, as *Being* is, in relation to it, a generic term. Here we are obliged to stop; *Being* is, therefore, termed by Logicians, *Genus summum*, or *Genus generalissimum*, and cannot, therefore, become a special term. If we descend, and subdivide the lowest term, we proceed from *Being* to *Animal*; from *Animal* to *Man*; from *Man* to *European*; from *European* to *Englishman*; from *Englishman* to *Londoner*; and from *Londoner* to *Edward*, *James*, or *John*, as individuals. Each term, except the first, is a *Genus*, in regard to the term immediately succeeding it, and a *Species*, in reference to the term preceding, till we at last arrive at *Londoner*, which is called *Species infima*, and has no generic character, but expresses a species of which the lowest terms, *Edward*, *James*, *John*, are individuals.

Here it is worthy of the young reader's attention, that, while the *genus* includes more individuals than the *species*, the name

RELIGIO.

SUPERSTITIO.

Though *religio* and *superstitio*, with their derivatives *religiosus* and *superstitiosus*, are often used indiscriminately by classic writers, we find them occasionally distinguished, as are the two correspondent terms in English. “*Religiosum a superstitioso Varro in libris rerum divinarum ita discernit, ut a superstitioso dicat timeri deos, a religioso autem tantum vereri —ut parentes, non ut hostes timeri.*” *Popma*. “*Evenerant prodigia, quæ neque hostiis, neque votis piare fas habet gens superstitioni obnoxia, religionibus adversa.*” *Tac. Hist. v. 13.*

It has been observed by several grammarians, that to the four acknowledged concords, of an adjective

of the species implies more ideas than the name of the genus. *Animal*, for example, comprehends more individuals than *Man*, the former embracing all living creatures, whether rational or irrational; the latter expressing the rational only. But the term *Man* implies in it more ideas than *Animal*, the latter denoting that of life only; the former, the idea of life, with those also of reason and speech; that is, it denotes, in the language of Logicians, the *genus* with the specific difference.

These observations, it is hoped, will sufficiently explain to the junior reader, the meaning of the term *generic*, and enable him to perceive the error of the critic, who supposes *Ater* to be a generic word, because it expresses the greatest degree of black. A term is not generic, because it expresses the greatest degree, but because it comprehends, and expresses, a number of species. *Niger*, therefore, including every species of black, or black in general, is properly called the generic term; *Ater*, “Coal black,” the special term.

with its substantive, of a verb with its nominative, of a relative with its antecedent, and of a substantive with a substantive, a fifth may be added, which has been termed the *responsive*. Thus, *Quis hoc imperavit? Pater. Cuinam dedit? Mihi*. Here *pater* agrees with *quis*, and *mihi* with *cuinam*. The construction, however, is elliptical, *imperavit* being understood to *pater*, and *dedit* to *mihi*. The scholar, therefore, in order to avoid error, should supply the ellipsis. “Ex captivis quærit, quis castris ad Bagram præsit; respondent Saburam.” *Cæs. B. C. i. 84*. not *Sabura*, as agreeing with *quis*, but “Saburam,” *præesse* being understood.

EXERCISE.

After the battle of Actium, in which Antony was defeated, Cassius of Parma, who had espoused his cause, fled to Athens, where he is reported to have had the following dream. He thought he saw a man approach him of huge stature, with a squalid beard, of black colour, and long hair, and on being asked, who he was, that he answered, he was an evil spirit. Terrified, he awoke, and called aloud for his servants. When they came, he inquired, if they had seen any such person enter, or quit his chamber. On their answering in the negative, he again lay down to rest, and the same vision presented itself. Sleep now forsook him, and Cassius arose in a state of great perturbation. Between this night, and the day, on which he suffered the capital punishment inflicted on him by Cæsar, only a short time intervened. Superstitious men are prone to believe, that dreams are prophetic of future events, instead of considering

them to be, what they really are, mere indications of the existing state of body, or mind.

OBSERVATIONS.

ORIRI.

Oriri signifies "To come into existence, and spring up, or arise." "*Oriri*," says Festus, "est *Nasci et surgere*." It is applied to the origination of any thing, physical or immaterial. "Ipsum a se oritur, et sua sponte nascitur." *Cic. de Fin.* lib. ii. "Rhenus oritur de Lepontiis." *Cæs. B. G.* iv. 9. "Officia virtutis suo cujusque genere oriuntur." *Cic. de Fin.* lib. 3. In this sense, it is nearly synonymous with *Nasci*, the only difference being this, that *Oriri* denotes also "rising," or "ascent," beside origination or production. Hence it is used, in the former of these senses, as synonymous with *Surgere*, thus; "Stellæ oriuntur, et cadunt." *Ov. Fast.* i. 293. "Astra ignea surgunt." *Virg. Æn.* iv. 352.

Surgere is opposed to *Sedere* or *Recumbere*, and means "To rise from a sitting, prostrate, or recumbent posture." It is evidently an abbreviation of *Subrigere* or *Surrigere*, "To raise one's self up." It is properly applied to animate beings only; but by metaphor is used to denote also the rise, or growth, of things inanimate, and likewise the rise of any thing mental or immaterial. "Prætor de sella surrexit." *Cic.* Here it is employed in its strict acceptation.

SURGERE.

“Æquora surgunt.” *Virg. Æn.* iii. 196. “Messis surgit.” *Virg. Geo.* i. 161. “Per spes surgentis Iuli.” *Virg. Æn.* vi. 364. In the two last examples, it is used figuratively, and is synonymous with *Crescere*. “Quæ nunc animo sententia surgit.” *Virg. Æn.* i. 582. Here it is applied to a thing immaterial, and is equivalent to *Oriri*. Tertullian and Lactantius have incurred the censure of Vorstius for the misapplication of *Exsurgere*, in the following passages. “Si propheta exsurrexerit in te, aut somnium somnians, ne audiat sermone prophetæ.” *Tert. adv. Gnost.* “Orietur stella ex Jacob, et exsurget homo ex Israel.” *Lact. Inst. Divin.*

Arias Montanus, in his translation of Deuteronomy, xiii. 1. has committed the same error. “Si somnium somnians, aut propheta in medio surrexerit.” Into this error these writers were evidently seduced by the Hebrew phraseology. The verb קום is employed, not only as synonymous with *Surgere*, but also with *Nasci* or *Oriri*, though in the latter of these senses it but rarely occurs. *See Kings*, i. 3. 12. Inattentive to this two-fold import of the verb, they were naturally betrayed into a Hebraism, by adopting a word equivalent to it, only in its general acceptation. It seems to have escaped them, that the verb *Surgere*, when applied to a human being, means either his rising from a sitting, prostrate, or recumbent posture; or figuratively his growing, or his rising from a state of inaction to energy and exertion; but never denotes his coming into existence, or

his appearance in public life. Castalio rendered the passage with classical accuracy, by saying, “*Siquis propheta extiterit.*” It differs from *Oriri* in this, that *Surgere* does not imply the origination of any physical or material substance, as is implied in *Oriri*. If we say, *Flamma surrexit*, it means simply, that the flame, its previous existence being supposed, arose, or ascended. If we say, *Flamma orta est*, it denotes, that it originated and arose. They agree in this, that they each express ascent or elevation; and hence, when this rising is for action or energy, a compound of either may be employed, as in the following Exercise. Hence we have *Adoriri*, “To rise to,” or “To attack.”

DIGNUS QUI.

It has been already observed, that *dignus* and *indignus*, are followed by *qui*. This, at least, is the usage of the best prose writers. The poets often join them with the infinitive, “He is worthy of being loved.” *Dignus est, qui ametur*. “He will be worthy to be taught,” *Dignus erit, qui doceatur*. “He was worthy of being heard,” *Dignus erat, qui audiretur*. The scholar will bear in mind, that the same rule for the correspondent tenses is applicable here, as in the case of *Ut*, namely, that when the finite verb preceding the *qui* is either present, or future, the verb following the relative must be put in the present potential; and when the finite verb is imperfect, perfect, or pluperfect, the verb following

qui must be in the præter-imperfect potential.—The tense of the participle, or of the infinitive preceding *ut* or *qui*, inasmuch as they express merely relative time, or time in relation to the principal verb, has no influence over the tense, which should follow the pronoun—thus, “He says that he is worthy of being loved,” *Dicit eum dignum esse, qui ametur*. “He said, that he was worthy of being loved,” *Dixit dignum esse, qui amaretur*. It is *esse* in both examples; but in the former, we have *dicit*, and in the latter *dixit*.

LEX.

ROGATIO.

Rogatio is thus defined by Festus, “*Rogatio est, cum populus consulitur de uno pluribusve hominibus, quod non ad omnes pertineat; et de una pluribusve rebus, de quibus, non de omnibus sancitur. Nam quod in omnes homines resve populus scivit, lex appellatur.*” Atejus Capito, as A. Gellius informs us, gave the same definition of the term *rogatio*, and defined *lex* to be *Generale jussum populi aut plebis, rogante magistratu*. According to these critics, *Rogatio* means a special law, regarding one or more individuals, or for one or more particular purposes; *lex* a general law, regarding the whole community. *Rogatio*, according to Pitiscus, has a more extensive meaning, comprising every law enacted by the people. That this was the import of the term in the later ages of the Roman state, it would be easy to adduce incontestable evidence; nay, we find that

Cicero and Livy use *lex* and *rogatio* indiscriminately. But that the terms are not strictly equivalent, appears at the same time to be equally clear. *Rogatio* seems, in its original import, to answer nearly to our parliamentary term *bill*, or proposed law; while *lex* denotes a positive statute.

When the magistrate intended to propose a law (*rogaturus*), he communicated the law to the senate, who authorized him (*Senatus consulto*) to promulgate it for three market days, that the people might have an opportunity of knowing it. This was done by putting it up in public (*publice proponendo*), and he, or one of his friends (*auctor vel suasor legis*), read it over to the people. The promulgation being duly perfected, the magistrate summoned the people into the Campus Martius. In the early ages, they met in a part of the Forum called *Comitium*; and hence such assemblies, though their place of meeting was afterwards changed, were called *Comitia*. The *rogatio*, or business to be submitted to them was publicly read.—The usual form in consulting them (*consultendo vel rogando*) was “*Velitis, jubeatis, Quirites*,” and by their votes, which they gave in centuries, they either sanctioned, or rejected, the bill.

Hence the expressions *Legem vel rogationem jubere*—*Legem vel rogationem vetare*. *Rogatio* then, strictly, seems to denote, “asking the people to pass a bill or proposed law.” “*Rogatio fit, cum rogantur tribus. Si uti rogatæ responderint, tum lex est.*” See *Pitisc. Lex. Ant. Rom.* *Rogatio* and *Lex* dif-

fer therefore in this respect, that the one precedes the other, “*Prius est rogatio, postea lex.*” *Steph.* The former is the act of the magistrate, the other of the people. “*Magistratus rogat, populus jubet vel vetat. Rogatio accepta fit lex.*” To every voter were given two tablets, on one of which were the letters U. R. that is, *uti rogas*, “I vote, as you ask;” and on the other, the letter A, that is, *antiquo*, “I vote for the old way,” “I am for no change.” Hence was the phrase *antiquare legem*, “to vote against a new law.” But, though the term *rogatio*, in its strict acceptation, answers nearly to our word *bill*, it is frequently used in the same general sense with *lex*. We may here remark, that *abrogare legem* meant “to rescind or repeal a law;” *subrogare legi*, “to add something to an existing law;” *derogare legi*, or *legem* (*Cic. Frag. pro C. Cornelio*), “to take something from an existing law;” and *obrogare legi*, “to weaken or impair the force of a law.”

In such expressions as the following, “He did nothing, but read,”—“We do nothing, but ask;” the former of the two verbs is, in Latin, elegantly omitted—thus, *Nihil aliud, quam legit*—*Nihil aliud, quam petimus*.

Conjunctions are elliptically, sometimes, joined with the infinitive mood, that infinitive being governed by a verb understood. Thus, “What else do we, than tell them, that we are their brethren, and if we have not the same authority, that we yet worship the same Gods?” “*Quid aliud quam dicimus, nos esse*

eorum fratres, et *si* non eandem auctoritatem *habere*, eosdem tamen Deos venerari?" The verb *habere*, which here follows *si*, is governed by *dicimus* understood—thus, "What else do we do, than tell them, that we are brethren; and if we do not (tell them, that we) have the same authority, we (tell them that we) notwithstanding, worship the same Gods."

Civitas, the common signification of which is "a city, or state," indicates, by its termination, its abstract character; shewing its affinity in this respect to *lenitas*, *suavitas*, *felicitas*, &c. Hence it denotes, and, perhaps, strictly so, "citizenship," or "the freedom of the city." *Dare civitatem* means, "to confer the privilege of citizenship."

EXERCISE.

During these discussions in the Senate, Canuleius, tribune of the people, delivered the following speech.—"Romans, in what contempt the senators held you, and how unworthy they accounted you to live in the same city with them, or within the same walls, I have often, methinks, observed, on former occasions; but now most of all, when they have risen up with such fierceness against the bills, which we are now proposing. And by these bills what do we, but remind them, that we are their fellow-citizens, and if not possessed of the same wealth, we nevertheless inhabit the same country? By one bill we ask the right of intermarrying with the Patricians; a right, which is usually granted to nations bordering on Rome, and even strangers more remote. Nay, the freedom of the city, an advantage surely much superior to that of intermarriage, we have conferred even on vanquished enemies.

OBSERVATIONS.

TANDEM.

“*Tandem*,” says Tursellinus, “*proprie quidem est adverbium temporis ; sæpe autem vim habet instandi vehementius.*” In the latter sense, it is often, and not improperly, rendered, “pray,” “I pray.” “*Quonam tandem modo ?*” “In what manner, pray ?”

That, after the interrogative *Why*, or “what is the reason,” is elegantly rendered by *cur*, as *Quid est, cur, taceas*, “what is the reason, that you are silent ?” “*Quid est, cur in hoc loco sedes ?*” *Cic.* “Why is it, that you sit here ?”

SACER.

SANCTUS.

SACROSANCTUS.

Sacer, “sacred,” denotes “what is dedicated or consecrated to some deity,” not by private individuals, but by public appointment. Hence, says Festus, places where private sacred offices were performed were not deemed sacred. *Sacrosanctus* denotes what was by a public decree, and a solemn oath, declared sacred, and inviolable under the penalty of death. It is applied to things animate, and things inanimate, as *Sacrosancti tribuni*, *Sacrosancta potestas*, *Sacrosanctum fœdus*. *Sacer*, according to Manut. P. F. is confined to things inanimate ; and is never applied to a human being, unless in a bad sense.

Sacer, though generally applied to things inanimate, as *sacra ara*, *sacra sedes*, *sacer lucus*, is sometimes applied to persons, denoting either a consecration

to divine purposes, or a renunciation to divine punishment: Hence the term is applied to *Vates*, whose office it was to celebrate the honour of the Gods, and whom the people might, therefore, be inclined to respect as sacred. In the following passage, it is equivalent to *execrandus*, or *detestandus*,—
 “Uter ædilis fueritve, Vestrum prætor, is intestabilis et sacer esto.” *Hor. Sat. ii. 3. 181.*
 The violation of a thing consecrated to Deity (*res sacra*) was considered as a crime punishable by the Gods; the violation of a person, or thing, pronounced sacred by law (*res sacrosancta*) was regarded as a political offence, and punished by the magistrate.

Sanctus differs from these, as being the generic term. “Omnia sacra, et omnia sacrosancta,” says Manutius, “dicuntur *sancta*; non item omnia *sancta*, *sacra* et *sacrosancta*.” We say, “*ædes sacra*,” and “*templum sanctissimum*.” (*Cic. pro Sext.*) We say, also, “*tribuni sacrosancti*,” and “*tribuni sancti*.” *Cic. 3. de Leg.* “*Sancti Dii*, sed non *sacri*, vel *sacrosancti*. *Proprie divina sancta sunt; humana vero sacra et sacrosancta. Homines autem non vere, sed similitudine bonitatis sancti et divini vocantur.*” *Ald. Man. de Quæst. lib. i.*

As *rogatio* is frequently used for *lex*, and *rogare* for *decernere*, though the former (*rogatio*) properly means “a bill,” and the latter (*rogare*) “to ask the people, that it may pass into a law,” so *ferre*, though often signifying “to enact,” “to decree,” properly means, “to bring forward,” or “to propose a law,”

and *perferre*, “to carry it through,” or “to establish it as law.”

LIBERTUS.

LIBERTINUS.

Suetonius says, that *libertus* in the early ages of the Roman state, or at least until the time of Ap. Cl. Cæcus, the censor, denoted, “a freedman,” et *libertinus*, “the son of a freedman.” The correctness of this opinion has been questioned. We find *libertina* applied to a freedwoman by Plautus. See *Mil. Glor.* iv. 1. 15. Pitiscus considers, that a slave made free was called *libertus* in relation to his master, and *libertinus* as opposed to *ingenuus*, or “one born free.” See *Lex. Ant. Rom.*, where the subject is fully discussed.

EXERCISE.

“By the other bill we propose no innovation, we merely claim the restoration of the people’s right to confer honours on whom they please. What, pray, is the reason, then, that they make such an outrageous uproar? that I have narrowly escaped from being assaulted in the senate-house? that they even deny they will refrain from blows, and threaten to violate the sacred authority of a tribune? What? If the freedom of suffrage should be granted to the people, that they may commit the consulate, to whom they please, and if not even a plebeian, if worthy of the honour, shall be excluded from the hope of the consular dignity, is the destruction of the city the necessary consequence? Is the empire ruined? Or will it be said, that we may as well propose to make a slave or a freedman consul, as a plebeian? Do ye feel, in what contempt ye live?”

OBSERVATIONS.

FASTI.

COMMENTARIUM.

Fasti were public records, divided into *Majores* and *Minores*. To the former belonged the *Fasti Consulares*, in which were recorded the names of the consuls and dictators, the years of their several governments, their wars, their victories, and the changes that took place in the state, the secular games, and all memorable events. To these also belonged the *Fasti Triumphales*, which contained a record of the triumphs gained by the Roman generals, with the year, the month, and the day, on which each triumph was celebrated.

To the *Fasti Minores* belonged the *Fasti Calendares*. These records formed a regular Calendar from the beginning to the end of every month, a *Calendis ad Calendas*, and hence they had their name. In them were noted the *Dies Fasti*, and the *Dies Nefasti*, with the sacred festivals, that occurred in the course of the month. These records were, at first, accessible to the High Priests only, and the Patricians; but C. Flavius, a notary by profession, and, according to some authors, secretary to the High Priest, in the 450th year of the city, published a system of the civil law, which had formerly been concealed in the cabinets of the Priests; and drew up a Calendar of all the days, on which the courts were open. (See *Liv.* lib. ix. 46.) From that time the

Fasti Calendares became generally known. They were set up, for the information of the people, in the public places of the city ; and were even exhibited in the halls of men of opulence and rank. In the *Fasti Calendares*, it is probable, that no names originally were admitted, except the names of those deities, in honour of whom any festival was wont to be solemnized. In this respect, the record may be considered as a sort of church calendar ; and hence, it is not improbable, that the Popish Calendar took its rise. In later ages were inserted the names of heroes and of great men. The name of the individual was usually subjoined to the notice of some festival, and connected with some signal achievement, or remarkable occurrence in his history : and this was accounted a superlative honour. Servility and adulation soon admitted others also, who were totally unworthy of so distinguished a place ; and Pitiscus tells us, that Antony was the first, that intruded his name into the *Fasti Calendares*. On examining the passage, however, (*Cic. Philip. ii.*) we do not find sufficient authority for this assertion. Cicero objects to Antony, that he inserted his name after the *Feast of Luper-caliam*, as having offered the crown to Cæsar ; but he does not either stigmatize this insertion as a profanation of the *Fasti*, though in other respects highly reprehensible, nor charge him with being the first, that introduced the practice. Nay, he himself did the same with regard to Brutus. “ Ego enim D. Bruto liberato, cum lætissimus ille civitati dies illuxisset,

idemque casu Bruti natalis esset, decrevi, ut in fastis ad eum diem Bruti nomen ascriberetur.' *Cic. ad Brut.*

The *Fasti Pontificum* were accessible to the priests only. These contained all the secrets and mysteries of religion, with an explanation of its various rites and ceremonies. They made no part of the *Fasti*, which Flavius published.

The *Commentarii*, or *Annales*, were composed by the priests, and contained a succinct account of all the principal events of every year. They were likewise, though, in the opinion of Pitiscus, very improperly, called *Fasti*, the latter strictly implying nothing more than a mere calendar, distinguishing the *Dies Fasti*, and *Nefasti*, (the court and non-court days,) and noting the festivals and games in each month*.

NE QUIDEM.

These words, denoting "not even," are always separated by one and sometimes two words. "Sed querelæ, ne tum quidem gratæ futuræ." *Liv. præf.* "Ne hostis quidem approbavit." *Cic. Off. lib. i.* "Me vero nihil istorum ne juvenem quidem movit unquam." *Cic.* "Ne quid dicatur quidem intelligo." *Cic. Ep. Fam. iii. 8.*

* "Majores improprie a minoribus appellatione sumpta *fasti* nominati sunt. Nam ut illi (*sciz Fasti*) fastos nefastosque dies, sacra, epulas, ludos, ferias, ita hi (*sciz Commentarii*) consulatus, dictaturas, bella, victorias, aliæque continebant." *Pitisc. Lex. Ant. Rom.*

EXERCISE.

“Are you sensible, in what contempt you live? Were it permitted them, they would deprive you of your share of this very daylight. They are offended, that you breathe, that you speak, that you have the shape of men: nay, even (in submission to the Gods) they say, that it would be an impiety to make a commoner consul. I pray you, if we are not allowed access to the Calendars and Annals of the Pontiffs, are we, therefore, ignorant of that, which even strangers know, that consuls came in the place of kings, and that they have not a tittle of authority, or dignity, with which the kings were not invested before them? Do ye believe, we never heard, that Numa, who was so far from being a Patrician, that he was not even a Roman citizen, was called from the Sabine country, by the order of the people, and with the consent of the senators, elected king?”

OBSERVATIONS.

RADIX.

STIRPS.

Radix means, simply, “the root.” *Stirps* denotes “the root,” or “stock,” with the shoots springing from it. Metaphorically, it signifies “the parents,” or “the children.” In its literal signification, as applied to a tree, it is of the masculine or feminine gender; when it denotes a family, signifying either parents, or children, it is always feminine. “Imo de stirpe recisum.” *Virg. Æn.* xii. 208. “Validæ stirpes.” *Virg. Geo.* ii. 367. In these two examples, it is applied to a tree. “Antiqua a stirpe ortus.” *Virg. Æn.* i. 630. Here it is applied to the stock

or progenitors.—“Virilis stirps,” *Liv.* i. 1, “Male issue.”

When it is opposed to *Genus*, it has the same meaning with *Familia*. *Gens*, says Sigonius, refers always to the *nomen*, or the name of the family.—*Familia* to the *cognomen*, or surname. The former comprises the whole, the latter only a part. All the *Cornelii*, for example, are said to be *Unius gentis*, because they are included under one name. The branches of this family are more in number, and distinguished by a diversity of surname. They are called *Familiæ*—as Cornelius Dolabella, Cornelius Cethegus, Cornelius Scipio.—Festus, therefore, defines *gens* to be, that which is made up of many families (*ex multis familiis*). The same distinction, as is applicable to *gens* and *familia*, may be applied also to *genus* and *stirps*. The former refers to the name, and the latter to the surname, “Imagines et elogia universi generis exequi longum est; familiæ breviter attingam,” *Suet. in Galb.* “Ex gente Domitia duæ familiæ claruerunt.” *Suet. in Ner. C. Cæs. Vit. cap. i.* “Cujus gentis familia est nostra.” *Id. in Jul. Cæs. Vit.* “Qui aliquandiu propter ignorantiam stirpis, et generis in famulatu fuerunt.” *Cic. in Læl.* “Quid? qua de re inter Marcellos et Claudios patricos centumviri judicarunt? cum Marcelli ab liberti filio stirpe; Claudii patricii ejusdem nominis hæreditatem gente ad se redisse dicerent, non in ea causa fuit oratoribus de toto stirpis ac gentilitatis jure dicendum.” *Cic. de Orat. lib. i.* These two pleas are concisely and per-

spicuously thus expressed by Sigonius, "*Illi* (referring to Claudii mentioned in a sentence immediately preceding) generis, hi Marcelli familiæ jure contendebant." *Vide Sigon. Schol. in Liv. iv. 1.*—*Claudius* was the name of the parent stock, belonging to the *gens*, as opposed to *familia*; or the *genus*, as opposed to *stirps*. Claudii Marcelli were descendants from the Claudii, distinguished from other branches of the same stock, by the *cognomen* "Marcelli." To them were applicable the terms *stirps* and *familia*.

When the three terms, *Gens*, *familia*, and *stirps*, are contradistinguished one to another, they may be thus explained, *Gens* distinguitur nomine; *familia* cognomine; denique, cum *familiæ* denuo in novas *stirpes* abirent, factum est, ut *stirps* distingueretur agnomine. *Gens* complectitur in se *familias*; *familia* vero *stirpes*, in quas abiit. (See *Popma*.)

AUDIRE.

AUSCULTARE.

These verbs agree in denoting a perception by the sense of hearing, and are sometimes used indiscriminately. The distinction is, that, while the former is confined to the mere perception, the latter denotes also obedience to the will, or admonition, of the speaker, and reliance on his authority. "*Istis, qui linguam avium intelligunt, magis audiendum, quam auscultandum censeo.*" *Pacuvius, quoted by Cicero de Div. i. 57.* "Auditis, non auscultatis." *Cato.*

CIVIS.

INCOLA.

Civis, “A citizen,” denotes one who is invested with all the privileges of citizenship, or who is a member of the state. *Incola* signifies merely an inhabitant.—“Socrates totius mundi se incolam et civem arbitrabatur.” *Cic. Civis inquilinus* denoted one, who was not born at Rome, but who possessed the rights of citizenship, having no house of his own, but occupying a hired lodging. “At vero te inquilino, non enim domino, personabant omnia vocibus ebriorum.” *Cic. Philip. ii.* “Cum eum servaret M. Tullius inquilinus civis urbis Romæ.” *Sall. B. C. 32.* Cicero, who was born at Arpinum, is here sneeringly termed an adventitious citizen, lodging in the city.

Non modo is frequently used for *Non modo non*, the omission of the negative, in such cases, creating no ambiguity—as “Regnare Romæ advenam non modo civicæ, sed ne Italicæ quidem stirpis,” for “Non modo non civicæ,” *Liv. i. 40.* “Not only of a Roman, but not even of an Italian family,” would involve an absurdity. See also *Liv. lib. xxv. cap. 26.* Being used for *non modo non*, the expression is consequently sometimes employed for *nedum*. “Quos clientes nemo habere velit, non modo esse illorum cliens.” *Cic. Phil. ii. ad fin.* “Much less to be their client.”

We would here also remark, that *modo* or *solum* is sometimes omitted, while the negative is expressed, “Hanc autem, inquit, gloriam—tuæ quidem suppli-

cationi non, sed triumphis multorum, antepōnō." *Cic. Brut.* i. e. *non solum, sed.* "Non armis, sed vulneribus, oneratus tranavit." *Frontin.* 3. p. 460. Unless *solum* were here supplied, the meaning would be materially altered; *arms* would be excluded.

EXERCISE.

"Do you believe, we never heard, that L. Tarquinius, descended not only from no Roman, but not even from an Italian family, was made king, even in the lifetime of the sons of Ancus? Did we never hear that, after him, Servius Tullius, the son of a captive woman of Corniculum, whose father nobody knew, his mother also being a slave, gained the throne by his understanding and virtue? I need not mention Titus Tatius, whom Romulus himself, the parent of this city, accepted as his associate in the sovereignty of Rome. And so it was, while no family, whose virtue was eminent, was treated with disdain, the Roman empire flourished and increased. You may now despise a plebeian consul, though our ancestors did not disdain to receive foreigners for their kings; nor was the city shut against the merit of strangers, even after the abolition of the regal government."

OBSERVATIONS.

PATRES.

PATRICII.

Romulus following, as Dionysius Halicarnasseus informs us, the example of the Athenian state, chose a hundred men to assist him in the government. These were elected from the most intelligent, and most respectable citizens, and were named *Patres*, either because they were fathers of families, or be-

cause their charge resembled that of a parent. "*Patres* ob similitudinem curæ nominavit." *Eutrop.* "*Patres* certe ab honore, *patriciique* progenies illorum appellati." *Liv.* i. 8. These formed, at first, the Roman senate. Plutarch, in his Life of Romulus, informs us, that he afterwards added another hundred to their number. Livy, however, by his silence on the subject, may be considered as opposed to this authority. Those elected by Romulus were called "*Patres majorum gentium*," and those enrolled by Tullus Hostilius, Tarquinius Priscus, and Brutus, were denominated "*Patres minorum gentium*." This at least is the opinion of some critics. Others maintain, that all those, who were enrolled before the time of Brutus, were named "*Patres majorum gentium*," and those enrolled by him, "*Patres minorum gentium*." The original hundred, according to Pitiscus, were honoured with the name of "*Patres*;" whereas, those who were afterwards elected into the senate, were called "*Conscripti*." Livy, however, takes no notice of the term "*Conscripti*," till Brutus increased the number to three hundred, and applies it to those whom that consul enrolled into the number of senators. He informs us, that, when the new senate was convened, after the expulsion of the kings, the *Patres*, or former members, together with those chosen, and enrolled by *Brutus*, under the designation of *Conscripti*, were summoned to attend. "*Deinde quo plus virium in senatu frequentia etiam ordinis fieret, cædibus regis diminutum, Patrum numerum, primori-*

bus equestris gradûs lectis, ad trecentorum numerum, explevit ; traditumque inde fertur, ut in senatum vocarentur, qui Patres, quique Conscripti essent ; Conscriptos videlicet, in novum senatum appellabant lectos."

Liv. ii. 1. That the term *Conscripti* took its origin from the first enrolment, in addition to the members of the old senate, seems sufficiently evident ; nor can we doubt, that Livy was perfectly acquainted with the usage observed in summoning the senators, agreeably to the distinction, which he himself has stated ; for the words *traditumque inde fertur* do not refer to the existence of the distinction, but to the origin of the custom. And, as the designation *Patres et Conscripti* might appear invidious, it is supposed, that the conjunction was omitted, and the appellation of *Patres Conscripti* assigned to the senators in common. The descendants of the *Patres* were named *Patricii*.

When *Patricius* is opposed to *plebeius*, or *plebs*, it is not a distinction of rank which is implied, but a distinction of birth, or descent. Many of the knights were plebeians ; and those Patricians, who, by reason of their poverty, or the will of the Censor, were not admitted into the equestrian order, were still not considered as belonging to the Plebeians. A plebeian chosen into the senate, and invested with the highest offices, was still termed *plebeius*. Neither Cato nor Cicero, for example, was entitled to the appellation of *Patricius*. A person might be *nobilis*, though not *patricius* ; for at Rome, all those were accounted

noble, whose ancestors had borne any of the curule offices, namely, that of Dictator, Consul, Prætor, Censor, or Curule Ædile, whether they were Patricians, or Plebeians. These were entitled to the privilege of *jus imaginum*, or the right of possessing images of themselves, or of their progenitors; and the more of these images, or pictures of ancestry, any nobleman could shew in his hall, the more honourable was the family esteemed, whether patrician or plebeian. Now there were many Patricians, who were not noble; because none of their ancestors had been elevated to a curule office; for the rank of knight did not ennoble.

A man, who was the first of his family, that had raised himself to distinction, and attained civic honour, acquiring the *Jus imaginis*, was termed *Novus homo*.

It is a mere fancy of a learned critic, when he supposes, that there were Patricians of the common people; and adds, that there were three orders of Patricians—1st. Senators; 2d. Knights; 3d. “*Patricii de Plebe*.” That there were Patrician Senators, and Patrician Knights, is true; but that there were “*Patricii de Plebe*,” is false. To *Patricius* is not opposed *Senator*, or *Eques*, but *Unus de plebe*.

It was not unusual for a Patrician to pass into the order of Plebeians, or for a Plebeian to be translated into the class of Patricians, “*Ea gens, (Octavia,) a Tarquinio Prisco rege inter Romanas gentes allecta in senatum mox a Servio Tullio in Patricias transducta, procedente tempore ad Plebem se contu-*

lit, ac rursus magno intervallo per Div. Julium in patriciatum rediit." *Suet. in Vit. Cæs. Aug. cap. 1.* Accordingly we find families (*gentes*) of which one branch (*familia*) was plebeian, and another patrician. This necessarily happened, when not the whole family (*tota gens*), but only some branch of it (*quædam familia*), passed over from the Patricians to the Plebeians. This transition many were desirous to make, because it was thus rendered more easy to become a tribune of the people. "P. Clodium, inimicum ejus frustra jampridem a patribus ad plebem transire nitentem eodem die, horaque nona transduxit." *Suet. in Vit. J. Cæs. cap. 20.*—"Patricia gens Claudia (fuit enim alia plebeia, nec potentia minor, nec dignitate) orta est ex Regillis." *Suet. Tib. cap. 1.*—But the Claudii Patricii, though they had neither senator, nor knight, belonging to them, were not ranked with the plebeians, and were eligible to certain offices, which a plebeian was not permitted to fill. They might be chosen "Interreges," or "Flamines Diales," a station inaccessible to any Plebeian, even though of the equestrian or senatorian order. *Pitisc. Lex.*

The distinction between *populus* and *plebs* is thus expressed by A. Gellius, "In *populo* omnis pars civitatis, omnesque ejus ordines continentur; *plebes* vero ea dicitur, in qua gentes civium patriciæ non insunt." *A. Gell. x. 20.*

The reader will bear in mind, that in English, we say, "all of them," "all of whom," or "they all," "who all:" but that the latter only is admissible

in Latin; if the practice of the best writers be regarded. Of the other phraseology, I have never met with above one or two examples. The following is from Pliny, "Non omnibus animalium hi (sunt oculi)." *Nat. Hist.* lib. ii.

Some critics have said, that *similis*, when it governs the genitive, expresses a mental, and when joined to the dative case, denotes a corporeal, similarity. There is no foundation for this distinction. Wakefield, in one of his notes on Lucretius, (iv. 1204,) says, that likeness of body, or of external figure, is expressed either by the genitive, or the dative case, but that likeness of manners or disposition, is always denoted by the genitive with *similis*. This opinion is incorrect, as the example in the following Exercise from Livy, among many others, is sufficient to shew.

EXERCISE.

"It was certainly after this period, that we admitted the Claudian family, not only to the freedom of the state, but also into the number of the Patricians. Shall a foreigner then be first made a Patrician, and afterwards a consul? And shall a Roman citizen, because he is a plebeian, be precluded from all hope of attaining the consulate? Pray, do ye believe it impossible, that a brave and active man, excellent in peace and war, like to Numa, Tarquin, or Tullius, should be found among the plebeians? Well then, if there should be such a man, shall we exclude this person from the administration of our affairs? And shall we have consuls, like to the Decemvirs, the basest of mortals, all of whom were Patricians, rather than men resembling the best of kings, descended, as they were, from obscure families?"

OBSERVATIONS.

EXPELLERE.

EXIGERE.

Expellere, “to expel,” or “drive out,” implies some degree of force, actually exerted on the person of him, who is expelled. The simple verb *pellere* signifies to drive, or move by striking. *Exigere* denotes merely, “to make to go out,” whether by threats, actual force, or in any other way. If this definition be correct, we may say, “*Exegi, sed non expuli;*” but we cannot say the converse, “*Expuli, sed non exegi.*” Metaphorically they are used indifferently—as “*Lassitudo est omnis exigunda.*” *Plaut. Cap. v. 4. 4.* “*Quæ res omnem dubitationem expulit.*” *Cæs. B. G. v. 46.*

POSTEA.

The analysis of the adverb *postea* clearly points out its meaning, “after that,” “afterwards,” “from,” or “of, that,” “coming from that.” In the same sense is used the English word “then.” Hence we say, “What then?” “What of that?” “*Quid tum postea?*” *Ter. Hec. iv. 1. 36.*

CENSUS.

The *Census* was instituted by Servius Tullius, who ordered the people to deliver upon oath a list of their names, as also of their wives, children, freedmen, and slaves, specifying their ages, with the class and century to which they belonged, the quarter of the

city where they lived, and containing an estimate of all their property. The punishment for disobedience was scourging, with slavery and confiscation of goods. The *census* was at first taken by the kings, and afterwards by the consuls; the frequent absence, however, of the two chief magistrates in the prosecution of foreign wars, rendered it necessary, in the year of the city 310, to appoint a proper officer for this purpose, who was called *Censor*. Livy informs us, that, when Servius Tullius instituted the *census*, he divided the people into six classes. The first consisted of those, whose fortune was equal to 100,000 *asses*, or pounds of brass; and was subdivided into ninety-eight centuries, eighteen of which were composed of knights. The second consisted of those whose fortune was equivalent to 75,000 *asses*, and was subdivided into twenty centuries. The third, of those, who had 50,000 *asses*, subdivided also into twenty centuries. The fourth consisted of the same number of centuries; and their estates were 25,000 *asses* each. The fifth was divided into thirty centuries, and consisted of those, who had 11,000 *asses*. The sixth class, far the most numerous, comprised the rest of the people, and formed only one century. To the first class were attached two centuries of mechanics, for making and carrying the military engines.

Those who belonged to the first class were named "Classici;" hence the phrase "Classici auctores," for writers of the first rank: those belonging to the other classes were said to be, "Infra classem."

Those of the lowest class, who had no fortune, were termed “*Capite censi*,” “rated by the head.” The expression for taking this review, or list of the people, was “*Censum agere*,” *vel* “*Censum habere* ;” and the citizens were said to be “*Censeri modum agri, mancipia, pecunias*,” &c., *sciz*, “*secundum pecunias*,” that is, to be rated at a certain quantity of land, or certain number of slaves, &c. And when a citizen made his return of property, he was said, “*Profiteri*,” “*In censum deferre*.” The taxes imposed for the service of the state were proportioned to the property of each individual. None but citizens were rated ; except in one instance which occurred in the second Punic war, when, we are told, that the pressure of the time rendered it necessary to take a *census* of twelve colonies, in order to ascertain their population and property. *Liv. lib. xxix.* The rich, or those, who bore the chief expence of the state, were termed *assidui*, (ab *assibus dandis*,) and those, who paid annually only 1500 *asses*, or contributed nothing, but who by progeny augmented the physical power of the state, were named *proletarii* quasi a *proles*. Hence the former term denoted “the rich,” and the latter “the poor.” See *Cic. de Repub. lib. ii. cap. 22.*

The *Census* was generally taken at the end of every five years, and when it was finished, a purifying sacrifice was offered (*sacrificium lustrale*,) named *Suovetaurilia*, a sow, a sheep, and a bull being slain on the occasion. This ceremony was called *Condere lustrum*. “*Idque conditum lustrum appellatum, quia*

is censendo finis factus est." *Liv.* i. 44. Hence *lustrum* denotes a period of five years.

PONTIFICES.

The office of *Pontiff* was instituted by Numa. The first, who was invested with this dignity, was Numa Marcius; and, as Livy mentions no person associated with him, it is probable, that he alone held the office. In process of time, a college was formed, consisting of four members, chosen from among the patricians; and in the year 454, the number was doubled, four more being added from among the plebeians. These, and their successors, named "*Pontifices majores*," continued to constitute the whole college, till the dictatorship of Sylla, who added seven more to the number. These, and such as were elected in their place, were called "*Pontifices minores*." See *Panv. de Civ. Rom.* cap. 33.—*Flocc. de Potest. Rom.* i. 8. Others deliver it as their opinion, that the "*Majores*" were those chosen from among the patricians, and that the "*Minores*" belonged to the plebeians; and this opinion is strengthened by a passage in Livy, from which it would appear, that the distinction existed before the time of Sylla. (See *Liv.* lib. xxii. 57.) The president of the college was named "*Pontifex Maximus*."

The office of the *Pontifices* was, I. To prescribe and explain the proper manner, in which all religious rites should be observed. "*Numa primo pontifici sacra omnia exscripta exsignataque attribuit, quibus hostiis, quibus*

diebus, ad quæ templa sacra fierent. Cætera quoque omnia publica privataque sacra pontificis scitis subjecit." *Liv.* i. 20.—II. It was incumbent on them to superintend the conduct of the inferior priests, to attend particularly to the sacred fire of Vesta, and to punish any of the Vestals, who had been convicted of a crime. III. They were bound to assist in all public and solemn acts, in which religion was concerned, such as the dedication of temples, the consecration of altars, the pronunciation of vows, and all public supplications to the Gods. "Vovit in eadem verba consul, præeunte maximo pontifice." *Liv.* xxxi. 9. "Flavius ædem concordiæ—dedicavit; coactusque consensu populi Corn. Barbatus pontifex maximus verba præire." *Liv.* ix. 46. "Obsecrationem ipso jure pontifex maximus præiret." *Suet. Claud.* xxii.—IV. To regulate the Calendar, and to compose the Commentaries. *Pitisc. Lex. Ant. Rom.*—*Struv. Ant. Rom.* c. 12.

TRIBUNUS PLEBIS.

The tribunes of the people were created in the 260th year of the city. They were chosen from the plebeians; and were appointed for the purpose of protecting the common people against the tyranny of the patricians. Their persons were, therefore, declared inviolable (*sacrosancti*). At first only two were appointed, (*Cic. pro Corn.* c. i.) and Livy tells us, that these created to themselves three colleagues. *Liv.* ii. 33. At last ten were chosen—"Tricesimo sexto anno a primis tribunis plebis decem creati sunt." *Liv.* iii. 30.

This continued afterwards to be the legitimate number. They were each attended by a "Viator," or serjeant, and were invested with authority to apprehend the person of an offender. *A. Gell.* xiii. 12. "Ardens ira tribunus viatorem mittit ad consulem. Adolescentes nobiles stabant nihil cedentes viatori, tum ex his prehendi quosdam Lætorius jubet." *Liv.* 256. At first they were not dignified with the appellation of "Magistratus;" and their power seems originally to have been purely defensive. They were not permitted to be absent from home a single night, unless on the "Feriæ Latinæ," and their doors were not only open in the day-time, but also in the night, for hearing the complaints of the people. Their political authority was at first, as has just now been remarked, purely negative or defensive, extending solely to the right of preventing any law injurious to the interests of the common people. This right was called "Jus intercedendi," which the tribune exercised by the formal expression "Veto." And by the Icilian law, introduced by Icilius, the tribune, in the year 261, it was enacted that no person should dare to interrupt a tribune of the people in any of his harangues, under the penalty of a fine, at the discretion of the tribune, and of capital punishment, if the fine was not paid. This law laid the foundation of a power, which, in process of time, threatened destruction to every other authority. For their persons being declared inviolable, under the heavy penalty of execration, and confiscation of goods, and the liberty being

granted of saying publicly, what they pleased, supported also, as they were, by the plebeians on every occasion, they at last arrived at that degree of arrogance, that they even dared to commit the consuls to prison. The plebeians also, protected as they were by the tribunes, to whom they never failed to appeal from the decrees of the magistrates, claimed to themselves the right of holding those offices, which constitutionally belonged to the patricians, such as the dictatorship, the consulate, the censorship, and the command of armies. Hence Cicero says, "*Tribunorum potestas mihi pestifera videtur, quippe quæ in seditione, et ad seditionem nata sit.*" *Cic. de Leg.* iii. Sylla, indeed, abridged their authority; but the restrictions which he imposed upon them, were, soon after his death, completely removed. In addition to the right of opposing a new law, they claimed the privilege of sitting in judgment, and making decrees, *Edicta*, or *Decreta*. They assumed authority to hold the *Comitia Tributa*, and to make laws for the whole of the people. These enactments, they called *plebiscita*. They assumed the right of holding the senate, of making motions, and of preventing the consuls from speaking beyond a limited time. In their own assemblies no one was allowed to speak, but with their permission. Hence the phrase, *concionem dare*, "to grant leave to harangue," *concionem habere*, "to hold an assembly," or "to make a speech."

ÆDILIS.

Dionysius Halicarnasseus informs us, that soon

after the tribunes were created, the commons prevailed on the senate to grant them the privilege of choosing annually, from their own body, two officers to assist the tribunes in the discharge of their duty, and that these officers were called “Ædiles,” because on them particularly devolved the care of all the public edifices. (*Dion. lib. vi. cap. 99.*) Besides the duty here mentioned, it was their business to attend on the tribunes of the people, to judge some inferior causes by their deputation, to inspect whatever was exposed to sale in the Forum, to take care not only that the provisions in the markets were of good quality, but that the weights and measures were of the legal standard, having authority to break them, if they were false, and fine the offender; to restrain the avarice of usurers, to limit the expense of funerals, and to punish insolent or petulant language,—“Sese aliquem credens, Italo quod honore supinus Fregerit heminas Areti Ædilis iniquas.”—*Pers. i. 129.*

“Ob hæc mulieris verba tam improba ac tam incivilia, C. Fundanius, et Tib. Sempronius Ædiles plebei multam dixerunt ei æris gravis viginti quinque millia.” *A. Gell. x. 6.* When they administered justice, they sat on benches (*subsellia*) like the tribunes, and their persons were deemed “Sacrosancti.”

In the year 389, two more Ædiles were chosen from the patricians, called “Ædiles Curules,” because they had the honour of using the “Sella curulis.” They were dignified with the “Jus imaginum,” and wore the “Toga prætexta.” Though they were created chiefly for the purpose of superintending the

public games and amusements, it was their province also to take care of the public corn, to inspect and repair public edifices, to attend to the public roads and bridges, to compel the proprietors of houses to keep them in a proper state of repair, to prevent all nuisances in the streets, and to judge in all cases relating to the sale of estates.—They were at first chosen from the patricians ; but, afterwards, in consequence of the complaints of the commons, they were elected alternately from the patricians and plebeians, and at last from both indifferently. *Pitisc. Lex. Kennett's Ant. Adam's Ant.*

QUÆSTOR.

The Quæstors, according to Tacitus, were instituted by the kings. “ Quæstores, regibus etiam tum imperantibus, instituti sunt.” *Ann. xi. 22.*—Plutarch says, that two quæstors were created from the patricians, soon after the expulsion of Tarquin, to manage the treasury according to a law made by Poplicola. They derived their name *a quærendo*, that is, from seeking, or collecting the public revenues. At first there were only two ; but in the 332d year of the city, the number was doubled, and from this time the quæstorship was open to the plebeians, as well as to the patricians. Of these, two always attended the consuls in time of war, for the purpose of paying the armies, and selling the plunder, and were named “ Quæstores peregrini.” The others, who remained at home, were called “ Quæstores urbani.” This number continued till the entire conquest of Italy, when

four more were added, who resided in the provinces with the proconsuls and prætors, for the purpose of regulating and collecting the taxes and customs. The quæstorship is termed by Cicero, "Primus gradus honoris," "The first step of honour," this being the first and lowest office, which could entitle a person to be admitted into the senate.

A contradiction has been remarked (*See Classical Journal*, No. 45.) between the statement of Livy, and that of Tacitus, respecting the priority of the *Quæstores Urbani*. According to the latter, two Quæstors were at first elected, for managing the funds belonging to the army, during military service, and two Quæstors, *Quæstores Urbani*, were afterwards added, for taking charge of the funds of the city. (*See Tac. Ann.* xi. 22.) Livy, on the contrary, states, that the *Quæstores Urbani*, were first appointed, and that two Quæstors for the army, *Quæstores Peregrini*, were afterwards elected. "Quam rem, ut præter duos urbanos quæstores, duo consulibus ad ministeria belli præsto essent, a consulibus relatam." *Liv.* iv. 43. It is impossible to explain this contradiction, with any semblance of probability, on the supposition, that so eminent an historian as Livy could be ignorant of a fact, with which almost every Roman must have been perfectly acquainted. Some error must exist in the text, and I am inclined to think, that the passage now quoted is an interpolation. This conjecture is rendered the more probable, as it is not found in *Edit. Mediol. Anno 1480.* (*See Drakenborch.*)

EXERCISE.

“ But no plebeian, you will say, has been made consul, since the kings were banished. What of that? Must nothing new be instituted? Many things have not yet been done in an infant state; and, because they have not yet been done, ought they, therefore, never to be done, though they should be ever so useful? In the reign of Romulus, there were no priests, no augurs; but they were instituted by Numa Pompilius. There was no *census*, no distribution into classes and centuries; they were appointed by Servius Tullius. There was a time, when there were no consuls: they were created, when the kings were banished. There had existed neither the authority, nor the name of dictator; it originated with the senators. There were no tribunes of the people, no ædiles, no quæstors; a law was enacted for their appointment. Within these ten years, we have both created decemvirs for compiling a body of laws, and we have annulled them.”

OBSERVATIONS.

SACERDOTIUM.

PONTIFICATUS.

The former is the generic, the latter the specific term. The former is applicable to every department of the sacred ministry; the latter to the pontificate, or high priesthood only. Every *pontifex* was *sacerdos*; but not every *sacerdos*, *pontifex*.

CONTUMELIA.

INJURIA.

These words are correctly defined by Noltenius,
 “ *Contumelia* gravior est quam *injuria*. Nam *contu-*

melia dignitatem alterius atterit et minuit, et in contemtionem viros bonos adducere studet—*injuria* lædit tantummodo famam, vel damnum infert, aut injuste agit. Hinc est, quod *contumelia* tanquam verbum aliquod gravius apud bonos scriptores *injuriæ* in verborum collocatione postponatur.”—“ Injuriis contumeliisque concitatus.” *Sall. B. C.*—“ Cum maximis injuriis, contumeliisque.” *Cic. in Verr.* Hence also the expression, “ Facile patior injuriam, si est vacua a contumelia.” *Pacuv. apud Non. v. 12*, “ I can easily bear an injury, if not accompanied with an affront, or an indignity.”

EXSILIUM.

RELEGATIO.

DEPORTATIO.

Exsilium (*i. e.* ex solo) denotes simply a removal from one's native soil, not necessarily implying either of the two accessory ideas, “ compulsion,” or “ disgrace.” “ Quid est enim exsul ? Ipsum per se nomen calamitatis, non turpitudinis. Quando igitur est turpe ? Revera quando est poena peccati, opinione autem hominum, si est poena damnati.” *Cic. pro Dom.*

The banishment implied by *exsilium* may be either voluntary, or involuntary. “ Egredere ex urbe, Catilina, atque in exsilium proficiscere.” *Cic. in Cat.* Here the banishment is supposed to be voluntary. It may be regarded also, perhaps, as a voluntary act on the part of a citizen, when, in order to evade the payment of a fine, he banishes himself from his native country. “ In colonias Latinas sæpe nostri cives aut sua voluntate, aut legis multa profecti sunt ; quam

multam si sufferre voluissent, tamen manere in civitate potuissent." *Cic. pro Cæcin.*

The banishment expressed by *exsilium* was compulsory, when it took place, in consequence of the sentence *Interdictio aqua et igni*—for, being deprived of all the necessities of life in his native country, the individual had no alternative but to go into exile. A person banished by a legal sentence, or who chose to exile himself, to escape punishment, forfeited, but not irrecoverably, all the rights of citizenship. It would appear, however, that he was allowed to retain part of his property. This opinion at least is somewhat probable, from the two following circumstances:—
1st. He was expressly prohibited by law from making a will. This prohibition would have been superfluous, if he had possessed no property to bequeath.
2dly. We find Seneca complaining of the vast riches, which the exiles of his time carried with them into banishment. "Eo temporum prolapsa est luxuria, ut majus viaticum exulum sit, quam olim patrimonium divitum." *Sen. ad Helv. cap. 12.* (See also *Tac. Ann. lib. xii. cap. 22.*) The exile was likewise frequently permitted to choose his place of residence.

It would seem also, that those who were not compelled to exile themselves by the sentence *Interdictio aqua et igni*, might, even after their banishment, retain the rank of senator. "Ne tum quidem, cum aberam, negare poteras, me esse senatorem. Ubi enim tuleras, ut mihi aqua, et igni interdiceretur?"

Ubi cavisti, ne meo me loco censor in senatum legeret." *Cic. pro dom.*

Deportatio differs from *exsilium* in implying uniformly that the banishment is involuntary, that the rights of citizenship are *irrecoverably* forfeited, and that the property of the individual, unless secured to him by an express clause in the sentence, is confiscated. The place also of his exile was not left to his own choice; and was generally some rocky or barren island.

Relegatio agrees with *deportatio*, and differs from *exsilium* in denoting, that the banishment is always involuntary. It did not, however, exclude the individual from the rights of citizenship, and allowed him the entire possession of his property. He was permitted also to bequeath it by will. While *deportatio* implied a fixed residence, to which the exile was to be confined, *relegatio* rather referred to certain territories from which he was excluded.

The mildness of *relegatio*, as leaving the exile in the full possession of all his rights and property, is contrasted with the severity of *exsilium*, by Ovid, in the two following passages: " Quippe *relegatus*, non *exsul* dicor in illo; Parcaque fortunæ sunt data verba meæ." *Ov. Trist.* ii. 137. " Ipse *relegati*, non *exsulis* utitur in me, Nomine." *Ib.* v. 11. 21.

Of these, *exsilium*, though its meaning is specialised, (if I may be allowed the expression,) when it is opposed to either of the other two, may be strictly

regarded as the generic term. Accordingly, we frequently find it, and the term *exsul*, applied to persons, *relegati*, and *deportati*. Marius had been, by a judicial sentence, banished Italy for two years. He was left, however, in the full possession of his property, and the rights of citizenship. He was, therefore, strictly speaking, *relegatus*. Juvenal, however, applies to him the appellation of *exsul*.

—“ Et hic damnatus inani
 Judicio (Quid enim salvis infamia nummis?)
Exsul ab octava Marius bibit, et fruitur dîs
 Iratus.” Sat. i. 47.

DUBITARE.

The verb *dubitare* (ex *duo* et obs. *biterè*, “to go,” as if the mind went two ways) denotes suspension between two opinions, affirmative and negative. It is accordingly followed by the infinitive assertively, as “Nec dubito te teneri.” *Plin. jun. Ep. i. e. Credo te teneri.*—I doubt not, or I believe, that you are kept; by *quin* for *quod non*, negatively, as, “Haud dubito, quin Troja peritura sit.” *Cic. de Senec. i. e. Non credo, Trojam haud perituram esse.* Suspensively by *Utrum*, *An*, *Anne*, as *Dubito an venturus sit*, that is, *Incertus sum*. The first of these phraseologies, in which the infinitive is used, occurs but rarely.—*Non dubito quin*, and *dubito an*, occur frequently.—The tense following *quin*, which must be in the subjunctive mood, is subject to the same rule,

as has been already given for *ut*, *ne*, *cur*, &c.—See Vol. I. p. 11.

It must be remembered, that *should* is often a sign of the present of the infinitive, and *should have* of the preterite. “What can be a more severe punishment, than that a freeman should be sold as a slave?” *Ecquid supplicium gravius, quam hominem liberum pro servo vendi, esse potest?* that is, “for a freeman to be sold,” where *vendi*, with the accusative before it, supplies the place of a nominative after the verb, as *supplicium* is the nominative before it, both referring to the same thing. In such examples, the subjunctive mood, with *ut*, is frequently used instead of the infinitive, especially after a comparative degree—thus, *Quam ut vendatur*, or *Venum eat*.

It has been already observed, that every decree or law is expressed by *ut*, and that for *ut non*, *ne* is elegantly used. It has been observed also, that though we say, in English, “all of you,” or “you all,” the latter is the only form admissible in Latin. The same observation is applicable to the word *most*—thus, we say, in English, “most of us,” “most of you”; but the Latin idiom is “we most,” “ye most,”—“Most of us are bereft of our country, but all of us of character and fortune,” “*Plerique patria, sed omnes fama atque fortunis expertes sumus.*” *Sall. B. C. cap. 34. (Edit. Haver.)* So also with other partitives—thus, “Some of you might have looked to others for subsistence.” “*Potuistis nonnulli alienas opes expectare.*” *Sall. B. C. cap. 61.* The greatest part of us

poets are deceived, “*Maxima pars vatum decipimur.*” *Hor. De Art. Poët.* 24. When the subjects of discourse are not by the speaker associated with himself by the pronoun *we* or *us*, or are not the persons addressed, but are the persons spoken of, whether present or absent, the partitive, and not the pronoun, becomes the nominative to the verb—thus, “*Plerique eorum, qui ante me sententias dixerunt,—casum rei-publicæ miserati sunt.*” *Sall. B. C.* cap. 50.

“To do all, but,” is elegantly expressed in Latin by *Tantum non*. *Me vehementer affligunt, et tantum non necant*, “They do all, but kill me.” The expression is equivalent to *Hoc solum deest*, and is nearly, though not precisely, as has been supposed, of the same import, as *fere, propemodum*, for which it may, in many cases, be substituted.

EXERCISE.

“Where is the man, who doubts, but in a city built to last for ever, and increasing to an immense extent, new authorities, new priesthoods, new privileges will be instituted? This very law, that a tricians should not intermarry with plebeians, was it not enacted within these few years, with the greatest detriment to the republic, and the highest injustice to the people? Can there be a greater, or more notorious insult, than that a part of the state, as if polluted, should be reckoned unworthy of intermarrying with the other? What else is this, than to suffer expulsion and banishment, within the same walls? They are afraid of our intermingling with them by affinity, or relationship. They do all, but tell us, that we are unworthy of the Roman name.

What! If this pollutes your nobility, which most of you have, not by birth or blood, but by adoption into the senate, either as chosen by the kings, or by a decree of the people, could ye not preserve this nobility uncorrupted by private resolutions of your own, yourselves abstaining from plebeian connections, and prohibiting your daughters and sisters from marrying any but patricians?"

OBSERVATIONS.

WOULD.

WOULD HAVE.

It has been already observed, that *would*, *might*, *could*, *should*, when used contingently, or interrogatively, and not absolutely, must be rendered by the potential mood. It may be useful now to observe, that the conditionality of the action is frequently not expressed, but implied. When Cicero says, "If I had left him, malicious men would say," "*Si reliquissem, iniqui dicerent*," *Fam. Ep. ii. 15*, the latter clause expresses a contingent fact, dependent on the preceding conditional clause. "If Dolabella had possessed himself of the army, he would have strengthened Antony's party," "*Si exercitum occupasset Dolabella, Antonium confirmasset*," *Cic. Fam. Ep. xii. 12*. Here also the condition, on which the contingent fact depends, is expressed. "*Quamobrem uteretur eadem confessione T. Annius, qua Nasica, qua Opimius*," *Cic. pro Mil.* "Milo, therefore, would have made the confession." Here there is no condition or hypothesis expressed; but it is evidently implied; for Cicero is arguing on the supposition,

that Milo had actually killed Clodius. In the following exercise, when Canuleius says, "Nobody would offer violence," the condition is implied, "if you should be disinclined to give your daughters to us in marriage." The same observation is applicable to the present tense. "Quid facias talem sortitus, Pontice, servum?" *Juv. Sat. viii. 179*. "What would you do, having, or if you had, such a slave?"—"Magno mercentur Atridæ," *Virg. Æn. ii. 111*, "would purchase, if they could."

Where the meaning is emphatic, absolute, or independent, the verb *volo* must be employed, as "Here I dwell; for Orcus would not receive me," "Hic habito; nam me recipere Orcus *noluit*," *Plaut. Most. ii. 2. 68*. "Volui uxorem ducere," *Ter. Phor. iv. 3. 46*, "I would have taken her as a wife," or "I was willing to take her." "Volui Chalinum, si domi esset, mittere tecum obsonatum," *Plaut. Cas. ii. 8. 4*. Here the meaning of *volui* is emphatic and absolute; for though the sending depended on his being at home, the determination was not dependent. *Misissem* would have expressed merely a future event contingently. The same observation is applicable to *may, might, can, could, shall, should*. But, though this rule may suffice for the general direction of the scholar, it may be useful to examine the subject more minutely, and to attempt an explanation of that mood, which is by some grammarians named the subjunctive, and by others the potential.

There are few questions in Latin grammar,

which have created more discussion, than that, which respects the characteristic use, and appropriate name, of this form of the verb. Some, among whom is the learned Sanctius, have even denied the existence of a subjunctive mood, while others have assigned to it more than one office, and have deemed it necessary to distinguish it by two different designations.

The arguments adduced by Sanctius, appear to me singularly weak and inconclusive. A subjunctive mood, he observes, is unnecessary. “*Modus in verbis non fuit necessarius*,” says another eminent critic. *Cæs. Scal.* v. 121. This is admitted; for some languages have no subjunctive mood; but the question is not respecting the necessity, but simply the existence, of this mood. He then advances a position not less strange than erroneous—that *amabam* and *amaveram* are truly subjunctive, according to the common explanation of the mood. This, as Perizonius terms it, is arrant trifling; for, according to no definition of this mood, generally received by grammarians, can these tenses be called subjunctive. He then observes, that the tenses of a finite verb are naturally three; but that we make eleven distinctions; namely, two of the present, *amo*, *amem*; two of the preterimperfect, *amabam*, *amarem*; two of the preterperfect, *amavi*, *amaverim*; two of the preterpluperfect, *amaveram*, *amavissem*; and three of the future, *amabo*, *amavero*, and *amato*. He then attempts to prove that the tenses commonly called subjunctive, with the imperative *amato*, all refer to future time, and are

used for a future tense. But, unfortunately for this theory, the very first example, which he adduces in its support, serves completely to subvert it—"Cum tot sustineas et tanta negotia solus."—*Hor. Ep. ii. 1. 1.* Here he is compelled to admit, that the present subjunctive denotes present, and not future, time.—He then proceeds to tell us, that *amarem* is, in all cases, found as a future. Here, unquestionably, it escaped his attention, that *amarem* after *quum*, and several other adverbs, and also conjunctions, denotes past time, in the same manner as the present tense of the same mood, by his own concession, denotes present time. Thus, "When I was writing these things," "*Hæc cum scriberem, jam tum existimabam ad te orationem esse perlatam.*" *Cic. ad Att.*—*Amaverim*, he says, is often used as a future. Here also his theory fails; for, by his own admission, it is not universally, or even generally, confirmed by usage. *Amavissem*, he observes, is employed as a future; but, whether he means to say, that it is uniformly, or only generally so used, we are left to conjecture. Numberless examples, however, might be adduced to shew, that it denotes also past time. "*Quum eum in itinere convenissent.*" *Cæs. B. G. i. 27.* That *amavero* always expresses future time, there can be no question.

From these examples and observations it must be sufficiently evident, that the theory of Sanctius, who rejects a subjunctive mood, and contends, that these tenses are all modifications of future time, cannot possibly be correct. That this mood frequently in-

volves the idea of future time is a truth, which no classical scholar will presume to controvert. But it is one thing to prove that a tense, or a mood, either occasionally, or merely by implication, expresses future time, and quite a different thing to demonstrate, that this expression of futurity constitutes its real and distinctive character.

Perizonius admits a subjunctive mood, and delivers it as his opinion, that it was so denominated, because it is always subjoined to a verb, or clause, either expressed or implied. This doctrine he illustrates by the following examples—"Tum vero ego necquicquam Capitolium servaverim." *Liv.* This sentence, he says, is not complete, and he supplies the following introductory clause, "Tum vero *res erit, ut* ego necquicquam Capitolium servaverim."—"O quam te memorem?" *Virg.* that is, *convenit, ut memorem?* "Hoc Ithacus velit," *i. e.* "*Est, cur* Ithacus velit." "Plura scripsissem, nisi tui festina-
rent." *Cic.*—"Erat, *cur* plura scripsissem." "Cum tot sustineas et tanta negotia solus, in publica commoda peccem, Si longo sermone morer tua tempora, Cæsar." *Hor. Ep. ii. 1. 1,* that is, "Peccem, si morer tua tempora, cum sustineas." If we say, *Misit, qui dicerent*, the relative clause is subjoined to *Misit*, and is dependent upon it.

In confirmation of this theory, he observes, that we sometimes find the common ellipsis completely supplied—thus, "Si est, ut facturus sit." *Ter. Ad. iii. 5. 4.* "Si est, ut velit reducere." *Ter. Hec. iii.*

5. 51. Sometimes partially, as “*Tibi ego ut credam.*” *Ter. And.* iii. 5. 12. “*Egone illam ut patiar.*” *Ter. Phor.* ii. 1. 74.

R. Johnson rejects both these opinions. In opposition to the theory of Sanctius, he admits a subjunctive mood ; but differs from Vossius and Perizonius, respecting its office and designation. He contends, that it is not merely subjunctive, but has a variety of uses, only one of which is subjunctive, and that the name potential is more appropriate to its character. He observes, “that in sentences properly optative, the verb of wishing, which is the principal verb, is generally understood, and that, which is expressed, is but the matter of the wish, and, being subjoined to the principal verb, comes properly into the subjunctive mood ; whereas in the potential mood, if that also be subjunctive, that subjunction does not so plainly appear, as being often neither expressed, nor intimated by any conjunction.”

In the doctrine of the author, as expressed in the first member of the sentence, we perfectly concur. If we say, *Utinam sapires*, it cannot be doubted, that the principal verb *Opto* is understood, and that the latter part of the sentence expresses merely, “that you were wise,” the wish being implied. A similar ellipsis obtains in English ; thus “O that they were wise, that they understood this, that they would consider their latter end.” *Bible*. In the latter member of the sentence, he speaks hypothetically of the existence of that, which it is his business to disprove ; for

he does not decidedly reject the doctrine of subjunction in potential clauses ; but merely contends, that, if there be subjunction, it is not so evidently marked, as in optative *sentences*. But the question is not, whether the subjunction be equally evident, but whether it equally exists, expressly, or by implication, in both cases. The observation, therefore, whether true or false, does not affect the question ; and the author, instead of speaking hypothetically, as if subjunction did exist in potential sentences, should have shown, if he meant legitimately to establish his own theory, that subjunction is neither expressed, nor implied in potential sentences.

In the following sentence, “*Frangas citius, quam corrigas,*” he observes, “there is no conjunction to intimate anything preceding to *frangas*, to which it is subjoined, and that though *res erit, ut* may be fancifully supplied, the verb even then is not merely subjunctive, differing only from the indicative in subjunction, but plainly predicates possibility, and must be resolved by *possum*.” In answer, it may be observed, that, if nothing else than *res erit, ut* can be supplied, this certainly cannot express the possibility clearly implied in *frangas*. But why may not *potest*, or *pote est, ut* be understood ? He admits, that, in optative sentences, the verb, expressive of wishing, may be suppressed, and that the verb expressing the subject of the wish is truly subjunctive. Why may not the verb expressive of possibility be likewise understood ? He admits also, that, when duty is implied

by the subjunctive mood, *oportet ut, æquum est ut*, may be understood to express the obligation. This is another important concession in favour of the theory, which it is his professed object to subvert. For, by parity of reasoning, why may not *potest, pote est*, or *potest esse ut*, be understood to *frangas*, to denote the possibility of the action expressed by the verb? To suppose, that there is an ellipsis, when duty, or wish, is implied, and no ellipsis, when possibility is expressed by *frangas*, or any similar expression, appears to me to be one of those inconsistencies, into which philosophers and critics are unconsciously seduced by a blind attachment to a favourite theory. On what ground is it to be asserted, or by what argument is it to be proved, that *amarem* does not denote "I should, or ought to, love," unless by ellipsis; but denotes "I might love," without any ellipsis?

He proceeds in his argument to observe, that all subjunctive propositions do not require a subjunctive mood. This is true; but he seems to have forgotten, that this form of the verb is not called subjunctive, because the indicative mood sometimes supplies its place, but because this mood is never employed but in subjunctive propositions; not because it is used in all subjunctives, but because it is never used, unless there be a subjunctive statement. The future of the indicative is sometimes used for the imperative mood; would the author deny to the latter its common designation on this account, or question its propriety?

Another argument adduced by the learned critic

is, that indicative sense is often expressed by the subjunctive mood. The examples quoted are the following, "Quæ vitia qui fugerit—is omnia fere vitia vitaverit." *Cic. ad Brut.* "Quis enim tibi dederit, aut omnia Deum posse, aut ita facturum, si possit?" *Cic. Ac. Quæst.* "Nam fuerit pene ridiculum malle sermonem, quo locuti sunt homines, quam quo loquantur." *Quint.* These examples, the reader will perceive, involve the tense commonly called the future subjunctive. The proper signification and use of this tense, we have already explained. Its meaning is clearly indicative; denoting that a future action will be perfected. It is neither potential nor subjunctive—for, when the future subjunctive is necessary, the future participle with *sim* is uniformly employed. When Pliny says, "Timebo, quum legero,"* the latter verb is not to be regarded as under the government of *quum*, the sense requiring the future action to be expressed as perfect. As this tense, therefore, is never used subjunctively, nor, as Johnson himself admits, ever employed in a potential sense, it must be referred to the indicative mood; and is, erroneously, in our Latin grammars, considered as belonging to the potential or subjunctive†. Any argument, therefore,

* When the actions or states are contemporaneous, and continued, two future imperfects are used. "Quæ sentiemus, ad te scribemus." *Cic. ad Att.* ix. 10. If perfected, two future perfects, as has been already remarked, are often employed.

† We are aware, that though supported in this opinion by several eminent critics, among whom, we presume, may be named

drawn from the import of this tense, its character being essentially different from that of the other four tenses, with which it is erroneously associated, can have no weight whatever in determining the point in question.

He concludes with observing, that "where it is merely subjunctive, such subjunction cannot be declared so much by the modal formation of the verb, (which being but one, and having so many several uses, can never of itself declare, which of those uses it is to be taken in,) as by the conjunction joined with it, or some manner of construction."

It cannot be denied, that, when the mood is merely subjunctive, its character is indicated not by the modal termination, but by the pronoun, conjunc-

Varro and Ursinus, we have to contend with the authority of Perizonius and others, who maintain this to be a subjunctive tense. Varro, when treating of these tenses, divides them into two classes, imperfect and perfect. The imperfect he illustrates by the words *discebam*, *disco*, *discam*, and the perfect by *didiceram*, *didici*, *didicero*. Ursinus infers that Varro regarded all these tenses as belonging to one and the same mood; and pleads, therefore, the authority of Varro, in support of his rejection of this tense from the subjunctive mood. Perizonius remonstrates against the truth of this inference, contending, that Varro was distinguishing tenses, and not moods; and that not finding a future perfect in the indicative, he went in quest of it to the subjunctive mood. But it is sufficiently clear, from Varro's enumeration, that he considered *didicero* to be of the same modal character as the other tenses, bearing the same relation to *discam*, as *didici* to *disco*, and *didiceram* to *discebam*. Unless, therefore, we are gratuitously to impute inconsistency to Varro,

tion, or adverb, which precedes it. Thus, *legerem* would signify, "I might," "could," "should," or "would read;" and it is only, when it is subjoined to *uter*, *cum*, *ut*, or some word of the same grammatical effect, that its subjunctive character is exemplified, as *Nescio, uter legeret*, "I know not, which of the two read." *Cum legerem*, "When I was reading." But this does not materially affect the theory of Perizonius; the simple question being, whether this form of the verb is ever found, unless subjoined to a clause, either expressed, or implied.

Having thus examined the arguments, adduced by the learned critic to shew, that this form of the verb is improperly called subjunctive, its real character being potential, and having endeavoured to

we must conclude, that he referred them all to one mood. But in questions, like this, where abundant evidence is accessible, authority on either side should have little weight. Can those, who refer this tense to the subjunctive or potential mood, produce a single example of its being used potentially? It has not been attempted. Can they shew us one example of its being used subjunctively? This *has been* attempted: but we believe we may affirm, that not one example has ever been, or can be produced, in which this tense has been employed, because subjoined to a conjunction; not one example in which the tense would not have been used, if the conjunction had been absent. In what sense then can it be called either potential or subjunctive, unless we are, in contradiction to the clearest evidence, to retain inapplicable names, and erroneous classifications, merely because they are sanctioned by some learned authorities? However, if the name should be retained, the reader should understand, that the meaning of the tense is purely indicative.

demonstrate the invalidity of these arguments, it will not be necessary to detain the reader with many additional observations.

After having considered the subject with the greatest attention, it appears to me, that the mood is strictly subjunctive, and that in all those cases, where its signification is potential, it is by ellipsis, and not by its own proper power of expression.—Of the two hypotheses, this, though not entirely free from objections, seems to me far the more probable, for the following reasons :—

1st. Though it be perfectly conceivable, that the Latins might have framed a mood, to express potentiality, it is not natural to suppose, that they would have formed a mood, which should perform the quadruple office of denoting *power, liberty, will, duty*, nay, likewise, *entreaty, admonition, and command*, thus creating a form of expression, which, they could not fail to perceive, must be extremely vague and doubtful in its import. For, if they framed the word *legissem*, for example, to denote “I could have read,” they must have perceived, that, by giving it the significations also of *might, would, should*, they rendered its meaning uncertain, and thus partly defeated the intention for which the mood was framed. It is more natural to believe, that the variety of signification arises from variety of ellipsis, and not from the original intention, or the construction of the word. If this presumption be correct, the mood is strictly subjunctive.

2dly. We find the present tense of this mood used imperatively, precatively, and hortatively, and this usage is undeniably elliptical, as "Let me love," *Amem, Sine ut amem*; "Do it," *Facias, Facias impero, Facias oro, Ut facias precor*. An ellipsis being abundantly manifest in the present subjunctive, as thus employed, reasoning from analogy, we may be justified in presuming, that the expression is elliptical, when the tense is potentially used. And as the present tense has one and the same character with the preterite tenses of the same mood, the inference may be warrantably extended to them also.

3dly. As far as we are capable of investigating the structure of inflected nouns and verbs, we have reason to believe, that, while the primary idea, or chief attribute, is expressed by the noun or verb, the accessary circumstances, though now incorporated with the principal term, were originally denoted by separate words, and that these, by a process simple and natural, gradually coalesced with the primary term. Now, unless we are to suppose, what is extremely improbable, that the terms significant of duty, inclination, power, and liberty, were all one and the same word, we cannot account for all these ideas, clearly very different, being denoted by one and the same suffix, or termination. If the mood, as Johnson himself supposes, involves the meaning of the verbs *possum, volo, debeo, licet*, it is natural to imagine, that these, or words, as different as these from one another, would be involved in the primary

term either in the form of a suffix, or prefix. Yet so far is this from being the fact, that we find the same termination express the four distinct ideas of *will, power, liberty, and duty*. It seems then a fair conclusion, that this form of the verb, having only one termination to express these distinct ideas, does not denote them by its own power, a power, which would be manifested by variety of suffix, but expresses these various modifications by ellipsis.—If this argument have any weight, it indicates the subjunctive character of this mood.

4thly. It appears an argument in favour of this opinion, that the elliptical expression, or what is called the potential mood, is not used, where emphasis is intended, or the meaning absolute; but in such clauses only, as are dependent, and where the ellipsis is manifested by the meaning of the correlative clause, either expressed or clearly implied. This abbreviation is observable in all languages, ellipsis being uniformly found where no emphasis is intended.

5thly. This opinion seems to be confirmed by those passages, in which the idea is either fully expressed, or with an ellipsis of the conjunction only. “*Si est, ut dicat.*” *Ter. Hec.* iv. 1. 43. “*Sin est, ut nolit.*” *Ter. Hec.* iv. 1. 44. “*Attamen dicat sine.*” *Ter. And.* v. 3. 24. “*Fac accures.*” *Plaut. Cas.* ii. 6. 69. “*Jube veniat.*” *Id. Most.* iii. 3. 26. “*Herum exhibeas volo.*” *Id. Mil.* ii. 6. 65. “*Si est, ut admiserit.*” *Ter. Ph.* i. 5. 39. “*Si unquam fuit tempus, cum fuerim.*” *Ter. Heaut.* v. 4. 1. “*Potest,*

ut alii ita arbitrentur." *Plaut. Pseud.* ii. 2. 38.—
 "Mea causa salvus sis licet." *Plaut. Rud.* i. 2. 51.
 "Ludas licet." *Ter. Ph.* ii. 1. 33. "Quam medius
 fidius veram licet cognoscas." *Sall. B. C.* cap. 37.

In some of these examples, the sentiment is fully expressed; in others there is an ellipsis of the conjunction only. When Demipho says, "Egone non succenseam?" *Ter. Ph.* i. 5. 30, it will not be doubted that there is an ellipsis of the conjunction *ut*—for we find the conjunction sometimes expressed, as "Egone ut patiar?" *Ter. Ph.* i. 5. 73. And here it is equally clear, that *æquum est*, or some similar expression, is understood. When Horace says,—“Non possis oculo quantum contendere Lynceus, Non tamen idcirco contemnas lippus inungi;”—*Epist.* i. 1. 28.—it is evident that *etsi*, with the substantive verb, is understood in the former clause, and *est ut*, I am inclined to think, is understood in the latter. The ellipsis being supplied, the sentence would proceed thus—“*Et si est, ut non possis contendere oculo quantum Lynceus, non est tamen idcirco, ut contemnas lippus inungi.*” When we say, *Legisset*, “He would have read,” it appears to me a rational conjecture, that *futurum erat, ut*, or some equivalent expression, is understood. Or, if we consider the expression as strictly potential, *potuit ut, licuit ut*, may be considered as suppressed. If we say, *Amasset*, “He should have loved,” the ellipsis may be supplied by *oportuit*, or *æquum erat, ut*. It will not be doubted, that *An ignoraret*, may denote, “Could

he be ignorant?" But when we find, "*Utin' hæc ignoraret suum patrem?*" *Ter. Ph.* v. 6. 34, expressing, "Could she be ignorant of her own father?" it is too evident to need any illustration, that *uti* points to something understood, and shews the expression to be elliptical. The sentiment, I conceive, would be fully expressed thus—*Potuitne esse, uti hæc ignoraret?* on which principle it is clear, that it is not *Ignoraret*, but *Potuit*, that expresses the possibility. The same conclusion is deducible, if the expression were *An ignoraret?*

6thly. We know, that this form of the verb is frequently employed to denote a prayer, a desire, or a wish. "*Dispeream, ni summôsses omnes,*" *Hor. Sat.* i. 9. 47, "May I die, if you would not supplant them all." Here an imprecation is signified by *Dispeream*. Does it then denote a prayer, or wish, by its own proper power of expression? or is it by ellipsis? By the latter, unquestionably.—When we say, *Valeas*, "May you fare well," *Salvus sis*, "May you be safe," it cannot be doubted, that the expression is elliptical, and that *opto ut, opto uti, opto utinam*, is understood. In evidence of this, we find the conjunction sometimes expressed, as "*Utinam esset mihi æqua pars amoris tecum,*" *Ter. Eun.* i. 2. 11, "I wish, that I had an equal share." "*Ut illum di deæque senium perdant,*" *Eun.* ii. 3. 10, "May the gods and goddesses confound." The words *utinam* and *uti* clearly indicate an ellipsis; and in both expressions *opto* is understood. Now if this mood be

used optatively, and if the expression of the desire, or wish, be evidently elliptical, it forms a strong presumption, unless we reject all analogy, that, when it is used potentially it expresses *ability, will, duty, liberty*, not by its own proper power, but by ellipsis.

These arguments incline me to believe, that this form of the verb is strictly subjunctive, and that, when it expresses *ability, liberty, duty, or will*, implying also, sometimes, the futurity of the action as necessarily posterior to these, it is by an ellipsis, and not by its own capacity of expression. Each hypothesis, I am aware, is accompanied with some difficulty; but of the two this appears to me far the more probable. This mood then never being used absolutely, but always in dependence on some preceding clause, expressed or understood, and being preceded by some conjunction or adverb, the name of subjunctive is very properly assigned to it. But, though I conceive this to be its appropriate name, as expressing its genuine character, there can be no reasonable objection to the designation of potential, when the mood is used elliptically, and denotes *power, liberty, duty*, or in general any action contingent, or dependent.

Having endeavoured to ascertain and explain the real character of this form of the verb, I would repeat the admonition, that this mood should not be employed where the action is predicated, as an absolutely certain fact, or where the *power, liberty, will, or duty*, should be emphatically and unconditionally expressed.

It has been said by some grammarians, that *nostrum* and *vestrum*, the genitives plural of *ego* and *tu*, are used only after partitives, comparatives, superlatives, interrogatives, and some numerals, *nostri* and *vestri* being used in all other instances. This rule is not strictly correct. *Nostrum* and *vestrum* are used, though not under the government of any of the classes of words now mentioned. “Habe mei rationem; habe tu nostrûm.” *Cic. Att.* vii. 9. It would be more correct to say, that *nostri* and *vestri* are not used after partitives, comparatives, &c.

EXERCISE.

“No plebeian would offer violence to the daughter of a patrician; this libidinous exploit belongs exclusively to the patricians themselves. No person would have been forced by us to enter into a nuptial contract against his will. But that this should be prohibited, and the intermarriage of patricians and plebeians be declared void by law, is indeed an egregious insult to the commons. Why do ye not concert measures, to prevent the intermarriage of rich and poor? It has been at all times, and in all places, left to the exercise of private discretion to determine, into what family a woman might be suitably married; and from what family a man should choose a wife. This freedom of choice you prohibited by the enactment of a superlatively insulting law, framed, it would seem, to make a schism in the state, and to destroy the unity of the political body.”

OBSERVATIONS.

QUIN. CUR NON.

It has been already observed, that *quin*, “but,”

is used for *qui*, *quæ*, *quod non*, as “Nemo est, quin existimet.” *Cic.* “There is no one, but thinks,” that is, “Nemo est, qui non existimet,” “who does not think.” “Nihil est, quin male narrando possit depravarier,” *Ter. Ph.* iv. 4. 15, that is, “Nihil est, quod non possit.” It is also used for *Quid* or *Cur non*, as “Quin conscendimus equos?” *Liv.* i. 54, “Why do we not mount our horses?”—“Quum in altera re causæ nihil esset, quin secus judicaret ipse de se,” *Cic. pro Quint.* that is, *cur non judicaret*, “Why he should not judge.” When used interrogatively, it implies some degree of impatience, and has the force of an exhortation or command; it is, therefore, joined to the imperative, as well as the indicative mood. When it follows a negative, and is used for *qui*, *quæ*, *quod non*, it is joined with the subjunctive mood, agreeably to the general rule, which has been already given for the relative, when it is preceded by a negative term. When taken for *Cur* or *Quid non* indefinitely, or for *quod*, the conjunction, with the negative, it governs the subjunctive mood.

But it is necessary to observe, that though *quin* is frequently used for *quid non*, they are not to be considered as in all cases perfectly synonymous.—*Quin* is used, as has been just now observed, with the imperative, and also with the indicative mood, when we encourage or desire a person to act, thus, “Quin abis?” *Ter.* “Why don’t you go away?” is nearly equivalent to *Abi*, or *Abeas*, “Go away.”—

“*Quin conscendimus equos?*” *Liv.* i. 57, “Why do we not mount our horses?” or “let us mount.” “*Quin expergiscimini?*” *Sall. B. C.* “Why do ye not awake?” It is also used, when we gravely chide, or censure, a person for not doing, as “*Quin continetis vocem indicem stultitiæ vestræ?*” *Cic.* “Why do ye not hold your tongue?”—“*Quin occidisti?*” *Plaut. Rud.* iii. 6. 3, “Why did you not kill him?”

Quin then implies either encouragement, or command to do, or it chides for not doing, the thing spoken of. But it is not, I believe, used like *cur non*, either simply to seek information, or to advise ironically to any mode of action. If we say, “Why do you not write?” meaning, “I want to know, why you do not write,” we cannot say, *Quin scribis?* but * *Quare non scribis?* The former would signify, either an exhortation to write, or a reproof for not writing. In the following exercise, when Canuleius says, “Why do ye not make a law, that a plebeian shall not travel the same road with a patrician?” the expression is ironical. It does not denote any desire, or encouragement on his part, that such a law should be enacted. It must be rendered, therefore, by *Cur non?* *Quin sancitis* would signify an exhortation to make such a law, or reprehension for not having made it. In short, *quin* implies a desire on the part of the speaker, that

* *Cur* and *Quare* have been thus distinguished: *Cur* simply asks a question, but does not imply, that an answer is required. *Quare* proposes a question, which requires an answer. *Dumesnil.* *Cur?* Why? *Quare?* For what reason?

the thing spoken of should be done: *cur non* does not necessarily imply this; but, on the contrary, sometimes denotes the reverse.

CONVIVIUM.

EPULUM.

EPULÆ.

The former denotes a repast, or common entertainment. “Bene majores nostri accubationem epularem amicorum, quod vitæ conjunctionem haberet, *convivium* nominarunt, melius quam Græci, qui hoc idem tum compotationem, tum concœnationem vocant.” *Cic. de Sen.*

Epulum denotes a solemn or religious feast. “Epulum est solemne et publicum convivium, sive in dedicatione templi, sive in triumpho, sive in funere, sive ludorum causa.” *Nolt. Lex. Antib.* “Epulum publicum et solemne senatui, prandium item; sed populo dabatur. Epulæ sunt convivia privata; item cibi affluentiores.” *Popma.* “*Epulum* solenniores quædam epulæ; et proprie publicum convivium in propatulo universis civibus exhibitum, sive in dedicatione templi, sive in honorem deorum, sive in magnificentiæ ostentationem, sive in funere magni alicujus viri.” *Dolet. Etym. Mag.*

According to these definitions, which pretty nearly agree, the words may be thus distinguished. *Convivium* is a common domestic repast: *Epulum* a religious or public feast given to the people: *Epulæ* a sumptuous banquet given by a private individual to such, as he chose to invite. “Ita enim illud epulum est funebre, ut munus sit funeris; epulæ quidem ipsæ

dignitatis." *Cic. in Vat.* As *convivium* signified a meal, or banquet at a regular and seasonable hour, *comissatio* denoted "a junketing, or revelling after supper," "a feasting at unseasonable hours." Suetonius, speaking of the emperor Vitellius, says, "Luxuriæ, sævitiaque deditus, epulas trifariam semper, interdum quadrifariam, dispertiebat, in jentacula, et prandia, et cœnas, comissionesque."

EXERCISE.

"Why do ye not enact, that a plebeian shall not live in the same neighbourhood with a patrician? that he shall not travel the same road? that he shall not be present at the same entertainment? that he shall not appear in the same forum? For what difference is there between this intercourse, and the intermarriage of patricians and plebeians? What privilege, I should like to know, is changed? The children surely follow the rank of their fathers, whether they be patricians, or plebeians. In short, it is evident, that by desiring the right of intermarrying with you, we have nothing in view, but that we be accounted in the number of men, and of citizens; nor have you, on the other hand, any reason for contesting the point, unless it be a gratification to you to contend with us, for the sole purpose of loading us with contumely and disgrace."

OBSERVATIONS.

IMPERIUM.

DOMINATIO.

Imperium as opposed to *Magistratus*, or *Potestas*, denotes military power, or authority. "Verum ex his magistratus et imperia, postremo omnis cura

rerum publicarum, minime mihi hac tempestate cupi-
unda videntur." *Sall. B. J. cap. 3.* "Si hoc fieri
possit, ut quisquam nullis comitiis imperium, aut po-
testatem assequi possit." *Cic.*

Imperium, as opposed to *Dominatio*, implies a
legally constituted authority, or sovereignty. It may
be despotic, but it is not tyrannical. *Dominatio* de-
notes tyrannic sway, or the domineering government
of a tyrant. "Ubi regium imperium, quod initio
conservandæ libertatis, atque augendæ reipublicæ fue-
rat, in superbiam dominationemque convertit." *Sall.*
B. C. cap. 6.

TRIBUS.

The etymology of the word *Tribus* is somewhat
uncertain. Asconius derives it from *tribus, seu Nu-
mero ternario*, because the Roman territory was
divided into three parts; and Varro, from the same
word, because the principal tribes were originally
three. Dionysius, likewise, seems to sanction this
etymology, when he considers *tribus* as synonymous
with τριτὺς or τριπλὺς, *tertia pars*. Other writers,
among whom is Livy, derive the word from *Tributum*,
or the tribute, which they paid. "*Tribus* eas ap-
pellavit, ut ego arbitrør, ab tributo; nam ejus quoque
æqualiter ex censu conferendi ab eodem inita ratio
est." *Liv. i. 43.*

At what precise period this arrangement was
established, is not indisputably ascertained. Diony-
sius refers it to Romulus, who, according to him, dis-

tributed the people into three tribes, and each tribe into ten wards, or *Curiae*, immediately after he was declared king. Livy ascribes it to Servius Tullius, who, he says, divided the city into four parts, according to the hills and quarters, which were then inhabited; and that these divisions were called "tribes," but had no connection with the previous distribution into centuries. Plutarch, who had an opportunity of consulting both these historians, differs materially from Livy, and does not entirely concur with Dionysius. With the latter, he ascribes the arrangement to Romulus, but writes, that it did not take place till after the Sabines were admitted into the city, when he divided the people into three tribes, called "Ramnenses," "Tatienses," and "Luceres." The first of these, he says, had their name from Romulus, the second from Tatius, and the third from *Lucus*, a "Grove," where the asylum stood, to which many had fled, and were admitted citizens. Hence all foreigners, the Sabines excepted, were included in the last tribe, the Romans, and the Sabines being severally ranked in the first and second. According to Livy, it was the horsemen only, or knights, and not the people in general, that were distributed into the three classes, "Ramnenses," "Tatienses," and "Luceres."—"Eodem tempore et centuriæ tres equitum conscriptæ sunt, Ramnenses ab Romulo, ab Tito Tatius Tatienses appellati; Lucerum nominis et originis causa incerta est." *Liv.* i. 13. In the 36th chapter of the same book he calls the divisions

by the name of centuries, and confines the term to the horsemen, or knights.

To reconcile these discordant opinions is, perhaps, impossible. The fact most probably is, that Romulus, after the admission of the Sabines into the city, divided the people into three tribes, under the names of "Ramnenses," "Tatienses," and "Luceres," that Tarquinius Priscus subdivided each of these tribes into two parts, under the names of *Primi*, et *Secundi*, that they continued under these three general designations, significant of their extraction, till the time of Servius Tullius, who divided the city into four parts, or tribes, and assigned them names according to the quarters, or hills, which they inhabited, the first being called "Palatina," the second "Suburrana," the third "Collina," and the fourth "Esquilina." "Quadrifariam urbe divisa regionibus, collibusque, quæ habitabantur partes, Tribus eas appellavit." *Liv.* i. 43.

It is remarkable, however, that though this is the first mention, which Livy makes of the division of the people into tribes, which, he says, were four in number, he alludes expressly, in book x. chap. 6. to the number of tribes, as originally three, thus concurring in the statements given by Dionysius and Plutarch. "Imparem numerum debere esse, ut tres antiquæ tribus, Ramnes, Tatienses, Luceres." *Liv.* x. 6. Nay, he informs us, that each of these tribes had an augur assigned to it; and we know that the augur belonged to the tribe generally, and not to the knights in par-

ticular. This seeming inconsistency in our historian, has induced some critics to suppose, that in Livy's account of the institution of the three centuries of knights, there is some error or omission. Grævius, however, has successfully evinced the accuracy of the present lection, and has reconciled the two accounts delivered by the historian, by shewing that the names *Ramnenses*, *Tatienses*, and *Luceres*, are not confined by Livy to the knights, as forming distinct tribes, but belong to the three general tribes, of which the "*Ramnenses equites*," the "*Tatienses equites*," and the "*Luceres equites*," were parts. *Græv. ad Flor.* i. 6. The "*Palatina*," "*Suburrana*," "*Collina*," and "*Esquilina*," were called "*Tribus Urbanæ*;" and each had a prefect, or chief, called *Præfectus*, or *Tribunus*.

Dionysius informs us, that Servius Tullius likewise divided the country, or lands, belonging to Rome, into several departments, under the name of "*Tribus Rusticæ*." The original number of these is not clearly ascertained. Fabius makes it twenty-six, and Vennonius thirty-one. These statements are clearly erroneous; for as the population increased, it is not probable, that the number of tribes would be diminished; and we know, on the authority of Livy, that in the 258th year of the city, the number was twenty-one, and was not increased till many years afterwards, when it was augmented to thirty-five. "*Ecquis homo ex quinque et triginta tribubus ad Hannibalem transfugerit.*" *Liv.* xxiii. 13. This

number continued unchanged. But though the number was permanent, the character of the arrangement was completely altered; for what was at first a portion, or division, of the city, or lands, became at last a division of the state.—“*Tribus fuit primo pars urbis agrique Romani; deinde non urbis, sed civitatis.*” *Pitisc.* It became, in fact, a company, or association of citizens, living where they pleased. Several causes may be assigned for this change. In the first place, it may be observed, that agriculture was deemed, by Romulus, a more useful and a more honourable employment, than any mechanical occupation. The former, accordingly, he committed to the freemen and citizens, who by this active and laborious mode of life, might be disciplined for bearing the fatigues of war: the latter he assigned to strangers, freedmen, and slaves. Hence it was, that husbandry being always considered as a more honourable pursuit, than any mechanical employment, the “*Tribus rusticæ*” were always more respected, than the “*Tribus urbanæ*.”

Again—We are told by Livy, that Q. Fabius Censor, to prevent the election of magistrates from falling into the hands of the city-mob, separated the meaner sort from the rest of the people, and erected them into four societies by themselves, which he called “*Tribus Urbanæ*.” See *Liv.* ix. 46. This contributed much to bring the city tribes into great discredit. Hence it became an object of ambition to be enrolled in one of the “*Tribus Rusticæ*.”—This pre-

ference, however, the existing laws prevented them from indulging, till Appius Cæcus, the Censor, allowed the people, who had been classed, as we have already observed, according to the district, in which they lived, to rank themselves in any tribe they chose, either in the city, or in the country. No sooner was this indulgence granted, than every person, who had been previously enrolled in one of the city tribes, if he was ambitious of distinction, transferred his name to one of the “*Tribus Rusticæ*,” and, if possible, to that tribe, which was distinguished by the most honourable names. “*Rusticæ tribus laudatissimæ eorum, qui rura haberent, urbanæ vero, in quas transferri ignominia esset, desidia probro.*” *Plin. xviii. 3.* After this, the distribution into tribes became a distinction, not of place, or residence, but of voluntary association; and after the principal branches of a family were introduced into any tribe, the other members of it naturally followed; and thus the name of the family sometimes gave name to the tribe, as Claudia, Cornelia, Fabia, Horatia. Sometimes we find the name of the tribe subjoined as a surname, to the name of the person, as, M. Oppius, M. F. Terentina. *Cic. Ep. Fam. viii. 7.*

The “*Tribus Prærogativa*” was the tribe from which the prerogative century was elected. When Servius Tullius divided the people into six classes, and 191, or, according to some, 193 centuries, he ordained that, at the *Comitia*, or public assemblies, the votes should be numbered by the centuries; and

by assigning to the first class ninety-eight centuries, he in fact threw the whole power into the hands of the richest citizens. For, if the first class was unanimous, the subject in question was determined; and if the centuries of that class were divided, it seldom happened, that the vote went beyond the second class. In consequence of this arrangement, the centuries of the four inferior classes were seldom, or never, admitted to vote. (See *Liv.* i. 44.) The commons, when they obtained their freedom, and began to assert their proper rank in the state, succeeded in partly correcting this iniquitous system; and a law was enacted, that the century, which should have the privilege of voting first, should be chosen by lot. The century, on which the lot fell, was called "*Centuria Prærogativa*." After the institution of the thirty-five tribes, it was also enacted, that a tribe should be chosen by lot, out of which the prerogative century should be elected, and this tribe was named "*Tribus Prærogativa*." The other tribes and centuries followed, according to the order of their classes, and were called "*Jure vocatæ*."

This alteration in the mode of giving their suffrages, imparted to the centuries of the four inferior classes, a chance, proportioned to their numbers, of being, one or other of them, the first to vote. And such influence did the example of the "*Centuria Prærogativa*" possess in determining the question, that the other centuries rarely, or never, dissented from their decision. Hence the term *prærogativa* is

frequently used to denote a favourable omen, or auspicious intimation of some future good. “*Supplicatio est prærogativa triumphi.*” *Cic. Fam. Ep.* xv. 5. “Una centuria prærogativa tantum habet auctoritatis, ut nemo unquam prior eam tulerit, quin renunciatus sit.” *Cic. pro Planc.* “Fulvius, quum comitia consulibus rogandis haberet, prærogativa Veturia juniorum declaravit T. M. Torquatum et T. Otacili-um. Manlius, qui præsens erat, gratulandi causa, quum turba coiret, nec dubius esset consensus populi, ad tribunal consulis venit.” *Liv.* xxvi. 22.

The *Comitia Tributa* were held for the election of magistrates, the enacting of laws, and public trials. At these were chosen the inferior magistrates, the tribunes of the people, the *Ædiles*, *Quæstors*, *Proconsuls*, *Proprætors*, and, in latter ages, the *Pontifex Maximus*, with the augurs and heralds.—The superior magistrates, as *Consuls*, *Prætors*, *Dictators*, were chosen at the *Comitia Centuriata*. Capital trials also were confined to the *Comitia Centuriata*.

The *Comitia Tributa*, for electing tribunes and plebeian *ædiles*, were held by one of the tribunes; but for enacting laws, and for public trials, they were held by the consuls. At the *Comitia Tributa*, every person was entitled to vote, who was a Roman citizen, whether he resided at Rome, or in the country; and all the votes were of equal authority. Hence the patricians rarely attended, their numbers bearing no proportion to the great body of the commons.

EXERCISE.

“To conclude; whether is the supreme power lodged in your hands, or in those of the people? When we banished the kings, was a despotic power purchased for you, or an equal share of freedom for all? The Roman people ought to possess the liberty of desiring the enactment of a law, if they please. Will you, as soon as any bill shall be promulgated, order an army to be levied by way of punishment? And when I, by virtue of my office, as tribune, begin to summon the tribes to vote, will you, as consul, oblige the youth to take the military oath, and lead them to the field? Shall you threaten the people, threaten the tribune? Have ye not twice already experienced what those threats, opposed to the unanimity of the commons, availed? You did not, forsooth, come to a rupture with us, because you wished our safety to be consulted; or rather, was not this the reason, there was no battle, because the party, which was the stronger, was also the more moderate?”

OBSERVATIONS.

TENTARE.

EXPERIRI.

Tentare properly denotes “to try by the sense of touch, any substance, with a view to discover its qualities.”—“Cum exprimit omnia perspicue, ut res dicta prope manu tentari possit.” *Auct. ad Her.* “Nec ullum hoc frigidius flumen attigi, cum ad multa accesserim, ut vix pede tentare id possim.” *Cic. de Leg. ii.* (See *Schor. de phras.*—*Gif. de phras.*) This is the strict and proper meaning of the verb. In

its more enlarged acceptation, it denotes, to try with a view to discover the qualities of any substance, by any of the senses; and metaphorically, to try to find out the feelings, or sentiments of the mind. It denotes, therefore, "to feel," "to sound," "to sift," "to probe," in order to discover the qualities of an object.

Experiri denotes "to try, by bringing the object to the proof of experiment:" as the verbal noun, *Experimentum*, signifies "trial," "experience," or "proof;" as *Dare experimentum*, "to give proof." Of these, *tentare* is the generic, and *experiri* the specific term, the former expressing, to try in general, the latter always referring to experimental proof, in order to ascertain, not the qualities only, but also the properties and effects of any thing. Hence we have the expression, "Tentare experientia." *Varro de Re Rust.* The former is not always accompanied with the knowledge desired, or with a discovery of the nature of the subject; and, accordingly, it often signifies merely to attempt, whether successfully, or unsuccessfully. The latter reduces the question to a certainty, and ascertains the qualities and properties of the subject. Hence, says Pliny, "Probabitur experimento." *Panegy.* "Animos vestros tentabunt; vires non experientur." "They will try any means to discover your sentiments; but they will never put your strength to the proof."

CONSORTIUM.

SOCIETAS.

Between these terms there exists the same difference as between *consors* and *socius*. "*Consortes conjungit fortuna eadem; socios labor idem*," is the distinction given by Noltenius and Popma. It is not, however, universally observed, the terms being often used indiscriminately.

FAMA.

RUMOR.

An error not less singular than egregious, has been committed by several critics of eminence, in defining the difference between these two words.—Quintilian observes, "*Famam atque rumores pars altera consensum civitatis, et velut publicum testimonium vocat; altera sermonem sine ullo certo auctore dispersum, cui malignitas initium dederit, incrementum credulitas, quod nulli non, etiam innocentissimo, possit accidere fraude inimicorum falsa vulgantium. Exempla utrinque non deerunt.*" *Quint. lib. v. cap. 3.* Nothing, we conceive, can be more evident, than that Quintilian is here treating of fame, or report, as a ground of argument, and that he is considering what may be urged in favour of such evidence, and what may be objected to its validity. One side may contend, that a report seldom arises without some foundation, and may, as he observes, pronounce it to be "*publicum testimonium*," "*civitatis consensum*." The other side may contend, that common report ought

not to be credited, for that it is often invented by malignity, and aggravated by credulity.

Mancinellus, completely mistaking the meaning of the passage, conceives, that Quintilian is here defining the difference between *fama* and *rumor*.—Popma runs into the same error, and quotes this passage from Quintilian, to shew, that *fama* expresses a common, and generally prevalent opinion, and that *rumor* denotes a report, without any certain author. Dumesnil commits the same mistake; and Hill, when he defines these terms, quotes, as the definition of Popma, what is, in fact, not Popma's, but Quintilian's words misinterpreted.

We have here a striking example, how easily error is propagated; and how unsafe it is to trust to quotation, without consulting the original.

Between *fama* and *rumor*, Doletus maintains there is no distinction. (See *Etym. Mag.*) Of the same opinion is Philander. (See *Quintil. a Capper. lib. v. cap. 3.*) Popma, as we have observed, mistaking the sense of Quintilian, considers *rumor* to denote a report circulated without any known author, and Hill seems to have included this idea in his definition of the term, when he says, that *rumor* relates to a report not so well supported, as that denoted by *fama*. But this distinction does not appear to be sanctioned by usage. If we find Cicero saying, “Sed adhuc sine capite, sine auctore, rumore nuncio.” *Ep. Fam. xii. 10*, we find him saying, also, “Fama nun-

ciabat te esse in Syria ; auctor erat nemo." *Cic. ad Brut.*

Dumesnil refers *fama* to something important ; while *rumor* expresses merely a current report. But may not a current report regard a matter of importance ? " Quidē republica rumores, scribe quæso." *Cic. ad Att.* Nor is *fama* confined to reports of great moment. This distinction of Dumesnil's is neither strictly correct, nor sufficiently precise. Popma, besides the definition just now quoted, distinguishes the terms thus, "*Fama rei antiquæ et novæ : rumor novæ tantum est.*" And Hill, adopting the same distinction, explains *fama* to be a generic term, applicable to events that have just taken place, as well as to those of high antiquity ; and *rumor* as relating to a report, that has not been of long standing, and that is neither so generally prevalent, nor so well supported. This definition, if we exclude the last particular, which, as has been already shewn, makes no part of the distinction, appears to be correct.

Rumor implies a report circulated in common conversation, either openly, or secretly, respecting a recent occurrence ; *fama*, a prevalent report publicly propagated, concerning either a recent or an old event. If we consider them both as relating to the same subject, the former may be the cause of the latter ; but the latter cannot be the cause of the former. "*Fama ex rumoribus nasci potest, sed non rumores ex fama.*"—*Rumores* are the individual com-

munications of what is heard or seen; *fama* is the aggregate effect. The former, though they may refer to one and the same subject, may be many in number; the latter can be only one. It is the public expression of what is seen or heard. Hence we find *fama* always used in the singular number only, while *rumor* is used either as singular, or plural.

It may be necessary to caution the young reader against the belief, that *fama* corresponds to our word *fame*. While the latter is confined to a good sense, the former is used indifferently. "Summæ nobis crudelitatis in patriæ civiumque perniciæ fama subeunda est." *Cic. iv. in Cat.* Here it means "infamy."

It has been observed, that the conjunction *Si*, when used affirmatively for *As*, *Since*, or *Though*, is frequently joined with the indicative mood, thus, "Si non admittimur," *Liv. iv. 3.* "If," or "though we are not admitted." When used hypothetically, implying merely a supposition, and not a fact, though generally joined with the subjunctive mood, we frequently find it joined with the indicative—as "Si aditus datur." *Liv. iv. 5.* "If access is, or should be, given."*

* Mr. Greenlaw, in order to reconcile the construction of *si* with his theory, has in one or two examples assumed, what cannot be conceded to him. Horace says,

"Quod, si bruma nives Albanis illinet agris,
Ad mare descendet vates, et sibi parcet,
Contractusque leget."—*Ep. i. 7. 10.*

Mr. Greenlaw says, that the conditional clause qualifies the subject *vates*, and that the verb is therefore in the indicative

EXERCISE.

“Nor now, Romans, will there be any battle. These men will, indeed, try your spirit, but they will never essay your strength.

“Why should I say more, consuls? If, re-establishing the right of intermarriage on its ancient footing, you will at last restore union to the state; if you will permit the plebeians to unite with you, and their families to be joined with yours by the ties of domestic alliance; if you will grant to brave and active men access to political honours; and, which is the very essence of equal liberty, if we may in our turn rule, as well as obey, the annual magistrates, then, consuls, we are prepared to attend you in those wars, whether real or pretended. But, if any person shall debar us from these rights, you may talk of wars, nay, exaggerate them, as much as you please; not a man will enrol himself; not a man will take up arms; not a man will fight for haughty lords, with whom he can neither participate in the honours of the state, nor be associated by the ties of matrimonial alliance.”

mood. Nothing can, as I conceive, be more evident, than that the term *vates* is not here qualified, as the author assumes; but is taken in its whole extent, that is, in the logical phrase, the term is distributed, the whole poet, soul and body, being there signified. The contingency, expressed in the conditional clause, might induce Horace to go to the sea-side, or it might operate as a dissuasive from going; but, in either case, it must be the poet, corporeally and mentally, absolutely and wholly; unless we can believe the absurdity, that part of him could go, and part remain behind. This is not the only instance, in which Mr. Greenlaw has supported his theory by a similar error.

OBSERVATIONS.

MULIER.

FEMINA.

Mulier denotes “a woman,” or “a female of the human species; *femina* is a generic term, and is applied to a female, of whatever genus, or species. *Bestiæ, aliæ mares, aliæ feminæ sunt.*” *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* *Mulier* is sometimes opposed to *virgo*, and is used for *uxor*.

LABORIOSUS.

DIFFICILIS.

The latter of these words is opposed to *facilis*, and denotes “not easy,” “requiring more than common energies to accomplish.” *Laboriosus* denotes the exertion of corporeal or mental power, continued even to fatigue. “*Quod utrum ei laboriosius, an gloriosius, fuerit, difficile fuit judicare.*” *Nep. in Att.* The epithets here could not be interchanged without altering the sense. To judge was simply not easy; the conduct of Atticus was laborious and fatiguing. “*Attici labore et industria factum est,*” says Nepos. “*Difficile ad fidem est, quot ceciderint, exacto affirmare numero.*” *Liv. iii. 5.* It is difficult credibly to affirm. *Laboriosus* would imply something fatiguing, or tiresome. “*Difficile est tacere, cum doleas.*” *Cic. pro Syll.* Silence being difficult, but not laborious, the term *laboriosus* would be inadmissible. “*Jus laboriosissime et severissime dicit.*” *Suet. in J. Cæs.* It is not indicated, that the administration of justice

was difficult, but that Cæsar devoted to it great labour and assiduity.

STUDIUM.

VOLUNTAS.

CURA.

Voluntas means "will," or "inclination," and in a special or favourable sense, "good will;" *cura*, that anxiety and that care, which may promote the end we have in view; *studium* rises higher, and denotes "zeal and ardor in the cause." "*Studium*," says Cicero, "est animi assidua et vehemens ad aliquam rem applicata, magna cum voluntate, occupatio." *Cic. de Inv. cap. 25.*

Præstare is thus construed. *Præstare vicem*, "to perform the duty;" *Præstare se virum*, "to shew himself a man;" *Præstare alicui, vel aliquem virtute*, "to excel any one in virtue;" *Præstabo eum facturum*, "I will become bound, that he will do it;" *Præstare aliquem*, "to become answerable for any one," "to engage for his conduct." "Eos, quos tibi comites et adiutores negotiorum publicorum dedit ipsa respublica, duntaxat finibus his præstabis, quos ante præscripsi." *Cic. Ep. ad Q. Frat. i. 1.* "You will undertake to be responsible for your attendants, &c., but within those limits, which I have prescribed." *Præstare dictum vel factum*, "to become accountable for what one says, or does." "Horum non modo facta, sed etiam dicta omnia, præstanda nobis sunt." *Cic. ib. Præstat emori*, "It is better to die." *Præstare alicui silentium, benevolentiam*, "to afford silence," "to shew good will, to any one."

If a desire or command be implied, though not expressed by any appropriate verb, the participle *ut*, must be used.

EXERCISE.

It creates in my mind no surprise, that you feel obliged by my services ; for I well knew, and have on all occasions declared, that no man ever possessed so grateful a heart. You have accordingly not only acknowledged, but also most amply returned, my good offices ; and this is a reason, why you shall experience in me the same friendly zeal, and the same good will towards you, in all the rest of your concerns. In reference to your recommendation of that excellent woman, your wife, to my protection, I immediately, on the receipt of your last letter, desired our friend Sura to acquaint her, in my own words, that, if in any instance she had occasion for my services, I hoped, she would let me know ; and that no zeal or attention should be wanting on my part, in effecting all her wishes. This promise I shall fulfil, and if it should prove necessary, I will wait upon her personally. I should like, notwithstanding, that you would beg her by your own hand, not to consider any office as difficult, or below my character, in which I can render her any service. On your own account, there is no employment, in which I can be engaged, that I shall not think both easy and honourable. As to Dionysius, I entreat you to settle the affair with him, and any obligation you may come under to him, I will discharge. May a thousand plagues fall on the Dalmatians, who give you so much trouble ; but I join with you in thinking, they will soon be reduced to obedience ; and as they have always been esteemed a warlike people, they will brighten the glory of your arms.

OBSERVATIONS.

REVERTI.

REDIRE.

There appears to be the same difference between these two verbs, as between the verbal nouns derived from them, though the distinction is not always observed. *Redire* refers to the place, whence we set out, and denotes a return to that place; *reverti* is "to turn back on the road without reaching the journey's end," having no direct reference to the place, from which we at first started. "Itaque persæpe revertit ex itinere." *Cic. de Div.* lib. 1. "He very often turned back." "Dii immortales, quam valde ille reditu, vel potius reversione mea, lætatus?" *Cic. Ep. ad Att.* lib. 16. "How greatly did he rejoice at my return," or rather, "at my turning back to return to Rome?"

ADVENA. PEREGRINUS. HOSPES. EXTERUS.

Advena denotes "a stranger, not a citizen," implying a person, who has come from another country. "Est e Corintho hic advena, anus paupercula." *Ter. Heaut.* i. 1. 44. *Exterus* expresses "a stranger, or foreigner," and so far it is synonymous with *advena*; but they differ in this particular, namely, that while *advena* implies, as its composition imports, that the stranger has quitted his own, and come to reside in another country, in respect to which he is *advena*; *exterus* does not imply any change of place, but merely that he is a foreigner in relation to any other

people, or "one not belonging to the same community,"—"one without the pale of their society." It has been defined to be, *alienus vel civitate, vel ditio-
ne, vel familia, vel collegio*. *Peregrinus* is "a stranger, or traveller;" *quicumque extra provinciam suam proficiscitur*. (*Facciolati*.) "*Peregrini omnes, qui a loco suo domicilii proficiscuntur; et specialiter peregrinus, qui civis Romanus non est*." *Martin. Lex. Phil.* It agrees with *advena* in expressing a person, who has left his home. "Non hospites, sed peregrini atque advenæ nominabamur." *Cic. contra Rull.* But it differs from it in this, that *advena* denotes "a stranger, who means to become a resident," whereas *peregrinus* means "a sojourner, or temporary dweller." *Facciolati* offers also another distinction—" *Peregrinus* dicitur respectu loci, unde est; *advena* loci, ad quem venit." *Hospes*, as denoting "a sojourner, or casual dweller," agrees with *peregrinus*, and differs from *advena*; while, as signifying also the mode of his reception, *hospitio vel benigne acceptus*, it differs from both. This is evident from the passage already quoted from *Cicero contra Rullum*. *Ignotus* means "a stranger, or one with whom we are not acquainted."

Subornare signifies "privily to prepare, equip, or instruct." *Schorus* condemns the use of this verb, as applied to the subornation of false witnesses; but in this acceptation it is found in *Cicero*, *Curtius*, and *Pliny*. "*Falsum subornare testem*." *Cic. pro Roscio*. (*Vid. Schor. in Appono*.)

We have already admonished the reader of errors, which an ignorant or negligent writer is apt to commit in expressing comparison. Thus, when we say in English, "A. and B. are equal in strength," the expression, though it may be, and is generally rightly understood, is certainly not sufficiently precise, and is capable of misconstruction. The equality may be predicated of each, or of both, as equal in strength to some person or persons previously mentioned, or the expression may signify the mutual equality of A. and B. If the latter be the sense intended, it would be more precisely expressed by saying, "equal to each other."

We say, in English, "He acted imprudently, to provoke so powerful a man as you," signifying, that the person addressed was the person provoked. But we must be careful to avoid saying in Latin, *Imprudenter fecit, qui lacesseret tam potentem virum, quam tu es*: for this might signify, "He acted imprudently, in provoking as powerful a man, as you are;" implying, that the person addressed was not the person provoked, but one, as powerful as he. The correct expression would be, *qui lacesseret te tam potentem virum*. This form of expression excludes the possibility of misconception.

FUNUS.

EXEQUIÆ.

Funus is, strictly, nothing more than "the carrying out," *corporis elatio*, and the "interment;" *exequiæ* (qui vel quæ exsequuntur), "the train of at-

tendants." "Clodii cadaver spoliatum imaginibus, *exequiis*, pompa, laudatione." *Cic. pro Mil.* "Fumus innumeris *exequiis* comitatum." *Plin. x. 4. 3.* "Silens agmen, et velut longæ *exequiæ*." *Tac. Hist. iv. 62.* It is extended, to denote also the whole funereal pomp, *officium funebre, quod in funere exequimur.* *Funus* is negatively defined by Cicero to be, "Quo amici conveniunt, ad *exequias* cohonestandas." *Cic. pro Quinct. cap. 15.*

EXERCISE.

When Solon had gone to Miletus, on a visit to Thales the philosopher, and was lodging at his house, he expressed some wonder, that Thales did not marry, and raise a family. The latter, at the time, made no reply; but a few days afterwards, he privately instructed a stranger to say, that he had just returned from Athens, which he had left ten days before. Solon inquired what news there were at Athens. The stranger, tutored what to tell, replied; "None, except the funeral of a young man, which was attended by the whole city; for he was, as I was told, the son of a person eminent for wisdom and virtue, who was then abroad on his travels." "What a miserable man!" said Solon. "But what was his name?" "I heard," said the stranger, "but it has escaped my recollection; all I remember is, that there was much talk of his wisdom and justice." Solon, whose apprehensions increased at every reply, was now much alarmed, and eagerly asked, if it was Solon. "It was," answered the stranger. The philosopher then began to beat his head, and say and do all such things, as are usual to men, in a transport of grief. Thales, smiling and taking him by the hand, said, "These things, which

strike down so firm a man as Solon, have deterred me from marriage. But do not distress yourself; what you have heard is not true; your son lives."

OBSERVATIONS.

CORONA.

DIADEMA.

Corona is the generic, and *diadema* the specific term. *Diadema* est regis; *corona* etiam civium.

RERI.

OPINARI.

ARBITRARI.

These verbs agree, in expressing a persuasion, or mental judgment, implying different degrees of subjective certainty. Though they are often used indifferently, like the English verbs, to which they correspond, namely, "to think," "to believe," "to suppose," "to imagine," "to judge," they are not to be considered as strictly synonymous. *Reri*, which Quintilian termed *verbum horridum*, and which Cicero considered to be, in his time, somewhat obsolescent, and rather of a poetical character, (*Vid. de Orat.* iii. 38,) has been defined to be, as from *res*, "Dicere in animo rem esse certam." Hence *ratus* means "confirmed," "established," "ratified." As Cicero informs us, that he had no decided objection to the word, but intimates no necessity for its use, we may reasonably infer, that it expresses nothing, which might not be signified by one or other of the synonymous terms. It seems to have been generally, if not always, confined to matters of fact, the ground of belief being either moral, or physical. "Ut reor

a facie, Calliopea fuit." *Prop.* "Reginæ, illum regem esse ratæ, suo more veneratæ sunt." *Curt.* iii. 12. They concluded from Hephæstion's superiority in person to Alexander, that he was the monarch.

Arbitrari agrees with it in expressing a firm persuasion, resting on what we have seen, or heard. It is evidently derived from *arbiter*, "a witness" or "person present when any thing is said, or done;" and applicable to matters, "quæ comperta habemus aut quæ ipsi vidimus," as Cicero expresses it. The primitive meaning seems to have been, to "observe, or watch," implying motion. Thus, Plautus says, "Huc et illuc potero quid agant, arbitrarier." *Aul.* iv. 1. 21. Here it is connected with the adverbs of motion, *huc* and *illuc*, and seems equivalent to the antiquated verb *arbitere ex ad et bitere*, an obsolete verb "to go," and *percipere*, implying *ire* and *observare*. *Martin. Lex. Phil.* Hence, we should conclude, that, while it denotes a mental decision, founded on what we have seen, or heard, it implies also some pains to investigate, and inquire. In this it differs from *reri*. It does not however express the subjective certainty, signified by *scire*. Accordingly, we find Cicero animadverting on the testimony of Induciomarus, who, departing from the usual and modest expression *arbitror*, substituted in its stead the term *scio*. "Credo hæc eadem Induciomarum in testimonio timuisse, aut cogitasse, qui primum illud verbum consideratissimum, nostræ consuetudinis *arbitror*, quo nos etiam nunc utimur, quum ea dicimus

jurati, quæ ipsi vidimus, ex toto testimonio suo sustulit, atque omne se *scire* dixit." *Pro. Font.* cap. 12. Thais, in the following sentence, marks the distinction. "Arbitror, certum non scimus." *Ter. Eun.* i. 2. 30. "We think so," "to the best of our belief, it is so; but we do not know for certain."

It has been observed, as a difference, which seems to obtain between these two verbs, that *veri* does not imply any inquiry or investigation, or necessarily denote any conflicting evidence, whereas *arbitrari* denotes a decision of the mind, after carefully viewing the facts on each side. Hence it became a technical term in law, denoting "to arbitrate between litigants."

Opinari differs from both these verbs, as extending beyond them to matters of pure, or abstract speculation. It means, "to form an opinion," implying no certain knowledge. "Se non opinari sed scire." *Cic. pro Arch.* "Sapiens nihil opinatur." *Cic. pro Mur.* "The wise man (of the Stoics) forms no opinion," that is, "he never doubts." This is said sarcastically. "Falsa multa in vita homines opinari." *Cic. Orat. pro Domo.* "Opinor, narras? non recte accipis; certo sunt." *Ter. And.* ii. 2. 30.

Having previously explained the difference between *cogitare* and *putare*, I shall conclude my observations with remarking, that *veri*, *opinari*, and *arbitrari* are used only relatively. The object must be either expressed, or clearly implied. *Cogitare* and *putare*, which have been already distinguished, are

used also absolutely. Thus we may say, *Non putaram, non cogitaram*, "I had not thought," or "I had not reflected;" but we cannot say *Non ratus*, or *opinatus*, or *arbitratus eram*, the object being neither expressed, nor implied.

APTUS.

CONVENIENS.

IDONEUS.

Aptus from *apo* seu *connecto* means strictly "connected," or "conjoined." "*Facilius apta dissolvere, quam dissipata connectere.*" *Cic.* "*Nec vero histronibus oratoribusque concedendum, ut iis hæc sint apta, nobis dissoluta.*" *Cic. Off.* i. 35. And, as things may be mutually connected, either naturally or artificially, *aptus* came to denote the aptitude of one thing to another, whether natural or artificial. *Idoneus* refers to what is naturally fit, proper, or right. *Conveniens* agrees with these in expressing the mutual aptitude of the subjects, *quæ inter se congruunt*, and moreover signifies *quod decorum est, vel consentaneum*, expressing a congruity resulting from nature, from art, or from established usage.

Aptus and *conveniens* differ from *idoneus*, in that the two former may express an adjustment of things among themselves, with no reference to any other subject; thus we find, "*apta inter se.*" *Cic.* "*Sibi convenientiæ finge.*" *Hor.* But *idoneus* always implies, though the idea is not always expressed, some end or purpose, for which the subject is fit, proper, or sufficient; *idoneus auctor*, "an author deserving credit," or "proper to be believed," *idoneus debitor*, "a

debtor fit to be trusted," *locus ad instruendam aciem idoneus*, "fit for marshalling an army." But we cannot say *res inter se*, or *sibi idoneæ*, as we say *res inter se convenientes* or *aptæ*.

Macte, the vocative case of *mactus*, i. e. *magis auctus*, and, by an Atticism, put for the nominative, formed part of a solemn expression, used by the ancients, when they made an offering to the Gods. Priscian informs us, that in the earliest ages, the Romans employed the nominative case, saying, *Mactus esto hoc vino, hoc porco*. See *Putsch.* p. 668. The vocative came afterwards into general use, and was transferred from denoting a wish, that the Gods might be improved, or benefited, by the offerings presented to them, to signify the approbation of a person's conduct, and an encouragement to proceed in the same course. "*Macte virtute esto.*" *Sen. Ep.* 68. "*Macte, hac pietate in patrem patriamque, T. Manli, esto.*" *Liv.* It sometimes is used absolutely, as "*Macte, scribas,*" *Cic.*; sometimes with the genitive, the accusative, and the ablative. When used in the plural number, it admits the ablative only; "*Macti virtute, militis Romani este.*" *Liv.* It is also used, as indeclinable, "*Macte, ait, O nostrum genus.*" *Val. Flac.* vi. 547. "*Juberem macte virtute esse.*" *Liv.* ii. 12. This is the only phraseology in Latin, in which the substantive verb has not the same case after it, as before it, the nouns referring to the same subject.

EXERCISE.

Alexander having received the city of Sidon on surrender, several circumstances induced the conqueror to think, that Strato, its king, was unworthy to retain the sceptre any longer. Hephæstion, therefore, received permission to name as sovereign, whomsoever of the Sidonians he should deem most deserving of that exalted station. Hephæstion had a few young friends of some note among their fellow citizens, to whom, one after another, he tendered the sceptre of the kingdom; but they all declined to accept it. Filled with admiration of the magnanimity, which despised, what others would aim at obtaining by fire and sword, "Go on," said he, "improving in virtue, ye, who have been the first to understand, how much more noble it is to contemn, than to accept a crown; but give me some fit person of the royal family, who will remember, that he holds a sceptre, which he received from you." They named accordingly one Abdalonymus, who was related, though remotely, to the royal family; but, by reason of poverty, was tilling a garden in the suburbs, for very scanty wages. Here they found him weeding his ground. Busily occupied in daily labour, he heard nothing of the din of war, which had shaken the whole of Asia.

OBSERVATIONS.

ILLUVIES.

SORDES.

SQUALOR.

The first of these words by its composition, *non lui, non lavari*, points out its proper meaning. Its primitive signification seems to have been "filth, or uncleanness, occasioned by the neglect of ablution." It is opposed to *cultus*, or "attention to cleanliness in dress, or person." "Cultus ex illuvie corpora varie

movebat." *Liv.* When applied to water itself, it denoted *quasi* inluere, or *illuere*, the influx of filthy matter, *inundatio aquarum sordes convehentium*. "Illuvies aquarum principio rerum terras obrutas tenuit." *Justin.* ii. 1. Or, it signified water left in a stagnant state, "Zenobiam placida illuvie spirantem . . . advertère pastores." *Tac. An.* xii. 51. *Sordes* has a more extensive signification, being applicable to any accumulation of unclean, or offensive matter, from whatever cause, "Sordem urbis et fœcem." *Cic. Att.* i. 16. "Pleni oculi sordium qui erant, jam splendent mihi." *Plaut. Pœn.* i. 2. 101. "Aurículas citharæ collecta sorde dolentes." *Hor. Epist.* i. 2. 53. In the two last of these passages, the term denotes excrementitious matter. *Illuvies*, and *sordes*, by continued negligence, become *squalor*, quasi, a *squama*, "a scurfy or scaly coating." "In corporibus incultis squamosisque, altâ congerie sordium, squalor appellatur." *A. Gellius*, ii. 6.

Specimen means a "sample," "an instance," furnishing an evidence of quality, or character: *documentum*, a lesson, by which we learn any truth or fact, in any mode whatever.

Sufficere is thus construed. *Sufficere alicui arma*, "To supply any one with arms." *Sufficere aliquem*, "To substitute any one in room of another," or "to choose him in his stead." "C. Julius Censor decessit; in ejus locum M. Cornelius suffectus est." *Liv. lib.* v. "Ne sufficiatur Consul, non timent." *Cic. pro Mur.* *Sufficere alicui*, "To be sufficient

for any person, or any thing." "Cupiditati paucorum sufficere poterant." *Cic. in Ver.*

CUPIDITAS. CUPIDO. DESIDERIUM. LIBIDO.

The difference between *Cupere* and *Desiderare* having been already explained, it is necessary only to observe now, that *cupiditas* is defined to be "vehementior affectus animi cupientis aliquid." In relation to *voluntas*, this definition is correct. It generally denotes, however, a less eagerness of desire, than *cupido*. "Cupiditas ex homine—cupido ex stulto nunquam tollitur, quod cupiditas pars quædam sit temperantior defluens ex cupidine." *Bas. Faber.* (*See Dumesnil.*) *Desiderium* means "the feeling of want," hence "a desire to have;" but it is generally confined to express "the desire of what is missing,"—"regret for some good absent, or lost." "Quis desiderio sit pudor, aut modus Tam cari capitis?" *Hor. Car. i. 24.* "What bounds to our regret, for the loss of so dear a man?"

Libido is defined by Cicero, to be "Cupiditas effrenata." *Tusc. Quæst. iv. 6.*

We have already remarked, that Sanctius objects to the designation of *Ablative Absolute*. Dr. Hunter also, in the notes subjoined to his edition of the first five books of Livy, expresses his disapprobation of this description. We should be gratified, could we concur with the learned author; but we candidly own, that, while we cannot assent to his opinion, his reasoning appears to us inconclusive, if not inconsistent.

Be it granted, that the ablative, as every other oblique case, involves in its form some modifying term, originally distinct from the simple name, and afterwards annexed to it as a suffix. This theory we have elsewhere stated as highly probable. (See ‘*The Etymology and Syntax of the English Language explained and illustrated.*’) Let it be granted also, that the adjunct signifies *to* or *with* : these hypotheses, if conceded, will not establish the impropriety of the designation in question. For, while the construction of the ablative is not ruled by either of the two grammatical principles, concord and government ; that is, when the ablative of the noun, with its participle, neither agrees with, nor is governed by, any other word in the sentence, it must be regarded as grammatically *absolute* and *independent*. It matters not, what suffix was annexed to it ; it is known now, simply as an ablative case : and, if we say, that this ablative is dependent, when governed by a verb or preposition, and is construed relatively to these, we are surely justified in calling it independent, or not dependent, absolute, and not relative, when it stands in the sentence, grammatically unconnected with any word. If we could ascertain the suffix as clearly as we can discover the prefix or suffix in the compounds *mecum*, *nobiscum*, *postea*, *quatenus*, we should then say, that there would be as great impropriety in terming the ablative, with its participle, *absolute* and *independent*, as in applying the designation to *me*, *nobis*, *ea* and *qua*. But, while we know nothing of this suffix, and find, that by no

rule, either of concord or of government, is this ablative determined, we conceive, that there is a propriety in describing it by the designation in question.

We would offer another observation. Dr. Hunter admits, that the act, or state, denoted by the participle, is not directly, or pointedly, referred to any subject in the sentence. *Cæsar, his dictis, abiit* does not unambiguously indicate, that the words were spoken by Cæsar. If then the words *his dictis*, or “these things being said,” have, as he observes, so loose a relation to Cæsar, that they may apply to any one else, as well as to him, this surely furnishes an argument for saying, that the clause is absolute and unconnected. It appears to us then, to involve some inconsistency, first to admit the looseness of this expression, and then to dispute the propriety of terming it independent. Nay, the learned author remarks, that, in order to give this ablative absolute that connection with its subject, which the form of the expression, and its usual collocation will not give, some classic writers, sensible of the ambiguity, endeavoured to preclude it by a different arrangement*. “*Dextra Hercules data.*” *Liv.* i. 7. “*Æcis Hannibal post*

* This ambiguity occurs sometimes in the most correct writers. When Cicero says, “*Balbus quæstor, magna pecunia numerata, duxit se a Gadibus.*” *Ep. Fam.* x. 32, we should be inclined at first sight to render it “having paid a large sum of money,” whereas the meaning is, “having received a large sum,” or “a large sum being paid to him.”

Cannensem pugnam captis." *Liv.* xxiii. 1. By this collocation, the actions are unambiguously referred to Hercules and Hannibal respectively. Thus also Cæsar; "Recepto Cæsar orico." *B. C.* iii. 12, instead of the more usual form, *Cæsar, orico recepto*. But this attempt, it would seem, to remove the ambiguity by the position of the agent, clearly shews, that this ablative, absolute in its strict construction, and usual place, has no proper connection with any subject in the sentence. If it had, this endeavour to attach it to its proper subject, by juxtaposition, would be entirely unnecessary.

The learned author remarks, that there is "nothing peculiar in the form of syntax, called the ablative absolute." Here we concur with him, though not on the ground, which the ingenious critic has assumed. We believe the expression to be elliptical, and the ablative to be governed by a preposition understood, which preposition is sometimes expressed. (See Vol. I. p. 65.) There is nothing more extraordinary in saying, *Hannibale duce*, with *sub* understood, or *urbe capta* with *ab* understood, than in saying *palleo metu* with an *ellipsis* of *præ*, or *initio regni*, with an *ellipsis* of *in*, or *emi duobus assibus*, with an *ellipsis* of *pro*. The ablatives are all grammatically independent on any word in the clause.

EXERCISE.

Having saluted him king, one of them thus addressed him;—"Your filthy garments must now be exchanged for the

apparel, which you see in my hands. Wash your body begrimed with dirt ; assume the mind of a king ; and take care, that the virtues of temperance and moderation accompany you into that condition, to which you are now exalted, and of which you proved yourself worthy. Moreover, when you shall be seated on the royal throne, invested with the power of life and death over all your subjects, see you forget not the state, in which you receive the crown." Abdalonymus at first regarded the whole of this affair as resembling a dream, and asked them, if they were sufficiently in their senses, to mock him in so wanton a manner. Upon their swearing to him, that they were serious, he was induced to believe them, and having cleaned his person, he put on the new apparel, and, accompanied by them, proceeded to the king. The latter, after having surveyed him for some time, said ; " The form of your person is not at variance with the fame of your birth ; but I should like to know, whether you bore your poverty with patience." " I wish," replied the other, " that I may be able to bear a crown with the same mind. These hands supplied my desires ; and while I had nothing, yet nothing was wanting." This reply served as an evidence to Alexander of his noble temper, and disposition ; he therefore not only gave him the whole of the royal furniture, but added to his dominion the country immediately adjoining the city.

OBSERVATIONS.

LEGATUS.

ORATOR.

These two words are frequently employed, as nearly synonymous, to express " A deputy, sent with a message, or commission." The difference seems to

be, that *Legatus* always denotes a person deputed by a sovereign, or a state, to transact some business of moment; *Orator*, “a person sent to intercede, or mediate, in behalf of his employers.” The distinction may, perhaps, be expressed thus, *Legatus est, qui ad mandata publica peragenda*; *Orator, qui ad quidvis impetrandum, mittitur*. “Quum Athenienses ad senatum de suis rebus oratores mitterent.” *Cic. de Orat.* “Vejentes pacem petitem oratores Romam mittunt.” *Liv.* “Quibus territi malis, Colophonii oratores Samum—fidem prætoris, populique Romani implorantes, miserunt.” *Liv.* xxvii. 26. *Legatus* being the generic, and *Orator* the special term, the former may be applied to any person deputed with a public commission, and may therefore be used for *Orator*; but the latter cannot always be employed for *Legatus*.—“Jamque oratores aderant ex urbe Latina.”—*Virg. Æn.* xi. 100.—These are afterwards designated *Legati*.—“Legati responsa ferunt.”—*Virg. Æn.* xi. 227.

The object of their mission was to intercede with Æneas, in order to obtain a truce.

PORTA.

JANUA.

“*Porta* differt a *fore*, *janua*, *ostio*, quæ ædium privatarum sunt.” *Facc.* “Hic portas frangit; at ille fores.” *Ov. Am.* 2. “*Porta* murorum est munitio-
numque, atque castrorum; *janua* parietis, ac domorum.” *Isid.* xv. 2. The former, then, denotes the

gate of a city, camp, or fortified town. It is generally considered to be derived from *Portare*, a custom having obtained among the ancients, when they were inclosing with a furrow a piece of ground for a city, or a camp, to lift up the plough, and carry it over that space, which they intended for an entrance, or a gate. "Qui urbem novam condit, tauro et vacca aret; ubi araverit, murum faciat; ubi portam vult esse, aratrum sustollat, et portam vocet."* *Cato*. Others are of

* An anonymous critic has objected to this explanation, alleging as a reason, that the Romans must have had a name for a gate, antecedently to the existence of this ceremony, otherwise, he observes, "they could not have spoken intelligibly" on the subject. This argument does not appear to be conclusive. The idea of an object may exist, and also a conviction of its necessity or convenience, before the object is produced, and before it receives a name. It is probable, that the utility of a vacant space on each side of a city wall occurred to the *Hetrurians*, before that space received the appellation of *Pomœrium*. A new invention or discovery is not necessarily preceded by its name. Nor is there any improbability in the notion either of *Cato*, or of *Varro*, that when the first city was inclosing by a furrow, the necessity would be obvious of leaving a passage, by lifting the plough, for the purposes of carriage from within and from without.

But though the critic rejects the derivation given by *Cato*, he admits the existence of the ceremony, to which it alludes, gravely delivering at the same time, an account of its origin, almost too ridiculous, to entitle it to any notice. He says, that it arose from the accidental resemblance in form between the words, *porta* "a gate," and *portare*, "to carry." Thus he would have it believed, that, when the ancients were drawing their furrow round the intended city, they lifted the plough, not to furnish a passage, or communication between the city and the fields, but because *porto*

opinion, that the entrance was so called, *Quia hâc quidvis portaretur*. This was the opinion of Varro. *Fores* is sometimes used to denote merely "the door of the gate," or *valvæ*, "the folding doors." Hence the explanation given by some critics, "*Fores* differt a *porta*, ut pars a toto." "*Priusquam fores portarum objicerentur*." *Liv.* i. 14.

INIRE. INGREDI. INTRARE. INTROIRE.

The three last verbs, says Dumesnil, are often used indiscriminately, but may, notwithstanding, be thus distinguished. *Ingredi*, he observes, is "To advance, in order to enter." *Intrare*, "To cross the threshold." *Introire* is "to go forward to the inner part," *Altius ingredi*. "Cum jam pontem ingredi inciperent." *Cic.* Here, he says, *Intrare*, and *Introire* would be inadmissible. "Tu istam domum ingredi ausus es? Tu illud limen intrare?" "Did you dare to present yourself before this house? To cross this threshold?" This distinction appears to be well founded.

The difference between *Inire* and *Ingredi* it is more difficult to ascertain. In their literal, as well as metaphorical sense, they appear to be nearly, if not precisely, equivalent words. If I were to offer a conjecture, I should be inclined to say, that, while *Inire* is

resembles *porta*. A very extraordinary reason indeed! His own derivation is from *πὸς*, "a passage." We have given the explanation offered by Cato, and that also of Varro, leaving it to the reader to form his own judgment.

a generic term, in its primary import, agreeing precisely with *Ingredi*, it differs in this, that *Inire* has no reference to the manner of entry, as either quick, or slow, and that *Ingredi* excludes the idea of haste, or speed. Whether the following passage will justify this explanation, is submitted to the judgment of the learned reader. “Si dormis, expergiscere; si stas, ingredere; si ingrederis, curre; si curris, advola.” *Cic. ad Att. lib. ii. 23.*

It has been delivered by some grammarians as a universal rule, that, when two subjects are compared together, and the substantives are connected by *quam*, they should be put in the same case. The inaccuracy of this, as a universal rule, has been already demonstrated. It is only when both subjects belong to one and the same predicate, that the rule is applicable, an example of which occurs in the following Exercise. When they belong to different predicates, the rule does not hold good. If we say, “He believed, that Philip had taken more cities by gold, than Alexander by arms,” the success of Alexander, and the greater success of Philip, are both individually objects of belief.

Hinc is elegantly and concisely employed to denote the origin, or cause, of any event, or effect; as “This made him imagine,” *Hinc existimavit. Quare* is often used to express the same idea.

Though the point of time, or *the time, when*, is generally put in the ablative, we find classic writers adopting a different mode of expression, when the

time is denoted by a pronoun, or definitive. “*Ostovius in agris id temporis erat.*” *Tac. An.* xvi. 15. for *eo tempore*. “*Incidit idem temporis, ut tempestate adversa afflictaerentur.*” *Tac.* for *eodem tempore*. “*Nec eum puduit id ætatis sycophantias struere.*” *Plaut.* for *ea ætate*. There is in these expressions, an *ellipsis* of the preposition *ad*.

EXERCISE.

The Tarentines being at war with the Romans, and unable to support the contest, resolved to crave the assistance of Pyrrhus, king of Epire, and put their armies under his command. Accordingly they sent ambassadors, to inform him, that they wanted a general of ability and character, and that they would find a supply of troops, to the amount of 20,000 horse, and 150,000 foot. This promise elevated Pyrrhus, and excited in the Epirotes a strong desire to become confederates in the war. There was at that time in the court of Pyrrhus, a Thessalian, named Cineas, a man of sound sense, and who had been a disciple of Demosthenes. This man had devoted himself to Pyrrhus, and in all the embassies, in which he had been employed, confirmed the saying of Euripides, “The gates, that steel will pierce, eloquence will enter.” This made Pyrrhus say, that Cineas had gained him more cities by his address, than he himself had won by his arms. Cineas, now perceiving, that Pyrrhus was determined to have war with the Romans, took an opportunity, when he saw him at leisure, to draw him into the following conversation.

OBSERVATIONS.

PERICULUM.

DISCRIMEN.

Periculum, from the obsolete verb *pereo*, and that probably from *πειρα* (*experimentum*), whence came *experior*, means, primitively, "a trial." "Fac periculum in literis." *Ter. Eun.* iii. 1. 33. "Make trial of him in letters." "Put him to the proof." In Apuleius we find the expression "bono periculo," to denote "a safe trial," or "there being no danger." And as the issue of a trial, or experiment, not previously made, as is implied in the phrase, *facere periculum*, is generally doubtful, the word by a natural transition came to signify "risk," or "danger." *Discrimen* from *discernere*, means "distinction," or "difference," *id, quo una res ab alia discernitur*. This is its general or etymological acceptation. Its special signification, as a synonym with *periculum*, is, *id quod dividit inter bonum malumque eventum*. "Discrimen belli in D. Bruto positum." *Cic. Fam. Ep.* xii. 25. "The issue," or "decisive termination of the war depends on Brutus." Hence, while *periculum* means simply "danger," *discrimen* denotes "a critical conjuncture, a trial," *periculum*, or "danger decisive of one's fate." "Illi ante discrimen feroces, in periculo pavidi." *Tac. Hist.* i. 68. "They, fierce, before the dangerous crisis was presented to them, became dastards in the moment of peril," or, "when they were put to the proof."

SUBIGERE.

DOMARE.

The former of these verbs, if we consult its composition (*Agere sub*), means literally, "To drive, or force, under," "To lay low," "To humble." "Mihi vivendum est cum illis, quos vici, ac *subegi*," *Cic.* "Whom I have conquered, and humbled." "Quos armis *subegimus*, atque in nostram ditionem redegitur." *Cic. pro Pont.*

Domare is "To tame by force," "To subdue a turbulent and refractory spirit." "Nulla gens est, quæ non aut ita *subacta sit*, ut vix *extet*; aut ita *domita*, ut *quiescat*." *Cic.* Here the distinction between the two verbs is clearly marked, *subacta sit* being opposed to *extet*, and *domita sit* opposed to *quiescat*.

HACTENUS.

EATENUS.

ADHUC.

Hactenus and *catenus*, "thus far," differ merely as *hic* and *is*. *Hactenus*, says Manutius, dicitur de re; *adhuc* de tempore; and this distinction, he remarks, is observed by Cicero. Other writers, however, have not scrupled to apply *hactenus* to time. "Dispecta est Thyle, quam hactenus nix, et hiems abdebat." *Tac. Agr.* "Still concealed." This use of the term, it must be acknowledged, is not common. There is one distinction, however, which, we believe, is uniformly observed. *Hactenus* implies progress or continuation to a certain limit, but nothing beyond it; *adhuc* often denotes that something is to

be added, and is used for *præterea*. “*Ortum amicitiae videtis, nisi quid adhuc forte vultis.*” *Cic. de Amic.* “Something more.” *Hactenus* would here be inadmissible, as “thus far” would be in English. According to this distinction, which we believe is never violated, *hactenus* means “so far,” in reference to what is “said or past ;” *adhuc* denotes also “farther,” or “besides,” in reference to what is yet to be said, or done.

The young reader has been already cautioned against inconsiderately transferring, or, in other words, literally translating metaphors, or any species of trope, from one language into another.—*Heaven* is often, by metonymy, employed to denote the Supreme Being ; but the trope is inadmissible in Latin. “Heaven forbid,” must be rendered by *Deus*, not *Cælum*, *avertat*.

Semel denotes “once,” opposed to two or more times, as “*Patria bis a me servata est ; semel autem eam servavit.*” *Cic.* “*Semel iterumque,*” *Cic.* “Once and again.” It is emphatically used to denote, that, if any thing is once done, it will be unnecessary to do it twice, or oftener, it having been done completely. Hence *semel* is used sometimes as equivalent to *prorsus*, *penitus*, *omnino*.—“*Quoniam Antonius semel induxit animum, sibi licere quod vellet, fecisset nihilo minus me invito.*” *Cic. ad Att.* “*Si hercle ego illum semel prehendero, nunquam iridere me inultum sinam.*” *Plaut. Epid.* iii. 4. 6. “If I *once* catch him.”

“Once,” “In a former time,” “In a former age,” is rendered by *Olim, Antea, Quondam*.

Universal, or abstract, truths, are, in English, generally expressed in the present tense. Metaphysical propriety requires this usage, propositions exhibiting these being immutably certain, and independent on the changes of time, or place. Hence there is a manifest impropriety in saying, with Swift, “Two young gentlemen . . . have made a discovery, that there *was* no God;” or, with another writer of eminence, “If an atheist would peruse the volume of nature, he would confess, that there *was* a God.” The Latins do not appear to have attended to this principle, when they expressed abstract, or general, propositions in narration, or as the subjects of a predicate, denoting past time. “*Nihil tale dicitis*,” said Cicero; “*sed casu esse factum, ut Deorum similes essemus*.” *De Nat. Deor.* lib. i. The latter part of this sentence we should render thus, “That it happened by chance, that we *are* like to the Gods,” not, “That we *were* like,” as if a similitude formerly existing had now ceased. “*Consideremus secundam (partem) quæ mihi talis videtur fuisse, ut, cum ostendere velles, quales Dii essent*,” We should say, “What *is* the nature of the Gods,” not, “What *was*,” as if their nature were mutable; or, as if the inquiry were, what was their nature in time past, and not, what it permanently is, or what it is now. The same observation is applicable to the expression, “*Non dubitares, quin mundus esset Deus*.” *Ib.* lib. iii. “*Quæ*

manus tota imbribus et fulminibus deleta est, ut intelligeret, quam nullæ *essent* hominum adversus Deos vires." *Justin.* ii. 12. The last clause of this sentence would, in English, be correctly rendered, "How insignificant *is* the strength of men against the Gods." We should thus express an immutable truth—a proposition true at all times, and in all places. But, if we were to adopt the tense of the original, and say, "How weak the strength of man *was*, when opposed to the Gods," we should convert a universal, into a particular truth—a permanent, into a temporary insignificance. The Latins, however, as has been remarked, did not attend to this distinction, but, in expressing these universal and immutable truths, in the form of narration, followed the general rule. *See* Vol. I. p. 141.

We are unwilling to conclude this observation, without recommending it to the English scholar, to be careful to express general truths by the present tense: he will thus consult propriety and perspicuity. We say, perspicuity, for it is by attention to the rule here recommended, that general are to be distinguished from particular facts, or propositions. When we hear an author saying, "James (VI.) used to compare him to a cat, who always *fell* upon her legs," (*Adam's History of Britain*,) one unacquainted with the nature of this animal might suppose, that the historiographer, or his majesty, had some particular cat in view, who had this property; and not that it was a faculty, common to the species.

It has been already observed, that Cicero joins *potiri* with the genitive, when he uses it to denote the acquisition of sovereignty, or political power. Cæsar, in the same sense, frequently joins it with the ablative. —“ Totius Galliæ imperio potiri.” *B. G.* i. 2.

EXERCISE.

“The Romans,” said Cineas, “have the reputation of being excellent soldiers; if it please Heaven, that we conquer, what use, sir, shall we make of our victory?” “Cineas,” replied the king, “you inquire, what is evident; when the Romans are once conquered, there is no town, Greek or Barbarian, that will dare to oppose us: we shall immediately become masters of the whole of Italy.” Cineas, after a short pause, continued, “After we have subdued Italy, what shall we do next?” Pyrrhus, not yet perceiving his drift, replied; “There is Sicily very near, and stretches out her arms to receive us, a rich island, and easy to be taken.” “What you say,” answered Cineas, “is very probable; but is the taking of Sicily to conclude our expedition?” “Far from it,” said Pyrrhus; “for, if Heaven grant us success, that success shall only be a prelude to greater things; for I will then make myself master of Carthage, of Libya, and next of all Greece.” “And, when we have conquered all, what are we to do?” “Why, then, my friend,” said Pyrrhus, “we will take our ease, eat, drink, and be merry.” Cineas, having brought him thus far, replied, “And what hinders us from eating, drinking, and taking our ease, now? We have already those things in our possession, at which we aim at arriving, through numberless toils and dangers, through innumerable calamities, which we must both cause and suffer.” This discourse gave Pyrrhus some uneasiness, but did not

in the least alter his determination. He knew not, what is the nature of the human mind ; nor was he aware, how little can extended dominion add to human happiness.

OBSERVATIONS.

The proper and characteristic meaning of the participle in *dus* has been a subject of great controversy among critics and grammarians ; some contending, that it always denotes necessity, or duty ; others, that it is a participle of the future tense ; and Perizonius alone, if I mistake not, affirming, that it is truly a present participle of the passive voice. From this contrariety of opinions, it may naturally be inferred, that the subject involves considerable difficulty.

It has been already observed, that tenses are employed not to express different times absolutely, but relatively. Inattentive to this simple but important truth, grammarians have perplexed themselves and their readers with the most absurd theories, and inexplicable subtleties. Hence evidently has arisen the erroneous doctrine of Sanctius Minerva, and other grammarians, respecting the real character and import of all the participles. *Amans, Amatus, Amaturus*, he tells us, do not severally express present, past, and future time ; but denote, each of them, all, or any of these times. The intelligent reader cannot fail to perceive, that such vagueness of signification would prove utterly destructive of all perspicuity ; and that independently on all usage and all authority,

there exists an insuperable presumption against the doctrine of the learned critic. But let us examine a few of the examples, which he adduces, in proof of his theory on this subject. “*Abfui proficiscens in Græciam.*” *Cic.* Here, he says, *proficiscens* expresses past time. If *proficiscens* expresses past time, it may be pertinently asked, what time would *profectus* denote? That it *refers* to a past action, is true; but that it does not *express* past time, appears to me equally certain. The time is denoted by *abfui*, and *proficiscens* marks the contemporaneity of the departure. “I was absent, being at that time setting out.” “*Ultro ad eam venies, indicans, te amare.*” *Ter.* Here, he says, *indicans* denotes future time, and the expression, he conceives, is equivalent to *venies et indicabis*.

In this opinion, we cannot concur. The participle denotes, that the two actions would be contemporaneous; but if the verb is substituted for the participle, the one action might follow the other, at any distance.

It is doubtless true, that, if any action, or event, be expressed as future, any action, or event, represented as contemporaneous with it, must also be future. But we should err egregiously, if we thence inferred, that the word denoting mere contemporaneity, and equally expressive of an action present at a past time, does, by its own proper and characteristic power, denote future time. Its real and distinctive office must be admitted to be the expression of

an action, or state, simultaneous with the action, or state, signified by the principal verb. *Indicans* does not denote future time; but the declaration of an action present, or contemporaneous, with a future time.

Amaturus, he observes, if it did not signify all times, would not be joined with all tenses. Perizonius justly ridicules this argument. In "*Profecturus tibi literas dedi*," the participle, says the author, denotes past time. If this be true, it may be here again pertinently asked, What time would *profectus* denote? How this question is to be answered, in consistence with this theory, without confounding things essentially and manifestly different, I cannot conjecture. *Profecturus* denotes future time in relation to *dedi*. *Amatus*, he observes, is joined with all the tenses of the substantive verb, and therefore denotes all the times. Here is evidently the same error. When we say, *Sum paratus, eram paratus, ero paratus*, is it the participle, which expresses the times? Certainly not, but the substantive verb; the participle expressing merely the completion of the preparation, whether in present, in past, or in future time. But I forbear to multiply examples. I shall only observe, that all controversy on this subject would probably have been precluded, if *amans*, and *amatus*, instead of being regarded as participles of the present and preterite tenses, had been considered to be, as they really are, participles expressing perfect and imperfect action, the completion, or incompleteness, of any state, or condition, the time being noted by the verb, with which

they are connected. If we say, *Est, erat, erit legens* — *Est, erat, erit lectus*, it is evident, that the participles do not express the times, but simply the perfection, or imperfection, of the act, or state.

Let us now proceed to investigate the real meaning, and true character, of the participle in *dus*. To assist us in this inquiry, it may be useful, in the first place, to ascertain its origin. It would be an unpardonable trespass on the patience of the reader, were I to occupy his time, in exposing the erroneous and groundless derivations, which some grammarians have assigned to this participle. Its evident resemblance to the participle in *ns* determines its origin. Thus we have *Amans*, (originally written most probably *amants*,) *amantis, amandus; adiens, adeuntis, adeundus*. Its extraction therefore is sufficiently clear.

If it be true then that the participle in *dus* is derived from the participle in *ns*, which, in active verbs, expresses a continuation, or the incompleteness, of an action, a presumption arises, that, as the participle in *ns* expresses incomplete *action*, the participle in *andus* or *endus*, derived from it, expresses an incomplete *passion*, or an imperfect state of being acted upon. If then the origin of this participle in *dus* would lead us to infer, that it is truly a present participle of the passive voice, let us next inquire, how far this conclusion is justified by usage. If it should appear that this participle does not by its own power ever express futurity, or the obligation either

of necessity, or duty, it will follow, that it is not a participle of the future tense; and if not of this tense, it must be a present participle, for it has never been supposed to denote past time simply and absolutely. Let us then take a few examples.

If we say *Tempus petendæ pacis*, is there futurity, or obligation, expressed here? Certainly not. The expression is equivalent to *Tempus petendi pacem*, *Tempus, quo pax petatur*, *Tempus, petere pacem* *. The gerund in *di* expresses no futurity, no

* Verbals in *io*, it would seem, in the early ages of the Roman language, governed transitively the same case with the primitive verb. "Quid me votis tactio est?" *Plaut.* Here *tactio*, like *tangere*, governs the accusative. One or two examples occur in Cicero. "Justitia est obtemperatio scriptis legibus." *De Legg.* i. 15. Here the verbal noun governs the same case with *obtemperare*. "Traditio alteri." *Cic. Top.* Here also the noun, like its primitive, governs the dative of the person to whom the thing is given. This observation is confined to verbs governing transitively. When the noun is of the same, or of a kindred signification with the verb, the observation does not hold: thus we say *Servire servitutem*, *Cic. pro Mur.* cap. 29, though the verb governs the dative.

The gerund seems to have retained its double mode of construction. "Fuit exemplorum eligendi potestas." *Cic. de Invent.* lib. ii. "Antonio facultas detur agrorum suis latronibus condonandi." *Cic. Philip.* "Aliquod fuit principium generandi animalium." *Varr. R. R.* ii. 1. "Ego ejus videndi cupidus rectâ consequor," *Ter. Hec.* iii. 3. 12. where *ejus* refers to a female. "Ejus amittendi nec retinendi copia," *Id. Phor.* instead of *videndæ* and *retinendæ*. Here, however, it must be allowed, that *ejus* may refer to "quod velim."

It may obviate a difficulty to the junior reader, if we here

obligation. *Cupidus discendi* is equivalent to *Cupidus discere*. If we proceed to the dative case, and say, *Par ferendo oneri*, equivalent to *Par ferendo onus*, here also it is evident that none of these modifications are expressed. In like manner, *Ad petendam pacem* denotes merely "For the purpose of seeking peace," and may be varied into the expressions, *causa petendi pacem*, or *petendæ pacis*. The purpose merely is signified; and, though the accomplishment of the purpose must be posterior to the purpose itself, the futurity is not expressed, but only necessarily implied. Were this posteriority indeed any evidence, that *ad petendum* or *petendam*, ex-

remark, that the gerund in *di* is sometimes used elliptically. "Decernatur, et maneat provincialibus potentiam suam tali modo ostentandi." *Sciz jus. Tac. Ann. xv. 21.* "Volugesi vetus et infixum erat armæ Romana vitandi." *Ib. xv. 5. i. e. consilium, seu propositum vitandi.* "Cum haberem in animo navigandi." *Cic. ad Terent.*

Sanctius Minerva endeavours to shew, that the gerunds in *di* and *do*, joined with an accusative, are truly verbs; but that the gerund in *dum* is, what he terms a participle of the neuter gender, and incapable of being joined with a substantive in the accusative case. Agreeably to his doctrine we may say, *Legendum est*, or *Legendum esse*, but we must not add *libros*, or any other noun. He would, therefore, condemn Ruddiman's example, "*Petendum est pacem.*" But the passages, in which this form of expression occurs, are too numerous, to admit the supposition, that they all involve a false reading, though the lection in some is questionable, and in some, without controversy, erroneous. I shall quote only one, "*Binas centesimas ab se ablatas ferendum non putant.*" *Cic. in Ver. ii. 3. 72.* No other reading appears to be here admissible.

presses future time, it would follow, that, in such expressions, as *Volo discere, Cupio scire, Est mihi in animo audire*, the infinitives, expressing what must be posterior to the wish, the desire, the intention, must also express future time. This, however, will not be affirmed. They express the immediate objects of these desires. When Cicero says, “*Cur adeo delectaris criminibus inferendis?*” is there futurity, necessity, or duty expressed? Evidently not. The expression is equivalent to *inferendo crimina*, or “*Cur adeo te delectat crimina inferre?*” “*In hostibus obsidendis*” may be varied, in like manner, into *In hostes obsidendo*, and *Dum hostes obsidebantur*, “While the enemy were in a state of blockade.” Vossius adduces an example from Agellius, in which he maintains, that this participle denotes future time. It is this, “*Nomine non adepto, sed cum spe adipiscendi.*” Here it seems to have escaped the consideration of the learned critic, that, though the attainment of any object must be posterior to the hope of it, yet that attainment is frequently, and with strict metaphysical accuracy, represented as its present and immediate object. Thus Terence says, “*Sperat avellere,*” and we say, “She hopes to get.” *Dare pollicitus est*, “He promised to give,” though the giving must necessarily be posterior to the promise. It is evident then, that, in none of these examples, does this participle express futurity, or obligation.

But Ursinus, who contends against the doctrine, which we would here establish, observes, that it is by

the nominative case chiefly, that the meaning of any word is most correctly ascertained. Let us then attend to one or two examples, in which this participle occurs in the nominative case. The first shall be from Virgil :—" *Volvenda dies en attulit ultro.*"—*Virg. Æn.* ix. 9.

Nothing can be more evident, than that the participle, in this passage, neither expresses any obligation, nor denotes future time either directly or indirectly. It is clearly a participle of the present tense, and passive voice, and is equivalent to *Sese volvens*, or *Dum volvitur*, "Rolling time has brought," or "The revolution of time has brought."

The next example we cite from Ennius :—" *Clamor ad cœlum volvendus ad æthera vagit.*"—*Enn. apud Var.* L. l. 3. 6.

Here also *volvendus* is precisely of the same import with *Dum volvitur*, performing the office of a present participle passive. We shall now subjoin an expression from an eminent classic, in which the participle occurs in the accusative case, and which, in addition to the examples already adduced, seems indeed to decide the controversy. Livy says in his Preface, "*Quæ ante conditam condendamve urbem—ea nec affirmare, nec refellere in animo est.*" Here *condendus* is clearly employed as a present participle passive. It is impossible to conceive a perfect and an imperfect state of *suffering*, or *being acted upon*, more forcibly contrasted, than they are in this passage. The one participle denotes, that the founding,

or building, was complete, and corresponds to our perfect participle *built*; the other denotes the state of suffering as progressive, and corresponds to our present or imperfect participle, in its passive acceptation, *building*. The same observation is applicable to the following passage, "In *gerenda* republica putabatur fuisse segnior, *gesta* multis senatus consultis defendit." *Cic. pro Domo. cap. 34.* "Quæ non auditu cognoscenda, sed oculis spectanda, habemus." *Tac. Dial. de Orat. cap. 8.* This is not to be rendered, "Things not about to be known," as if future time were meant, or "which ought not to be known," as if obligation were implied, or "things not known by past experience," as if the expression were *cognita*, but "things not abeing known* by the ear, but abeing seen by the eye." The participles denote a present and continued state of passion, as *cognoscens* et *spectans* would each signify a present and continued action. "Ne ipsos quidem Græcos est cur tam multos legunt, quam legendi sunt." *Cic. de Fin. 1. 2.* Here *legendi sunt* means "are being read," and is equivalent to *leguntur*, the term, which he uses immediately afterwards.

It may be granted, perhaps, that, in these and

* I am aware, that this mode of expression is now almost obsolete, when the imperfect participle belongs to a neuter verb, or the verb of existence. But by the omission of the prefix *a*, it is evident, that a meaning, different from that intended, would, in this case, be conveyed.

similar examples, neither futurity nor obligation is implied. But it may be asked, how is this doctrine reconcilable with such expressions, as the following; *Permisit urbem diripiendam, Suscepit puerum educandum, Dedit pecuniam portandam, Curavit servum interficiendum* ? Is neither futurity, nor obligation expressed here ? In answer, it is observed, that, in the three first of these examples, it is not the idea of futurity, but of purpose, which is directly expressed ; and though, as has been already observed, the accomplishment of every purpose, or intention, must necessarily be posterior to the purpose itself, yet the thing intended may be, and often is, represented as contemporaneous with the purpose, being its present and immediate object. If we say, “ He gave up the city, for the purpose of *its being plundered*,” “ He gave the money, for the purpose of *its being carried*,” we employ no term expressive of futurity, and yet we convey the sentiment intended. It seems not an improbable conjecture, that such phraseologies are elliptical, the preposition *ad*, denoting purpose, or effect, being understood. Again—if we say, *Eum interfici jussit*, it will not be maintained, that the infinitive is in the future tense, or that it denotes future time ; and is not the expression strictly analogous to *Eum interficiendum curavit*, the one signifying, “ He ordered him *to be put to death*,” and the other, “ He caused him *to be put to death*” ? In the English expressions, which convey the full import of the Latin, there is not a single note of futurity. And when

Livy, in the thirty-first chapter of the first book, says, “Ædificanda divisa sunt loca,” “places or grounds were divided to be built upon,” *purpose*, if not *obligation*, is the primary notion.

“Prima dicte mihi, summa dicende Camœna,” *Hor.* has been urged, as an incontrovertible proof, that the participle in *dus* expresses future time. Whatever other examples may yet be adduced, to subvert the doctrine of Perizonius, this quotation will not be admitted, as incontestably sufficient. Scaliger has delivered it as his opinion,—an opinion by no means improbable,—that this was the last of the poet’s productions; and he objects to the order, in which this epistle is generally placed. If the opinion of this eminent critic be well founded, “Dicende,” instead of overturning, serves to corroborate the doctrine of Perizonius; the sense being, “now a celebrating,” or “a being celebrated in this my last song.” At any rate, it is clear, that no futurity is expressed. Horace does not mean, “who *will be* celebrated,” but, “who oughtest to be,” or “art worthy of being celebrated.” In the parallel passage, “Colendi semper et culti,” if “colendi” cannot with propriety be disjoined from “semper,” and cannot therefore mean “now in the condition of being worshipped,” it is evident, that the poet does not presume to assert the future permanence of his countrymen’s devotion, but the permanence of the obligation to worship. When he says, —“Rivus, si decidit imber, Multa mole docendus aprico parcere prato.”—*Ep.* i. 14. 30. he does not

mean, that the stream will be taught, but that it must be, or ought to be taught. “Disce docendus adhuc.” *Hor. Ep. i. 17. 3.* “Still requiring instruction,” or “needing to be taught.” “Palladius in eo non cognoscendus Athenas.” *Ov. Met. vii. 723.* Here the verb and the participle express contemporaneous circumstances. “I enter Athens, *in a state of not being known*,” “not knowable,” or, as it is semibarbarously expressed, *incog.* The purport, then, of the preceding observations is, to shew, that the participle in *dus* is originally and strictly a present participle passive, that it was employed to denote necessity and duty, but never by classic prose writers, to express simply the futurity of any state, or condition.

While I submit these observations to the judgment of the reader, I am perfectly aware, that, after the decline of the Latin language, the participle in *dus* was employed by some writers to denote futurity. “Se in unum dispergenda per totum orbem multitudo contraxit.” *Sulp. Sever. Hist. Sacr. i. 4.* “Omne enim, quod factum est, prius faciendum fuit.” *Macrob. de Diff. et Soc. Gr. et Lat. Verb.* But such authority is of no value, and unworthy of imitation. I am aware also, that one passage has been quoted from Cæsar, in order to shew, that this participle was used by him to express futurity. The passage is this:—“Movebatur misericordia civium, quos interficiendos videbat.” *B. C. i. 72.* Here the participle has been considered as equivalent to *interfectum iri*. Perizo-

nus, when endeavouring to reconcile this expression to his doctrine, observes, that *interfici* might, without injury to the sense, be substituted for *interficiendos*. In this opinion, however, the intelligent reader will not, I apprehend, be inclined to concur. That all verbs expressing desire, purpose, promise, hope, or intention, may be followed by a present tense, though the action, or event, must be future, or posterior to the desire, purpose, &c., there can be no doubt; and the principle has been already explained. But that any phraseology would be adopted by any classic of eminence, or should be employed by any writer studious of perspicuity, by which that, which is foreseen, or seen as future by the eye of the mind, is or may be confounded with that, which is actually beheld as passing, or is the object of corporeal vision, is highly improbable. A more satisfactory reconciliation of this passage with the theory in question may be proposed.

Now, though the participle in *dus* is never found in classic writers expressing necessity, duty, or futurity, by itself, it is not denied, that, joined to the verb *esse*, it uniformly does denote moral, or physical obligation. The admission, however, of this fact is nowise repugnant to the doctrine, for which we contend. For, in questions of this kind, a distinction must be made between that, which any tense expresses by its own proper power, and that import, which usage may, in certain cases, have imparted to it. If

we say, "Is a man to be punished for what he could not prevent?" the expression is equivalent to "Ought a man to be punished?" But is there any word in this sentence, which simply and directly expresses right, duty, or obligation? There is not. Is there any word significant of futurity? The negative is equally clear. If we convert the question into an affirmation, and say, "The man is to be punished for what he could not prevent," the expression becomes ambiguous; for though, in this particular instance, it might be considered as denoting mere futurity, in many cases it would imply either futurity, or right. Now, if we say *Num homo est puniendus?* I apprehend, we shall find no word in this sentence expressive either of futurity, or obligation. *Est* is a present tense; and, as we have found no example of the participle in *dus* standing alone denoting futurity or obligation, we are justified in saying, that the expression corresponds to the English phraseology, and that neither futurity, nor obligation, is expressed either by the substantive verb, or by the participle, though the combination of the two words has by usage acquired this signification. From these observations, I trust, it will appear, that the participle in *dus* is, in its real character, a present participle of the passive voice, and that it is only in conjunction with the verb *sum*, that it ever denotes necessity or duty.

Let us now return to the passage in Cæsar, and we shall find it, I conceive, by no means repugnant

to the doctrine, which is here proposed. Cæsar informs us, that his army had already suffered severely; and he foresaw, that another battle must cost him many lives. “*Movebatur igitur misericordia civium, quos interficiendos videbat.*” It can scarcely be necessary to remark, that nothing is more common than an ellipsis of the substantive verb. *Fore*, therefore, as Perizonius proposes, being supplied to *interficiendos*, the meaning is, “He was moved with pity, because he saw, that many of his countrymen must fall, or would necessarily be slain,” if he encountered the enemy in another battle.

I conclude these observations with remarking, that, as it is only with the verb *sum*, that the participle in *dus* expresses necessity, or duty, and as it must, in conjunction with this verb, be understood in this sense, and no other, the junior reader must be careful not to use this phraseology, when mere futurity is to be expressed*. He must observe, that, though the English expression *Is to be* denotes either futurity, or obligation, the participle in *dus* with the verb *sum* always expresses necessity, or duty. If we take the following passage from Livy—“All of whom readily entertained the hope, that Alba would be small, that Lavinium would be small, in comparison with the

* This caution becomes the more necessary, when we find such an eminent scholar as the late Dr. Parr committing this error, oftener than once in his Preface to Bellendenus. *Est reperiendus*, he writes to express, “Is to be found,” or “can be found.”

city, which was to be built, or which they were going to build," we shall find the author saying, "Qui omnes facile spem facerent, parvam Albam, parvum Lavinium fore, præ ea urbe, quæ *conderetur*," not *quæ esset condenda*. "Et ut libera a cæteris religionibus area esset tota Jovis, templique ejus quod *inædificaretur*, exaugurare fana sacellaque statuit," *Liv. i. 55*, not *quæ erat inædificanda*.

The construction of the relative, with *primus*, *ultimus*, and other superlatives, has been already explained. (*See Vol. II. p. 27.*) But it should be remembered, that, wherever contingency is implied, the potential mood must be used. Thus, if we say, "He gave me the most valuable book, that he had," which is an elliptical expression for, "Of all the books, which he had, he gave me the most valuable one," it must be rendered *Omnium librorum, quos habuit, mihi donavit pretiosissimum*; *Vid. Cic. Frag. pro C. Corn.* or, *Quem pretiosissimum librum habuit, mihi donavit*. The relative clause here expresses a past, and therefore certain fact. But, if we say, "He promised to give me the most valuable book he had," it must be rendered, "*Quem pretiosissimum haberet librum, mihi daturum pollicitus est*." Here it signifies something future, and contingent. "Hunc præsentem iis affecit honoribus, quos habuit amplissimos." *Cic. pro Font. cap. 5*. Contingency would have required *haberet*.

EXERCISE.

Pyrrhus accordingly took the field, and defeated the Romans at Heraclea. After the battle, Fabricius was sent, as an ambassador, to Pyrrhus, to treat about the ransom and exchange of prisoners. Pyrrhus, being informed by Cineas, that Fabricius was a man of incorruptible integrity, but very poor, offered him gold; and begged him to accept it, as a pledge of friendship. Fabricius refusing the present, Pyrrhus was unwilling to press him any further; but knowing that he had never seen an elephant, formed a plan for frightening him, which was to be put in execution next day. With this view, he ordered the largest elephant he had, to be armed, and placed behind a curtain in the room, where they were going to converse. This was accordingly done, and, on a signal being given, the curtain was drawn, and the elephant, raising his trunk over the head of Fabricius, made a hideous and frightful noise. Fabricius, nowise discomposed, turned about, and, with a smile, said to Pyrrhus, "Neither your gold yesterday, nor your beast to-day, has made any impression on me." The prisoners were afterwards restored without ransom; and Pyrrhus, after another battle, in which he came off victorious, passed over into Sicily, and in a short time made himself master of the whole island.

How much better would it be for mankind, and for the ambitious themselves, if they duly attended to the words of the poet:—

"Latius regnes avidum domando
Spiritus, quam si Libyam remotis
Gadibus jungas, et uterque Pœnus
Serviat uni."

Hor. Car. ii. Q. 9.

OBSERVATIONS.

TECTUM.

TEGMEN.

The former of these words, though strictly signifying "the thing covered," denotes the uppermost part of a house, and by *synecdoche*, the whole house. *Tegmen* is "whatever covers or protects," and is applied, therefore, to the roof of a house, so far agreeing with *tectum*, and also to a buckler, to a coat of mail, and any sort of apparel for the body. "Deturbavit ventus villæ tectum, et tegulas." *Plaut. Rud. Prol.* 78. "Tegmina capitum." *Virg. Æn.* vii. 742. "Helmets," "Tegmina plantæ." *Val. Flacc.* vi. 702. "Shoes."

Sufficere is thus construed. As an active verb, it denotes "to supply;" as *sufficere alicui arma*, "to furnish any one with arms;" and also, "to substitute," as *sufficere aliquem in locum alterius*, "to place one in the room of another." As a neuter verb, it denotes "to suffice," and governs the dative. *Hoc sufficit mihi*, "This is sufficient for me."

Sententia was originally employed to denote *id quod animo sentimus*, or *quod nobis videtur*, "a feeling of the heart," or "a sentiment of the understanding," "a wish," or "an opinion." "Ex animi sententia." *Cic. Off.* iii. 24. "From my soul," "Mea sententia." *Cic. de Orat.* ii. 23. "In my opinion." Hence it came to denote "a sentence," or "the expression of an opinion, wish, or feeling."

“Est brevitate opus, ut currat sententia.” *Hor. Sat.* i. 10. 9, “that the sentence may run.”

Sensus, in its primitive acceptation, denoted any of the five external senses, “Neque oculis, neque auribus, neque ullo sensu percipi potest.” *Cic. in Orat.* And as *sensus* expressed the faculty of perceiving, or the organ by which we perceive, *sensa, orum*, signified “the things perceived.” The former term, however, came to be applied to the internal senses, and feelings of the mind. “Vultus omnes perspicimus, qui sensus animi plerumque indicant.” *Cic. de Orat. lib. ii. 35.*

The term *sententia* had its meaning changed still further; for it was employed by Quintilian and others of his time, to denote the luminous exhibition of a thought, especially at the end of a sentence. “Consuetudo jam tenuit, ut mente concepta *sensus* vocaremus; lumina autem, præcipueque in clausulis posita, *sententias*.” *Quint. viii. 5.* The latter term is thus explained by Schulze: “Quævis fere enunciatio breviter, et cum acumine dicta, periodoque inserta, illis pro sententia erat.” He adds, “Oratio non placebat, nisi sententiarum luminibus distincta; hæ velut scintillæ ubique emicare debebant, præcipue in clausulis.” It would appear, then, that *sententia*, as a rhetorical term, was a concise and luminous exhibition of a thought at the close of a period, darting, as it were, a sudden and brilliant light upon the subject.

Referre is thus construed. *Gratiam alicui re-*

ferre, “to repay a favour to any one.” *Referre ad senatum*, “to lay before the senate.” *Referre aliquem*, “to resemble any one.” *Refert patris*—*Refert mea*. “It concerns my father.” “It concerns me.” It signifies sometimes “to remember,” and also “to carry away with you,” or “to carry home with you,” *domum* being understood; and so it has been rendered in the passage from which the Exercise is taken. It is here translated by the verb “to borrow.”

The expression *læti loci*, which occurs in the original, has been defined to be, “Qui capiunt ornatum verborum et sententiarum.”

DIVES.

PECUNIOSUS,

LOCUPLES.

In early ages, wealth among the Romans consisted of land and cattle. Those, rich in land were called *locupletes*, (ex *locus* et *pleo* pro *impleo*, quasi *locorum pleni*). Those rich in cattle were called *pecuniosi*, a *pecore*, and afterwards, a *pecunia*. See Vol. I. p. 342. “Quod tunc res erat in pecore, et in locorum possessionibus; ex quo *pecuniosi* et *locupletes* vocabantur.” *Cic. in Frag. apud Non.* While *locuples* denoted strictly, “rich in lands,” and *pecuniosus*, “rich in cattle, or in money,” *dives* had a more extended signification, and signified “rich generally,” taking every thing into account. Hence a person, encumbered with debt, might be *locuples*, “having many estates,” but not *dives*. “Unum genus est eorum, qui magno in ære alieno majores etiam possessiones habent, quarum amore adducti

dissolvi nullo modo possunt. Horum hominum species est honestissima, sunt enim *locupletes*," *Cic. in Cat. Or.* ii. "having many possessions." A person likewise might be rich in lands, slaves, and houses, but not in money, "Mancipiis locuples, eget æris Cappadocum rex." *Hor. Ep.* i. 6. 39. The Cappadocian king was therefore not *pecuniosus*.

This is the etymological and primitive distinction of *dives*, *locuples*, and *pecuniosus*. But it is to be observed, that, while the last is confined to its literal and original meaning, the two first are employed metaphorically without distinction; and where no contrast or discrimination of wealth is intended, are used also, indifferently, as denoting "rich." "*Dives pecoris.*" *Virg.* "*Dives agris, dives positus in fœnere nummis.*" *Hor.* "*Dives ager.*" *Val. Flac.* "*Dives lingua.*" *Hor.* "*Mancipiis locuples.*" *Hor.* "*Pecunia locuples.*" *Apul.* "*Lysias oratione locuples.*" *Cic.*

I have said, that *locuples* and *dives*, in a metaphorical sense, are always used indiscriminately; but I ought to have specified one exception. *Locuples* is applied to a person capable of making good his engagements, and denotes "worthy of confidence." "*Accedit eodem testis locuples Posidonius.*" *Cic. Off.* iii. 2. "*Num locupletiores quæris auctores?*" *Cic. Off.* iii. 27. *Dives* would in this sense be inadmissible.

In the following Exercise, Tacitus, the supposed author of "*Dialogus de Oratoribus*," passes without

intimation from the description of a rich man's house and furniture, as emblematical of an orator's intellectual treasures, to a specification of the characters, belonging to a true oratorical style, blending both in one description. They are here necessarily separated, and the separation is noted by the clause in *Italics*.

EXERCISE.

I now proceed to Cicero, who had on his hands the same controversy with his contemporaries, which engages us at present. For it was the fashion with them to admire the ancients, while he gave the preference to that eloquence, which obtained in his own time. And I may remark, that by no quality did he evince his superiority to the orators of the same period more, than by the solidity of his judgment. He was the first, that polished the oration ; he was the first, that devoted attention to the choice of words, and applied art to his compositions. He attempted also to introduce the higher graces of oratory ; and invented some brilliancies, in the close of his sentences, particularly in those orations, which he composed, when verging on old age, and near the close of life. He had then attained to greater proficiency ; and practice, with experience, had taught him the true oratorical style. In his earlier orations, we see the rough cast of antiquity. The exordium is tedious ; the narrative is drawn into length ; he wastes time in digressions ; he is not easily affected, and he rarely takes fire. His sentiments are seldom appositely and luminously expressed ; and you find nothing to cull, nothing to borrow from him. He is like a wall in a rude building, strong indeed, but deficient in polish and beauty. I would have an orator to be like an opulent and elegant master of a family, who should have, not such a house, as

would merely keep out wind and rain, but one to captivate the eye, and present a delightful object to the sight; not only replenished with such furniture, as may suffice for necessary purposes, but having a store of gold and precious stones, which one may have pleasure in handling and looking at again and again; while certain things should be kept out of sight as now become antiquated and offensive. *So also in respect to the orator*; there should be no word which has the rust of time; there should be no sentiments expressed in heavy and sluggish periods, in the manner of an Annalist; he should avoid disgusting and senseless scurrility, and should consult variety in the termination of his sentences.

OBSERVATIONS.

RECIPERE.

SUSCIPERE.

These verbs have been thus distinguished. "*Suscipitur* totum; *recipitur* pars; *suscipitur*, quod principale est; *recipitur*, quod hinc pendet; *suscipitur* solum aliquid propter se; *recipitur* etiam propter aliud." *Ascon. Ped.* The distinction offered by Agrætius seems more correct, as well as more precise. "*Recipimus* aliquid rogati; *suscipimus* sponte;" but that which Gesner has proposed, appears to be most consonant with general usage. "*Recipiuntur* delata; *suscipitur* aliquid ultro." "Ego, in hoc judicio, mihi Siculorum causam *receptam*, populo Romano *susceptam* esse arbitror." *Cic. in 2 Cæc. Div.* The same distinction is observable in his oration against Verres (*ad init.*)

Recipere, as a synonyme of *polliceri*, has been considered to imply a stronger obligation. “De aestate polliceris, vel potius recipis.” *Cic. Att. xiii. 1.* “*Recipere* est quasi periculum et eventum rei suscipere in se.” *Vid. Popma.*

“To commence an action at law” was, among the Romans, termed *litem intendere*, or *in jus vocare*. Actions on bargains or contracts were called *actiones empti, venditi, locati, conducti*, and were brought in this form; “Aio te mihi ex stipulato, locato, dare, facere, oportere.” When the parties appeared in court, it was usual to state briefly, what are now technically termed, the points of the case. This was called *conjicere causam*, or more frequently *conjicere et consistere causam*, i. e. “*causæ argumentum judici summatim exponere*,” or, in the words of Padianus, “in breve cogere, antequam ipsa causa ageretur.” It is not improbable, that *in locos* is understood. Cicero says *in locos conjicere. Orat. pro Cn. Plan. sub fin.* The expression is as old, as the twelve tables. “In foro aut comitio, ante meridiem causam conjicito.”

ETSI.

TAMETSI.

QUAMQUAM.

QUAMVIS.

LICET.

Valla has observed, that the three first, hold a rank or consequence, superior to that of the other two, very frequently occupying the first place in a sentence; that they are then uniformly joined to the

indicative mood; and that in the second place, they take either the indicative, or the subjunctive. Steweckius Husdanus has remarked, that Cicero introduces not fewer than twenty-nine of his "Epistolæ Familiares" with *etsi*; and in all of these we find it joined with the indicative mood. *Quamvis* and *Licet* very rarely occupy the same prominent position; and they take the subjunctive mood. The following distinction, in the use of these words, as given by Valla, deserves attention. *Etsi*, *tametsi* and *quamquam*, may be used absolutely, and independently, forming a distinct clause, and succeeded by an interrogation; the other two are connected with the words, which follow them. "Dedit enim mihi, quantum maximum potuit, daturus amplius, si potuisset, *tametsi*, quid homini dari potest, majus quam gloria, laus, et æternitas?" *Plin.* "And, *yet*, what could have been given?" Valla has given no example of *etsi* thus used, and those offered by Doletus seem to me irrelevant. The following example from Cicero may be quoted. "Do pœnas temeritatis meæ, *etsi*, quæ fuit illa temeritas?" *Cic. Att.* ix. 18. "And yet," or "after all." "Quamobrem hoc vos doceo, Sulpici *quamquam*, te quidem, quid hoc doceam?" *Cic. de Orat.* ii. 1. "And, yet (as if correcting himself) why should I give you this instruction?" In these examples, *licet* and *quamvis* would be inadmissible.

Gerunds generally govern the cases of their own verbs. We find, however, that the gerund in *di* of an active verb, instead of governing an accusative

sometimes governs a genitive case. “*Reliquorum siderum quæ causa collocandi fuerit.*” *Cic. de Univ.* “*Agitur, utrum M. Antonio facultas detur agrorum suis latronibus condonandi.*” *Cic. Philip. v. ad init.* Vossius attempts to explain this phraseology by supposing the expression elliptical, and in the former passage from Cicero *collocare* to be understood ; thus *collocandi collocare siderum*. If we inquire, by what is *siderum* governed, he answers, “by *collocare*,” which has the character, and here the regimen, of a noun. This explanation appears to me to be a very unphilosophical solution of the difficulty, and wholly inadmissible. I am almost inclined, indeed, to concur with some critics in pronouncing it absurd. R. Johnson acknowledges it to be erroneous ; but does not consent to reject it, on the alleged ground, that it is not supported by any authority. He quotes the following example from Cicero ; “*Visum est faciendum vos certiores facere.*” *Ep. Fam. iv. 12.* Were the authority of a reputable author to be received, as a sufficient justification of an expression, which is not a transgression of grammar, so much as it is a violation of common sense, and which is found in the author only once, there is no expression, however nonsensical or absurd, which might not be justified. But we question, whether the passage quoted by Johnson from Cicero be strictly analogous. May it not be rendered, “This seemed a thing proper to be done, namely, to make you acquainted” ? If this interpretation be admitted, the passage will then furnish no authority for

the presumed ellipsis of Vossius, nor for Johnson's justification of that author's hypothesis, on the credit of Cicero. But the conclusive and unanswerable argument against the learned critic's explanation is this, that not a single example can be produced, in which the infinitive of an active verb governs the person or thing *acted upon* in the genitive case, although in its capacity as a noun it governs the person or thing *acting*, in that case. We know that verbals in *io* have a double character, sometimes in virtue of their verbal power governing the case of their own verbs, and sometimes in their capacity as nouns construed with a genitive case. "Quid istum tibi tactio est?" *Plaut. Curc.* v. 2. 27. "Traditio alteri." *Cic.* May not the gerunds then, which, in respect to inflexion, have equally with verbals in *io* the character of nouns, have like them a double government, the former, when in the nominative, and the latter when in the genitive case? This hypothesis appears to me more probable, than the unnatural and fanciful ellipsis of Vossius, which Perizonius correctly terms "durum et absonum."

In the following exercise, *petere* is used by A. Gellius, not however in the sense of "to ask by entreaty," or "to demand as a recompence," but in its primitive signification, "to aim at reaching, or obtaining." See Vol. I. p. 14.

Some grammarians have said, that *dies* though either masculine or feminine, when it signifies "a day," is always feminine, when it denotes time inde-

finitely, or an indefinite number of days. This opinion is not correct, as it would be easy to prove by numerous examples. It may be right, however, to observe, that, whether taken in a definite or indefinite sense, it is always masculine in the plural number.

EXERCISE.

Euathlus, a young man of fortune, being desirous of acquiring the art of eloquence, and of becoming a pleader at the bar, put himself under the tuition of Protagoras, the most acute sophist of his day. The youth engaged to give to his master whatever fee he demanded, one half of which he paid previously to his commencing his course of instruction; and at the same time he became bound to pay the remainder, on the first day that he should plead in court, and gain a cause. After continuing for some time to attend the philosopher's prelections, and having made great progress in his study of eloquence, but, notwithstanding, having undertaken no cause, it occurred to Protagoras, that his pupil adopted this procedure, with the view of escaping the payment of the remainder of the fee. He therefore instituted an action against Euathlus; and when they appeared in court, to state the points of the case, Protagoras thus commenced his argument: "Learn," said he, "most foolish youth, that, in either way you will have to pay my claim, whether the decision shall be for you or against you. For if the cause go against you, the fee will be mine, agreeably to the sentence of the court, because I shall have gained my suit; but if the cause go on your side, the fee will be due in terms of our contract; for you will then have gained a cause." To this Euathlus replied: "I might," said he, "obviate this sophism of yours, by not speaking myself, and by employing another advocate; but my gratification will be

heightened, when I not only defeat you in the cause, but also baffle you in the argument. Learn then, most sapient master, that in either way I shall not have to pay your claim, whether the cause go for me, or against me. For, if the court shall decide in my favour, I shall, by their decision, owe you nothing, for I shall have gained my cause; if they decide against me, then by our agreement, I shall not be your debtor, because I shall not have gained my suit." The judges being of opinion, that the argument on both sides involved a perplexity, excluding the possibility of disentanglement, and fearing, lest their judgment, on whichever side pronounced, might subvert itself, left the matter undecided, and postponed the cause to a very distant day.

OBSERVATIONS.

CONSECRARE. DEDICARE.

Consecrare is a generic term, signifying an alienation from common use, to sacred purposes. It is applied to every object, animate or inanimate, devoted to the gods, as fields, fruits, cattle, &c. *Dedicare* is a special term, referring immediately to what belongs to the worship of the gods, as statues, temples, altars, chapels. *Quodcunque dedicatur, consecratum est; non contra. Facc.* Dedication implies consecration; but consecration does not imply dedication. A private person might consecrate, but a magistrate only, or one publicly authorized, could dedicate.

GRATIAS AGERE. GRATIAS, *or* GRATIAM, HABERE.

The latter of these expressions is generally ren-
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dered, "To owe thanks," and the former, "To give thanks." In English, the phrase "To owe thanks," denotes simply, that thanks are due. We may say of a person, on whom a favour has been conferred, "He owes thanks to his benefactor," without implying, that the person, on whom the kindness is bestowed, is sensible of his obligation, or grateful for the favour. The expression, as has been just remarked, simply implies, that thanks are due. But *habere gratiam*, or *gratias*, denotes, that the person, on whom the kindness is conferred, is sensible of the obligation, and grateful for the favour. It is equivalent to *Accepti beneficii mentem memorem habere, et invicem gratificandi voluntatem*. (See *Steph. Thes.*) "Magna habenda est gratia." *Ter. Ph.* i. 2. 6. "Diis immortalibus habenda est gratia." *Cic.* "Et habetur, et referetur a me gratia." *Ter. Eun.* iv. 6. 12.

Habere gratiam, or *gratias*, therefore, denotes not merely, "To owe a favour," or "To owe thanks," but to feel that a favour, or thanks, are due to a benefactor for a kindness conferred—"to be sensible of the obligation, and desirous with gratitude to return it."—*Agere gratias* denotes, "to express, or return, thanks." *Referre gratiam*, "to return, or requite, a favour." If *habere gratiam* implied, like our English phrase, simply a debt due by the person benefited, whether he were grateful for it, or not, the following observation, which Cicero commends, would be false, if not absurd—"Commodè autem," says he, "quicunque dixit, *Pecuniam qui habeat, non reddi-*

disse; qui reddiderit, non habere: gratiam autem et qui retulerit, habere, et qui habeat, retulisse." *Cic. Off. cap. 20. (Pearce.)* This observation seems directly repugnant to the opinion of Donatus, if he means by *Habere apud se gratiam*, the same as *Habere gratiam*. He says, *Qui habet apud se gratiam, nondum retulit; retulit, qui destitit habere*. The enigmatical interpretation of the latter clause of the sentence, given by L'Estrange, as far as its meaning can be conjectured, conveys scarcely an idea of the sentiment in the original. He translates it thus,—“He, who has money, has not restored it; and he that hath restored it, has it no longer: but in the case of good will, he, that has paid it, has it still; and he, that has it still, has paid it.” The sense of the passage is evidently this—“He, that retains money, *due to another*, has not paid it; he, who has paid it, does not retain it; but he, who has repaid a kindness, retains a sense of that kindness; and he, who retains a sense of it, has repaid it.”

It may be useful to remark, before we quit the subject, that *referre gratiam*, is used in a bad, as well as a good sense, being equivalent to *referre par pari*. “*Altera (vis æquitatis) ad vicissitudinem referendæ gratiæ pertinet; quod in beneficio gratia, in injuria ultio nominatur.*” *Cic. Orat. Part. cap. 37*

DULCIS.

SUAVIS.

These words agree in denoting, what is generally agreeable to the palate, but with this difference, the

former means, "Sweet," as having a saccharine quality, or the taste of sugar. The latter denotes what is pleasant to the taste. "In musto sola dulcedo est, suavitas nulla; nam vinum cum in infantia est, dulce; cum pubescit, magis suave quam dulce est." *Macr. Sat. vii. 7.* "Sic enim has suaves, et quasi dulces, voluptates appellas." *Cic. de Fin. ii. 10.* Metaphorically, they are used indiscriminately.

ÆQUARE.

— This verb strictly denotes "to equal," or "equalise," as "Urbem solo æquavit," *Liv.* "He made the city equal with the ground," *i. e.* "He levelled it with the ground." Here the thing made equal is put in the accusative, and the thing, to which it is equalised, is put in the dative. It is sometimes, however, construed with the accusative of the person, or thing, to which the subject is made equal, and in this sense is equivalent to *æquari*, or *sese æquare*—as, "Ea arte superiores reges æquasset," *Liv. lib. i.* "He would have equalled (or been equal to) any of the former kings."

Adjectives in *ius*, *inus*, *ivus*, and *orus*, are not compared. Instead of *prior* we say *magis pius*; and instead of *clandestinissimus* we say *valde clandestinus* for "very secret;" *maxime clandestinus* for "most secret." *Piissimus* is noted by Cicero, as being in his time, a word entirely new. "Tu porro ne pios quidem, sed piissimos quæris; et quod verbum omnino nullum in lingua Latina est, id propter tuam divinam

pietatem novum inducis." *Cic.* This superlative, however, came afterwards into use. (See *Tacit. Agric.* xliii. 7, and *Q. Curt.* ix. 6.)

There is no language so consonant to the strict principles of metaphysical propriety, in respect to all its idioms and forms of expression, as not occasionally to violate these principles. This position it would be easy to illustrate, by a great variety of examples. On the subject of comparison generally, and adjectives admitting intension or remission particularly, the few following will suffice.

It is a common Hebraism to say, when two subjects are compared with each other, that the one is superior, or inferior, to the other, contrasting them as if they belonged to different denominations, though the former subject of comparison makes part of the latter. Thus we are told, "Jacob loved Joseph more than all his children, because he was the son of his old age." This expression, we perceive intuitively, involves a contradiction, Joseph himself being one of his children. The phraseology should have been, "more than all his other children," the word *other* at once contrasting Joseph with his brothers, and being joined with the substantive, denoting at the same time, that they were the sons of the same family.

It is not uncommon also in Greek to join the superlative degree with ἄλλος, the two subjects of comparison being included in one class. Thus, Homer makes Thetis say of her son Achilles, Ὀκυμωρώτατος

ἄλλων ἔπλετ', "He is the most short-lived of others," instead of παντῶν. "The most short-lived of all," The same impropriety occurs in English, when we say, speaking of ingratitude, for example, "Of all other vices, this is the most odious." The expression should be, "Of all vices this is the most odious." No man, capable of the least degree of discrimination, would say, "Of all the other Romans, Cicero was the most eloquent," unless he had previously mentioned one, to whom the others are opposed; but, "Of all the Romans, Cicero was the most eloquent."

These exceptionable phraseologies involve either a contradiction, or a logical impropriety. They are not censurable as ungrammatical, for they violate no rule either of concord or government: but, when strictly examined, they express a sentiment either repugnant to reason, or contrary to fact. In Latin, we find fewer of these illogical expressions, than in any other language with which I am acquainted.

It is a truth, which will not be contested, that what is already either as great, or as little, as possible, can be neither increased, nor diminished. Hence it follows, necessarily, that an adjective expressing a quality, which admits neither intension nor remission, cannot properly be compared, nor admit an intensive word, which may modify its meaning.—Under this description are included, 1st. Adjectives, denoting mathematical figure, as *Circularis*, *Triangularis*. 2dly. Adjectives expressing order, or number, as

*Primus, Secundus**, *Medius, Unus, Duo*. 3dly. Adjectives denoting the highest or lowest degree of the quality, or property, as *Princeps, Præcipuus*, “Chief,”—*Interminatus*, “Boundless,”—*Ater* †, “Coal black,”—*Sempiternus*, “Everlasting.” 4thly. Adjectives significant of measure, as *Uncialis*, “Of, or belonging to, an inch,”—*Pedalis*, “Of, or belonging to, a foot.” 5thly. Adjectives denoting substances, or matter, as *Quernus*, “Oaken,”—*Abiegnus*, “Of fir.” 6thly. Adjectives expressing universality—as *Totus, Omnis, Cunctus, Universalis*, and also individuality, as *Solus, Unicus, Hodiernus*.

This rule, however, is more or less violated in most languages. Thus we have *Infinitior*, “More infinite,” and *Perfectissimus*, “Most perfect,” in Cicero; *Immensissimus*, “Most immense,” and *Æternior*, strictly, “More eternal,” for “More durable,” in Pliny.

This violation may, perhaps, be reconciled to our perceptions of strict propriety, by supposing, as Mr. Grant has ingeniously enough observed ‡, that the adjective, in its positive state, does not denote absolutely the highest, or lowest, degree of the quality, but merely a close approximation to that degree.

* *Secundus* denoting “Favourable,” admits comparison—as, *Res secundiores* (*Cæs.*), “Greater prosperity.”

† *Atrior* is found in Plautus, but I believe no where else.

‡ See *Institutes of Latin Grammar*.

Analogous to the maxim now mentioned is another truth, equally evident, which is, that *nothing*, or *pure nihility*, can neither be increased nor diminished; and that the word expressive of this idea cannot, with propriety, admit an intensive word to qualify it. The Latins, however, in deviation from this principle, joined *adeo* with *nihil*, as if *nonentity*, or *nihility*, were capable of augmentation.—Thus, “*Adeo nihil tenet solum patriæ, nec hæc terra, quam matrem appellamus?*” *Liv. v. 54.* This idiom does not obtain in English. We say, “Has your native soil *so little* hold of your affections?” “*Adeo nihil est tibi, quod hæc passus sum?*” “Is it of *so little* consequence to you, that I have suffered these things?”*

Obscurity, and sometimes ambiguity, is created by an injudicious suppression of the substantive, when it belongs to an adjective, and also to another substantive in the same clause. To prevent this obscurity, the substantive should be understood to the

* We find a similar violation of metaphysical propriety in the use of *nemo*. “*Contigit enim tibi quod, haud scio, an nemini.*” *Cic. Ep. Fam. ix. 14.* Lexicographers, in order to reconcile the expression with logical accuracy, have said, that *nemo* is here used for *ullus*. But, if it did not happen to any one, how could it happen as it did, to *Dolabella*, whom Cicero was addressing. This explanation leaves the expression equally liable to objection. In order to reconcile it with metaphysical accuracy, the word *alii* should be added; “which, I am inclined to think, has been the lot of no other man.” Or the sentiment might be expressed by “*an præter te nemini.*”

adjective, the termination of which will generally shew to what substantive it refers, and it should be expressed with the other substantive. Thus if we say, "He preferred his own to his brother's safety," we must not render it, *Suam salutem fratris anteposuit*, but *Suam fratris saluti anteposuit*. "He compared his own courage to that of the king," not *Regis suam virtutem comparavit*, but *Suam regis virtuti comparavit*.

EXERCISE.

Alexander, embracing them in a more than usually familiar manner, desired them to be seated, and thus addressed them:—"Most faithful, and most affectionate countrymen and friends, I return you my thanks; and am duly sensible of my obligations to you, not only because this day ye prefer to your own the safety of your prince, but because on no occasion have ye omitted to testify your singular friendship and benevolence towards me.—Never till now, I must confess, did I feel life to be of so much value. Never till now did I pray to live, that I may long enjoy your affection and regard. It was in my power, you well know, to pass my days in ease, satisfied with my paternal kingdom, and to wait, in peace, the approach of an obscure and ignoble old age. But I compute my life not by my years, but by my victories; and if I do not miscalculate the gifts of fortune, I have already lived long enough. Beginning with the sovereignty of Macedonia, I am now in possession of Greece. Conqueror not only of Asia, but of Europe also, in my twenty-eighth year, do I appear to you capable of halting in the pursuit of that glory, to which my whole soul is devoted? Reflect, I pray you, that we have now arrived in a country,

whose name has been ennobled by the achievements of a woman. What cities did Semiramis build? What nations did she subdue? What enterprises did she not undertake? What laborious works did she not execute? My friends, we have not yet equalled a woman in renown, and are we already satiated with glory? No. If it please the Gods, greater exploits still remain. So little do I regard the dangers before us, that, if you will secure me against domestic treachery, the perils of war I will fearlessly encounter.—Philip was safer in the field of battle, than in the theatre at home. The swords of the enemy he avoided; but the hand of the domestic assassin he could not escape. And now it occurs to me to mention a circumstance, which has often occupied my attention, and which I have long earnestly desired. Of all my toils, and all my dangers, this, my countrymen, will be the sweetest recompense, if, when my mother shall close her life, you will, in affectionate remembrance of me, consecrate her to immortality. If the Gods shall spare me, I shall myself have the gratification of conferring this honour; but, if fate shall prevent me, I conjure you to bear in mind, that with this request I solemnly charge you.”

OBSERVATIONS.

FABULA.

APOLOGUS.

These words agree in signifying a fabulous narrative. The former is the generic term, applicable not only to those fictions, in which inferior animals, and even things inanimate are represented, as speaking and reasoning, but also to the higher productions of the Muses, in Epic, Tragic, and Comic poetry. To these the term *apologus* is inapplicable, being con-

fined to fictions of a narrower range. Quintilian terms it “*fabella brevior*.” *lib. v. cap. 11*. The Apologue of Jotham, and the Fables of Æsop furnish examples. Every *apologus* is *fabula*; but every *fabula* is not *apologus*. It seems surprising, that Quintilian should have quoted Plautus, as using *apologatio* for “apologue,” a word which, he remarks, never gained currency, and should have overlooked *apologus*, used by Plautus and Cicero. From the preceding observations, the reader will understand, that in the following Exercise, either term may be used.

NUTRIRE.

ALERE.

These two verbs may be thus distinguished:—
 “*Nutriuntur*, ut crescant, ut convalescant, vel ut vires acquirant; *aluntur*, ut vivant.” Hence the former is applied to the young, the sickly, and the weak; the latter, denoting to furnish food, or whatever is necessary for the support of life, may be applied to any individual. The former, when applied to an animate agent, denotes the tender and personal care of the individual who nurses; the latter does not necessarily imply this idea, but merely, that he, or she, furnishes, whether personally, or by the medium of another, things necessary for human sustenance.—
 “Fecundaque semina rerum Vivaci nutrita solo, ceu matris in alvo Creverunt.” *Ov. Met. i. 420*. “Serpente ciconia pullos Nutrit.” *Juv. xiv. 75*. “Quod nostra infantia cœlum Hausit Aventini bacca nutrita

Sabina." *Juv.* iii. 85. "Re frumentaria ex Sicilia alimur." *Cic. in Verr.* "Quingentos equites, vi tempestatis in possessiones suas compulsos aluit, et vestivit." *Val. Max.* iv. 8. 2.

CURA.

SOLICITUDO.

These terms are thus defined by Donatus:—
 "Cura est in consecratione, et conservatione, et spe bonorum; sollicitudo in metu malorum: sollicitudo igitur plus est quam cura; unde veteres in conjungendo illud posteriori loco posuerunt." (See *Popma.*)
 This, however, is rather an accidental, than the essential, distinction between the two words.

Hill explains the difference between *cura* and *sollicitudo* as consisting in this, that the former does not necessarily imply, that its object is disagreeable, and that the latter uniformly expresses this sentiment. The critic, however, though he quotes the passage, seems not to have been aware, that this explanation is not easily reconcileable with the following expression—"Curam ergo verborum; rerum volo esse sollicitudinem." *Quint. Inst.* lib. viii. in *Proœm.* It requires, we presume, no argument to prove, that the learned rhetorician did not mean to say, that the matter of an author should be disagreeable to him, how much soever it may occupy his attention.—Their difference may, perhaps, be explained thus—

1st. *Cura* denotes "care," "concern," "anxiety," expressing the sentiment, or feeling, simply and absolutely; *sollicitudo* denotes it in a high degree, accom-

panied also with the feeling of uneasiness. The object of the former may be important, or trivial, nay, even amusing and agreeable; that of the latter is always weighty and serious. “Omnibus his inerunt gratæ vestigia curæ.” *Ov. De Art. Am.* ii. 331. *Solicitudo*, it is conceived, would be here inadmissible. “*Curam* ergo verborum, rerum volo esse *solicitudinem*,” *Quint. in Proem.* lib. viii.—“I would recommend it to an author to bestow due care on his diction; but it is the matter, about which he should be chiefly anxious and uneasy.” “*Cæsar* mihi tantum studium, tantam etiam *curam*, nimium est enim dicere *solicitudinem*, præstitit.” *Plin. Ep.* ii. 11. *Solicitudo* is defined by Cicero to be “*Ægritudo cum cogitatione*.” *Tusc. Quæst.* lib. iv. The kindred terms imply the same idea of uneasiness.—Thus, *solicitare*, literally denoting “to stir up,” expresses “to disturb,” “to disquiet,” and is sometimes joined with *cura*, as its cause. “*Quid te ergo sollicitat?*” *Ter. Eun.* i. 2. 82, “What then makes you uneasy?”—“*Hic me dolor angit; hæc cura me sollicitat.*” *Cic. Brut.* “*Omnis expers curæ, quæ scribentis animum, etsi non flectere a vero, sollicitum tamen efficere possit,*” *Liv. Præf.* “May render the mind of the author anxious and uneasy.”—Hill, therefore, it is conceived, would have expressed himself more correctly, if, instead of saying, that the object of *solicitudo* was disagreeable, he had said, that the care and concern, implied by *solicitudo*, is always accompanied with some degree of uneasiness.

2dly. *Cura* denotes not only the feeling of care, the sentiment of concern, but also “active care,” or the charge we take of any object for its safety and protection: *solicitudo* is purely mental. “Xenophilo cura arcis mandata est.” *Curt.* lib. ii. cap. 16. “Hanc quoque suscipe curam.” *Cic. Att.* vii. 1.—“Ut cura ærarii ad prætores transiret.” *Suet. in Cæs. Aug.* “Non modo principis *solicitudinem*, sed et parentis affectum unicum præstitit.” *Suet. in Flav. Vesp.*

When the mere sentiment is expressed by *cura*, it very generally precedes *solicitudo*, as being a weaker term.—“Quanta me *cura* et *solicitudine* afficit Gnatus?” *Ter. Ph.* ii. 3, 1.

But when *cura* denotes active care, it generally follows *solicitudo*, as implying more than the mere feeling; thus, “Vota pro reditu suscepta sunt; ne minimam quidem occasionem quoquam omittente in testificanda *solicitudine* et *cura* de incolumitate ejus.” *Suet. in Calig.*

SEGNIS.

DESES.

SOCORS.

Segnis, quasi *sine igne*, denotes “want of ardor”—the absence of a natural stimulus to action, and hence by metonymy “inactive,” “sluggish.” It is strictly opposed to *ardens*. *Deses*, à *sedere*, denotes “sitting still,” “not moving or acting,” without reference to the cause. *Socors*, or *secors*, i. e. *sine corde*, “stupid,” “mentally indolent.” The same distinction subsists between the derivatives of

the two last terms, *segnitia*, and *socordia*. “*Illa ad agendum, hæc ad considerandum, refert.*” *Vid. Popma.*

In translating the following fable, the reader must observe, that, if it be delivered, as it is here in the words of the speaker, the relative pronoun, and all words of relative import, as *dum*, *ubi*, &c., if any such be used, must be joined with the indicative mood. This admonition is agreeable to the rule already delivered for the construction of the relative. It must, at the same time, be carefully observed, that, if any sentiment is to be expressed, not as the speaker's, but of those (here, the members) of whom he is speaking, the relative must be joined with the subjunctive mood. This, indeed, is the case in the first sentence of the fable, the words, “While it, placed,” &c., being an observation of the members *.

* It has been delivered, as a general rule, that *dum*, signifying “until” is joined to the subjunctive, and denoting “while” takes the indicative mood. It has been observed also, that *ubi*, *cum*, *quando*, signifying *quo tempore* in oblique clauses, are joined with the subjunctive mood; analogy therefore would lead us to infer, that *dum*, signifying *per quod tempus*, or *et inter hoc tempus*, would be construed in the like manner. Usage seems to favour this conclusion, though one or two examples occur to oppose it, if we can rely on the correctness of the readings. We should say, for example; *Hoc unum est tempus de pace agendi, dum sibi uterque confidit*; “while each has confidence in himself;” but “*Cæsar dixit, hoc unum esse tempus de pace agendi, dum sibi uterque confideret.*” *Cæs. B. C. iii. 10.* “The law is defeated, unless while the matter is entire, while you are at

But, if the fable is not delivered in the precise words of the speaker, but detailed by the historian, as the subject of the speaker's address, then the clauses of the narrative are each under the government of the introductory words, *Narrasse fertur*, in which form they are delivered by the Roman historian. In this case, the relative words require to be joined with the subjunctive mood. Had due attention been paid to this distinction, the corrupt readings, which have crept into several editions, would have been excluded. According to the former of these phraseologies, the fable would proceed thus :—" *Tempore quo, non, ut nunc, omnia in unum consentiebant,—sed singulis membris unum cuique consilium fuit, indignatæ sunt reliquæ partes,*" &c. According to the latter, it would proceed thus :—" *Narrasse fertur, tempore quo, non, ut nunc, omnia in unum consentirent, sed singulis membris suum cuique consilium fuerit,—indignatas reliquas partes,*" &c., &c.

home, and while you are in your gowns, you take care, that you be not driven from the city, and receive the yoke of slavery," *Lex victa est, nisi dum in integro res est, dum domi, dum estis togati, caveatis, ne possessione urbis pellamini, et jugum accipiat. This sentence, thrown into the form of historical detail, would proceed thus ; " Tribuni personare, victam legem esse, nisi, dum in integro res sit, dum domi, dum togati sint, caveant, ne possessione urbes pellantur, ne jugum accipiant."* *Liv. iii. 10.* Notwithstanding, then, one or two repugnant examples, which have occurred to us, we are inclined to think, that *dum* joined to a clause, the subject of a preceding verb, should take the subjunctive mood.

I am not acquainted with any edition of Livy, in which this apologue seems to be correctly exhibited. Drakenborch, Ruddiman, and Hunter, with several others, have *consentiebant*, in repugnance, it is conceived, not only to the universal practice of Livy, but to an established general principle in all oblique sentences. In order to justify this lection, and reconcile it with other passages in the apologue, instead of saying, “*indignatas reliquas partes*,” they ought to say, *indignatæ reliquæ partes*; and instead of *conspirasse*, they should say *conspirârunt*, changing the several infinitives, and the subjunctives, into the indicative mood*. Rhenanus, Gebhardus, and Sigonius, more correctly give *consentirent* and *suus sermo fuerit*. The Frankfort edition has *consentiebant* and *fuerit*, in contradiction, we apprehend, to all rule. Ruddiman, Drakenborch, and Hunter, have “*dum ventrem domare vellent*.” This lection appears entirely irreconcilable with their retention of *consentiebant* and *fuerat*. Drakenborch, indeed, seems doubtful of its correctness, and remarks in a note, that *dum* for “while” is joined with the indicative mood. He therefore appears inclined to prefer “*dum volunt*,” or “*quum vellent*.” The latter would be grammatically correct, but *quum* is not precisely equivalent to *dum*; and the former reading would be, in a double respect,

* In three of the former editions an error occurs, which, though palpable, escaped the author’s observation. After adopting *conspirarunt*, as the proper lection, it was an obvious contradiction, to recommend the subjunctive mood.

incompatible with *indignatas*, and *conspirasse*, if we have not mistaken the practice of classic writers.

In such phrases as, “He did nothing, but read,” “He did nothing, but say,” the former verb is suppressed in Latin. Thus, *Nil nisi legit. Nil nisi dixit.*

EXERCISE.

The commons, now highly indignant at the conduct of the patricians, withdrew from the city, and encamped on Mount Sacer. The senate, fearing the consequences of this secession, if they should be assailed by a foreign war, sent Menenius Agrippa to effect, if possible, a reconciliation. Being introduced into their camp, he is reported to have used no other argument, to induce them to return, than the following short fable:—

“On a time, when the members of the human body were not governed, as they are at present, by one common mind, but had each a distinct understanding and a different language, the other parts were offended, that they should undergo so much care and toil for the sake of the belly, while it, placed in the midst of them, did nothing but enjoy the gratifications procured for it by their industry. Accordingly, they formed a conspiracy against it, the hands not to carry, the mouth not to receive, and the teeth not to masticate its food. But, while they endeavoured to starve the belly, they quickly perceived, that they themselves, and the rest of the body, rapidly wasted away—that the service of the belly was neither useless, nor inactive, and that, if nourished by the other parts, it no less in turn nourished them, diffusing through every part of the body, that blood, by which they were all severally invigorated.” By showing that the secession of the commons resembled the intestine sedition of the

members, Agrippa is said to have softened their resentment, and prevailed on them immediately to return to the city.

OBSERVATIONS.

FALLERE.

DECIPERE.

These verbs have been variously explained by lexicographers and critics. “*Decipere est dolo malo circumvenire. Fallere est a vero abducere*; fitque proprie verbis cum nimirum contra facimus, quam dicimus.” *Popma*. This distinction is incorrect.—*Decipere* is used, when no evil whatsoever is intended to the person deceived.—“*Quin et Prometheus, et Pelopis parens, Dulci laborum decipitur sono.*”—*Hor. Car. ii. 13. 37.*—“Prometheus and the father of Pelops are beguiled of their labours,” or “forget their labours.” Nay, it is often used, where to promote the good of the person deceived is the sole purpose of the deception.

“Sed veluti pueris absinthia tetra medentes
Quom dare conantur prius ora pocula circum,
Contingunt mellis dulci flavoque liquore,
Ut puerorum ætas improvida ludificetur,
Labrorum tenuis; interea perpotet amarum
Absinthii laticem, deceptaque non capiatur.”

Lucr. i. 935.

The explanation of *fallere* appears to be equally incorrect, the verb being frequently used, not only in a reflex sense, which excludes the idea of any deception practised by another, but also in cases, when the deceiver had no intention to impose, or mislead.

Hill approaches nearer the truth, when he says, that *fallere* always relates to the weakness of the person duped; and *decipere* to the dexterity of the deceiver, and his intention to deceive. There is, however, even here, some little degree of inaccuracy, *decipere* being often used, where no dexterity in the deceiver is implied, and where no intention to deceive is even insinuated. When Val. Maximus, speaking of Alcibiades, says, “Decepit cives suos bonis,” nothing more is meant, than that his good qualities inspired them with hopes, which his conduct disappointed. When Alexander says to Sysigambis, “Nostri decipere me mores,” *Curt. v. 2.* he does not mean to signify, that the manners of the Greeks were intended to mislead him, but merely, that they were the cause of the error, which he committed.

Nor is it true, as these and the following examples will evince, that *decipere* always implies, as Hill supposes, “circumspection and care, in order to effect the deception.”—“Maximapars vatum, (pater, et juvenes patre digni,) Decipimur specie recti.”—*Hor. De Art. Poët. 24.*

“Magis spe, quam somnio deceptus, cœnavit, Syracusis captivus, non victor.” *Val. Max. i. 7. 8.*

When Geta says to Antipho,

“Nam, ut erant alia, illi certe consuleres, quæ nunc tibi domi est;

Ne quid, propter tuam fidem decepta, pateretur mali;”

Ter. Ph. iii. 1. 4.

he does not mean to impute to Antipho any inten-

tion to deceive, nor to insinuate, that any art, or disingenuity, had been used by him, to impose on Phanium.

The essential distinction between these two verbs, we apprehend to be simply this—*Decipere* always implies, that the person deceived is misled, or imposed upon, by something positive and express in the person, or thing, deceiving; and *fallere*, that we are deceived by something negative, or indirect, in words, actions, or appearance. The former denotes, that we are deceived by something, which we see, or hear, or know—the other by something, which we do not know, in the character of the person, or thing, deceiving. Hence *fallere* often denotes “to elude our notice,” “to escape our observation.” *Decipere* never implies this idea—“*Neque me fallit*,” *Cic.* “Nor does it escape my knowledge.”—“*Non me fallebat*,” *Liv.* “I was perfectly aware.” If we are deceived by the pretended virtues of the hypocrite, we say, *Me decepit*; if by his concealed vices, *Me fefellit*. The former verb uniformly implies something done, said, or exhibited, by which we are deceived, whether intentionally, or not; the latter, that something has been concealed from us, or escaped our knowledge, by which we are led into error. When Martial says to the hypocrite,—“*Decipies alios verbis, vultuque benigno*,” *Lib. iv. 89. 9.* it is signified that the semblance of virtue was positively assumed by the hypocrite, for the purpose of deception. The expression may be considered as equivalent to *Decipies*

simulatione. *Falles alios* would imply, that his real character would escape the detection of others, and that they would be deceived by his dissimulation. *Ego fallor* means, “ I am deceived,” “ I mistake.” Here the error may be purely my own. It may arise from my ignorance of facts, or my want of discernment. The expression does not necessarily imply, that any thing external has been presented to the mind, by which the error has been produced. *Ego decipior*, on the contrary, denotes that something fallacious, or deceptive, has been exhibited, intentionally, or otherwise, which was the cause of the error.

They are clearly contrasted in the following passage.—“ Nam illa amphibolia, quæ Cræsum decepit, Chrysippum potuisset fallere.” *Cic. de Div.* “ For that ambiguity, which was intended to deceive Cræsus, might have eluded the penetration of Chrysippus.” In the passages already quoted, “ Decipimur specie recti.” *Hor.* “ Nostri me decerpere mores.” *Curt.* “ Nequid propter tuam fidem decepta pateretur mali.” *Ter.*—there is no deception intended ; but it is implied that there is something positively said, done, or exhibited, by which the person is deceived, and his expectations disappointed. The deception may be either intentional, or unintentional. *Fallere* refers more to the ignorance, and weakness of the person deceived, or to his unacquaintance with the real character and intentions of the person deceiving, than to any thing, which the latter may have expressly said, or

done. Each may be applied to the same person in the same circumstances, still, however, conveying two distinct conceptions of the conduct of the deceiver, and the error of the person deceived. In the comedy of Phormio, Antipho says to Dorio, “*Siccine hunc decipis?*” (iii. 2. 43.) Here an allusion is made to a positive breach of promise, Dorio having himself appointed a day, on which he engaged to give Pamphila to Phædria.—Dorio answers, “*Imo enim vero hic me decipit.*” This also refers to a breach of promise on the part of Phædria, who had engaged to pay Dorio, on a certain day, a stipulated sum. He adds, “*Iste me fefellit.*” Here an allusion is made, not to any positive engagement, which Phædria had violated, but to his unknown, or mistaken, character, by which Dorio, misconceiving the person, had formed expectations, which Phædria had disappointed. For he adds,

“*Nam hic me hujusmodi sciebat esse: ego hunc esse
aliter credidi,*

Iste me fefellit; ego isti nihilo sum aliter, ac fui.”

Ph. iii. 2. 43.

When deception simply, or disappointed expectation, is to be expressed, without any reference to the cause, or the manner, either of the verbs may be used, as—“*Nam dominum sterilis sæpe fefellit ager.*” *Ov. De Art. Am.* 450.—“*Qui sterili toties cum sim deceptus ab arvo.*” *Ov. Ep. ex Ponto.* i. 5. 33.

HORTARI.

MONERE.

SUADERE.

PERSUADERE.

Concerning the precise meaning of these verbs, critics are pretty nearly agreed. “*Monemus* consilio, præparaturi aliquem ad omnes, ut se dant, casus anticipites; *hortamur* impulsu et persuasoriis ad certam aliquam et determinatam actionem.” This is the opinion of Donatus—“*Monemus* verbis lenioribus, *hortamur* gravioribus.” “Hinc *hortor*, ut gravius et ponderosius, quoties cum *moneo* conjungitur, loco posteriori ponendum.” *Nolt. Lex. Antib.* To the same effect is the opinion of Doletus. (See *Comment.* vol. I. p. 743.) Hence we find it applied to the influence of mere passion. “Impulsio est, quæ sine cogitatione, per quamdam affectionem animi facere aliquid hortatur.” *Cic. de Inv.* ii. 5.

“*Hortari*,” says Hill, “implies, that he, who gives the advice, apprehends, that the person advised is ignorant of the value of some object before him, or suspects greater difficulty and danger than there really is;” and that the intention of *Hortator* is to excite courage, or hope. *Suadere*, he says, supposes that the good proposed is within the reach of the person advised, and may be attained without difficulty. *Monere*, he observes, differs from both in not suggesting the attainment of a future good, but the avoidance of a future evil.

If Dr. Hill means here to affirm, that *Suadere* is confined to a suggestion for attaining some future

good, and does not comprehend advice given for the avoidance of future evil, he very unwarrantably, as we conceive, circumscribes the meaning of the verb.—*Suadere* is a generic term, implying the recommendation of some action, by arguments or motives.—It has been defined by some critics, *Auctor sum, ut id fiat. Commendo faciendum ut utile. Id fieri probo.* And Cicero says, “Quid enim interest inter suasorem facti, et probatorem?” *Cic. 2 Phil.* “Suasionis finis utilitas ejus, cui quisque suadet.” *Cic. Frag.* That *Suasio* is addressed to our fears, as well as to our hopes, is evident from the words of Cicero. “Delectationem in exornatione; in judicio aut sævitiam, aut clementiam judicis; in suasionem autem aut spem aut reformationem deliberantis.” *Cic. Part. Orat.* That it recommends, not only for the attainment of good, but also for the avoidance of evil, numberless examples might be produced. When Epignomus says, “Non it, non it; quia tanto opere suades, ne ebitat.” *Plaut. Stich. iv. 2. 28*, he alludes to *suasion*, or advice, given as a caution against danger. Nay, it is not even necessary, that the thing recommended by argument be useful to the person advised. When Tranio says, “Orat, ut suadeam Philolacheti, ut istas remittat sibi,” *Plaut. Most. iii. 2. 110*, it is not supposed, that returning the house, which he had purchased, would be a thing useful to Philolaches; on the contrary, it is even probable, that it was contrary to his wish, as well as his interest. The advice was intended to be serviceable, not to the person advised, but to

Simo, a third, and, indeed, the person chiefly concerned. In short, *Suadere* is well defined by Dumesnil, "To advise by giving reasons, in order to persuade." The thing recommended may be any thing whatever, whether easy, or difficult, useful, or unuseful, whether to ourselves, or others. The meaning of the term is general.

Monere is not confined, as Hill seems to think, to advice given for the avoidance of evil. When Chremes says, "*Monere oportet me hunc vicinum Phanium, ad cœnam ut veniat,*" *Ter. Heaut.* i. 1. 117, no intimation of danger is implied, no caution to avoid it. "*Macedonum reges credere, ab illo deo ipsos genus ducere; se vero id ut faceret, etiam oraculo monitum.*" *Curt.* iv. 2. 4. Here also no admonition is signified, for the avoidance of evil. It would seem, therefore, that the learned critic has erred in his explanation of this term, by confining its signification to "Suggestion given for the avoidance of evil." The meaning of *Monere*, as also of *Suadere*, is much more general, than he appears to think. The former denotes, "To suggest what is probable, necessary, or useful." Thus, "*Ratus id, quod res monebat, frequentiam negotiatorum, et commeatu juvaturum exercitum, et jam paratis rebus munimento fore,*" *Sall. B. J.* cap. 51, "Thinking, as was natural, or as the case suggested to be probable, that the conflux of merchants would supply his army with provisions." "*Uti res et tempus monebat,*" *Sall. B. C.* "As the affair and the conjuncture suggested to be necessary."

“Quicquid Alexamenam res monuisset subiti consilii capere,” *Liv.* lib. xxxv. cap. 35, “Whatever sudden measures the affair had suggested the necessity of taking.” “Ipsi phalangem vocant peditum stabile agmen; vir viro, armis arma conserta sunt; ad nutum monentis intenti, sequi signa, ordines servare didicerunt,” *Curt.* lib. iii. cap. 2, “Watchfully attentive to the order, or signal, of the person communicating, what was necessary to be done.”

When it is a person, that suggests, or communicates, what is proper, or necessary, a friendly intention, real or pretended, is always implied. “Monere, et moneri, proprium est veræ amicitiae.” *Cic. de Amic.* “Sed ego vos, quo pauca monerem, advocavi,” *Sall. B. C.* cap. 60, “That I might give you a few friendly instructions.” “Regis laceratus est literis parricidia et cædes, et ignaviam objicientis, monentis, ut voluntaria morte, maximo justissimoque civium odio quam primum satisfaceret,” *Suet. in Vit. Tib. Ner.* cap. 66, “Advising him, as a friend, to satisfy the very great and just hatred of his subjects, by voluntarily terminating his existence.” In this passage, the advice is jeeringly offered. The friendship is affected, and not real.

The difference, then, between *Suadere* and *Monere*, may be explained thus:—1st. The former implies that arguments are employed to produce persuasion, and is nearly equivalent to *Persuadere conor*; while the second denotes simply, that something is suggested or communicated, as probable, necessary,

or useful.—2dly, *Suadere* has no reference to the intention of the *Suasor*, or adviser, as either friendly, hostile, or neutral; while *Monere* denotes, that the disposition of the adviser, or monitor, is friendly to the person, to whom the advice is given; or, at least, that the friendship is professed. Hence, while *Suasus* means simply, “Instigation by argument,” *Monitum* and *Monitio* always imply “advice,” given with a friendly intention, real or pretended, whether accompanied with argument, or not. “Si te recte *monere* volet, *suadebit* tibi ut hinc discedas,” *Cic.* “If he shall be disposed to give to you the sound advice of a friend, he will endeavour to persuade you to go hence.” “Sic moneo ut filium; sic faveo ut mihi: sic hortor, ut et pro patria, et amicissimum.” *Cic. Ep. Fam. lib. 10. Planc. Imp.* *Sic suadeo* would not imply any friendship, or affection in the adviser, as is here expressed by *Moneo*; but merely denote, that he urged him by argument to a certain action, or conduct.

If the distinction here offered between these two verbs be correct, the difference may be thus expressed: “*Suadeo* ut persuadeam,” that is, “Argumentis incito sive amico, sive inimico animo, ad quoddam faciendum.”—*Moneo* is equivalent to “Benevole commendo quoddam tibi faciendum.”

Hortari means “To animate, or encourage, to any action.”—“Alius alium hortari,” *Sall. B. C. cap. 5*, “They encouraged one another.” “Animus, ætas, virtus vestra me hortantur,” *Sall. B. C. cap. 61*,

“Animate or inspire me.” “Quem neque gloria, neque pericula excitant, nequicquam hortere,” *Sall. B. C.* cap. 60, “You will in vain exhort, or encourage, the man, whom neither glory, nor dangers, rouse.”

Persuadere is *suadendo inducere*, and also *adeo suadere, ut quis credat*; “to advise thoroughly,” or “with effect,” and likewise “to convince,” or “impress the belief.” “Hoc cum mihi non solum confirmasset, sed etiam persuasisset.” *Cic. ad Att.* xvi. 5. “When he had not only assured, but also convinced me.” Here it refers to sentiment. “Persuasit, se ut amitteret.” *Plaut. Bacch.* iv. 9. 40. “He persuaded her to let him go.” Here it refers to action.

CÆPISSE.

INCHOARE.

ORDIRI.

These verbs agree in expressing the act of beginning, or the commencement of a change. At an early period of the Latin language, the verb *cœpere* was in general use, and employed transitively and intransitively; but there appears no example, in which its object was immediately a material substance, of whose formal existence the commencement was predicated. “Ecce jam biennium est, cum mecum rem cœpit.” *Plaut. Merc.* iii. 1. 35. Here the verb is used transitively, and the word *rem* refers to a love matter. “Nec pugnas, nec lites ego cœpio.” *Plaut. Truc.* ii. 1. 23. “Prius olfecissem, quam ille quicquam cœperit.” *Ter. Adelph.* iii. 3. 44. In this sense, however, as governing an accusative, it was afterwards sup-

planted by *incipere*, and was used only as a preteritive verb in the active voice, and in an intransitive sense to denote the beginning of an action or state, but not directly that of formal existence. “Et sane quæ sunt commodissima, desinunt videri, cum paria esse cœperunt.” *Plin. Ep. iv. 14.* Here the subject, or nominative to the verb, is not active; a change commences, but no efficient cause is expressed.

Inchoare, on the contrary, always implies, that the subject of the predicate, or nominative to the verb, is the cause of the commencement of the change, and is applied immediately to the formal existence of a material substance. We say *bellum cœpit* for “the war began,” but we cannot express this fact, by saying *bellum inchoavit*; for this would signify “he began the war.” We say *inchoavit ædem*, “he began the temple;” but we cannot say *cœpit ædem*, to express the same action. The verbs then, considered as denoting commencement, may be thus distinguished, *Inchoare* is *originem dare*, and *cœpisse* is *originem dare*, and also *originem habere*, corresponding to the English verb “to originate,” now used transitively and intransitively. The former admits an accusative of the thing begun; the latter universally excludes this accusative, if expressing a material substance, and unless in Plautus and Terence, I believe, is not found with any objective case.

“*Cœpisse*,” says Hill, “would be improperly used to *denote* an object, that had no prior existence, and of course cannot change its state.” If this opi-

nion were correct, we could not say, *bellum cœpit, odium cœpit, amor cœpit, tempestas cœpit*; and yet all these are classical expressions. If he had confined his observation to the formal existence of a material substance, he would have stated a position, which could not be disputed, but which it was superfluous to offer; for, as a substance, unless existing, cannot act, or be acted upon, and therefore cannot produce, or suffer change, so no quality or property can begin to exist, or cease to exist, without a subject. *Cœpisse* is certainly, as far as we have observed, not applied by classic writers to a material substance, as undergoing an incipient change. We say *inchoavit ædem, templum, pontem, navem*; but I remember no example of *cœpit ædem, templum, &c.* The general, if not the universal expressions, are, *ædem, pontem, templum ædificare cœpit*. “*Ædes suas detulit sub Veliam, posteaquam, quod in excelsiore loco Velix cœpisset ædificare.*” *Cic. de Rep. ii. 30.*

Cœpisse is opposed to ceasing, or ending; *inchoare* to perfecting, or completing. “*Cœpisti melius, quam desines.*” *Ov. Her. Ep. ix. 23.* “*Absolvit priora, inchoat posteriora.*” *Plin.* *Cœpit et non desinet; inchoavit et non perficiet.* “*Inchoat, qui incertum facit,*” says Fronto; “*incipit, cujus eventum sperat.*” It is to be observed also, that, if the work were finished, we may say, speaking of its commencement, *cœpit*, or *inceptum est*, but not *inchoatum est*; for *inchoatus* implies commencement indeed, but incompleteness. “*Ne hanc inchoatam transigam comœ-*

diam." *Plaut. Amph.* iii. 1. 8. "Lest I leave this comedy incomplete." "Erat difficile rem tantam tamque præclaram inchoatam relinquere." *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* lib. i. "To leave so great and so noble an affair unfinished." Neither of the other two verbs would express this conception.

Ordiri seems primitively to have had a reference to the process of weaving.—"*Ordiri*," says Isidorus, "est texere." lib. xix. 29. Scaliger delivers the same opinion. In confirmation of this explanation, we find *redordiri* signifying *fila dissolvere*. "Geminis feminis nostris labor redordiendi fila, rursus texendi." *Plin.* vi. 7. Hence it denotes to begin a process requiring considerable time, and implying a series of circumstances, connected by the relation of cause and effect, contiguity of time, or contiguity of place, or what may be termed, a tissue of events. This idea is not implied in either of the other two verbs. "*Ordinur*," says Dumesnil, "aliquid longum et artificiosum." "Nec gemino bellum Trojanum orditur ab ovo." *Hor. de Art. Poët.* 147. "Inde toro pater Æneas sic orsus ab alto." *Virg. Æn.* ii. 2. In both these passages *cœpisse* and *inchoare* would be inadmissible, for reasons already given; and also, because they would not imply that continuity, or regular train of events, which the authors intended to express. "Imitemur ergo Aratum, qui magnis de rebus dicere exordiens, a Jove incipiendum putat." *Cic. de Rep.* cap. 36. The former verb indicates the nature of the subjects, as embracing connected details; the latter

merely the commencement, with no reference to the continuous character of the subjects.

There is another distinction, which I am inclined to think, is justified by classic usage. *Ordiri* always refers to the earliest origin, or the very first link of a series of changes; *cœpisse* denotes a commencement from any term of the series. Suetonius, speaking of Claudius Cæsar, as attempting to write a portion of Roman history, says, “transiit ad inferiora tempora, cœpitque a pace civili.” cap. 41. Livy, commencing with the origin of the Roman state, employs the terms *orsis* and *ordiundus*.

DOCERE.

ERUDIRE.

Docere has been defined to be, “cognitionem vel scientiam alicujus rei tradere;” *erudire* “e rudi doctum facere.” The former is, “to give information or instruction,” with no reference to the previous state of the person instructed; the latter implies his previous want of culture, and tuition. By the former we communicate knowledge of any kind, principles, or rules, facts or occurrences. The latter refers chiefly, if not solely, to intellectual improvement. “Quod enim munus reipublicæ afferre majus meliusve possumus, quam si docemus atque erudimus juventutem?” *Cic. de Div. lib. ii. ad init. i. e. “docendo, e rudi doctum facimus.”* “Studiosos discendi erudiunt, atque docent.” *Id.* Here we have expressed rudimental instruction, and progressive culture. Sylla is described by Sallust as “doctissime eruditus.” *Eru-*

ditus, *doctus*, and *peritus*, have accordingly been thus distinguished. *Eruditus est non rudis*; *doctus*, qui rationem tenet; *peritus*, qui experientiam et consuetudinem habet.

We find the pronoun of the first, and that of the third person sometimes emphatically combined, to express the same individual. "Egomet credidi homini docto rem mandare; is lapidi mando maximo." *Plaut. Merc.* iii. 4. 47. "Atque hæc omnia is feci, qui sodalis Dolabellæ eram." *Cic. Fam. Ep.* xii. 14.

By a grammatical figure called *Enallage*, or specially *Heterosis*, the pluperfect indicative is sometimes used for the same tense subjunctive; as,—"*Impulerat* Argolicas ferro fœdare latebras,"—*Virg. Æn.* ii. 55.—to denote "he would have persuaded us."

Sufficient attention is not always paid to the distinction between *past* and *passing* time. To this cause may be traced several slight errors in chronology. *Decimum annum agit* is not correctly rendered "He is ten years old;" but "He is in," or "going his tenth year;" i. e. *Novem annos habet*, or *natus est*, "He has been born nine years."

DISTRIBUTIVE NUMERALS.

The distinction between these, and the cardinal numerals, has been already partly explained. It only remains to be observed, that, if the substantive, with which the numeral agrees, wants the singular number, a distributive, and not a cardinal, numeral must be employed. Thus we say, *Binæ literæ*, that is,

Duæ epistolæ. Bina castra, not *Duo castra. Terna arma*, not *Tria arma*. To this rule there is only one exception. If the number spoken of be *One*, we use *Uni*, *æ*, *a*, rather than *singuli*, thus *Una mœnia, Unæ nuptiæ*. "I received three letters from you, one of which I find is shorter than usual," *Ternas accepi literas, quarum unas, &c.*

It may be here observed, that it is an error to say, that *unus* has no plural, unless joined to a noun, which has no singular number. We have in Cicero, "Ab unis hostium copiis bellum geri." *Pro leg. Man.* "Unis moribus." *Cic. pro Flac. cap. 26.* "Unis vestibus lætatus es." *Ib. cap. 29.* "One dress," "the same dress." It is correct to say, that *unus* is not used as a plural unless when the individuals, expressed in the plural, are considered, as one aggregate, or when *unus* is used for *idem*, as opposed to *alius*.

EXERCISE.

In the conference between Scipio and Hannibal, before the battle at Zama, the Carthaginian is reported to have thus addressed the Roman general :

"Since fate has so decreed, that I who began the war against the Romans, and who have been so repeatedly on the point of terminating it by a complete victory, should now come to ask peace, I rejoice that it is of you, Scipio, I have the fortune to ask it. Of your numerous and splendid honours this will not be the least conspicuous, that Hannibal, by the favour of the Gods, victorious over so many Roman generals, has at last submitted to you; and that you have terminated a war, which was marked by your disasters, before we experienced defeat.—This also is one of the singular

sports of fortune, that I, who took up arms, when your father was consul, and who gave him battle in his first military command, should myself, unarmed, come to ask peace of his son. Happy would it have been, if the Gods had inspired our ancestors with that wisdom, which would have made them contented, you, with the sovereignty of Italy, and us, with the government of Africa. For not even to you, has the conquest of Sardinia and Sicily been an adequate compensation for the loss of so many fleets, so many armies, so many generals of such distinguished name. So eager was our thirst after foreign possessions, as to subject our own to the hazard of war. But past errors it is much easier to censure, than to correct. For my own part, returning with grey hairs to my country, which I left, when a boy, years, with alternate prosperity and adversity, have taught me to leave nothing to the decision of fortune, which reason can determine. You are yet a young man: fortune has hitherto smiled on all your enterprises; you are yet a stranger to the frowns of adversity. I fear, therefore, you will pay but little regard to my suggestions; and that youth, with uninterrupted success, will tempt you to scorn every proposal for peace. He, whom fortune has never deceived, rarely reflects on her inconstancy. You are now, what I was at Thrasymene and Cannæ. Scarcely had you reached the military age, when you were entrusted with the supreme command of the army. You commenced your career with confidence, and fortune has never once failed you. You have avenged the death of your father and uncle; you have recovered Spain; you have expelled thence the Carthaginian armies; you were elected consul, when no Roman but yourself had the resolution to defend his country. You have passed into Africa; you have vanquished two armies; in one day you have taken and burnt two camps; you have made Syphax captive, lately a most powerful prince; and

myself, after being in possession of Italy for fifteen years, you have dragged thence, to protect my native land. But I exhort you to remember, that fortune once smiled on me."

OBSERVATIONS.

PERTINERE.

ATTINERE.

It has been already observed, that prepositions very generally in composition transfuse somewhat of their meaning into their compounds. Attending therefore to the significations of *per* and *ad*, we should naturally conclude that *pertinere* denotes a closer, or more intimate, connection than *attinere*. Usage, I believe, justifies this conclusion. *Pertinere* expresses the closest relation, as that of cause to effect, substance to quality, proprietor to property, thus "Ea quæ ad effeminandos animos *pertinent*, important." *Cæs. B. G. cap. 1.* "Which tend to enervate their minds." Here cause and effect are signified. "Expugnatae urbis prædam ad militem; deditæ ad duces *pertinere*." *Tac. Hist. 3. 19.* "Belonged to the generals." "Ad voluptates percipiendas maxime *pertinere*." *Cic. de Fin. 2. 26.* Here also are denoted cause and effect. *Attinere* expresses a looser relation, or a cursory reference. "Sed quid istud ad me *attinet*?" "How does that *touch* or affect me?" *Plaut. Pæn. iii. 3. 24.* "Negotium hoc ad me *attinet* aurarium." *Id. Bacch. ii. 2. 51.* "Touches or concerns me." There seems to exist a similar difference between these verbs, used impersonally. See *Schorus de phras. Lin. Lat.*

PARUM.

PAULLUM.

“A little,” is opposed to “not none,” or “some;” “little” is opposed to “much.” The former is rendered by *paullum*, the latter by *parum*. “A little money,” *Paullum pecuniæ*. “Little money,” *Parum pecuniæ*. “*Paullum hoc negotii mihi obstat.*” *Ter. Heaut.* iii. 1. 92, that is, *Aliquid* or *nonnihil negotii*. “*Satis eloquentiæ, sapientiæ parum.*” *Sall. B. C.* “He had eloquence enough, but little wisdom.”

It is to be observed, however, that *paullum* is often used in the sense of *parum*; but the latter is never employed for the former. “*Paullum sepultæ distat inertiae Celata virtus.*” *Hor. Car.* iv. 9. 29. Here *paullum* denotes “little,” and is used for *parum*.

QUOD.

UT.

These adverbs are abbreviations of one and the same etymon; but they differ widely in their signification. The former denotes the cause, the latter the effect; the former points to the origin of an action, the latter to its end. If we say, “He covets riches, not that in truth he believes them preferable to virtue, but that he may gratify for a little the vicious appetites, by which he is enslaved,” we should render it, “*Divitias appetit, non quod virtute potiores credat, sed ut pravis libidinibus, quibus inservit, parumper indulgere possit.*” In modern Latin, they are frequently confounded, as in the following passages,—

“In tantum desperaverant Romani, *quod* fugere ab urbe volebant, nisi Scipio Africanus, tunc tribunus militum, stricto gladio, ipsos coercuisset.” *Fordun. Scotichron.* xi. 19. Here *quod* is improperly used for *ut*. “Annibal scripsit civitati, *quod* amoveret obsidionem sub hac conditione, *quod* de tribus cognitionibus mitteret sibi tres viros.” *Ib.* Here the first *quod*, with the subjunctive mood, is improperly used for the infinitive, and the second for *ut*.

The rules given for the government of the conjunction *quod* are vague and contradictory. Its construction has baffled the ingenuity and researches of every critic and grammarian. The question is one of extreme difficulty. Mr. Greenlaw has endeavoured to reduce the subject under his general theory; but though several of his remarks are judicious and pertinent, he has not, I conceive, succeeded in his attempt. The difficulty still remains. The following observations are by no means offered, as an evolution of principle, or a solution of the question; but they may, it is hoped, be of some use in guarding the reader against error.

1st. *Quod* introducing a sentence, or a clause, corresponding to our introductory phrase, “as to,” is joined with the indicative. To this rule, we believe, there is no exception, unless when the clause is oblique, or the subject of the leading verb. “*Quod scribis, Apamea præsidium deduci non potuisse.*” *Cic. Ep. Fam.* i. 17. “As to your writing,” “in reference in what you write.” “*Quod suades.*” *Cic. Att.* xi. 16.

“As to your advising.” “Quod me in forum vocas.” *Cic. Att.* xii. 21. “Quod ad me misisti.” *Cic. Ep. Fam.* iv. 11. “As to your having sent.” In the following example, the reader, by referring to the passage, will find the clause to be oblique. “Quod sibi Cæsar denunciaret.” *Cæs. B. G.* i. 36. “As to Cæsar’s threatening.”

2nd. When the conjunctional clause answers to the question “How?” or “In what respect,” in other words, when it expresses the predicate, or limits its extent, *quod* takes the indicative mood. “Facis tu fraterne, quod me hortaris.” *Cic. Ep. ad Q. Frat.* ii. 1. “You act a brotherly part.” “How?” or “In what respect?” “In exhorting me.” “Spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore quod negavit in ea sola positum esse beate vivere.” *Cic. Ac. Quæst.* i. 1. 9. “How did he rob virtue?” “By denying.” “In as much, as he denied.”

3d. *Quod*, when its clause answers to the question who? or what? supplying the place of a nominative to the principal verb, and stating a fact, takes the indicative mood. The phraseology of Cicero and Cæsar, as far as I have observed, accords with this rule. “Parumne est malæ rei, quod amat Demipho?” *Plaut. Merc.* iv. 2. 1. “What is no small evil?” “That Demipho is in love.” “Accedit etiam, quod familiam ducit.” *Cic. Ep. Fam.* vii. 5. “What is added?” “That, as a jurisconsult, he is at the top of his profession.” “Apparet, quod aliud a terra sumsimus, aliud ab humore.” *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* See

Plaut. *Pæn.* i. 3. 144. *Ib.* i. 2. 114. *Cic. Ep. Fam.* xi. 7. 6. 6. and xi. 9. In the following sentence, the conjunctive clause does not express a fact; and therefore the subjunctive mood is used. "Facile est, quod conservam habeant." *Varro R. R.* ii. 10. "It is easy for them to have." It is to be observed, that a few examples occur in opposition to this rule. Tacitus, for instance, says "Augebat iras, quod Judæi non cessissent." *Hist.* v. 10.

4th. When *quod* is used for *quia*, the conjunctive clause answering to the question "Why?" and expressing a fact, as the cause of the thing predicated by the principal verb, it takes the indicative mood. "Hoc magis sum Publio deditus quod me sicut parentem et observat, et diligit." *Cic. Ep. Fam.* v. 8. "Why am I devoted to Publius?" "Because he respects, and loves me." "Quod autem a tuis abes, ideo levius ferendum est, quod eodem tempore a multis ac magnis molestiis abes." *Cic. Ep. Fam.* iv. 3. "Why is that to be borne as a lighter evil?" "Because you are removed from many troubles." "Nos, quod Romæ sumus miserrimum esse duco, non solum quod acerbius est videre, quam audire, sed etiam quod sumus objecti," &c. *Cic. Ep. Fam.* vi. 4. Here we have the first conjunctive clause supplying the place of an accusative before the verb *esse*, as it stood for a nominative, under the third rule, answering to the question what? and the two following conjunctive clauses, expressing the reasons, or causes, answering to the question, "why?" "Consolatione

non utebar, quod . . . audiebam, quam fortiter . . . injuriam ferres." *Cic. Ep. Fam.* vi. 11. The conjunctive clause expresses the reason, why he did not employ the language of consolation. "Vix resisto dolori, quod ea me solatia deficiunt." *Cic. Ep. Fam.* iv. 6. In this way is *quod* generally construed, when it notes the cause of what is predicated by the principal verb.

If the conjunction refer to the secondary verb, the subjunctive mood is used, in order to mark the connection, thus, "Dolore maximo, quo maxime te confici audio, quod Romæ non sis, animum tuum libera." *Cic. Ep. Fam.* vi. 1. Here, *quod non sis* is connected with *dolore*, "grief, that you are not at Rome." If he had said *non es*, the conjunctive clause would have been connected with *libera*; "free your mind from grief, seeing that you are not at Rome."

5th. When the conjunctive clause does not express the cause of the predication, but the object, or subject matter of the predicating verb, *quod* is joined very generally to the subjunctive mood; and in most of such examples the infinitive may be used. "Scio jam, filius quod amet meus." *Plaut. Asin.* i. 1. 39. "What was the object of his knowledge?" That his son was in love. This might be rendered *filium amare*. "Nec credit, quod bruma rosas innoxia servet." *Claud. lib.* iii. Here also the infinitive might be used. "Multo gravius, quod sit destitutus, queritur." *Cæs. B.G. lib.* i. Destitutum esse would express the same conception. "Mitto, quod invidiam, quod

pericula subieris." *Cic. Ep. Fam.* xv. 4. This difference of mood is often necessary, in order to distinguish between the object of the principal verb, and the cause of the predication. Thus, if we say *Credo, quod rem bene intelligit*, or *Credo, quod rem bene intelligat*, to denote "I believe, that he knows the subject well," or "I believe him, because he knows the subject well," we create ambiguity, by giving two meanings to each of these two expressions. But, if we use the former, to denote "I believe him, because he knows the subject well," and the latter, to signify, "I believe, that he knows the subject well," all ambiguity is precluded. But this distinction, though often subservient to perspicuity, is not always observed. Cicero says, "Illud plane moleste tuli, quod certissimum et justissimum triumphum hoc invidorum consilio esse tibi ereptum videbam." *Ep. Fam.* iii. 10. This sentence, construed by itself, might imply that the conjunctive clause assigns the reason, why something previously mentioned (*illud*) gave him uneasiness, and so is this conception generally expressed; but this is not the author's meaning. The conjunctive clause expresses the subject matter of his regret. "What vexed me, was my seeing, that you had lost the honour of a triumph."

When the conjunctive clause expresses the object of some mental emotion, we find the indicative or subjunctive used indiscriminately, where there seems no risk of ambiguity or misconception. "Quod bene vales, gaudeo." *Cic.* "Lætatus sum,

quod mihi liceret." *Cic. Ep. Fam. lib. ii.* "Quod redieris incolumis, gaudeo." *Cic.** "Dolet mihi, quod tu non stomacharis." *Cic. Ep. Brut.* "Miraris, quod non addixerit." *Plin. vii. 10.* "Miramur, quod accessionem fluminum non *sentiant*; æque mirandum est, quod detrimentum exeuntium terra non *sentit*." *Sen. in Nat. Quæst. lib. iii. cap. 4.* In these examples the conjunctive clause does not express the cause of the predication, but its object. "Quod vales, gaudeo" is equivalent to "Te valere gaudeo," or "*Te valere mihi est gaudio.*" "Dolet mihi quod tu non stomacharis" is the same, as "Mihi dolori est, te non stomachari."

As the distinction here remarked is of importance, and may not be obvious to the junior reader, I will illustrate it by an example. "Ego te abfuisse tam-

* The two examples here adduced, "Quod bene vales, gaudeo," and "Quod redieris incolumis, gaudeo," present an insuperable objection to Mr. Greenlaw's theory. If the conjunctive clause be attached to the subject in the former example, and the verb, therefore, according to his rule, be in the indicative mood, it cannot surely be denied, that the conjunctive clause is attached to the subject, in the latter example also. Why then did Cicero write *redieris*, and not *rediisti*? And, if Mr. Greenlaw should contend that the conjunctive clause is attached to the predicate in "Quod redieris incolumis, gaudeo," the same objection occurs. The clause must be attached to the predicate in "Quod bene vales, gaudeo." Why then did not Cicero write, "Quod vales?" In short there is no argument, which will serve to defend the author in the one position, which will not dislodge him from the other. Phraseologies, mutually discordant, cannot be reduced under one and the same rule.

diu a nobis doleo, quod carui fructu jucundissimæ consuetudinis, et lætor, quod absens omnia cum maximæ dignitate es consecutus." *Cic. Ep. Fam. lib. xii.* Here we have a clause expressing the object of his grief, and answering to the question, At what? "Te abfuisse doleo," "I grieve at your absence." Again, we have a clause, signifying the cause, why he grieved for the absence of his friend, answering to the question, Why? "Quod carui fructu," &c. "Because I have been without the benefit of your society." These are distinct conceptions. In the former case, and in similar instances, the conjunction takes the indicative or the subjunctive mood, the infinitive also being elegantly used, and in the latter the indicative only. To these rules I subjoin the following observations.

It is essential to perspicuity, that contingency should be carefully distinguished from certainty, and fact from mere supposition, or an implied negation of the fact. *Non quod*, and *non quo*, "not because," "not that," are therefore generally connected with the subjunctive mood, when it is intended to deny or exclude the cause, expressed by the conjunction and the verb. Thus, "Equidem, cum hæc scribebam, aliquid jam actum putabam; non quod ego certo scirem, sed quod non difficilis erat conjectura." *Cic. Ep. Fam. vi. 4.* Here it is intimated, that Cicero had no certain knowledge of the fact; and that this knowledge, therefore, was not the ground or cause of his belief. This ground he states in the concluding

clause, in which the relative is joined with the indicative mood. Had he said, *non quod sciebam*, it would imply, that he did know the fact. The same observation is applicable to the following sentence : “ Non pol, quo quenquam plus amem, aut plus diligam, eo feci.” *Ter. Eun.* i. 2. 16. Had Thais said, “ quo quenquam plus amo,” she would have admitted the superiority of her affection for another, though she denied that to be the cause, why she had excluded Phædria from her house. This rule, however, though conducive to perspicuity, is not universally observed. “ Non quod sola exornent, sed quod excellant.” *Cic. de Orat.* But, as it serves to distinguish between a fact merely supposed and not existing, from a fact, which does exist, but is not the cause of the action or event, an observance of the rule may, with propriety, be recommended. The distinction in our language is often very properly noted, by *that* and *because*; thus, in the passage, quoted from Cicero, “ Not *that* I knew it for certain, but *because* conjecture was not difficult.”*

In like manner, when the conjunctional clause expresses the reason, why the act or event, predicated

* An ambiguity in the use of the word *because*, after a negative, often occurs in English, the adverb *not* sometimes negating the principal predicate, the cause assigned being admitted as true, and at other times negating the causal clause, while the principal predicate is affirmed. The following example, before quoted, will afford a sufficient illustration of this fact. “ I did not do it, because I loved him more, than you.”

by the principal verb is excluded, *quod* takes the indicative mood; but when the act or event, predicated by the principal verb is not excluded, and merely the conjunctive clause is denied to be its cause, the subjunctive mood is used. An example or two will illustrate this rule. “Neque reprehendo, quod ad voluptatem omnia referantur.” *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* “I do not censure the Epicureans, because they refer, or for their referring, all things to pleasure.” Here he signifies, that this reference is not the ground, or cause, of his censure. But if he had intended to say that “he did not censure them at all, and for this reason, that by their doctrine, all things were referred to pleasure, perspicuity would require *referuntur*.”

“Nihil ex fugitivorum bello, aut suspicione belli, laudis adeptus est, quod neque bellum ejusmodi neque belli periculum fuit.” *Cic. in Verr. ii. 5. 17.* Here the praise is excluded, and the reason is, because there was no war. If Cicero had meant to say, that the absence of war gained him no praise, *fuerit*, instead of *fuit*, would have expressed the meaning. This rule, however, though evidently subservient to perspicuity, is not always observed.

From the numerous examples here quoted, it would seem, that classic writers, where ambiguity was not to be apprehended in their construction of *quod*, were either governed by no general precise rule, or that they often violated it. The few following examples, out of a vast number, which we might

cite, appear to lead to this conclusion. “*Quod non indicasti gratias agit.*” *Cic. Phil.* ii. 14. “*Trebatium quod ad se miserim, gratias agit.*” *Cic. ad Q. Tr.* ii. 15. “*Iis gratiam habeo, quod dixerunt.*” *Cic. de Orat.* iii. 18. “*Numquis, quod bonus vir esset, gratias diis unquam egit?*” *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* iii. 36. “*Non tibi objicio quod spoliasti.*” *Cic. in Ver.* ii. 4. 17. “*Cato objecit, quod duxisset.*” *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.* i. 2. “*Laudantur quod ceperunt.*” *Cic. Phil.* x. 7. “*Laudas, quod sit liberalis.*” *Plin. Ep.* ix. 30. Cicero says, “*Non probabam, quod negabas.*” *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* ii. 16. “*I did not approve your denying.*” “*Utrum reprehendis, quod juvabat?*” *Cic. in Ver.* ii. 1. 47. “*Do you blame him for assisting?*” And in another passage, he says “*Reprehendo, quod non enumeres.*” *Or. pro Planc.* cap. 26. “*I censure you for not enumerating them.*”

The reader must bear in mind, that these rules, as far as they are applicable to *quod* with the indicative mood, yield to the general rule, that in all oblique examples, and expressions of mere contingency, the subjunctive mood must be used.

DEPRECARI.

De, compounded with a verb, sometimes heightens the signification, as *Amare*, “to love;” *Deamare*, “to love exceedingly”; sometimes reverses the signification—as, *Honestare*, “to grace,” *Dehonestare*, “to disgrace.” When the effect of the preposition, in one and the same word, is either augmentative, or

privative, ambiguity must sometimes be necessarily created. This is the case with the verb *Deprecari*, which signifies either “to pray earnestly for,” in order to obtain; or “to pray against,” or “deprecate,” in order to avert; and the verbal noun *Deprecatio* is equivalent either to *Obtestatio*, or *Detestatio*. “Non-dum legati redierunt, quos senatus non ad pacem deprecandam, sed ad bellum denunciandum, miserat.” *Cic. Ep. Fam. lib. xii.* Here it denotes, “to entreat,” or “to pray for,” “Nullum supplicium deprecatus est, neque recusavit.” *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.* Here, on the contrary, it signifies “to deprecate,” in order to avert. In the following passage from Catullus, it has been differently rendered by different interpreters.

“Lesbia mi dicit semper male, nec tacet unquam
De me Lesbia; me dispeream nisi amat.
Quo signo? Quasi non totidem mox deprecet illi
Assidue: verum dispeream nisi amo.”

Cat. Ep. 87.

A. Gellius considers *deprecari* as here equivalent to *detestari*, or *abominari*. Valla rejects this interpretation, and contends, that the verb is here synonymous with *precari*, or *imprecari*. But, though the idea of imprecation be that, which is chiefly here implied by Catullus, yet, as Scaliger observes, the verb *deprecari* is never used for “to imprecate,” simply. It is to be observed also, that, though A. Gellius explains the verb *deprecor*, as here equivalent to *abominor*, it is evident, he perfectly comprehended the full force of the expression; for, he adds, “Catullus,

eadem se facere dicit, quæ Lesbiam, quod et malediceret ei palam, respueretque, et recusaret, detestareturque assidue, et tamen eam penitus deperiret." lib. vi. 16. The meaning intended by the epigrammatist is clearly, that he retorted on Lesbia her own revilings and imprecations; that is, *deprecari a se, et imprecari in ipsam*. (See *Fran. Flor. Sabin. Lect. Subeis*.)

Heusinger and others have observed, that *quod ad me attinet* and *quod ad me pertinet*, are in modern Latin often confounded. The former means simply "as to myself," *de meipso*; the latter denotes some matter of interest or of obligation. See *A. Schor. de Phras. Gasp. Schop. Obs.* and *Dolet. Com.*

EXERCISE.

"All human glories are transitory and uncertain. I, who not long ago pitched my camp between Rome and the Anio, and whom you saw advancing the Carthaginian banners to the very walls of your capital; I, after the death of my brothers, two most renowned generals, alarmed myself for the safety of Carthage, now almost in a state of blockade, came forward to deprecate those very calamities, with which I once threatened Rome. Behold in me a signal example of the vicissitudes of fortune. A single hour may strip you of all your glory. A certain peace is at all times preferable to the hope of victory. If you conquer, it will add but little to your fame; if you are vanquished, the splendour of your past achievements will perish.

"It is not, Scipio, that I despair of the courage of my troops; it is not that I dread the issue of a battle; it is not because I imagine, that fortune has forsaken me, that I thus address you; it is, that a sincere and lasting peace, useful, I believe, to both countries, but especially to my

own, may be established between us. Sicily, Sardinia, Spain, together with the islands between Africa and Italy, I engage, shall be yours. The Carthaginians shall confine themselves within the limits of Africa. These are the conditions.—I own that our insincerity, on some former occasions, may give you reason to suspect the Carthaginian faith; but remember, that the observance of treaties, and the maintenance of peace, depend much on him, who asks them.

“I have been told, that your principal motive for refusing our suit, when we lately requested peace, was the want of dignity in our ambassadors. It is I, Hannibal, who now ask peace; and if it be granted, persuaded as I am, that it will be advantageous to my country, I will inviolably maintain it.”

Scipio answered thus: “I was fully aware, Hannibal, it was the hope of your return, which prompted the Carthaginians to infringe the truce, and to frustrate the hope of peace, when it was well nigh concluded. This you do not deny. But, as it is your study to make your countrymen sensible of their obligation to you, for easing them of a heavy burden, so it should be my care, that they do not profit by their former perfidy. Our forefathers did not carry their arms into Sicily, nor we ours into Spain, for the sake of conquest, but to protect our allies. You yourself confess, that you were the aggressors; and the Gods, by granting victory to those, who had justice on their side in the former war, affirmed the same truth. That they will favour us also in this, and that the Carthaginians will be humbled, I entertain no doubt. As to myself, I am fully sensible of human weakness, and the power of fortune. I am likewise well aware, that all our enterprises are subject to a thousand accidents. But, as I would not have denied your suit, if, before I marched into Africa, you had voluntarily evacuated

Italy ; so now, when I have dragged you after me into your own country for its defence, I can be under no obligation to make any concessions. In a word, if the conditions first stipulated appear too hard, prepare for war, since you cannot endure peace." Thus the conference ended ; and the generals retired, each to his own camp.

OBSERVATIONS.

The genitive is often used with the verb *sum* elliptically, such governing words, as imply duty, property, possession, matter, and various other relations to the subject, being understood. "Hominis (proprium) est errare." *Cic.* "Judicis est (officium) in causis verum sequi." *Cic.* "Me Pompeii totum esse scis." *Cic.* viz. *amicum, fautorem.* "Est multi laboris." *Tac.* "It is a matter of great labour." "Est voluptatis." "It is an affair of pleasure." Here *res* seems understood, which is sometimes expressed, thus "Res cibi." *Phæd.* "An affair of food," implying food itself. "Res voluptatum." *Plaut. Amph.* ii. 2.1.

Manceps properly denotes "one possessing property by his own right," whether by inheritance, or by purchase, and specially by public sale. It came to be extended particularly to those who farmed the public taxes, which were always exposed to public auction. Hence the publicans were termed *mancipes* and their sureties *prædes*. Its meaning came to be still farther extended to denote "a person, who undertook the payment of a debt, due by another," and *præs* the surety for his fulfilling his engagement.

In rationibus referre denotes, according to Le

Clerc, "to state in an account delivered to the treasury;" *in rationes referre*, "to insert in a private account."

Æstimatio, in its general acceptation, denotes "appreciation," or "fixing the value of any commodity, or property whatsoever." It is often, however, used to express not the act of appraising, but "the thing valued, and to be given as an equivalent, or security, until the money price can be paid," or "something given in exchange." "Mihi et res, et conditio placet, sed ita, ut numerato malim quam *æstimatione*," *Cic. Att. xii. 25. i. e.* "by giving in exchange property of the same value." It sometimes denotes "loss by the composition of a debt;" for Julius Cæsar, after the civil war, decreed, that debtors should satisfy their creditors, by giving in payment their possessions, valued at what they were worth, before the war, deducting the interest due to the creditor. Thus a fourth part of the debt was lost; and hence *æstimatio* came to denote a loss by compounding a debt. "Non sis eo consilio, ut cum me hospitio recipias, *æstimationem* te aliquam putes accipere." *Cic. Ep. Fam. ix. 16*, "that you welcome me as a debt, reduced by the new law," or "as one of your compounding debtors."

Expensum ferre was a technical phrase in the Roman language to denote "carrying to the debtor side of any one's account, money lent to him," and hence "to advance," or "to lend money." *Acceptum ferre* was, on the contrary, "to give him credit for

money received." "Satis te elapsurum arbitrabare, si, quibus pecuniam credebas, iis expensum non ferres, cum tot tibi nominibus acceptum Curtii referrent." *Cic. in Verr.* "Did you think, that you would escape all suspicion, if you did not enter as debtors, those, to whom you gave credit, (or to whom you lent money,) when the Curtii entered in their books so many sums, they had received from you."

Beneficium, which properly means "a benefit," or "act of kindness," was specially applied to honorary distinctions, particularly to promotions in the army; and those, who received them, were termed *beneficiarii*. They were obtained through favour with the general, the proconsul, the prætor, or a military tribune, who, on their return from the provinces, had a right to present to the treasury the names of those who had distinguished themselves by their services abroad.

Contubernales were generally young men, who attached themselves to the governor's suite, when he was going to take the command of a province; their object being to acquire some knowledge of civil and military affairs, by his instruction and example.

EXERCISE.

Cicero greets Rufus. I should have used my utmost endeavours to give you a meeting, if you had continued in your resolution of going to the place, you first appointed; and, though you were unwilling to put me, for the sake of your convenience, to any trouble, yet, if you had sent me notice, be assured, that my convenience, compared with

your wish, would have been to me only a secondary consideration. I should be able to send an answer to your letter more in detail, were it not for the absence of my secretary, respecting whom I have clearly ascertained, that as far as the exhibition of the accounts is concerned, (for as to other matters I cannot be positive,) he has not intentionally taken any step, detrimental either to your interest, or your reputation. Moreover, if the old law, and the custom formerly observed, had been still in existence, I should not have laid my accounts before the treasury, without having, agreeably to that friendly connection, which subsists between us, previously examined, and completed, them with you. If the former practice had still obtained, I should have done this in the city; but the Julian law rendering it obligatory to leave a statement of the account in the province, and exhibit an exact copy of it to the treasury, I drew it out in Cilicia. Nor did I adopt this procedure, with the view of controlling your accounts by mine; but made such concessions to you, as I shall have no reason to repent of. The truth is, the accounts with you were made out in my absence; and I took no farther concern in them, than to cast my eye over them. The copy, which I thus received from my secretary, I considered, as coming from your brother's own hand. As to the article you mention, relating to Volusius, it did not belong to the accounts. For I am informed by those, who are conversant in business of this kind, that Volusius cannot stand charged with this sum instead of Valerius; but that the sureties of Valerius are liable to the payment. Nor did that amount, as you state, to 30,000 sesterces, but to 19,000; for money had been secured to us by a bill of Valerius, who had undertaken the payment; and it is only the balance that I have charged.

In answer to your inquiry concerning my honorary list, I must acquaint you, that I have delivered the names of

only my own prefects, and military tribunes, with the names of those who attended me, as proconsular companions. In this matter I was misled by an erroneous opinion; for I had conceived a notion, that no certain time was limited for this purpose. I have since been informed, that it is necessary to present this list, within thirty days after exhibiting the accounts. I am sorry that you had not the benefit of paying this compliment, as I had no ambitious views, in taking it upon myself.

I have nothing farther to observe, except in reference to the 100,000 sesterces. I remember you wrote to me on this subject before, in a letter dated from Myrina, acknowledging it to be an error, not of mine, but of your own. But, if there be any error in the case, it seems rather chargeable on your brother, and my secretary. It is now, however, not possible to be corrected. At the same time, you ought to consider, that I left in the hands of the farmers of the revenue at Ephesus all the money, which legally accrued to me, and that Pompey seized the whole. Whatever effect, favourable or unfavourable, this may have on my spirits, you ought not to be discomposed by the loss of 100,000 sesterces; and should only look upon it, as a dish less at your table, or some deduction from what I should have given you. But, if you had actually advanced 300,000 sesterces to me, out of your own property, you are too courteous, and too affectionate towards me, to require an equivalent in property; for to pay the money, if I wished it, was not in my power. I have no objection to your tearing this letter. Farewell.

OBSERVATIONS.

ÆRARIUM.

FISCUS.

These two words seem to have been used indiscriminately, during the republic. The former

was, under the emperors, appropriated to the public treasury, and the latter to that of the prince. “*Bona Sejani ablata ærario, ut in fiscum cogerentur.*” *Tac. Ann.* vi. 2. “The property of Sejanus was removed from the public treasury into the coffers of the prince.”

FENUS.

USURA.

VERSURA.

From the diversity of opinion among lexicographers and critics, respecting the difference between *fenus* and *usura*, we may naturally conclude, that there is some difficulty in ascertaining the precise distinction. Some have said, that *fenus* refers to the principal only, and excludes *usura*, which denotes “the interest.” This is an error which Pitiscus, Gronovius and other critics have sufficiently exposed. Dumesnil gives the following explanation. “*Fenus* se prend le plus souvent pour le profit, qu’on retire de l’argent prêté; *usura* étoit le dedommagement de la perte, que fait le crancier, pour n’avoir pas l’argent, qu’il avoit prêté; au lieu que *fenus* étoit pour le gain et le profit.” Hill, with more reason, considers the difference to be this. He says, that *usura* had no reference to any rule, or standard, whereas *fenus* always referred to a regulated interest. And, in confirmation of this opinion, he observes, that *usura*, being itself an indefinite term, denoting any rate of interest, is found limited by *centesima*, *centesima quaterna*, and other definitives, whereas *fenus* is not thus modified. If this observation were universally true, it might be deemed sufficient to

establish his distinction. But he admits that *fenus* is sometimes accompanied with a definitive term; and he endeavours, though in my judgment at least, unsuccessfully, to reconcile the examples to his distinction. What is the precise difference between *usura* and *fenus*, seems to me still doubtful. That *usura*, which properly denotes "the act of using," or "the liberty to use," denotes by metonymy "the profit, arising therefrom," is sufficiently evident. Hence, it is specially applied not only to remuneration for the use or loan of money, but also to rent, paid for fields, gardens, &c. In the latter sense *fenus* is, I believe, never employed; *usura*, therefore, implying the return made from any capital, is a more general term, than *fenus*. When they are applied to money transactions, I am inclined to think, that, while *usura* is confined to "interest," *fenus* sometimes includes also the principal, being equivalent in such cases to *sors* and *usura*. In this acceptance it seems to me to be used in the following exercise.

The Romans were in the habit of computing interest by the month. The principal was termed *sors* or *caput*. "Debitor usuram pariter sortemque negabit." *Mart.* The coin denominated *As* being divided into twelve ounces, and the year into twelve months, an ounce *per* month amounted to an *As* for a whole year; and the calculation being always on a hundred, *fenus unciarium*, denoted one *As* for a hundred, or one per cent. interest for a year.

Fenus semiunciarium, denoted half an ounce per month, or half of an *As* per year, or the half of one per cent.

Quadrans,	3 oz.	per month,	or	}	3 per cent.
		3 asses	per year		

Triens,	4 oz.	-	-	-	4 per cent.
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Quincunx,	5 oz.	-	-	-	5 per cent.
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Semis,	6 oz.	-	-	-	6 per cent.
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Bes,	8 oz.	-	-	-	8 per cent.
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Deunx,	11 oz.	-	-	-	11 per cent.
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Centesima,	$\frac{1}{100}$	per month	-	12 per cent.
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Centesima quaterna	-	-	48 per cent.
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Compound interest was termed *usurae usurarum*, or *anatocismus*.

Versura strictly implies interest paid for money borrowed from one person, to discharge a debt due to another. It has been defined *mutatio creditoris*; hence *versuram facere* is used to signify "to contract a debt, or borrow money on interest, in order to cancel another debt." And, as these were cases, in which the borrower would generally find it difficult to procure money, at the usual rate, *versura* came to denote sometimes exorbitant interest. Hence *solvere versuram* meant "to pay more severely," "to aggravate one's difficulties." "*Versuram solves.*" *Ter. Ph.* v. 1. 15., familiarly rendered "you will get from the ashes into the fire," or as an old translator has it, "Tinker like, mending one hole you will make two."

Annona, from *annus*, means "a year's production

of food," but especially of corn. "Provincia, annonæ fecunda." *Tac. Hist.* i. 11. The term is often used, to signify "the price of corn:" "Jam ad denarios quinquaginta in singulos modios annona pervenerat." *Cæs. B. C.* i. 52. The person, whose duty it was, to provide the city with a sufficient supply of corn, was called *Annonæ præfectus*.

Authors, *aureæ ætatis*, used the phrase *præcipitem dare* for "to throw headlong" or metaphorically "to occasion the instant ruin of any one."

"Nam cæteri quidem hercle amici omnes modo
Uno ore auctores fuere, ut præcipitem hunc darent."
Ter. Ph. iv. 3. 20.

The adjective afterwards came to be sometimes employed as an adverb as "Præceps in exsilium acti." *Ammian* xxix. 1. This usage, however, is not to be imitated.

Derivative adverbs, when they govern a case, govern that of the primitive word; thus, "omnium optimus"—"omnium optime." *Cic.* "Naturæ congruens"—"Naturæ congruenter." *Cic.* "Pedem altus"—"Pedem alte." *Col.* The adjective *obvius* governs the dative: *obviam* therefore the same case.

EXERCISE.

During their consulship, a great dearth of corn had well nigh excited a popular insurrection. For several days the clamorous demands of the people in the theatre were numerous, and uttered with a degree of licentiousness towards the emperor, beyond all former example. These agitated him exceedingly, and he censured the magistrates

and the senators, for not having curbed the people by public authority. He stated, in addition to this censure, the quantity of grain, which had been imported by his order ; and also named the provinces, from which he drew supplies, as far exceeding the importation, accomplished by Augustus. A decree of the senate was accordingly settled upon for controlling the people, in all the spirit of the old republic ; nor did the consuls fail to issue their edict with equal energy. Tiberius himself took no part in the business ; his silence, however, did not, as he had trusted it would, gain him any popularity, but was construed into the sullen pride of a tyrant.

In the mean time a host of accusers rushed forward against those, who were in the practice of increasing their wealth, by usurious means. This, it must be admitted, was an evil, which had been of long standing in the city, and had been a very frequent cause of sedition and broils. Laws were therefore enacted, to repress the mischief, while the morals of the people retained their ancient character, and had suffered less corruption. For, in the first ages of the commonwealth, the interest of money was arbitrary, depending on the will and pleasure of the rich ; but by a law of the Twelve Tables, it was reduced to one per cent. Afterwards by a regulation of the tribunes, it was reduced to one half. At last it was finally abolished, and checks were established by numerous decrees of the people, against the frauds of usurers, which, though often repressed, made their appearance again, through the extraordinary artifices practised by these men. But at the time, to which I now allude, that question came before Gracchus the pretor, and he, impelled by the great number of those, who had brought themselves into peril, submitted the case to the consideration of the senate. The fathers were alarmed (for not one of them was guiltless) and asked forgiveness of the empe-

ror. Tiberius complied with their request; and eighteen months were granted, to enable every one to settle his accounts according to law.

This measure occasioned a scarcity of specie, all debts being, at the same time, thrown into a state of disquisition; and in consequence of judgment being signed against such a number of debtors, and their goods sold, the whole of the coin was locked up in the coffers of the prince, or the public treasury.

In order to alleviate this distress, the senate had given orders, that two-thirds of every man's debt should be secured to the creditor on lands in Italy. But the creditors claimed the whole; nor was it an honourable thing for those, on whom these claims were made, to curtail the obligation. The consequences at first were mobbing, and supplications; subsequently the tribunal of the pretor resounded with noise and clamor; and what was sought as a remedy, namely, selling, and buying, was attended with the very opposite effects: for the usurers had hoarded all their money for purchasing lands at a reduced price. The quantity of property sold being followed by a reduction of value, great numbers were ruined, and the destruction of their private fortunes proved a death blow to their dignity, and their reputation. This state of things continued, until Cæsar brought them relief, by opening a fund of a hundred thousand great sesterces, giving them liberty to borrow without interest, for three years, on condition, that the borrower, for the security of the state, should mortgage lands of double the value. Thus was credit restored, and the money, which had lain in private hands, gradually began to be issued in loans, and the order of the senate for the purchase of lands fell into disuse. Like almost all such plans, it commenced in ardor, and the novelty being over, ended in indifference.

OBSERVATIONS.

ORIRI.

NASCI.

Oriri, as a synonyme of *surgere*, has been already explained. Distinguished from *nasci* it has been defined *in lucem prodire*, not essentially implying generation; and *nasci, ex utero procedere—e semine provenire*. The latter always implies literally, or figuratively, a generating cause; the former often denotes a beginning, or origin, where no generation is implied. “*Belgæ ab extremis Galliæ finibus oriuntur.*” *Cæs. B. G. i. 1.* “The country of the Belgians commences from the remotest confines.” Where origination, or beginning merely, is signified, without reference to the cause, they are employed indifferently.

VOCARE.

APPELLARE.

NOMINARE.

These words, though used indiscriminately, as denoting “to name” are thus distinguished. *Vocare* is employed to denote “a call, or summons,” as *vocat senatum*, “he summons the senate,” *vocare ad arma* “to call to arms.” In this sense the two other verbs are never used. *Nominare* is “to express by its proper name,” *proprio nomine nuncupare*, and also “to choose” or “to appoint,” as *nominatus est consul*. In this latter sense, *vocare* is not employed. *Appellare*, while it agrees with *vocare* and *nominare* as signifying “to name,” differs from the former, as never signifying “to summon,” and from the latter, as never denoting “to elect,” and from both, as denoting “to address,” “to appeal to for aid, or

relief." "Quem alium appellem?" *Cic.* "Whom else shall I invoke for aid?"

ÆQUALIS.

PAR.

SIMILIS.

Æqualis est, qui tantundem habet; *similis*, qui alterum refert. *Par* (absolute) *æqualis* and *similis*. But, when preceded or followed by *æqualis*, it signifies "like, and adapted to;" when accompanied with *similis*, it means "equal and adapted to." *Similis* expresses mere resemblance, *æqualis* denotes mutual and absolute equality; *par* mutual congruity, proportionate equality. Two shoes, for example, may be *similes* without being *pares*, and may be also *æquales* without being either *similes* or *pares*; but, if they are *pares*, they must be both *similes* and *æquales*. When mathematical and strict equality is to be expressed, *æqualis* must be used; when this notion is excluded, we sometimes find *par* employed in the sense of *æqualis*, as is the case in the following Exercise.

The verb *adducere*, literally "to lead," is figuratively used for "to induce," or "prevail upon," and is followed by *ut* or *ad*, before the act, corporeal or mental, denoted by the following verb. "Si Cæsar adductus sit, ut præsidia deducat." *Cic. Att. vii. 15.* "If Cæsar should be prevailed upon to withdraw the garrisons." In the following Exercise it is used by Cicero for *adduci ut credat*, and in this sense, is contrary to common usage, followed by *ut*. "Magis adducor, ut credam iræ causam exercitui fuisse." *Liv. iv. 49.* "I am more induced to believe." Maxi-

me autem assequere, quod vis, si me adduxeris, ut existimem, me iudicium bonorum non funditus perdidisse." *Cic. Att. xi. 7.* This is the general phraseology of Cicero, and I believe, universally adopted by other reputable authors. Cicero, agreeably to the usual rule for verbs of believing, joins it sometimes with the infinitive, "Ego non adducor, quenquam bonum ullam salutem putare mihi tanti fuisse." *Cic. Att. xi. 16.* "I do not believe," "I am not persuaded," or "convinced."

When the English infinitive is used in an absolute, or independent, sense, it must be rendered in Latin by *ut*, and the subjunctive mood. "Not to detain you longer, I will conclude." "Ne diutius te morer, finem faciam." "That I may not detain you."

It has been already observed, that, when an adjective refers to two, or more, substantives, it often agrees with the substantive nearest to it. The same observation is applicable to a verb, to which there are two, or more, nominatives.

EXERCISE.

Zeno, in laying the foundation of his doctrine, has entirely lost sight of nature. After having placed man's chief happiness in excellence of mind, that is to say, in virtue, and after telling us, that there is no other good, than moral rectitude, and that there could be no virtue, if in other matters there were any thing, which could make one thing better or worse than another,—after laying down these propositions, he maintained, without exception, their

legitimate consequences. But so false are these consequences, that it is impossible, for the principles on which they are founded, to be true. For, we learn from the professors of the dialectic art, that, if the conclusions are false, the very premises themselves are false. This maxim is not only so consonant with truth, but also so evident, that logicians deem it unnecessary to offer any arguments in its support. "If it be *that*, it is *this* also; but if it be not *this*, it is therefore not *that*." Thus, if the deductions are subverted, the premises are subverted. What then are the conclusions here? That all, with the exception of wise men, are equally wretched—that all wise men are completely happy—that all virtuous actions are equal, and all moral offences alike. These positions, says Cicero, strike us at first, as having somewhat of an air of dignity; but when we come to consider them, we refuse them our assent. For common sense and the nature of things, not to say truth itself, may be said to raise their voice against the persuasion, that there subsists no difference between those things, which Zeno pronounced to be alike. For, if this were true, it would follow, what no wise man would maintain, that the parricide, and the petty thief, are equally criminal. It would follow also, that those, who have made great progress towards perfection in virtue, but without completely attaining it, are consummately wretched; and that there exists not the shadow of difference between their life and that of men of the most reprobate character; so that Plato, one so eminently great, if he was not truly wise, was no better than the most worthless of mankind, nor lived more happily.

OBSERVATIONS.

PRÆBERE.

PRÆSTARE.

It has been already explained, how *præstare* is construed. As a synonyme with *præbere* denoting “to shew,” or “to exhibit,” as *se virum præstare*, or *præbere*, it has been thus distinguished. “*Præbeo patientis*,” says Diomedes, “*præsto facientis*.” This explanation narrows the import of the former verb too much. It implies more than a passive feeling. “Non legatum populi Romani, sed tyrannum præbuit.” *Cic.* Manutius is nearer the truth, who says, “*Præstare* plus est quam *præbere*, cum hoc propensi, animi sit, illud rem ipsam et actionem significet.” The distinction we believe to be, that *præbere* refers chiefly to the disposition of mind, and does not necessarily imply action; and that *præstare* always does. “Reliquum est, ut tibi me in omni re eum præbeam, præstemque,” &c. *Cic. Ep. Fam. iv. 8.* “Multi,” says Le Clerc, “se *præbent*, non *præstant*.”

OBEDIRE.

OBTEMPERARE.

The difference between *obedire* and *parere* has been already explained. *Obedire* and *obtemperare* have been thus distinguished. *Obedire* denotes an unreserved obedience to an express command, or admonition—an obedience to the very letter; *obtemperare*, an obedience to the spirit of the advice, or the order given—a conformity to what may be presumed

to be the will of the person obeyed, though that will be not expressed. "Obtemperamus," says Donatus, "tacitæ voluntati." "Nec vero solum ut obtemperant, obediuntque magistratibus, sed ut eos etiam colant, diligentque." *Cic. de Leg.* "Here," says Hill, "*obtemperare* signifies that obedience which is consistent with the spirit of the law, when all has not been said by the magistrate, that is required; and *obedire*, what is consistent with the letter of the law, which the subject willingly receives, and follows as his guide.

Causari est *tanquam causam affere*—*veram vel falsam causam dicere*. Drakenborch considers it, as always implying falsehood; but in this conception, I apprehend, he errs. Some critics are of opinion that it means also "to blame;" I am inclined, however, to adopt the notion of the eminent writer just mentioned, who maintains, that it never bears this signification, and that the examples, cited in favour of it, may be otherwise interpreted.

Recusare is "to allege a reason against any thing proposed, as either asked or offered," "a reason for declining, or refusing." *Causam afferre, cur aliquid nolis*. *Excusare* implies, that the reason is given by way of apology. It governs the accusative expressing sometimes the apology offered, as "*Iis diversa excusantibus*." *Tac. Ann.* iii. 11. "They offering different excuses;" and sometimes the thing, for which the apology, or excuse, is offered, positively, or negatively; thus, "*Memineris excusare tarditatem literarum*." *Cic. Att.* xv. 26. "To offer an apology

ERRATUM.

Vol. II., p. 469, line 7, for *generally*, read *by prose writers*.

for my tardy correspondence." Here the sense is positive. "Reditum Agrippinae excusavit ob imminentem partum et hiemem." *Tac. Ann.* i. 24. Here the sense is negative. The meaning is not, "He offered as an apology for Agrippina's return," but "for her not having returned."

Gnarus, which is generally used in an active sense, is employed by Tacitus, and by him only as far as I know, in a passive signification, as denoting "known."

In detailing speeches, it is not uncommon for the author to pass from the direct to the oblique mode of expression, and instead of connecting an interrogative with the indicative, or the subjunctive mood, to join it with the infinitive, the clause being under the government of the principal verb. "Tentari profecto patientiam, ut, si jugum acceperint, obnoxios premat." Cui enim non apparere, affectare eum imperium in Latinos? *Liv.* i. 50. i. e. *Nemini enim non apparere.* The words of the speaker would be, *Cui non apparet?* "Hoccine patiendum fuisse, si ad nutum dictatoris non responderet vir consularis?" *Liv.* vi. 17. i. e. "Hoc non patiendum fuisse," or in the words of the speaker, "Hoccine patiendum fuit?"

Cavere is thus construed. When it governs the accusative, it signifies "to beware of," or "to guard against, and also, when it is followed by *a* or *ab*. "Cavere pericula," *A. Gell.* "Cavere vallum." *Cæs.* "Cavere a veneno." *Cic.* When it governs the dative, it denotes "to provide for one's safety," "to take care of one's interest." "Amabo, tu huic caveas."

Plaut. As a technical expression in law, it denotes with the dative "to give security to any one," and with the ablative governed by *a* or *ab*, "to demand, or get, security from any one." "Prædibus et prædiis populo cautum est." *Cic. in Verr.* "Tibi ego, Brute, non solvam, nisi prius a te caverò, amplius eo nomine, cujus petitio sit, petiturum." *Cic. de Clar. Orat.*

CESSARE. ABSTINERE. SUPERSEDERE.

Cessare is "to desist from," or "to discontinue an action." "Non cessavit, quoad omnem stirpem deleret." *Just. xvi. 1.* "Cassander did not desist until he had destroyed the whole race."

Abstinere, sciz. *manum vel sese*, means literally "not to touch," and hence "to refrain from doing." "Cæsar prælio abstinencebat." *Cæs. B. G. i. 22.* "Cæsar abstained from battle." It differs from *cessare* as not, like it, implying the discontinuation of a thing begun, but an abstinence from it entirely.

Supersedere is used in both these senses. 1st. For *cessare*. "Supersede istis verbis." *Plaut. Pæn. i. 3. 5.* "Desist from." "Don't repeat these words." *Desine sic loqui.* "Supersedeo te habere civem." *Val. Max. ii. 6. 6.* "I cease to regard you as a citizen." "I recal the grant of liberty." 2dly. For *abstinere*. "Cæsar prælio supersedere statuit." *Cæs. B. G. ii. 8.* While it is thus far synonymous with these two verbs, it differs from both, as it conveys the accessory idea of inutility, or of im-

propriety. "Supersedeas hoc labore itineris." *Cic. Ep. Fam. iv. 2.* "Spare yourself the fatigue of this journey, as being useless." "Hæc ego scribere publice supersedi; primum, quod memineram pro necessitudine amicitiae nostræ, pro facultate prudentiæ tuæ, et debere te, et posse, perinde meis, ac tuis partibus fungi; deinde, quia verebar ne modum, quem tibi in sermone custodire facile est, tenuisse in epistola non videar." *Plin. Ep. v. 7.* Here Pliny specifies the reasons, why he deemed it unnecessary and inexpedient to write.

Invidere, was construed by Cicero, and other writers of the same period, sometimes with the dative of the person or the thing, as "Quod Hircio invideres." *Cic.* "Nonnulli invident eorum laudi." *Cic.*; sometimes, with the dative of the person, and accusative of the thing, as, "Non inviderunt laudes suas mulieribus viri Romani." *Liv. ii. 40.* "Nobis optimam naturam invidisse videntur." *Cic.*; sometimes with the dative of the person, and ablative of the thing, with the preposition *in*, as, "Ego vero ita fecissem, nisi interdum in hoc Crasso inviderem." *Cic.* Quintilian remarks that Cicero, and ancient writers, construed the verb with the accusative. He means, I presume, the accusative of the thing; for I am inclined to think with Ascensius, that there is no example in Cicero, in which the verb is joined to the accusative of the person. "Pœne jam quicquid loquimur, figura est, ut *huic rei invidere*, non, ut omnes veteres, et Cicero præcipue, *hanc rem.*" *Quint. lib.*

ix. *cap.* 3. It is evident, however, from one of the examples here quoted, that Cicero did not scruple to join it with the dative of the thing, though he seems evidently to have preferred the accusative case.

EXERCISE.

Nero had now resolved, that Seneca should be put to death, and, as poison had not succeeded, he determined to proceed against him by the dagger. Natalis was as yet the only person, who had brought the subject forward, saying, that he himself had been sent on a visit to Seneca, then confined by illness, with instructions to mention in the way of complaint, that Piso had always been refused admittance into his house, and that it would be for the greater benefit of both, to live on terms of mutual friendship. Seneca's answer, he said, was, that conversations together, and frequent conferences, did no good to either party, but that his own life depended on the safety of Piso. This allegation Granius Silvanus, a tribune of the pretorian cohort, receives orders from Nero to report to Seneca, and to ask him, if he acknowledged the words of Natalis, and his own reply. Seneca answered, that Natalis had been sent to him with a complaint, that Piso's visits had not been received, and that he had offered the state of his health, and his love of ease as an apology—that he had no reason to prefer the safety of a private citizen to his own safety—that a disposition to flattery was no part of his character, and that this was a truth better known to no one than to Nero, who had oftener found in Seneca the spirit of a freeman, than the servility of a slave. Silvanus returned to Rome.

When these things were reported by him to Nero, in the presence of Poppæa and Tigellinus, who formed his cabinet

council, whenever he was in a savage humour, the emperor asked, if Seneca was preparing for a voluntary death. "He exhibited," the tribune assured him, "no symptom of fear, nor did his language or his countenance shew any feeling of dejection." "Go back," said Nero, "and tell him, that he must die." The tribune did not return the way he came, but struck off the road, and went to the house of Fennius the prefect. After explaining to him the commands of Cæsar, he asked him, whether he should obey them? "You must," said Fennius, "or you must die." The tribune sent a centurion to Seneca to denounce his death. The philosopher, nowise dismayed, called for his last will. The centurion refusing to let him have it, he turned to his friends, and said, "I call you to witness, since I am not at liberty to requite your services, that I leave you the example of my life, the only and the most precious legacy in my power to give; and if you bear in remembrance the virtues of this character, you will secure to yourselves the fame of a steady friendship." At the same time he repressed their tears, and recalled their fortitude, sometimes by familiar conversation, and at other times in a tone of authority. "Where," said he, "are the precepts of wisdom? Where the arguments of philosophy against impending evils—arguments the subject of our meditation during so many years? To whom is the cruelty of Nero unknown? He murdered his mother, he murdered his brother, what now remains but to add the destruction of his guardian and preceptor?" Then embracing his wife, he besought her to moderate her grief; and, while she contemplated his life spent in virtue, to support her spirits under the loss of her husband, by consolations derived from honourable principles. She, in opposition to his counsel, resolutely told him, that she was determined to die with him; and she called for the hand of the executioner.

Seneca, not inclined to bar her future celebrity, and with affectionate tenderness fearing, lest he should leave a wife, whom he loved with his whole soul, to the injuries of the world, briefly said, "I made you acquainted with the means of alleviating the ills of life; you prefer the glory of death. I will not envy you the example, you will furnish to others. Of firmness of mind, while we meet this violent end, each of us may have an equal share; but the greater renown will be yours." Then with one stroke of the dagger they made an incision into their arms. Seneca, his body being now aged, and emaciated by a low diet, bled very slowly; and in order to hasten his death, he cut asunder the veins, and also the hams of his legs. Worn out with excruciating pains, the philosopher, with the view of preventing the courage of his wife from being overcome by his sufferings, and his own patience from sinking, by beholding her tortures, advised her to retire into another apartment. And now in his last moments while his eloquence continued to flow, he called for his secretaries, and dictated the greatest part of that discourse, which being now published in his own words, I forbear from injuring by giving the substance in any other form.

Nero, who had conceived no enmity against Paullina, and who wished to prevent an aggravation of that odium, which his cruelty had excited, sent orders to have her death staid. The slaves and freedmen, by the direction of the soldiers, bound up her arm, and stopped the blood; but whether they did so, with her knowledge, is uncertain; for as the vulgar are always prone to detraction, there were not wanting persons, who believed, that, while she feared Nero was implacable, she had ambition to share the glory of her husband's fate; but a milder prospect being presented to her, the charms of life overcame her previous resolution. She survived her husband a few years, whose memory she cherished with affectionate regard. In the mean time, Seneca, while the blood still flowed

sluggishly, and the approach of death was tardy, drank some poison, but without effect. At last he was carried into a bath, and there suffocated by the vapour. Thus died Seneca, a philosopher distinguished by many virtues, and also, it is said, by several vices.

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
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